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FOOTPRINTS 
One night a man had a dream.    He dreamed he was walking along the beach with the 
LORD.      Across the sky flashed scenes from his life.      For each scene, he noticed 
two sets of footprints in the sand;    one belonged to him and the other to the LORD. 
When the last scene of his life flashed before him, he looked back at the footprints in the 
sand.    He noticed that many times along the path of life there was only one set of 
footprints.    He also noticed that it happened at the very lowest and saddest times in his 
life. 
This really bothered him and he questioned the LORD about it.     "LORD, you said 
that once I decided to follow you, you'd walk with me all the way.  But I have noticed 
that during the most troublesome times in my life, there is only one set of footprints.  I 
don't understand why when I needed you most you would leave me". 
The LORD replied, "My precious, precious child.   I love you and I would never leave 
you.  During your times of trial and suffering, when you see only one set of footprints, it 
was then that I carried you". 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to investigate, describe, and thus understand, the 
phenomenon of the strategy-creation process, the process, content, and context in senior 
Welsh rugby clubs, 1990 - 2000.  The inspiration for the research arose during a 
monumental decade of transformation to the Game of Rugby Union Football. The 
research questions concern evaluating the clubs’ strategy-creation process, and the 
reactions to the introduction of National Leagues and Professionalism.  
 
The process pursued was centred on a purposive sample of three nonprofit rugby clubs.        
In addition to an in-depth analysis of the general strategy management literature, reviews 
were conducted within the themes of small business, nonprofits and sporting 
organizations.  A lack of prior research in the strategy action-outcomes in the nonprofits, 
sporting sector, particularly the rugby union environment, was a cause for concern. The 
general literature revealed clear differences of opinion between researchers about the 
relationship between organizational strategy, strategy-creation and outcomes. An 
interpretive approach was adopted, employing the validated theoretical framework by 
Bailey et al (2000), to collect, and analyse, ‘insider’ data from different levels of club 
respondents, and also from various club stakeholders. 
 
The content (outcomes) found that rugby clubs employed operational planning regularly 
during the playing season.  Strategic planning had been used, but only on a few necessary 
occasions.  The decision-making processes were found to have strong political and 
enforced choice dimensions, both pre- and post- 1995. The Introduction of 
Professionalism had caused the need for clubs to manage conflicting rugby and business 
objectives, and to re-appraise the influence of culture on decisions. However, it did not 
change the clubs’ long established priority of placing playing performance before 
financial performance. The context of the clubs’ turbulent external environment, coupled 
with the uncertainty and unpredictability of the Game, ensured an annual, seasonal 
struggle for survival for clubs operating in a niche market.  These distinctive operating 
conditions strongly influence a rugby club’s strategy-creation. This thesis concludes by 
considering the theoretical and managerial implications of the findings arising from the 
study of non-profit rugby clubs. 
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Glossary of Terms 
"Behind the many terms are, of course, different purposes.    Definitions are neither true 
nor false, and they are ultimately judged by their usefulness in describing a part of reality 
of interest to us.    Specifically, a definition must be simpler than the reality it seeks to 
describe. "   
(Anheier, 2005, p.39). 
 
Acceptability of 
Strategy 
 
 is  an  evaluation of  the  stakeholders  likely approval of the 
strategic proposal  
(Jeffs, 2008). 
 
Axiology  a philosophical assumption about the role of values 
(Punch, 2009) 
 
Case Study 
 
 a research  strategy that involves the empirical investigation 
of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context using multiple sources of evidence.   
(Saunders et al, 2009) 
 
Community  Communities primarily characterized by geography 
represent people residing within the same geographic 
region but with no reference to the interaction among them. 
Communities primarily identified by regular interaction 
represent a set of  social  relationships  that may or may not 
be place based. Communities characterized primarily by 
identity represent a group who share a sense of belonging, 
generally built upon a shared set of beliefs, values, or 
experiences. In this case, the individuals need not live 
within the same physical locality. 
 
Competitive 
Rivalry 
 are organizations that compete in the same sector (product/ 
 service) and for the same potential customers. 
(Jeffs, 2008). 
 
Co-operative 
Enterprise 
 is owned and democratically controlled by its worker-
owners. This control may be exercised in a number of ways. 
In "pure" forms of worker co-operative, all shares are held 
by the workforce with no outside or consumer owners, and 
each member has one voting share. In practice, control by 
worker-owners may be exercised through individual, 
collective or majority ownership by the workforce, or the 
retention of individual, collective or majority voting rights 
(exercised on a one-member one-vote basis).  
(Wikipedia, 2010)    
 
Co-ompetition  is simply Competition + Co-operation. 
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Criterion 
Sampling 
 
 
 Where cases are selected on the basis of meeting a pre-
determined criterion of importance. 
(Punch, 2009) 
 
Critical Incident 
Technique 
 ‘…..is a qualitative interview procedure, which facilitates 
the investigation of significant occurrences (events, 
incidents, processes or issues) identified by the respondent, 
the way they are managed, and the outcome in terms of 
perceived effects. The objective is to gain an understanding 
of the incident from the perspective of the individual taking 
into account cognitive, affective and behavioural elements’.  
(Chell, 2006). 
 
Deduction  a study in which a conceptual and theoretical structure is 
developed which is then tested by empirical observations; 
thus particular instances are deducted from general 
inferences  
(Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
 
Empiricism  philosophical  term  which  holds  that  the  only  knowledge 
humans  have  can  come  from  our  observations,  and  that 
humans have no innate ideas which are not from experience 
(Lee and Lings, 2008) 
 
Epistemology  a  philosophical  assumption  about  what  constitutes  valid 
knowledge  in  the  context  of  the  relationship  of   the 
researcher to what is being researched  
(Collis and Hussey, 2009) 
 
Feasibility of 
Strategy 
 is  an  assessment  of  the  likely   success  of  the   strategy  
in particular with regards to the availability of resources, 
skills and finance  
(Jeffs, 2008). 
 
Firm  a group of people who form a commercial organization 
selling goods or services 
 
Formal Planning  an  activity  associated  with  a  method  that  is   scheduled,  
orderly,  written,  recorded   and   disseminated.      It   often 
involves  a  prescribed  meeting  with  at  least one company 
employee in attendance  
(Allred et al, 2007) 
 
Homogeneous 
Sampling 
 
 
 cases are all the same; small samples used for detailed 
understanding to emerge from their in-depth study.  
(Punch, 2009). 
 
Idiographic  an approach to social science that emphasizes that   
explanation of human behaviour is possible only through 
gaining access to actors’ subjectivity or culture  
(Gill and Johnson, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
                            xxi 
  
Induction  a study in which theory is developed from the observation 
of empirical reality; thus general inferences are induced 
from particular instances (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
 
Informal 
Planning 
 is not associated with fixed rules and schedules. It is flexible 
and may be conducted anytime, anywhere, inside or outside 
the organisation. The informal plan may be disseminated 
via verbal or written communication  
(Allred et al, 2007) 
 
Interpretivism  is   concerned   with  an   understanding  of  the  way  in  
which   the individual creates, modifies and interprets the 
world  
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979) 
 
Judgment 
Sampling 
 is   a   survey   method, where the   principle of selection   of   
the participants is based on their experience of the 
phenomenon under study. The researcher makes his 
judgment decision prior to the start of the survey  
(Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
 
Methodology  the study of the methods or procedures used in a discipline 
so as to gain warranted knowledge  
(Gill and Johnson, 2010) 
 
Nomothetic  approaches  to   social   science   that   seek   to  construct  a    
deductively  tested  set  of  theories  that explain and predict 
human behavior  
(Gill and Johnson, 2010) 
 
Non-profit  
Organisation 
 (abbreviated  as NPO, and  also   known   as   a   ‘not-for-
profit’ organization) is an organization, e.g. an association, 
charity,  co-operative,  or any  other  voluntary organization, 
that exists solely to provide  programs and services that are 
of self-benefit.  Their startup funding is provided by their 
members,  trustees, or  others who do not expect repayment, 
and  it  does  not  distribute  its  surplus funds  to  owners or 
shareholders, but instead uses them to help pursue its  goals  
(Wikipedia, 2010)  
 
Ontology  a philosophical assumption about the nature of reality  
(Collis and Hussey, 2009) 
 
Operational 
Planning 
 Operational planning refers to the process of engaging in 
detailed planning activities that lead to the development of 
short range goals, action plans and procedures to guide the 
handling of day to day operations. It focuses on tactical 
initiatives, issues and problems in the functional area of the 
business.  It  involved the relative allocation of small 
amounts of resources, was often repetitive in nature and 
covered a short time span i.e. one year or less  
(Robinson et al, 1986, p.7-8) 
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Organization  is a group of people working together to achieve a common 
purpose. Organizations exist to achieve goals that 
individuals can’t achieve on their own   
(Covell et al, 2003). 
   
Paradigm  is a set  of  assumptions  about  the   social   world,   and 
about  what constitutes proper techniques and topics for 
inquiring into the world: a set of basic beliefs, a world-view, 
a view of how science should be done (ontology, 
epistemology, methodology)  
(Punch, 2009) 
 
Phenomenology  a study of how things appear to people – how people 
experience the world  
(Gill and Johnson, 2010) 
 
Philanthropist  is a person who has a desire to improve the material, social, 
and spiritual welfare of humanity, especially through 
charitable activities 
 
Planning  a  long-term plan is aimed at meeting estimated future needs 
a short-term  plan  at  meeting  current  or  immediate needs,  
and a tactical plan at realizing interim objectives that lead 
to the goal(s) of a strategy.  
 
Positivism  held that all genuine knowledge is based on sense 
experience and can be advanced only by means of 
observation and experiment. An acceptance of natural 
science as the paradigm of human knowledge  
(Cohen et al, 2007). 
 
Quantitative Data  data in a numerical form  
(Collis and Hussey, 2009) 
 
Random Sample  a sample that is representative of the population because 
every member has a chance of being selected  
(Collis and Hussey, 2009) 
 
Reliability  the absence of differences in the results if the research were 
repeated  
(Collis and Hussey, 2009) 
 
Small Business 
Owner-
Manager(s) 
 individual(s) who own or part-own a small business, and 
manage it in a personalized way  
(Curran and Blackburn, 2001)  
 
Small Business  there is no established, widely accepted definition, official 
or otherwise, of the small business  
(Curran and Blackburn, 2001).  
For the purpose of this study, ‘small business’ is defined as an 
independent business with fewer than 50 employees and for which the 
owner-manager(s) is/are in charge of organizational decisions 
concerning business’s  activities. 
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 Social Enterprise    There’s no universally accepted definition of social  
enterprise, their key distinguishing features are their  social  
aims and social ownership,  combined with trading 
 viability 
(Smallbone, 2001) 
 
Social Enterprise is a business with primarily social 
objectives and whose surpluses are principally re-invested 
for that purpose in the business or the community, rather 
than being driven by the need to maximize profit for 
shareholders and owners.  
(DTI, 2003). 
 
Sport   is best understood as a socially constructed phenomenon, 
situated within a social context and shaped by social 
processes creating that context and comes to mean different 
things within different settings over time   
(Trenberth, 2003). 
 
Stakeholder  any person, group, or organization that can place a claim on 
an organization’s attention, resources or outputs or is 
affected by that output.  
(Bryson, 2005). 
 
Strategy  is the direction and scope of an organization over the long 
term which achieves advantage in a changing environment 
through its configuration of resources and competences 
with the aim of fulfilling stakeholder expectations  
(Johnson et al, 2008). 
 
Strategic 
Management 
 deals with the major intended and emergent initiatives taken 
by general managers on behalf of owners, involving 
utilization of resources, to enhance the performance of 
firms in their external environments  
(Nag et al’s, 2007) 
 
Strategic 
Planning 
 
 is the devising and formulation of organisational level plans 
which  set  the  broad  and  flexible  objectives,  strategies   
and policies  of  a  business,   driving  the  organisation 
towards  its vision of the future  
(Stonehouse and Pemberton, 2004, p.854). 
 
Strategy Process    a  sequence of  individual and  collective events, actions, and 
  activities unfolding over time in context 
((Pettigrew, 1997, p.338). 
 
Suitability of 
Strategy 
 
        is an evaluation of  the  proposed  strategy  to ensure that key 
  organizational issues have been addressed  
  (Jeffs, 2008).    
 
Theory  a set of interrelated variables, definitions and propositions 
that specifies relationships among the variables  
(Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
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 Thick 
Description 
 the emphasis in qualitative research on capturing and 
conveying the full picture of behaviour being studied – 
holistically, comprehensively and in context  
(Punch, 2009). 
 
Triangulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
using several kinds of methods, data or researchers to study 
a topic; the most common type is data triangulation, where 
a study uses data collected at different times or from 
different sources 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009) 
 
Validity  a complex term with many meanings, both technical and 
general; three important technical means are: the validity of 
a measuring instrument; the validity of a research design; 
the truth status of a research report  
(Punch, 2009). 
 
Voluntary  (also sometimes called a voluntary organization, A 
Association or Union, unincorporated association, or just 
an association) is where two or more persons are bound 
together in a public, formally constituted, and non-
commercial organisation, for one or more common 
purposes by mutual undertakings, each having mutual 
duties and obligations, in an organisation which has rules 
identifying in whom control of the organization and its 
funds are vested, and which can be joined or left at will 
within a particular society."  Examples include leisure 
associations or clubs. 
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 CHAPTER ONE:   THE INCEPTION  
 
“An understanding of strategy process as (rational) 
decision-making is largely inadequate because it does little 
justice to the complicated nature of actually doing strategic 
management”. 
(Sminia, 2009, p.11) 
    
1.1     Overview of this chapter 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to present a rationale for the research subject, 
highlighting the need for the study, before detailing the aim and objectives of the thesis 
and considering the research approach adopted. The chapter is structured along the lines 
of the recognised three dimensions of strategy, the process, content, and context, and 
affords the reader an overview of the thesis by providing a framework of the study’s 
chapters. 
1.2     Rationale for the Study 
This thesis is an investigation into the strategy-making process in small, nonprofit, sport 
organisations.  The key aim of the study is to examine the degree to which contemporary 
hypothetical perspectives and interpretations of strategy-making found in the existing 
literature are applicable within the context of the Welsh rugby industry.  With a long-
standing involvement with both the theory of strategic management and the practicality 
of rugby union football, thus combining the researcher’s work and hobby (Appendix 1.1), 
the motivation to undertake such doctoral research into strategy was provided by a desire 
to understand ‘how’ and ‘why’ Welsh rugby clubs reacted to the major transformations to 
rugby, both globally, with the introduction of professionalism (IoP), and within the 
Principality, the establishing of National Leagues, during the 1990s.  The challenges, and 
difficulties, of embracing theory with practicality is acknowledged by Chia (2004, p33), 
“On the one hand, legitimacy and respectability of management studies as an academic 
discipline is still governed by the ideals of science that defines rigor in terms of a 
surveying consciousness: a spectator theory of knowledge.  On the other hand, as an 
applied discipline, management studies is under pressure to respond to the pragmatic 
concerns of the practitioner world who seek answers in terms of ‘how to’ rather than 
‘what’ and ‘why’.  Therein lies the essential tension”. 
To achieve the key aim of the study, therefore, it was necessary to explore and understand 
the dynamics and complexities within non-profit rugby clubs, in order to acquire 
knowledge about, the decisions made, the actions taken, and the resultant outcomes.  
1 
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1.3     The Research Subject 
Strategies and strategy formation have existed since before the birth of Christ (Bracker 
1981; Cummings 1993) both in the West and in the East.  Some five hundred years B.C. 
a Chinese warrior-philosopher, Sun Tzu, was writing about a ‘strategy’ to achieve 
military objectives (Mintzberg et al, 1998).  The word ‘strategy’ was actually derived 
from the Greek ‘strategos’, or ‘the art of the general’ (Ohmae, 1982).  Such a military 
approach, ‘Where tactics are concerned with the manoeuvres necessary to win battles, 
strategy is concerned with winning the war’ (Grant, 2010, p.14), still exists in the business 
environment in the 21st century.  An alternative view to the military version, that strategy, 
is biologically driven, is offered via Darwin's natural selection theory based on the 
survival of the fittest species and its adaptation to a changing environment (Henderson 
1989).    
Yet, despite its growth within the management field and decades of research on the 
subject, there is no agreed, singular, universal definition of strategy (Markides, 2004) 
mainly because, it is argued, strategy is multi-dimensional and situational (Hart, 1992).  
Research covering ninety-one definitions of strategy formulated since 1962 undertaken  
by Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-Martin (2012, p182),  employing content and co-word 
analysis, identified the terms ‘firm,’ ‘environment,’ ‘actions,’ and ‘resources’ as making 
up the core of the definitions of strategy.  In addition, the focus had shifted over the period 
from achieving the firm’s goals to improving the firm’s performance.  Resulting from the 
research, they proposed a consensual definition about the essence of the strategy concept 
as, 
“the dynamics of the firm’s relation with its environment for which the 
necessary actions are taken to achieve its goals and/or to increase 
performance by means of the rational use of resources”. 
 In this study, strategy is viewed as the decisions and actions taken to achieve a specific 
outcome.  Previously, prominent authors, such as Chaffee (1985),   Pettigrew (1988), 
Mintzberg (1990) and Pettigrew and Whipp (1993), had identified three dimensions 
within strategy-making; the process (generation, evaluation and implementation of 
strategies), the content (the outcomes) and the context (unique environment).  Based on 
the three dimensions, therefore, the grounds for the research was threefold; first, to obtain  
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evidence to understand and describe the process involved in Welsh clubs’ actions, 1990 
– 2000; second, to evaluate the outcomes resulting from the clubs’ decisions and actions, 
and finally, to explore and describe if, how, and why the strategy dimensions were affected 
by the Game’s transition in Wales, that from amateur to professional clubs.   
1.3.1     Research Objectives 
The core aim of this research is to provide an empirical investigation into the strategy-
making process in Welsh rugby clubs during a turbulent decade, 1990-2000, and is 
reinforced through two key objectives: 
 To explore and described the strategy-making process in Welsh rugby clubs 
within the broader NPO and small business sectors within the UK, and to compare, 
contrast and evaluate the amassed empirical evidence with the mainly prescriptive 
literature. 
 
 To identify and understand the influence of a strategic ‘shock event’, the IoP, on 
the decisions and actions taken by clubs, and the resultant outcomes of any 
strategy pursued.  
The study period incorporates the termination of the amateur era, when rugby clubs were  
non-profit making, and the start of the professional era, when many clubs became small  
businesses.   
1.3.2    Research Questions 
The research questions were developed after undertaking a review of existent literature 
on the strategy-making process.  The two main questions explored in this research are as 
follows; 
RQ1.   Was there a presence, or an absence, of a strategy-making process in Welsh  
             rugby clubs during the decade, 1990-2000? 
The first question arose from the questions posed by the research of Kearns and Scarpino 
(1996, p.435) who inspired further research by claiming that, “... a variety of questions 
concerning the context and process of planning in nonprofit organisations remain 
unresolved”. This study builds on the research of Bailey et al (2000, p159), who 
advocated that ‘one area of research may seek to understand the relationship of strategy 
development processes to differing contexts’.  The research was accomplished mainly 
through employing Bailey et al’s (2000) six dimensional instrument (4.5.7.1).  The  
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instrument’s questionnaire was distributed amongst diverse levels of respondents, who 
were within, and outside, the homogeneous rugby clubs. The rich data collected, and 
analysed, justified the employment of this particular framework. 
RQ2.     How did clubs react to the IoP to Welsh Rugby in August 1995, and what   
              were the resultant outcomes?  
            
The recommendations that emerged from the research of Bailey and Johnson (1991, p37) 
formed the basis of the second question.  To develop further knowledge on strategy 
making processes, they encouraged researchers “to examine whether particular strategic 
issues are dealt with in similar or dissimilar manners across organisations….whether 
managers within the same organization agree or disagree on the patterns of processes at 
work within their organization and whether this perception differs across managerial 
groups”. In addition, Pearson and Clair (1998), called for further empirical research 
regarding organizational crises, and so the research examined how clubs reacted to this 
unexpected, critical event by adopting distinctive approaches to ‘crisis’ management to 
achieve individual survival.  Understanding of ‘a particular strategic issue’ (IoP) was 
achieved through using Pettigrew’s (1988) model, in combination with three qualitative 
research approaches, ‘insider accounts’, shock-event planning and the critical incident 
technique, that permitted an in-depth investigation in to the momentous IoP.   
1.4      The Research Process 
This investigation follows two clear pathways in order to fulfil the rationale of the 
research.  First, a review of the secondary literature, abstract and applied theoretical 
works, to ascertain both the conceptual framework concerning the process of strategy- 
making and the historical, and current, contextual setting of the study.  This review of 
literature is comprised of writings in strategy and strategic management coupled with the 
sociology and history of rugby, the memoirs of significant Welsh rugby participants and 
the annals of clubs.  The research commenced with a broad review of the subjects then 
narrowed down to focus on small firms and nonprofit organisations.  In the nonprofit 
sector, Stone et al (1999), noted gaps in major areas such as strategy formulation, content, 
implementation and performance.  In the small firm sector, Curran and Blackburn (2001) 
called for more research into how small firms in particular industries have coped with 
change generally and historically. Therefore both the nonprofit and small business sectors 
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contributed to defining the research objectives.  
Secondly, within the social constructivist ontology, a subjective, interpretive approach, 
rather than an objective, positivist approach, was considered appropriate.  “It is the goal 
of all interpretive traditions to understand these processes of subjective reality 
construction in all walks of social life” (Prasad, 2005, p14).  The investigation adopted 
the stance that knowledge was constructed by those individuals who were part of social 
situations reflecting upon their experiences (Lee and Lings, 2008). In this longitudinal 
study, therefore, an understanding of the strategy-making process in nonprofit rugby 
clubs could be obtained from various individuals within each of the clubs.  The required 
knowledge, the individual’s ‘reality’ of events, was to be found within the minds of rugby 
club ‘insiders’ which included their stated beliefs, intentions, motives, and values.  There 
was solid support for employing, then entering, a case study process with specific research 
questions, ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Yin, 1994) with a planned case study design (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  A comparative case study was adopted, being viewed as the best suited method to 
pursue the research subject, the strategy-making process, within the context of the Welsh 
rugby industry. 
1.5     The Research Content (Outcomes). 
Strategy content is defined as ‘the output of the strategy process-the intended or realized 
course of action selected to achieve long-term objectives’ (De Wit and Meyer, 2004, 
p212).  The longitudinal exploratory study looked to obtain an in-depth understanding on 
if/how clubs ‘created strategy’ for managing expected, and unexpected, events whilst 
achieving their performance goals during the ten years from August 1990, to May 2000, 
a time-frame that embraced a very significant period in Welsh Rugby history when key 
‘turning points’ took place. Hence the importance of documenting, evaluating and 
understanding the impact of the unique major events that occurred, and the strategic 
responses (*outcomes) of clubs operating within that environment.  In order to 
accomplish the aim of the study, and therefore to produce an outcome, two main research 
questions (2.14) are established to direct the selection of research methodology for data 
collection and data analysis.  
*Clubs had measured outcomes (‘successes) by their performance on the field in the domestic league and 
cup competition (Szymanski, 2003). 
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1.6     The Research Context 
The research intends to explore, and understand, if the strategy-making process is to be 
found in a sport context, because it has been established that strategies can be developed 
to suit varying organisational and environmental contexts (Johnson et al, 2008).  Sport 
has now emerged as an industrial sector in its own right, “with a number of studies and 
estimates that it makes a major contribution to economic and commercial activity both 
within and across national boundaries.  At the same time, sport continues to have a 
profound influence on the social, cultural, health and psychological spheres of human 
existence” (Chadwick, 2009, p202).  However, the researcher is aware that the audience 
for this study, academics and rugby practitioners, do not necessarily all have the same 
awareness, knowledge and command of the contextual background (Brewer, 2007).   
 The context for the research was the environment encompassing the national game of 
Wales, Rugby Union Football, chosen for study during a decade when three major, novel 
events took place; the formation of the first National League in the Principality (1990), 
the IoP globally (1995), and the organisation of a club cup competition in Europe (1996). 
These events were instigated by the centralised governing body of international rugby, 
the International Rugby Board (IRB), and the national rugby unions, including the Welsh 
Rugby Union (WRU) (Smith and Williams, 1999).   
The change to the playing structure in 1990, with the formation of the National League, 
brought a meritocracy to all Welsh clubs for the first time.  The study intends not only to 
describe but to present, via club respondents, a ‘coalface’ insight into the decisions and 
actions taken by senior first class clubs in coping with the unprecedented demands of 
being in a League structure, faced with relegation threats and promotion opportunities.  
Within that National League, prior to 1995, the Game of Rugby Union Football operated 
on an amateur basis, with participants not permitted to receive payment for being 
involved, so rugby clubs displayed not-for-profit characteristics (Table 2.12). However, 
shamateurism’ (illegal monetary payments) did prevail within the sport, particularly in 
Wales where clubs sought, and paid for, success (Williams, 1991).  The study describes 
and examines the impact of the transformation in 1995, from the context of being an 
‘amateur’ game to that of a professional sport, on Welsh clubs, including the emergence 
of small business traits exhibited by rugby clubs post 1995 (2.14).    
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1.7      Contribution and Justification 
The lack of empirical research into strategy-making in nonprofit, small sporting 
organizations in Wales, which are socially and economically significant, is noticeable 
when compared with the large amount of literature about strategy-making in large, for-
profit business organizations in the United Kingdom.  The research findings, therefore, 
contribute to the body of academic literature on strategic management, strategy – making 
in both the not-for-profit and small business context, and the study broadens knowledge 
on the management of sports organisations, including ‘crisis’ decision-making. The 
principal contributions are explained below. 
1.7.1      Fills a research gap in strategy-making in nonprofit organizations in general,     
             and in sport clubs in particular. 
 
Recently, Ghobadian and O’Regan (2011, p.423) asserted that ‘there are very few cases 
that examine strategy, strategic decisions, and strategic management in not-for-profit 
organisations’.  This study adds, via Research Question 1, to the understanding and 
knowledge of strategy-making in NPOs, by shedding light on a group of sport NPOs in a 
new and interesting way.  It supplements, and advances, academic knowledge on strategy 
theory in a previously little researched context, nonprofit Welsh rugby clubs, and offers 
additional evidence, and insight, to the on-going strategy – performance debate.  
1.7.2     Makes a contribution to knowledge, and understanding of the strategy   
             development process, and decision-making, made prior to, during, and  
             following, a crisis in a NPO. 
 
The knowledge and theoretical insight acquired via the important ‘coal face’ accounts of 
the strategy development process, and decision-making, during an industry ‘crisis’, 
(Research Question 2), adds to, and provides a fresh understanding of, crisis management 
in NPOs.  In addition, by focusing on the interactions between actors and context, strategy 
as practice, the ‘micro’ study contributes to the understanding of individuals decision-
making, and actions, during the performance of strategic work in a unique NPO context. 
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1.7.3       Contributes through findings that situate historically the clubs’ actions and   
               outcomes during a turbulent period, and key ‘turning points’, for the Welsh   
               rugby industry. 
The research time-frame embraces a very significant, unique period in Welsh rugby 
history, the proclaimed ‘national’ game of Wales. The introduction of the first National 
League, followed by the unprecedented transition of the Game’s core value, from that of 
amateur to being ‘open’, professional, can never happen again; hence the importance of 
evaluating, and documenting, the reactions to, and the impact of, both key events. 
This original research generates new knowledge, and understanding, of the strategy-
making process in a unique sport context. 
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1.8       Overview of the Thesis.  
The thesis is divided into nine chapters, and Table 1.1 presents the structure of the thesis.  
This chapter introduced the thesis.   
Table 1.1.   Structure of the Strategy-Creation Process Thesis 
 
The Three 
Dimensional 
View of Strategy 
  
Chapter Contents 
 
  
Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROCESS 
  
Chapter 1- Introduces the research 
context, process and content, and the 
research questions to be investigated. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 - The review of literature 
concerning the concept of strategy-
making process, the dimensions, levels, 
components, in SMEs & NPOs 
 
Chapter 4 – Explains and espouses the           
research strategy and methodology 
adopted        for data collection and 
analysis within the study. 
 
  
Initial organizing 
framework  
depicting strategy 
components and 
influencing factors 
Establish relevant 
gaps in the literature. 
 
 
 
To verify a 
framework evaluating 
the degree of strategy-
making in NPOs. 
To determine the 
components of any 
process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENT 
  
Chapters 5, 6 & 7 – In order to answer 
the research questions, these chapters 
detail the findings from the cross-
sectional case studies stage via cross-case 
comparative analysis. 
 
Chapter 8 – Incorporates the key findings 
from the three case studies and examines 
them in connection with the existing 
literature/ theories and concepts; proposes 
the theoretical and practical implications 
of findings, the contributions, limitations 
and future research. 
 
  
To examine the clubs’ 
actions and outcomes 
 
 
 
Compare theory with 
findings 
 
Implications for 
theory, clubs, and the 
governing body 
(WRU). 
 
 
CONTEXT 
 
  
Chapter 3 – The background to the 
context, rugby clubs, of the subject being 
investigated. Outlines the environment of 
the decade being researched.  It introduces 
the three rugby clubs, and the 
respondents, who assisted with the study. 
 
  
Presents a foundation 
to the context of the 
research. 
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1.9    Summary 
The purpose, and contribution, of this introductory chapter was twofold.  Firstly, the 
chapter aimed to offer a rationale for the topic of study; this was accomplished by 
describing the research problem and emphasizing the requirement for the research.  The 
aim and objectives of the thesis were specified and the adopted research approach was 
considered.  The second objective of this chapter was to provide the reader with an outline 
of the thesis by providing a summary of each chapter’s contents.   
In consideration of the broad readership, Sutton (2004) had cautioned as to academic 
debate focusing on issues that “are of no practical value to anyone” (p.29), and the use 
of academic jargon, “so much of it is incomprehensible to anyone but a fellow overtrained 
academic” (p.28).  The researcher is not only an academic but has also experienced being 
a management practitioner in the world of rugby. Therefore the research is communicated 
in plain language within the thesis in an attempt to make the text plausible not only to 
other academics, but also accessible to the management practitioner, the lay rugby reader, 
and other interested parties.   
In addition, supplementary information, necessary for the diverse readership to 
understand the strategy content and the rugby context, is included in the appendix.  To 
offer a fuller appreciation of the subject that is at the heart of the research, strategy-
making, the following chapter reviews the literature on strategy. 
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“Strategy-making does not always involve the necessary        
 formulation of goals, mental maps or plans...For the most 
part strategy-making on an everyday basis takes place 
unreflectively, on-the-spot and in the twinkle-of-an-eye” 
(Chia and McKay, 2007, p238)       
 
2.1     Setting the Scene   
The aim of this chapter is to examine the existing literature related to the strategy-making 
process which is incorporated in the objective of the research.   The review of literature 
underpins the presentation and analysis of the empirical case studies, presented in 
Chapters, 5, 6, and 7, and provides the foundation for the discussion, and conclusions, in 
Chapter 8.  With the potential diverse readership of this thesis, from academics on the one 
side to rugby personnel on the other side, and the large volume of literature concerned 
with the phenomenon of strategy-making over the past fifty years, containing a 
bewildering array of conceptual models, dimensions and typologies (Hart, 1992), this 
chapter considers a number of basic issues concerned with strategy-making.  Therefore, 
a brief resume is presented at the start of this chapter covering strategy and strategic 
management (SM), in order to accommodate those who have little or no knowledge of 
either subject.  The difficulty of a lack of consensus in developing a singular definition 
of the term strategy will be a common thread throughout this chapter.  
Various dimensions and levels of strategy were considered as was the development of the 
various ‘strategy’ schools since the 1960s. The three dimensions of strategy-making that 
have been identified  by  some  prominent  authors,  Chaffee (1985),   Pettigrew (1988), 
Mintzberg (1990) and Pettigrew and Whipp (1993); the process (generation, evaluation 
and implementation of strategies), the content  (the outcomes), and the context (unique 
environment), were evaluated within sections in that order. The Strategy Process 
examines the evolution of strategy, its dimensions and levels, and the two major 
approaches, prescriptive and emergent, to strategy-making.  This is followed by a review 
of some of the main strategic typologies that have been developed over the past two 
decades, in particular the chosen framework of Bailey et al (2000).  The conditions under 
which decision-making takes place is also evaluated.  Next the Contents section appraises 
the performance and outcomes arising as a result of strategy implementation, and finally, 
the Context section, strategy was considered within small businesses and nonprofit 
organisations, and that completes this chapter. 
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2.2     Defining Strategy 
Like many concepts in the area of management, there is no universal, singular definition 
of strategy or SM (O’Regan and Ghobadian, 2007; Chaharbaghi and Willis, 1998), 
(Appendix 2.1).  One of the difficulties with this concept is that “Strategy has become a 
catchball term used to mean whatever one wants it to mean” (Hambrick and Frederickson, 
2005, p.52).  Their approach to strategy can be found in Figure 2.1. 
                     Figure 2.1         Putting Strategy in its Place 
                                                                    (Hambrick and Frederickson, 2006). 
  
 
 
    
Strategic Analysis 
 
 Industry Analysis 
 Customer/marketplace 
trends 
 Environmental forecast 
 Competitors analysis 
 Assessment of internal  
Strengths, weaknesses 
Resources. 
 
  
     
 
  
     
             
 
 
  
Supporting 
Organisational 
Arrangements 
 
Mission 
 
 fundamental 
purpose 
 values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objectives 
 specific 
          targets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 structure             
rewards 
 process              
people 
 symbols            
activities 
 functional 
policies 
and profiles 
 
 
 
 
By returning to the origin of strategy proposed by Sun Tzu (500BC), a strategy within 
this study is considered to be ‘a course of action on how to achieve a specific goal.’   This 
basic ‘definition’ of strategy surfaced in the business environment of the 1960s, where 
the development of plans or programs for achieving long-term goals were seen as 
fundamental elements in the strategy concept (Andrews 1971,  Learned et al, 1965). Since 
that period, strategy has emerged as the central concept within SM. 
 
 Strategy 
The central 
integrated 
externally 
oriented 
concept of  how 
  we will achieve 
   our objectives  
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2.3     Strategy Dimensions and Strategic Levels 
Several notable authors, Chaffee (1985), Pettigrew (1988), Mintzberg (1990) and 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1993), identified and distinguished between the three dimensions 
of strategic management. The Process concentrated on the method of strategy formation, 
how organisations generate, evaluate, and implement their strategies over time, and was 
the link between content and context (i.e. “how” the main actions interact together 
through a series of steps prior to it arriving at a strategy); next, the Content was the 
“what”, not the “how”, that included the main decisions, actions and the output of the 
intended or realized strategy chosen to achieve a firm’s long-term objectives (Pettigrew 
and Whipp, 1993).  Finally, the Context was the ‘unique’ environment within which the 
organisation’s strategy developed and operated (the “who, when, where and why”). 
Strategy-making involved consideration of all three dimensions, both separately and 
together (Pettigrew, 1987).  However, the fact that researchers had suggested there being 
several dimensions (Appendix 2.2) was one reason why so many frameworks existed for 
strategy-making (Feurer and Chaharbaghi, 1995).  
It was also generally accepted that strategies existed at a number of levels in an 
organisation (Hax, 1990: Bowman, 1990; Johnson et al, 2008).  The idea of levels in a 
firm was first proposed by Ansoff (1988) who wrote about strategic decisions, 
administrative decisions, and then operating decisions.  It was considered that there were 
three main levels of strategy – corporate, for the company as a whole, which could adopt 
growth, stability, retrenchment or combination strategies; business level strategies of cost 
leadership, differentiation or focus aimed to gain a competitive advantage, by 
outperforming competitors for the primary performance goal, for each separate business 
that was under the company’s umbrella (Porter, 1980), and functional, for each specific 
function within a business (Grant, 2010).  Even  though  the  levels  of strategy were  
distinct,  they  were inter-related, fitting together to form a coherent and consistent whole 
for any  particular  organisation, if that  organisation  was  to  be  successful  over  the  
long  run (Hofer and Schendel, 1978).  Therefore, corporate strategy constrained business 
strategy, which in turn constrained functional area strategy.  In reality, however, it was 
difficult to isolate the three levels due to their strong interdependence and the lack of clear 
borderlines between them (De Wit & Meyer, 2004).     
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2.4     Strategy Management Evolution.  
“The history of strategic management is a story of promiscuous borrowing from other 
disciplines and sub-fields of management” (Pettigrew et al, 2006, p6).  The emergence of 
strategy in the business environment occurred during the early 1960s. It was 
acknowledged by many writers (Bowman, 1990; Schendel, 1992) that the three key 
figures concerned with developing the concept of strategy in terms of concepts, 
definitions and methodologies were Alfred D. Chandler, Kenneth R. Andrews and H. Igor 
Ansoff.  There were apparent differences between the three authors over whether strategy 
was a broad or narrow concept.  Since then, there have been many approaches that 
categorised SM into schools or typologies, in terms of processes and outcomes (Appendix 
2.3). In order to comprehend the evolution of SM, McKiernan’s (1996) excellent 
historical review, divided the various approaches into four main branches: the planning 
and practice school, the learning school, the positioning school and the resource base 
school.  
2.4.1     The Planning and Practice School 
The dominant view during the 1960s and early 1970s was the idea that strategy could be 
planned.  The Planning school viewed strategy as a rational process that could be 
formulated in a deliberate manner through systematic long term planning.  By integrating 
the organisation, resources and its environment in a rational and deliberate manner, 
strategies could   be   formulated,   and   then   implemented   thus   achieving organisation 
objectives.  Planning encouraged analysis and thinking about complex problems facing 
the organisation.  It was considered useful in encouraging a long-term view of strategy 
within the organisation and, by involving staff, helped create ownership. Managerial tasks 
such as control, communication, and co-ordination were enhanced by the planning 
process.  In a review of the literature of planning practices of small firms, Bracker and 
Pearson (1986) identified eight components, which were subsequently adopted by 
nonprofit (Bryson, 2005) and sporting organisations (Hoyle et al, 2009). The eight 
components were, 
Objective setting       Environmental analysis (PEST) 
SWOT analysis    Strategy formulation  
Financial projections    Functional budgets  
Operating performance measures                 Control and corrective procedures. 
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Based on these eight components, Bracker and Pearson (1986) identified four distinct 
levels of sophistication in the SP process; unstructured plans, intuitive operational plans 
and structured strategic plans (Appendix 2.4).  From their study they concluded that the 
process, not the plan itself, was a key component in performance.   Critics of the Planning 
School, particularly Mintzberg (1994), argued that strategies were implemented through 
people, not inflexible plans.  He challenged the view that plans were owned by staff, 
individual contributions being seen as merely an intellectual exercise and not viewed as 
part of a bigger picture.  In addition, Mintzberg and Waters (1985) claimed that the 
intended strategy did not necessarily result from ‘the plan’; rather, an unintended strategy 
might have emerged. Nevertheless, Rue and Ibrahim (1998, p.24) maintained ‘the 
literature strongly supports the argument that, in small business, planning is key’.   
2.4.2     The Learning School 
It became clear during the 1970s’ that not all intended strategies were realised and that 
other strategies emerged informally.  The traditional view that the Planning School was 
the only approach to strategy development was now strongly challenged (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985).  There were five views of the Learning School.  The Natural Selection 
View  (McKelvey  and  Aldrich,1983);  the  Incremental  View  (Lindblom, 1959,  Quinn, 
1980);  the Cultural View (Schein,2004);  the  Political  View  (Pettigrew, 1977)  and the 
Visionary View (Hurst et al, 1989).  The five views of the Learning school, along with 
the Planning school, became incorporated in the Six Dimensions framework of Bailey et 
al (2000).  The emergent process critics saw it as an organisation ‘muddling through’, 
with strategy being formulated as a compromise to cultural and internal political pressures 
(Ansoff, 1991).    
2.4.3     The Positioning School 
During the 1980s within this School, the firm was removed as the focal point of analysis 
and replaced by the industry within which it operated and the central focus was upon the 
link between strategy and the external environment (so-called ‘outside-in’ approach by 
De Wit and Meyer, 2004).  The premises of the Positioning School, in the context of a 
competitive environment, were that strategies were generic and based on analytical 
calculations (Porter, 1979).  Porter’s (2004) assessment of each industry by his ‘Five  
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Forces’ model enabled a firm to identify the forces which affected the level of competition  
within its industry and thus position itself where it could either influence, or defend, 
against these forces.  The contending forces were the threat of new entrants, the threat of 
substitute products/services, the bargaining power of customers, the bargaining power of 
suppliers and finally the Industry itself.  Criticisms of the positioning school concerned 
the belief that industries structures are ambiguous and difficult to define, the static nature 
of ‘positioning’, and that competition drives rather than destroys value (Jarzabkowski and 
Wilson, 2006). 
2.4.4     The Resource Based School 
In the early 1990s, the firm was once again placed at the centre of analysis for SM 
thinking through the writings of Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Barney (1991) and Grant 
(1991).   The premise of this approach, that each organisations’ performance differs 
because of a unique cluster of resources and capabilities, ‘was probably incapable of 
falsification’ (Lockett et al, 2009, p10). The ‘inside-out’ approach regarded core 
resources as the key to competitive advantage by providing flows of ‘rents’ not available 
to other firms.  Core competencies were regarded as the organisation’s ‘collective 
learning’ that did not diminish with use, provided potential access to a wide variety of 
markets, made a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end 
product and should be difficult for competitors to imitate (Barney, 1991).  Therefore, it 
was reasoned that firms, in the short run, could sustain profitability by building their 
strategies by ensuring that their resources have at least one of the following four 
characteristics, physical uniqueness, durability, appropriability, or substitutability (Collis 
and Montgomery, 1995).  In formulating strategy, Grant (1991) advocated that each 
firm’s unique characteristics, in the shape of its tangible resources, assets such as finance, 
equipment, patents and brand name, and its intangible capabilities, such as leadership, 
managerial skills, teamwork and culture, offering a source of competitive advantage, 
should be exploited to maximum effect (Appendix 2.5). Individuals with experience, skill 
and capabilities, particularly managers, were considered as rare resources for an 
organisation (Lockett et al, 2009).  Therefore, in the rugby industry, the most strategically 
important resource was considered to be the tangible human resource, the players, and 
coaches, who brought with them their intangible, unique individual capabilities and skills.   
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The  Resource  Based  view (RBV),  as  an  alternative  theory  of  strategy,  was  not  
without its critics. They highlighted the difficulties in establishing ‘what makes a resource 
unique or valuable’ and argued that competitive advantage was gained from a collection 
of all sources, not just resources. It was contended by Porter (1991, p.108) that, 
“Resources were only meaningful in the context of performing certain 
activities to achieve certain competitive advantages”. 
Other researchers warned of core competences becoming, in practice, a ‘feel good’ 
exercise that no one fails (Collis and Montgomery (1995), and voiced concerns over the 
difficulty of identifying explicitly what were the organisation’s core competences actually 
were (Johnson et al, 2008).   If the competences were ‘taken for granted’ then they could 
become rigidities preventing organisational change.  In addition, adopting the RBV could 
affect the ability of the organisation to create its own future.  A conclusion offered by 
Connor (2002, p.313) was that ‘the RBV literature seems to raise more questions about 
competitiveness and strategic success than it answers’. 
2.4.5     View of the Schools*  
With regard to the four schools contained in his historical review, it was maintained by 
McKiernan (1996 p.xv) that they 
“...should not be seen as mutually exclusive avenues down which to 
travel.   A better analogy was to see them as strands interwoven to form 
a strong rope”. 
Having critically reviewed each one of the schools, the conclusion reached was that, 
individually, they simply presented another point of view by means of which managers 
could obtain an appreciation of the strategic condition of their organisation (Stonehouse 
and Pemberton, 2002). Following research on the history of strategy, the next step was to 
examine the existent literature on the research topic, the strategy-making process. 
2.5     The Strategy Process 
The origin of strategy offered two routes, military (Bracker, 1981; Cummings, 1993) and 
biological (Henderson, 1989). In the same vein, the approaches to strategy-making  
* More recently, the latter two schools were joined with the high velocity school and the complex 
ecosystem school of strategy, and were examined in an attempt to answer growing criticisms that strategy 
knowledge was not actionable in practice (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2006).    
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offered two different processes – the prescriptive approach, (formulation) likened to the 
military origin because of a strategy’s desire to achieve a stated objective, and the 
emergent or biological  approach (formation), where survival by the organisation was  
achieved through continually adapting to an ever-changing environment (Sminia, 2009).  
Some organisations, usually large ones, needed to plan for change over a long period of 
time, whereas other organisations, usually small, were unable to plan ahead for more than  
a few months because of operating in a turbulent environment and thus needed to be 
reactive and flexible with planning (Risseeuw and Masurel, 1994).  The small rugby club, 
operated in a seasonal niche market, restricted by the laws and regulations put down by a 
governing body, plus other factors, indicated the need for caution in managing the strategy 
of such an organisation (Bowman, 1990).  A precautionary note, offered by Whitehill 
(1996, p.250), suggested that ‘there was no single right answer in strategic management’.  
2.5.1     The Prescriptive Approach (Formulation) 
The prescriptive approach involved a structured SP system that involved analysis, choice 
and implementation (Appendix 2.6).  The foundation stones were the mission, the purpose 
of the organisation; the vision of the future state of the organisation; the goal(s) which 
were general aims tied to the mission and an objective, which was a precise aim in line 
with a goal (Johnson et al, 2008).  Once agreed, the starting point was the setting of 
objectives, then an analysis of the internal (SWOT) and external (PEST) environment of 
the organisation.  This was followed by generating strategic alternatives (growth, stability 
or retrenchment) and selection (via a feasibility, suitability acceptability evaluation), then 
implementing the optimum option. Strategy formulation, therefore, was a consequence of 
the process that arose from the analysis, and resulted in a formal plan (Ansoff, 1988).  The 
major advantage of the prescriptive process was that it gave a complete overview of an 
organisation.  By defining its objectives, an organisation was able to analyse the demands 
on the resources required to meet its stated goals, and was able to monitor and compare 
its progress towards reaching its objective at each stage.  Supporters concluded that the 
rational deduction process saved valuable time through the generation of strategic 
alternatives, reducing strategic errors and costs by removing improbable options from its 
strategic choices. (Ansoff 1991).    
One of the major critics of the prescriptive approach, Mintzberg (1990), challenged the  
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assumptions on which the prescriptive process was based. He argued that the environment 
was too volatile to predict the long-term future direction of an organisation, that the 
cultural and political aspects of an organisation could have affected the selection of the 
optimum strategy for the CEO/leader, and that this approach could contribute to a false 
sense of control and perhaps, an inability to learn from past strategic missteps.  Mintzberg 
(1994, p.110) also contended that formal planning assumed that “the world was supposed  
to hold still while a plan was being developed and then stay on course while that plan 
was being implemented”.     
2.5.2     The Emergent Approach (Formation) 
The emergent approach did not involve a structured SP system but strategies emerged 
during a process of crafting and testing (Lindblom, 1959; Quinn, 1980; Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985). There was no clear final objective and, whilst analysis of the internal and 
external environment might take place, there was no distinction between strategic choice 
and implementation.  Strategies could have formed without being formulated, although 
strategies did not have to be purely emergent; so the term strategy formation was preferred 
over strategy formulation (Mintzberg, 1994). Emergent strategies came about, were 
‘realised’, “including bottom-up initiatives, rapid responses to unanticipated 
opportunities or threats, and sheer chance” (Johnson et al, 2008, p.15). Therefore, 
strategic decision-making, which was more of a bottom-up’ rather than a ‘top down’ 
activity, was greatly affected by unanticipated key incidents (Quinn, 1980).  So, unlike 
the rigid prescriptive process, the emergent approach offered the advantage of flexibility 
to an organisation to respond swiftly, by adapting and ‘change course’, to a changing 
environment. The strategy formation process reflected experimentation, learning, 
investigation, and intuition, and included the impact of an organisation’s culture and 
politics, in addition to people issues, in this course of action.  Champions of the emergent 
process advocated that it accorded with real life in many organisations (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985).   
Nevertheless, and in spite of that view, critics of the emergent process saw it as an 
organisation ‘muddling through’, with strategy being formulated as a compromise to 
cultural and internal political pressures (Ansoff, 1991), which could lead to reactive, 
overly ad-hoc and non-purposeful strategies (Titus et al, 2011).   
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2.5.3     Formulation or Formation? 
The formulation phase of the strategy process, emanated from a rational analysis of the 
organisation and its environment, and the resultant plans for the future were depicted as 
intended strategy.  With regard to emergent strategy, the term formulation had to be 
substituted by formation because here strategies could have formed without any rational 
analysis (Figure 2.2).  
                      Figure 2.2    Deliberate and Emergent Strategies  
                                                                                 (Mintzberg, 1987) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
2.5.4     A Dual Approach 
It was suggested, (for such a long-running debate) that there was still no ‘silver bullet’ 
for a firm who tried to resolve SM problems (Meers and Robertson, 2007).  It was the 
adoption of a mixed, rather than an individual, approach that was neither prescriptive nor 
emergent but instead, as Mintzberg and Waters (1985, p272) advocated,   
 “strategy formation walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other   
emergent...the relative emphasis might shift from time to time, but not 
the requirement to attend to both sides of the phenomenon”. 
Both approaches were, in effect, concerned with the same coin (process) but approached 
it from different sides, and as such could be viewed as complimentary paradigms rather 
than conflicting paradigms as “all viable strategies have emergent and deliberate                 
(planned) qualities” (Mintzberg, 1994, p.111).  Deliberate or emergent strategies can, and 
should, be used by firms, as dictated by environmental dynamism (Harrington et al, 2004), 
and it was argued that both formal and informal practices were required for optimum 
success (Allred et al, 2007), and that researchers needed to recognise the centrality to a  
firm’s success of employing both approaches (Titus et al, 2011). 
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2.6     An Alternative Approach to Strategy 
Whenever an organisation, such as a rugby club, competed only in one industry, its 
corporate and business strategy were the same (Slack, 1997).  A relevant quotation about 
business strategy measurement, that could apply equally to a sporting organisation, was 
written by Ohmae (1982, p37/38).   
 “In the real world of business, “perfect” strategies are not called for.   
What counts…is not perfect performance in absolute terms but 
performance relative to competitors.   A good business strategy, then, 
is one by which a company can gain significant ground on its 
competitors at an acceptable cost to itself”.   
The object of the resultant strategy was to attain a relative competitive advantage through 
avoiding (differentiating) doing the same thing as competitors through attempting to bring 
about the conditions most favourable to them (Ohmae,1982).   Nonetheless, finding an 
innovative, sustainable, competitive advantage was an exceedingly difficult undertaking 
for most organisations.  Therefore, a ‘copycat’ strategy might be employed; which was 
basically observing what other organisations were doing in the same operating 
environment and copying the successful strategy.  However, it was argued that successful 
strategies are rarely copycat strategies (Kay, 1993). 
The basic difficulty with a copycat strategy was that there was no guarantee that 
successful activities within one specific environment could be transferred to other unique 
environments with the same result.  Changes in strategic activities to a ‘copycat’ approach 
could also encounter difficulties integrating with the new club’s culture, politics and other 
aspects of its infrastructure, such as necessary resources, and went against the belief that 
successful strategies were uniquely individual to the actual firm which adopted them (Kay 
1993).  Researchers maintained that only a small number of organisations have competed 
successfully, on the basis of operational effectiveness, over a prolonged period of time 
(Porter, 1996); equally, it was evident that preserving a ‘competitive advantage’ over 
competitor clubs became more difficult daily caused by the rapid dispersal of best 
practices from benchmark clubs which were generic.  Rival rugby clubs could quickly 
imitate operational techniques, organisation effectiveness techniques and improved ways 
of meeting stakeholder needs.  Despite the warning that a ‘copycat’ approach, based on 
operational  effectiveness,  could  be  unproductive  (Herman and Renz, 2008), there  are  
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examples of rugby clubs in Wales (and other countries) following such a strategy during   
certain periods in their history. Many have been successful at one time or another and, 
despite barren periods of success, in some instances decades, the clubs were still in 
existence.   
2.7     Absent Strategy 
Whilst some researchers have argued that every firm has a strategy (Hofer and Schendel, 
1978), others have been more cautious when offering a perspective, in that strategy might 
have been absent from firms because of various reasons (Inkpen and Choudhury, 1995). 
They asserted that it could be absent as a failure on the part of management or it could be 
absent as a result of conscious decisions and actions by management. Strategy could also 
be missing as a result of the firm being in a transitional phase of its life cycle.  
Interestingly, and particularly relevant for NPOs was Porter’s (1996) assertion that 
strategy is not only what the organization intends to do, but also what it decides not to do. 
As established in section 2.12.1, it was maintained that NPOs only plan when they have 
to plan (Stone et al, 1999), and that formal planning processes were rare (Sharp and 
Brock, 2010). In order to investigate, and understand, the strategy-making process further, 
the literature was searched and uncovered various frameworks that could assist the study. 
2.8     Strategic Decision-Making 
An essential part of any strategy development process was the strategic decision, which 
came about ‘as a stream of actions’ (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) although the sequence 
of decisions and the actions was questioned (Chakravarthy and White, 2002).  A single, 
universal definition of strategic decision-making has yet to be acknowledged.  However, 
it was proposed by Johnson et al (2008, p6) that, 
“strategic decisions are about the long-term direction of an 
organisation; the scope of an organisation’s activities; gaining 
advantage over competitors; addressing changes in the business 
environment; building on resources and competencies (capability) and 
the values and expectations of stakeholder”. 
In a similar vein, it was suggested that ‘there were five criteria for use in identifying and 
making a strategic decision’ (Harrison, 1996, p.49), 
 the decision must be directed towards defining the organisation’s relationship 
to its environment; 
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 it must take the organisation as a whole for the unit of analysis; 
 it must encompass all of the major functions performed in the organisation; 
 it must be critically important - term success of the organisation’,    
 It must provide constrained guidance for all of the administrative and 
operational activities of the organisation 
The following section examined such strategic decisions, including the conditions in 
which they were made (Table 2.1).        
Table 2.1         Three Conditions under which Decisions are made. 
                                                                  (Parent and O’Brien, 2003) 
 
 
Condition 
 
Knowledge 
1. Certainty: All of the alternatives and their ramifications were known. 
2. Risk: 
 
Some of the alternatives and their ramifications were known. 
3. Uncertainty: 
 
 
Very little or nothing was known about potential decision 
alternatives and their ramifications.   
 
Strategic decision-making was regarded as one of the central aspects in the strategy 
process, but not all researchers saw strategic decision-making as being simple and 
straightforward. Researchers warned that ‘there was general agreement on the 
complexity and uncertainty associated with strategic decision-making’ (Bowman, 
1990, p.30), and, as they were ‘characteristically ill-structured and non-routine, they 
could not be solved through the application of a standard formula’ (Bailey and 
Johnson 1991, p1).   
It had been originally proposed that strategic decision-making (SDM) was a rational 
process made up of three phases, the identification phase, the development phase and the 
selection phase (Minztberg et al, 1976).  Rationality, the degree to which decision makers 
collect and analyse information relevant to the decision, characterized behavior that was 
logical in pursuing goals (Dean and Sharfman, 1993). Subsequently, SDM has been 
understood as a rational, boundedly-rational, or intuitive process (Appendix 2.7).  In their 
review of SDM processes, Rajagopalan et al (1993, p351) identified ‘contextual 
antecedent factors namely, environmental, organizational and decision-specific factors 
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significantly influence strategic decision process characteristics’, in developing an 
integrative model of strategic making rationality.  However, the rationality of the SDM 
process was subsequently questioned (Mintzberg, 1985), with critics contending that 
empirical research specified that rational decision-making was not only unrealistic but 
nearly ‘impossible to put into practice’ (Sminia, 2009, p99).  In supporting those views, 
following their study of small Dutch firms, Brouthers et al (1998), concluded that, 
1) small firms did not appear to be extremely rational or extremely rational in their 
decision-making process.  At best, moderately rational strategic decisions, 
 
2) that politics and power did not appear to significantly influence decision-making 
in the small firm, and 
 
3) small firm managers relied on their intuition, ignoring any information gathered. 
           They did not necessarily select the optimum strategy based on rational analysis.   
Researchers also supported the view that decisions were driven by intuition and emotion 
(Chakravarthy and White, 2002). Intuition was seen as central to all decisions, even those 
based on the most concrete, hard facts, and considered more appropriate for strategic, 
rather than operational, decisions, effectively in an unstable environment (Khatri and Ng, 
2000). Rational decision-making might be influenced by several factors including power 
and politics (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988), external control (Porter, 2004), or 
managerial characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).   A review of the dominant 
paradigms on strategic decision-making, which were rationality and bounded rationality, 
politics and power, and the 'garbage can' paradigm, concluded that strategic decision 
makers were boundedly rational, that power won battles of choice and that chance 
mattered (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). In a sport organization, such as a rugby club, 
the sources of power could vary, and included legitimate, reward, coercive, referent and 
expert power (Trenberth, 2003).   
In an earlier appraisal of an organisation’s strategic decision, Rice (1983, p.62) had 
identified that it was made by an individual,  
“The fact that a decision has a long-term impact on the company is not 
so definitive as is the fact that a manager made the decision deliberately 
in order to achieve a long-term goal, or to build and shape the company 
to meet anticipated future demands to be made on it”. 
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The manager could, in order to improve decision-making, employ any of four separate 
procedures (Yukl, 1998).  He could initiate strategy himself, autocratic decision-making; 
the manager could consult with senior colleagues before making the final decision, 
consultation;   all the relevant managers met to make the final decision, joint decision 
making;   and, where final approval, within certain boundaries, was passed on to others, 
delegation.  The advantages to an organisation with one autocratic decision-making 
leader were that, as ‘only one person need act’, the organisation’s speed of response to 
changes in the environment was much quicker, and if the leader was devoted to the 
organisation’s “mission”, showing the drive and determination to achieve its goals, it 
could have generated a positive togetherness amongst members in moving forward 
(Mintzberg, 1991), and, in addition, could defuse any politics (Eisenhardt, 1999).    
It was maintained that within an organization, its structure could facilitate, constrain or 
simply shape the strategic decision process and its outcomes (Rhodes and Keogan, 2005), 
and that a change in structure could enhance performance (Harris and Ruefi, 2005).  
Within a sports organization, Hoye et al (2009) identified four  structures;  i) the  simple  
structure (centralisation), ii) the bureaucracy (formalization), iii) the matrix structure 
(specialisms), and iv) the team structure (decentralized).  Previously, it had been argued 
that, ‘Organisations that differ in their dominant structure were likely to make strategic 
decisions using a very different process’ (Fredrickson, 1986, p.294). However, as rugby 
clubs tended to be similar simple structures, governed by a members committee with short 
communication channels from top to bottom, meaning few people involved would be 
decision-makers, therefore ensuring that decisions were made and communicated quickly 
(Hoye et al, 2009).   
In fast changing environments, such as surrounding the IoP, decisions that were flexible 
enough to permit adaption had to be made (Eisenhardt, 1997), as  it was unlikely that a 
firm’s competitive advantage would be sustainable over a long period (Eisenhardt and 
Sull, 2001). Where the environment was uncertain, strategic decisions were likely to be 
complex, affected operational decisions, required an integrated approach and involved 
considerable change (Johnson et al, 2008).  Within NPOs managers had to be able to cope 
with uncertainty and ambiguity, and such dynamic environments impacted on the 
decision-making  process  (Paton and Cornforth, 1992).  Therefore,  of  relevance to  this  
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study were the findings that threatening environments, high uncertainty and external 
control, decreased rationality in decision-making (Dean and Sharfman, 1993).  In such 
environments, if the mission and vision were understood and accepted by an 
organisation’s managers and members, this enabled consistent decisions to be made 
quickly (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988).   
In August 1995, rugby clubs were faced with an external decision that was completely 
outside their control and culpability.  The IRB’s transformation pronouncement, allowing 
the Game to move from an amateur to professional environment, threatened clubs with 
an unanticipated, unique event that could have caused a major financial reversal and 
which required an immediate response.  Decision-makers were faced with taking 
unprecedented, practical actions in an uncertain, dynamic environment (Smith and 
Williams, 1999). The ‘shock event’ (Ansoff, 1988), or ‘organisational crisis’ (Coombs, 
2007), as revealed within the literature, was, by description, an infrequent happening. A 
frequently cited definition of organizational crisis, offered by Pearson and Clair (1998, 
p60), is “a high impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is 
characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of resolution, as well as by a belief 
that decisions must be made swiftly” . Their review discovered that ‘there is a lack of 
common, explicit agreement about the nature and meaning of crisis’ (p.61) and also ‘to 
date presents no crisis decision process models’ (Hale et al, 2006, p304).  Other 
researchers contended that more research was needed to improve organizations’ capacity 
to respond in a crisis (Lalonde, 2007), and that a new proactive prevention approach was 
needed to reshape crisis management (Jaques, 2010).   
In any crisis situation, the challenge facing an organization, especially its decision-
makers, was to make a decision quickly and accurately, but to balance “gut feeling” 
(Kharti and Ng, 2000) – acting without thinking – with “analysis paralysis” (Lenz and 
Lyles, 1985)” – thinking instead of actions (Clark and Harmon, 2004).  An exploratory 
investigation, undertaken by Hale et al (2006), into the decision processes during crisis 
response, had found that, 
  The wrong action taken quickly was often better than the best action taken 
even a minute too late, 
  Delays were common in organisational decision – making, 
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  The presence of a crisis management plan improved the decision process, 
  
 
To cope with complexity, decision-makers imitated or mimic past 
practices judged to be successful – equivalent to adopting a ready- made 
solution in a new context 
  Judgment on alternative choices was overwhelmingly based on the 
decision – maker’s individual intuition, 
  The crisis management and organisational decision – making literatures 
had developed largely in isolation of each other. 
Due to the contention that situational contingencies strongly influenced the decision-
making process (Nutt, 1992), the findings by Hale et al (2006) could serve as a template 
for comparison against the decisions taken within the researched rugby clubs on the IoP.   
2.8.1     Decision Making Constraints 
Small firm’s owner/managers were constrained in their decision making by internal and 
external pressures that were unique to the small firm sector (Byers and Slack, 2001);  
therefore the SM process was individual and tended to be practiced instinctively (Jennings 
and Beaver, 1997).  Some of the reasons given by owner-managers for the lack of SM 
were not having enough time,  unfamiliar with SM techniques and process, a lack of skills 
for SM, and a lack of trust and openness (Beaver, 2002), and in addition, small business 
managers confused SM with operational management (Harland and Kent, 2007).  Whilst 
it was contended that accurate decision-making was important to small businesses 
because of the  greater  levels  of  background  uncertainty  they  faced, with  more  limited  
resources  and  markets compared to large firms (Atherton, 2003), research showed that 
the small firm owner’s tendency to practice strategic decision-making was somewhat 
limited or even non-existent (Schrader et al, 1989).    
Research found that owing to uncertainty, small firm owner/ managers tended to be 
concerned with short-term issues, (Westhead and Storey, 1996) and were therefore 
orientated towards short-term planning and decision-making (Mathews and Scott, 1995).   
Small firms, it was suggested, needed to make flexible strategic decisions otherwise they 
might have severe implications, including failure for the firm (Dean and Sharfman, 1993). 
Research found the decision-making process within small firms was primarily of an 
adaptive nature (Byers and Slack, 2001).  Decisions were not strategically orientated nor  
long-term,  but  rather,  they  tended to be routine,  operational,  day-to-day decisions  or  
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immediate response decisions made because of the firm’s rapidly changing circumstances 
(Mintzberg, 1973); and where the event was not anticipated or expected, the response was 
reactive (Atherton, 2003).  Perhaps a strategic decision made in small firms was best 
summed up by Beaver (2003, p.65), in that; 
"For many small firms, management decisions are made in the context 
of survival and operational necessity, rather than growth and business 
development". 
2.9     Patterns of Strategy Development: Strategy Frameworks 
Since the early writings of Andrews, Ansoff and Chandler, researchers had been eager to 
propose different approaches to strategy development. There have been many 
frameworks held up as being the correct approach (Feurer and Chaharbaghi, 1995), and 
as Hart and Banbury (1994, p252) suggested, that 
“Despite the limited efforts at empirical classification of strategy 
processes, the literature contains a bewildering array of conceptual 
models, dimensions and typologies"  
Over the past two decades it has been suggested (2.3) that the optimum methodology for 
the research considered, was a multi-dimensional procedure.  After evaluating the various 
methods, it was considered that such a multi-dimensional approach would be the best 
method of studying the strategy development process. 
2.9.1     Hart’s Framework (1992) 
An in-depth argument for a multi-dimensional approach was made by Hart (1992), who 
examined eleven key process typologies drawn from the literature during the 1980’s and 
categorized them into three broad themes: rationality (comprehensive and bounded), 
vision and involvement. He reasoned that none of the competing or overlapping 
typologies captured the full range of content associated with the strategy-making process.  
Building on the typologies, Hart proposed an integrative framework that consisted of five 
modes, command, symbolic, rational, transactive and generative, and the five modes were 
not seen as mutually exclusive; rather they represented process types that could be mixed 
by combining two or more modes into different groupings in organisations.  Within the 
framework, (which Hart acknowledged required validation) he contrasted the roles that 
top managers and organisational members played in the process of strategy-making.   
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Hart (1992) was clear when he stated that, 
“...strategy-making could no longer be limited conceptually to the chief 
executive or the top-management team.  Rather, strategy-making must 
be conceptualized as an organisation - wide phenomenon. Specifying 
the complementary roles played by top managers and organisational 
members serves to clarify how strategy actually gets made in 
organisations” 
2.9.2     Strategy, Top Down, Bottom Up or a Combination? 
The view that strategy started at the top was supported by research that found agreement 
amongst members of the top management team (TMT) was positively related to 
organisational performance (Iaquinto and Fredrickson, 1997).  It depended on senior 
management because ‘strategy-making was a process interwoven with all that it takes to 
manage an organisation’ (Mintzberg, 1994, p113).  Researchers argued that because  of  
the  complex  and  creative  nature  of  strategy  making,  it could not be an isolated 
process  and  that   strategy  should  not  just  be  the  prerogative  of  top  management 
because the involvement of middle managers in the formation of strategy was associated 
with improved organisational performance (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997).  An extended 
viewpoint, that strategy development could be both top-down and bottom-up, was 
acknowledged both by Bourgeois and Brodwin (1983), and also Nonaka (1988).   
The 'postures' that organisational members assumed in strategy-making were viewed by 
Nonaka (1988) in his typology as three modes. First, deductive management was driven 
by strong leadership from the top down; by contrast, inductive management, supported 
by an influential leader, was driven from bottom-up.  Compressive management saw the 
leader as a catalyst with a vision, which then involved contributions from both top 
managers and organisational members who created and implemented the vision, in effect  
a combination of the deductive and inductive modes.  Furthering that view, an alternative  
approach to strategy assumed everybody within an organisation was responsible for its 
performance (Hart, 1992). Whilst Hart’s theoretical framework lacked confirmation, a 
similar instrument produced by Bailey et al (2000), consolidating the earlier research of 
Bailey and Johnson (1991), into the development of strategies in organisations had been 
endorsed by practicing managers, and senior academics. 
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2.10     A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Strategy Development 
Bailey et al’s (2000) strategy formulation needed to be understood in terms of a mix of 
processes, similar to the five modes proposed by Hart (1992). They identified an 
instrument that had acceptability, reliability and validity, using the six dimensions of the 
process of strategic decision-making (see Appendix 2.8).  Whilst the framework had been 
validated in large organisations, its individual dimensions had been raised and discussed 
as topics by club stakeholders during conversations (4.8.5).  Therefore it was believed 
that the framework could be applied to a small nonprofit organisation context.  The six 
dimensions of strategy development processes were: 
2.10.1     Command Dimension,  
Here, strategy was formulated under the direction of a central, powerful leader (Bennie  
& Nanus, 1996) or a small group of senior individuals within the TMT (Chaffee, 1985).  
The vision or strategic aspirations of the individual or group provided the future strategic 
direction of the organisation (Shrivastava and Nachman, 1989) and might have been 
developed through intuition, inspiration or experience (Westley and Mintzberg, 1989).  
An individual with a strong leadership style, had a greater impact on performance than a 
weak leadership style (O’Regan et al, 2005).  In NPO’s, leadership was associated with 
successful SP (Bryson, 2005), and the administration style was identified as strongly 
influencing strategy formulation (Crittenden and Crittenden, 1997).  However, leaders 
might have had no experience of business management  (Paton and Cornforth, 1992) but 
charismatic, transformational leaders possibly had a ‘gut feeling’ (Westley and 
Mintzberg, 1998) for the direction the organisation should follow, especially in turbulent 
environments, where trying to plan or predict for the future was considered to be of no 
purpose (Risseeuw and Masurel,  1994).  Within such a situation, a strong leader, 
therefore, was prepared to take bold, risky actions on behalf of the organisation (Yukl, 
1998).  If decision-making lay with one single leader, then two advantages were enjoyed 
by organizations (Mintzberg, 1991).  First, there was the ability to respond quickly to 
changes in the environment, as "only one person need act".  Second, a business run by a 
strongly magnetic personality could have led to a feeling of ‘belonging’ felt amongst firm 
employees knowing that it had a leader with the drive and determination to realise its 
goals  successfully.  In  dynamic  environments  the  traditional  planning  approach   of  
‘ends-ways-means’ should change its approach to a more effective ‘means–ways-ends’ 
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 (Hayes, 1985).  This gave organisation members a common vision to follow.  The role 
of organisational members, who accepted and ‘bought- in’ to the vision (Rowe et al, 
1989), was to obey the orders from the top individual or group and to “make it happen”. 
(Hart, 1992), but such an approach might have caused motivational problems amongst 
organisational members.  The organisation members were needed because on his own the 
leader/ visionary, despite the position, power, and authority endowed upon him by the 
organisation’s structure and history, could not turn the vision into strategy (Bennis and 
Nanus, 1996).   
 2.10.2     Planning Dimension  
SP attempts to systematise the process that enable organisations to achieve goals and 
objectives (Crittenden, 1999).  This dimension follows a strict sequential approach that 
involved analytical techniques and systematic procedures concerning the organisation 
and its environment (Chaffee, 1985).  Various options, capable of attaining the goal or 
strategic issue, were generated, evaluated and the optimum strategy was adopted (Aldrich, 
1979). The selected strategy developed by senior individuals/ executives, not organisation 
members (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), was made explicit by precise plans and 
programmes (Ansoff, 1988), with strategy formulation preceding strategy 
implementation.  Implementation was the responsibility of those operating below within 
the organisation (Mintzberg, 1978).  It was found that formal planning proved to be 
superior to informal planning (Armstrong, 1982), and that a higher degree of 
formalization is related to a higher degree of performance (Kraus et al, 2006). However, 
the results of studies concerned with the linkage of planning with improved performance 
in NPOs (Crittenden et al, 2004), and in small businesses (Jennings, 1997) are mixed and 
overall inclusive. Interestingly, it was found that planning conducted by small businesses 
was limited in its scope and activities, and tended to be operational (Carsons and Cromie 
(1990). 
The formal approach to SP has been subjected to long standing criticism (Fletcher and 
Harris, 2002). Strategy, it was argued, was not primarily about planning but rather about 
intentional, informed and integrated choices (Hambrick and Fredrickson, 2005). Planning 
did  not  consider  the  decision-makers  personal  and  cognitive   limitations   allowing 
subjectivity to enter the process (Bailey and Johnson 1991), neither did it take into 
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account the less ‘objective’ aspects of the organisation such as the social, cultural and 
political environments of an organisation (Chaffee, 1985). With regard to performance, it 
was argued that the question was no longer ‘does SP affect small firm performance’ but 
rather was ‘under what conditions was performance enhanced by small firm strategic 
planning”? (Schwenk and Shrader, 1993). SP and performance was a part of management 
but, ‘the linkage between planning and success or failure has been difficult to establish 
and even more difficult to quantify’ (Perry, 2001, p.202).   
Disagreement existed between researchers who contended that planning was important in 
a dynamic, unstable or turbulent environment (Anderson, 2000; Slevin and Covin, 1997; 
McKiernan and Morris, 1994; Hart and Banbury, 1994) and those who submitted that 
planning was counter-productive in an environment perceived as highly dynamic 
(Mintzberg et al, 1998; Richardson, 1995;  Risseeuw and Masurel, 1994).  In a dynamic 
environment, innovation, flexibility and responsiveness were the make-up requirements 
of strategy (Mintzberg, 1979).  Conversely, other studies argued the case that formal SP 
was best within stable environments (Fredrickson and Mitchell,1989; Fredrickson and 
Iaquinto, 1989), and that incrementalism was recommended for the more uncertain and 
rapidly changing environments (Quinn, 1980).  Whatever the environment, critics of SP 
believed that there was no ‘magic’ tool or technique which ensured profitability for small 
firms (Meers and Robertson, 2007).  Various conclusions emerged from different studies 
concerning structuring planning processes in small firms (Brews and Hunt, 1999; Capon 
et al, 1994; Miller and Cardinal, 1994).  Nonetheless, whilst there was no clear evidence 
that the planning dimension was appropriate, neither was there clear evidence to argue 
that it was not (Fletcher and Harris, 2002). 
2.10.3     Incremental Dimension  
Due to ‘learning through doing’, constant readjustment and limited commitment, this led 
to a deliberate development of strategy (Quinn, 1980). The complexity and uncertainty 
of organisational environments prevented boundedly rational managers from considering 
all possible strategic options against pre-set, explicit objectives (Lindblom, 1959).  In this 
situation, strategic decision-making was instinctive, fragmented and gradual; 
commitment  to  strategy  was  kept  tentative, subjected  to  review, and  offered  neither 
distinct strategic direction nor specific plans for implementation  (Idenburg, 1993).  The 
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objective was not to identify the best or optimum solution (Mintzberg et al, 1976), rather  
the challenge was for changes in procedure in the organisation to have matched with 
changes in the environment (Bailey and Johnson, 1991).  In response to a difficult, 
complex environment, the organisation adapted in small, disjointed steps (Mintzberg, 
1978) where the TMT acted as facilitators who empowered and enabled other members 
to participate through learning and improving (Quinn, 1982).  
2.10.4     Political Dimension  
Strategy-making is an inherently political process (Chakravarthy and White, 2002) where 
powerful groups of stakeholders, internal and external, through negotiation, bargaining 
and compromise (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003), could influence strategy (Hickson et al, 
1986). Information, which was not politically neutral, but which might be distorted, could 
also influence strategic decisions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  The level of power of a 
wide range of stakeholders was often provisional upon the organisation’s reliance upon 
them for resources (Freeman, 2000). A stakeholder’s influence could vary from strategic 
decision to strategic decision because of different concerns (Feldman, 1986) and degrees 
of power (Hickson et al, 1986); such as, the influence of top level decision-makers 
decreases as a strategy enters the implementation stage (Bailey and Johnson, 1991). 
Through compromise amongst stakeholders requiring different outcomes, an acceptable 
strategy emerged by mutual adjustment (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), where consensus 
rather than the optimum solution, allowed those vested stakeholders to produce an 
acceptable strategic decision (Johnson, 1987). Therefore the final plan resulted from a 
concession by stakeholders.  The strategy adopted was not objective criterion based, but 
rather it was reached through fulfilling the interests of powerful stakeholders/groups who 
could   influence   the   decision-making process (Johnson, 1987). However, strategy 
could also be driven by the initiatives of organisational members (Peattie, 1993). Previous 
research had found that NPO’s had a variety of different stakeholders setting different 
goals (Paton and Cornforth, 1992). In sport organisations, basic centres of power for 
individuals or groups included legitimate, reward, coercive, referent and expert power.  
The implementation of this power, to defend or enlarge existing power bases, obviously 
involved political activity (Parent and O’Brien, 2003), and in turbulent times, when an 
organisation faces uncertainty, the process of decision-making became more prone to 
power (Bailey and Johnson, 1991). 
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2.10.5     Cultural Dimension  
This dimension viewed strategies as outcomes resulting from the organisations routines 
and the way ‘we do things around here’ (Schein, 2004).  Managers sought solutions to 
new strategic issues through a framework developed over years within the organisation, 
and by its members, through familiarity; new situations were not perceived as unique 
(Schon, 1991).  By also involving people, with their experience and expectations, at 
middle and lower levels in the organisation, the development of an intangible corporate 
culture could help the implementation of strategy.  Shared beliefs and assumptions were 
considered to exist, not just to the individual organisation (Huff, 1982), but on an industry 
wide basis (Spender, 1989) in the form of acceptable ‘recipes’. However, organisations 
faced with the same ‘objective’ environment might have viewed it, then reacted 
differently. Strategies were reflected by adjustments rather than major change, but if not 
appropriate for the solution could lead to strategic drift (Johnson, 1992).  The role of the 
TMT was like a team coach, to motivate and inspire the ‘players’ who should in turn 
respond to the challenges (Hart, 1992). 
Researchers warned that if the future direction of the organisation was based upon 
routines, beliefs, attitudes, values, rituals, stories, perceptions and other symbolic 
artefacts, the organisational paradigm was, in turn, likely to provide resistance to change. 
Strong cultures would suppress deviance, avoid change and tended to foster inbreeding 
through decisions made in line with the organisation’s paradigm (Johnson, 1987). 
Nevertheless, ‘the culture of the firm could be changed through information, experience 
or sanctions’ (Kono, 1994, p.88). 
2.10.6     Enforced Choice Dimension 
With this dimension the firm had little or no choice over the strategies they followed as 
outside factors external to the organisation impose strategy on the firm which best fitted 
the environment (Hannah and Freeman, 1989).  Within an industrial sector, pressures, 
such as from the governing body, the WRU, meant that the strategies an organisation 
could follow were severely limited (Harris and Jenkins, 2001), and tended to be common  
to all organisations within that sector (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). Considering that 
rugby clubs were small in size, would it align them with Bailey and Johnson’s (1991, 
p.34) contention that, ‘The smaller organisations which make up the majority in most  
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industries, are relatively unable to influence their environment’?   Equally, if  the  clubs 
were NPOs, would findings agree that “strategic processes are typically forced on the 
nonprofit organizations”? (Sharp and Brock, 2010, p323). The role organisational 
members’ played in choosing a strategy was limited but change could still occur in such 
circumstances (Aldrich, 1979).  In ‘hostile’, unpredictable and uncontrollable external 
environments associated with high levels of uncertainty, small firm managers favoured 
short-term planning (Covin and Slevin, 1989), because they were mainly concerned with 
short-term problems and issues (Westhead and Storey, 1996).  The firm’s ability to cope, 
understand, and respond to, with environmental uncertainty was critical to its continued 
viability (Grant, 2008). 
The consideration of environment was important because, it was argued, SP was a highly 
contextual activity (Goll and Rasheed, 1997), and when a firm’s strategic behaviour was 
aligned with its environment, its profitability was optimised (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1993). 
The characteristics of a region could have a significant impact on relative performance, 
with firms based in an unattractive location facing large challenges in achieving 
competitive success (Porter, 1991).  It could be argued that as the research clubs had 
existed for well over a hundred years, the detailed knowledge about their environment, 
gained over such a long period, would have reduced environmental uncertainty and the 
need to plan (Gibson and Cassar, 2002). However, such a view, proposing that knowledge 
is uniform and universal within discrete groups of small businesses, has been challenged 
(Atherton, 2003). 
The research by Bailey et al (2000), built upon the earlier work of Bailey and Johnson 
(1991) and Hart (1992), suggested that, in every situation and at any point in time, because 
of the complexity of strategic decision-making within organisations, the dimensions were 
not mutually exclusive but rather occurred in combination.  The multi- dimensional view 
of strategy formulation was supported by Mintzberg et al (1998, p.372) who agreed that, 
 “Strategy formulation is judgemental designing, intuitive visioning, 
and emergent learning: it is about transformation as well as 
perpetuation; it must involve individual cognition and social 
interaction, cooperation as well as conflict; it has to include analyzing 
before and programming after as well as negotiating during; and all of 
this must be in response to what could be a demanding environment. 
Just try to leave any of this out and watch what happens!” 
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The Bailey et al’s (2000) strategy development process six dimensional instrument, along 
with Pettigrew’s (1988) model, of process, content and context,  was considered to have 
the necessary trustworthiness (see 4.3.3) to offer the depth of investigation required by 
this study.  While the Bailey et al’s (2000) instrument contributed to the main focus of 
the research, the strategy-making process within an organisation (a rugby club), it could 
also contribute to developing an understanding of the role of individual managers in the 
practice of strategy within the clubs (Chia and MacKay, 2007). 
2.11    Strategy Evaluation and Selection 
In the prescriptive approach, strategies were constructed based on the results of the 
strategic analysis, which was carried out on an organisation’s environments, both internal 
and external.  Therefore, the uniqueness of each rugby club impacted on the selection of 
a ‘correct’ strategy, but as Thompson (2001, p.531), pointed out,   
“When assessing current strategies, and evaluating possible changes, 
it is important to emphasize that there is no such thing as a right or 
wrong strategy choice in absolute terms”. 
The evaluation of strategies was based on a small number of particular criteria (Appendix 
2.9), such as feasibility, suitability, and acceptability (Johnson et al, 2008).  Another 
framework, based upon ‘intentional, informed and integrated choices’, using key 
evaluation criteria, was designed by Hambrick and Fredrickson, (2005, p63), for testing 
the quality of a strategy (Appendix 2.10).  The choice of strategies emanating from the 
prescriptive approach was as a result of a rational process where the organisation’s 
objectives, frequently stated in financial terms, were used to evaluate options.  The 
assessment techniques defined above, then proved helpful in particular circumstances by 
singling out, what the organization believed to be, the ‘correct’ strategies by providing 
calculated information concerning all the options.  As such, individual subjectivity and 
judgment was also involved in the strategic decision-making.  With a strategy being 
selected completing the process dimension, the researcher’s attention then turned to the 
understanding of outcomes, and sought to establish the content of strategy, ‘how’ the 
rugby clubs measured performance.    
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2.12     The Content (Measuring Performance) 
Following research undertaken on performance in large firms, researchers into small 
firms questioned the similar assumptions that were being made about the sector; that small 
firms were profit maximisers, growth orientated or even highly competitive (Curran and 
Blackburn, 2001).  Either through design, or by virtue of barriers to further development, 
small firms might not wish to optimise profits or follow a growth strategy (Mount et al, 
1993).  It was established that merely a minority of around 10 per cent wanted to grow 
significantly and even then only a slight percentage of them grew considerably (Hakim, 
1989).  In small firms “success is no longer regarded as synonymous with optimal 
performance since this represents an extremely elusive concept” (Jennings and Beaver, 
1997, p.68).  Common to both large and small firms was that to outperform its rivals, and 
improve performance, a ‘firm must establish a competitive difference that it could defend 
and preserve’ (Porter, 1996, p 62), since “the foundations of corporate success are unique 
to each successful company” because “there are no recipes and generic strategies for 
corporate success” (Kay, 1993, p19).    
The need to establish small, nonprofit, sporting organisations performance measures was 
reflected in the statement by  Pettigrew et al, (2001, p.701), that “Management scholars  
seem to have been curiously uncurious about why and how certain organisations 
consistently “outperform” their competitors. NPOs exist to achieve a social mission, so 
measuring and comparing performance for them is a more subjective and values-driven 
exercise than that aimed at for-profit organisations (Moore, 2000).  An important 
consideration for rugby clubs, facing promotion and relegation every season, was that 
time horizon assumptions should be very situation specific, because due to the industry 
involved, performance implications could be outdated in weeks or months (Shrader et al, 
1989).  In a seasonal game, therefore, “Performance is related to the firm and to industry 
and to the yearly interaction of the firm with the industry” (Schwartz and Teach, 2000, 
p81), suggesting that a rugby club’s template could follow that of small businesses which 
were inclined to focus on OP that had short term goals, action plans and day-to-day 
operations (Robinson et al, 1986).  Planning was limited in its scope and activities in 
small businesses, where a greater emphasis tended to be placed on OP (Shrader et al, 
1989).  In addition to being short-term orientated,  planning  in small  firms tended to be  
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adaptive in nature and concerned with managing scarce and limited resources (Gibson 
and Cassar, 2002). Survival was then achieved by adopting a ‘status quo’ strategy, with 
the firm’s performance dependant on the relationship between the firm’s resources and 
its decision-making. Given the paucity of empirical assessment of small firm performance 
measures, deciding how to measure the achievements of a particular firm was 
problematical and complex (Cameron, 1986).  Rugby clubs were a compilation of 
different stakeholders, and as such, Jennings and Beaver (1997, p.68) argued that, 
 “Success can be viewed as the attainment of certain pre-defined 
objectives which satisfy stakeholder aspirations and which might have 
culminate in performance which falls substantially below the optimum 
level attainable.”  
Rugby clubs being considered as NPOs, stakeholder satisfaction, it was argued, was the 
best and most accurate way of judging performance (Beaver and Prince, 2004).  So rugby 
clubs needed to ascertain the criteria used by the multiple stakeholders to measure the 
organisation’s performance (Appendix 3.2), because ‘the key to success for...NPOs (and 
communities) is the satisfaction of key stakeholders’ (Bryson, 2005, p27).    
Of much relevance to this study were the findings on small firm management that politics 
within the TMT (the committee) was associated with poor firm performance (Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois, 1988), and that equally, the level of TMT agreement was positively 
related to a firm’s performance (Iaquinto and Fredrickson, 1997). In small firms, the 
power which accompanied majority ownership could not be challenged by other 
stakeholders and had a significant impact upon the performance of the firm and clearly 
impacted on the firm’s objectives (Jennings and Beaver, 1997), especially as owner 
managers, ‘define success in much narrower terms than external stakeholder groupings 
and the public in general’ (Beaver and Jennings, 2000, p398).   Consequently, the 
performance of small firms was very much dependent on the quality of strategic decisions 
made by the owner/manager. (Robinson and Pearce, 1984).  It was also established that 
managerial competence and expertise, especially in cash management, was important for 
success (Jennings and Beaver, 1997), and a lack of SM skills and abilities were considered 
the underlying causes for small business failure (Beaver, 2002).  In linking strategy to 
action, Sharman (1998, p.26) suggested that, “When created, most organisational goals 
are realistic and achievable but without a mechanism to convert them into concrete action 
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items, it is pure luck if those goals are realized.”  (The Oxford dictionary defined ‘luck’ 
as “success due to chance”).  Researchers, in particular, have been criticised because of 
their fixation to employ uni-dimension constructs particularly accounting figures, such as 
Return on Investment (ROI) Profit, Sales growth, only to measure a firm's performance; 
‘This masks the very complex nature of organisational performance and leads us to 
oversimplify not only what it is but how it is achieved’ (Daft and Buenger (1990, p.92).   
Small organisations, such as rugby clubs, were reluctant to impart objective financial data 
and such information was not always publicly available (Bracker and Pearson, 1986), and 
for that reason, subjective measures were more adaptable and thus beneficial (Covin and 
Slevin, 1989). In acknowledging the complexity of evaluating a small organisation’s 
performance, it was recommended that the researcher employed multiple measures of 
performance (Birley and Westhead, 1990).  A single measure, particularly financial such 
as profit, merely reflected the small organisation’s performance in the short term, but did 
not reflect its ability to survive and grow in the long term.  Unlike for-profits 
organisations, where the financial bottom line was the primary key indicator, there was 
no universally accepted measure of performance in NPOs (Stone, 1999), as outputs ‘are 
typically intangible, bundled and difficult to measure’ (Speckbacher, 2003, p269). 
Therefore, end-of-year financial results were not necessarily an indicator of the NPO’s 
effectiveness (Akingbola, 2006). It was further asserted that “unlike financial 
management, there is no common currency for monitoring performance” (Hudson, 1999, 
p171).   
Performance in NPOs had been defined as “the ability to acquire resources necessary for 
organizational survival” (Stone et al, 1999), because so many were resource dependent 
in comparison to other types of organisations (Stone and Brush, 1996).  When they were 
required to deal with key resource deficiencies strong evidence revealed that planning 
techniques were employed (Stone, 1989).  It was contended that performance measures 
needed to be tailored to the missions and goals of individual NPOs (Sawhill and 
Williamson, 2001). Consensus among many researchers, and practitioners, revealed that 
performance was multidimensional and social in nature (Kaplan, 2001), which in itself 
generated a difficult challenge for NPOs’ on how to measure the effectiveness of strategy 
or to ascertain any strategy content–performance linkage (Crittenden, 2000). Supporting 
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the difficulty with measuring nonprofit performance, Kendall and Knapp, (2000, p.129) 
proposed that, 
 “There is no single criterion of performance upon which to rely, 
particularly in view of the multiple-stakeholder context within which 
most voluntary (nonprofit) organisations find themselves, nor is there 
any simple or uncontroversial way to aggregate indicators across 
domains”  
Similarly, it could be argued that the performance of NPOs was influenced by social, 
cultural, political, economic and historical factors that could not be explained simply in 
terms of matching the organisations strengths with the environment’s opportunities to 
ensure the effectiveness of any strategy (Akingbola, 2006). Kaplan and Norton (1992) 
argued that their ‘balanced scorecard’ facilitated the formulation of strategy and provided 
a vital technique for the translation and communication of strategy throughout an 
organization. 
The character of sporting (rugby) organisations was extremely competitive and the single 
most influential performance benchmark was victory over rival competitors, a point well 
made by Szymanski (2003, p.468).  
“In sport competitions, relative performance measures are typically all 
that matters and they are well defined.  Rankings are allocated 
according to points scored, matches won,...and while the losers 
frequently argue the toss, such arguments carry little weight – winning 
is everything.”  
Within the rugby industry, playing performance (utility maximization) was considered to 
be more important than financial results (profit maximization) (Hoye et al, 2009).  It was 
found that NPOs had more luck in setting a measureable, mission orientated goal and then 
assessing progress against that goal (Sawhill and Williamson, 2001). 
2.12.1     A Multi-Dimensional Construct. 
The often cited critique that “...the treatment of performance in research settings is 
perhaps one of the thorniest issues confronting the academic researcher today” led to the 
contention that measurement of an organisation’s performance should be a multi- 
dimension construct (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986, p801).  They proposed three 
general levels of measurement of performance  i.e. financial  performance,  operational 
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performance and organisation effectiveness.  The recommendations put forward by the 
various researchers suggested that non-financial criteria should be used in addition to 
financial criteria when measuring performance (Rue and Ibraham, 1998).  To allow 
comparisons of criterion, objective and subjective data should be used, and where 
possible short and long term measures.  Nonetheless, in spite of these recommendations, 
it was established that qualitative measures of performance seemed to have been largely 
ignored (Greenley, 1993).  A potential performance measure matrix is Figure 2.3.  
      Figure 2.3 Performance Measures Matrix                                                               
         (Adapted from Haber and Reichel, 2006). 
 
        Long-Term 
 
Growth in Revenues 
 
 
Development and Growth 
Playing Strength 
 
        Short-Term 
 
Revenues 
Number of wins and 
trophies in a season 
 
Stakeholder Satisfaction 
Players Welfare 
                                Objective                              Subjective 
One approach which was widely used was the goal attainment approach that measures 
effectiveness (doing the right thing) based on the achievement of an organisation’s goals, 
the ends not means, and which often reflects the owner-manager point of view in 
determining the direction and performance of the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The 
quantity of resources used to achieve the required goals, normally measured in economic 
terms, reflected the efficiency (doing things right) of the organisation (Slack, 1997).   
In the context of this research into rugby clubs, it was worth recalling again that Storey 
(1994), posed critical and searching questions concerned with the assumptions regarding 
performance made about small firms, concerning profit,  growth and competitiveness.  
Many small firms adopted the status quo because the product-market niche did not allow  
growth (Churchill and Lewis, 1983), as was the case in many small village communities 
or towns where rugby clubs existed.  Rugby clubs, like the majority of small organisations 
(Mount et al, 1993), were content to remain the same size over the years.  The club’s very 
identity, based on a geographical area, meant that its raison d’être held back any growth 
in a different locality, and that those clubs based in an ‘unattractive’ location faced huge 
challenges in achieving competitive success (Porter, 1991).  Previous research concluded 
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that the characteristics of an area had a significant impact on relative performance (Mason 
and Harrison, 1985), and in the ‘amateur’ days the perceived glory for the village or town 
was achieved through the winning of a local cup or championship title, a view confirmed 
by Frisby (1986, p.95). 
  “The goals most often measured in a sport context reflect an emphasis 
on performance outcomes and have been operationalised in terms of 
win/ loss records or performance rankings in comparison to other 
teams”.  
Whilst few studies have attempted to examine relationships between strategic processes 
and performance in NPOs (Crittenden, 2000), a problem exists in that it is difficult to 
dissect the highly complex NPO performance variable (Forbes, 1998).  Nonetheless, in 
order to measure performance from various sector levels within the clubs, the multi -
dimension construct devised by Venkatraman and Ramanujam, (1986) multi-dimension 
was adopted.  The research then turned to examine the context of the study. 
2.13     The Context (The Strategic Environment). 
The majority of studies located in the SM literature involved large firms in a business 
environment (Shanley and Peteraf, 2006).   Over the last decade, researchers, such as 
Jarzabkowski (2003), Whittington (2006) and Chia and Mackay (2007), have challenged 
the treatment of strategy as being the property of large organisations by viewing strategy 
as ‘something that people do’.  The ‘strategy-as-practice’ emphasised a ‘micro-activities 
based’ to understanding strategy and how managers strategise (Jarzabkowski, 2003) 
rather than viewing strategy-making as a whole process, focusing on where, how and who 
does the work of strategising and organising (Whittington, 2006).  Therefore, this research 
into strategy operated within the broad parameters of, practitioners (those people who do 
the work of strategy); practices (the social, symbolic and material tools through which 
strategy is done); and praxis (the flow of activity in which strategy is accomplished) 
(Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009). The ‘strategy wheel’ was turning full circle because such 
a ‘micro based activity’ was the approach the Athenians adopted under a tribal head, 
Kleisthenes (508 BC), the ‘strategos’.    
Recommending such an approach, Cummings (1993, p134) stated, 
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“A great deal of insight could be gained from examining those from 
whom we inherited the term (historically and culturally). The first 
strategists- the Greek strategoi, (leaders) perhaps practiced strategy in 
its purest sense.”   
However, some 2,500 years later, the literature on SM in the small firms, nonprofit and 
sporting organisations area was still lagging well behind that written on large 
organisations (McCarthy and Leavy, 2000).  It was contended that much of the empirical 
evidence regarding the use of SM tools and techniques were based mainly upon large 
organisations (Rigby and Gillies, 2000), and that such tools and techniques could not be 
applied directly either to small firms (Beaver and Jennings, 2000) or to nonprofit 
organisations (Beck et al, 2008). However, for any organisation, large or small it was 
argued, techniques do not make, or implement, strategy (Hussey, 1997). Researchers 
called for further investigation on how strategies were actually formed in small firms 
(Beaver 2003, O’Regan and Ghobadian, 2005), nonprofit (Kearns and Scapino, 1996; 
Ghobadian and O’Regan, 2011) and sporting organisations (Slack, 1997).  In examining 
the private, public and third (nonprofit) sectors, Hudson (1999) warned researchers that 
the boundaries between the three sectors were not clear cut. It was important, therefore, 
to clarify into what sector a rugby club actually should be placed. 
Consideration was given as to whether rugby clubs should be regarded as ‘social 
enterprises’.  An original description was ‘an enterprise that is owned by those who work 
in it and/or reside in a given locality, is governed by registered social as well as 
commercial aims and objectives and run co-operatively may be termed a social 
enterprise...with the emphasis on social, environmental and financial benefit’ (Spreckley, 
1978).  Examining that definition within the rugby context, no-one ‘worked in it’ and 
clubs did not have ‘commercial aims and objectives’ nor an ‘emphasis on environmental 
and financial benefits’, therefore it was concluded that rugby clubs, pre-1995, better 
matched the various characteristics of volunteer run NPOs.  
2.13.1     Nonprofit Organisations 
Most strategic research had focused on ‘for-profit’ organisations (Bryson, 2005).  The 
literature on SM in the nonprofit sector did not start to appear until the late 1970’s, when 
factors which limited the progress of rational planning in NPOs were identified (Newman 
and Wallender, 1978). It was proposed by various researchers that non-profit 
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organizations had unique characteristics (Table 2.2), that differed from those of ‘for-
profit’ organizations (Crittenden and Crittenden 1997), and the differences mattered 
enough to suggest that NPOs may need their own concept of strategy formulation (Moore, 
2000) and strategic choices (Appendix 2.11). 
 Table 2.2     The Nonprofit Organization  
      (Adapted from Paton and Cornforth (1992) Osbourne (1996) and  Hudson, 1999) 
 
- Existed  primarily for social purpose 
- Small, informal structured organisation 
- Independent of the State 
- Nonprofit, all financial surpluses re-invested 
- Possible vague objectives 
- Impact difficult to measure 
- Accountable to a variety of stakeholders 
- Self-governing and are able to control their own activities 
- Voluntarism is essential; helpers, management 
- Purpose influences management 
- Cherished Organizational Values/Culture 
- Social Goals - financial ‘bottom-line’ is not a priority 
Almost twenty years later Kearns and Scarpino (1996, p.435) were claiming that, “ 
Clearly we still do not have an adequate understanding of the internal and external 
factors that combine to provide the catalysis for strategic planning in NPOs, ... a variety 
of questions concerning the context and process of planning in nonprofit organisations 
remain unresolved”. More recently, Sharp and Brock (2010, p.323) asserted that,  
‘the focus of existing research, and the weight of empirical evidence, 
suggests that the behaviour of VNPOs in strategic processes was 
characterized by the avoidance of strategic process, the application of 
defensive and protective measures, and the partial or selective 
execution of planning and implementation’ 
In spite of the increase in studies into aspects of SM in NPOs over the last two decades, 
and a major review and analysis of empirically based research on SM in non-profit 
organizations from 1977, the field remained fragmented (Stone et al, 1999).  The over-
reliance on the private sector’s dated approaches to researching strategy, with the majority 
being USA studies (Courtney, 2005), needed to be addressed via further research into 
process, outcome and context in UK NPOs (Rhodes and Keogan, 2005). With regard to 
planning processes, it was maintained that NPOs exhibited a significant level of resistance 
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to SP, only planned when they had to plan  (Stone et al,1999), and that formal planning 
processes were rare, typically forced on the NPO, and the use of associated techniques 
was limited (Sharp and Brock, 2010).   The need for a strong body of empirical evident 
was demanded by Kearns and Scrapino (1996), and were supported by the contention that 
‘there are very few cases that examine strategy, strategic decisions, and strategic 
management in not-for-profit organisations’ (Ghobadian and O’Regan, 2011, p.423).  
Comparing the characteristics of nonprofit organisations against rugby clubs, particularly 
pre-1995, it was found that rugby clubs displayed nonprofit characteristics.  However, 
with the advent of professionalism within the Game, did rugby clubs then moved towards 
operating as ‘for-profit’ small businesses. 
2.13.2     Small Business 
No single, uniformly acceptable definition, either operational or numerical, of a small 
firm had been agreed (Storey, 1994), and as such ‘Small firms remain much easier to 
describe than to define’ (Beaver and Jennings, 2000, p397).   In the UK the Department 
of Trade and Industry (1995) defined a small business as one with less than fifty 
employees.   On a broader front, the European Commission (2003) disaggregated small 
and medium enterprise (SME) sector into three components (Table 2.3).   
Table 2.3   European Company Categories (2003) 
 
Company category  Employees Turnover Balance sheet total 
Medium-sized < 250 ≤ € 50 m ≤ € 43 m 
Small < 50 ≤ € 10 m ≤ € 10 m 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 m ≤ € 2 m 
 
SM could be seen as a valuable option available to both large and small firms, though the 
scope of the operation within small firms was likely to be less of a strategic issue than it 
was with larger firms (Pekar and Abraham, 1995).  The leading standpoint, in relation to 
strategy in smaller firms, has been the prescriptive approach (Hanlon and Scott, 1993), 
but other researchers have challenged the benefit of the prescriptive approach to small 
firms (Bhide, 1994).  Recent literature indicated that small firms might be distinguished 
from larger firms by a number of key characteristics; unlike large organisations, which 
tended to be  mechanistic  and  highly  formalised,  the  small  business  organisation was 
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likely to be organic and loosely structured (Beaver and Jennings, 1996).  In addition, 
contrasting the small firm owner/manager with his large firm counterpart, it was easier 
for the small businessman, with superior knowledge of his local environment, to gather 
and evaluate information than for the big businessman (Curran and Blackburn, 2001).  So, 
‘by their very nature, small firms are different and have special characteristics, operating 
contexts, objectives and qualities’ (Beaver, 2003, p.115).  Research into strategy-making 
in small firms found the following characteristics concerning planning (Table 2.4), 
Table  2.4       The Small Business Planning Perspective 
 
- Informal, flexible, incremental,  irregular process (Scott & Gibb, 1985) 
- Lack of formal analysis, use of strategic tools (Woods and Joyce, 2003) 
- Limited objectives  (Beaver, 2003) 
- Importance of improving financial management (Gorton, 1999). 
- Planning concerned with limited/scarce resources (Hamel and Prahalad 1989). 
- Strategic knowledge acquired outside of owner/manager (Aram and Cowen, 1990) 
- Judgement, experience and intuition more important (Yusuff and Saffu, 2005) 
- Short-term, functionally focus  (Matthews and Scott, 1995) 
- Focus on operational planning  (Shrader et al, 1989) 
- Inability to cope with external pressures (Byers and Slack, 2001)    
- Lack of time for planning  (Risseeuw and Masurel, 1994) 
- Time horizon should be short (Stonehouse and Pemberton, 2002) 
- Planning adaptive in nature (Gibson and Cassar, 2002) 
- Success was due to luck rather than planning (Sharman, 1998) 
 
The  characteristics  of  small firms,  and  NPOs, as  established  within  the literature,  
(Appendix 2.12), were  compared  against  the  characteristics  found in  the  three  
research  clubs both pre- and post-1995. Characteristics in the amateur era, pre-1995, 
matched those of nonprofit organisations, whilst in the new professional era the traits of 
the rugby clubs were similar to those representative of small businesses.  The context of 
the study over the research decade was therefore established. 
2.14     The Research Questions. 
Whilst studies of strategy in nonprofit organisations have increased over the past decade, 
the discipline continued to be disjointed (Stone et al, 1999).  Nonetheless, there were 
relatively few studies on strategy in UK nonprofit organisations with a turnover of under  
£1 million (Rhodes and Keogan, 2005). This might have been due to the over-reliance on 
dated approaches from the private sector based mainly on  research  studies  in  the  USA 
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 (Courtney, 2005).  The demands for more research into NPOs were made by Kearns and 
Scarpino (1996), and more recently, Ghobadian and O’Regan (2011).  With regard to the 
strategy making processes, Bailey and Johnson (1991, p37) had encouraged researchers 
“to examine particular strategic issues’, and to establish how managers at different levels 
dealt with the issues.  The research questions revolved around the assertion that a strategy 
’was the decisions and actions taken to achieve a specific outcome’.   
In the preceding chapter, the research topic was presented, the originality of the theses 
was established, the unit of analysis and its context were evaluated, and the concepts 
under analysis were critically appraised.   As a result of evaluating and understanding the 
explicit knowledge, the existent literature reviewed in this chapter, including the 
unanswered issues posed by previous researchers, the following research questions were 
constructed.  
1 Was there a presence, or an absence, of a strategy-making process in 
Welsh rugby clubs during the decade, 1990-2000? 
 
      i)    What were the patterns of process in each club? 
 a)     ii)     The  Role  of  Managers  and  Club  Members  in  the  Strategy- Making  
b)             Process.  Who were the critical personalities? 
 c)    iii)    Did Managers within the same club agree/disagree on the pattern of      
d)             process at work within the club? 
 e)    iv)      Consideration of all alternative explanations of the process that resulted  
f)             in strategic action. What features of context and action drove process? 
                       i) v) How did clubs measure performance?  What were the intended and     
ii)               unintended consequences of the revealed pattern of continuity and  
iii)               change? 
 
2. How did clubs react to the IoP in Welsh Rugby in 1995? 
 
 a)   What was the role of goals in the decision-making process? 
 b)   Were the strategic decisions taken on the IoP, planned or emergent? 
 
 c)   Were the findings comparable in each club? 
This empirical research intended to produce an understanding of the answers to the 
questions. 
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2.15     Conclusions.   
This chapter aimed to present a detailed insight into the central theme of this research, the 
concept of strategy.  Therefore, via the review of literature on organisational strategy over 
the past fifty years, the chapter contributed to the study by identifying gaps in the 
literature concerning this research. The conclusion drawn from the review was that the 
sizeable majority of the literature was based around large organisations, and a minority 
had focused on small or nonprofit organisations; only over the past decade had research 
turn its attention to the people who did the work of strategy within organizations.  It was 
deduced that frameworks on strategy and SM had tended to be prescriptive, and that the 
lack of consensus of a singular definition of various terms such as strategy, SM, small 
business, non-profit organizations and strategic decisions, was a concern for researchers.   
It was established that the strategy development Process had progressed since the singular 
Planning School approach of the early 1960s (Ansoff, 1965), but that the existent 
literature did not provide clarity on the use of formalized SP. The two major approaches 
to  strategy-making,  prescriptive  and  emergent,  were  evaluated  and  a  review  was 
undertaken of SM’s evolution covering McKiernan’s (1996) four schools.  An evaluation 
was undertaken of some of the main multi-dimensional strategy development process 
frameworks (Appendix 2.2) that have been developed over the past two decades.  
Following this assessment, it was concluded that the Bailey et al’s (2000) six dimensional 
instrument, used in  conjunction with Pettigrew’s (1988) model, had the ability to provide 
the means required by this study, in order to acquire understanding and knowledge,  in 
responding to the research questions.  The conditions under which decision-making was 
made was evaluated, and it was ascertained that small business owners/managers were 
constrained in their decision making by internal and external pressures that were unique 
to the small firm sector (Byers and Slack, 2001).  It was deduced that decisions appeared 
to be made mainly in the context of survival and operational necessity (Beaver, 2003). 
However, further research was needed that explored the broader context of strategic 
decision-making such as the role of the strategist (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 
2006).  
The Contents section contained a synopsis of measuring performance in both small 
businesses and nonprofit organisations.  In  sport  organisations,  including  rugby  clubs,  
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playing performance (utility maximisation) was established to be the main measurement 
of success (Chadwick, 2009), but it was concluded that a multi-dimensional approach to 
performance, including playing performance, would develop a greater understanding of 
this research.  The chapter moved toward closure with a Context section that deliberated 
the frameworks of NPOs and small businesses, but, as previously stated, definitions in 
each area were not consistent.  It was concluded that rugby clubs over the research period, 
matched the characteristics displayed in the literature concerning NPOs and small 
businesses. 
The following chapter examines, and provides an insight into, the context of the research 
into the strategy-making process.    
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“Sport has, and can be used as a context for management 
research”  
(Adcroft and Teckman, 2008, p.601).     
3.1:     Setting the Scene 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  present, and outline,  the  context  of  the  study. The 
researcher was “always mindful that those who play, watch, referee or administer have 
never existed in a vacuum but are the products of their time and place, acting within and 
upon a wider social context” (Richards, 2007, p.22). So the research examines, via current 
literature and historical data, the social, economic, cultural and political influences on the 
development of the Game of Rugby Football.  Due to the need to understand the changing 
context in which Rugby operates, it was necessary to examine, and comprehend, not only 
the history of the individual clubs in the study, but also to chronicle the development of 
the Game in Wales since its conception.  The reader may appreciate that the history of 
the first one hundred years of Welsh Rugby researched by Smith and Williams (1980) 
covers 461 pages, so it was necessary, therefore, to condense the findings and to place 
them in the appendices section of this research.   This chapter therefore, concentrates on 
the rugby period from the formation of the National League in 1990, through the 
establishment of the Professional Game in 1995 and up to the position of the Game in 
Wales and Europe as at 2000.  Throughout, a defining question was asked, ‘Is Rugby a 
Sport or a Business?’   
To obtain a deep and full understanding of each club, key stakeholders were identified in 
order to acquire their knowledge, and interpretation, of events over the research period.  
Backing such an approach, Beaver (2003, p63), stated that, 
“Management in small firms cannot be separated from the motivation 
and actions of the key actors.  They are the fundamental component in 
understanding the fashioning of the relationships between owners and 
decision-making, managerial styles, organisational structures and 
cultures, and patterns of business development"  
As an additional aid to assist the understanding of the reader, the chapter closes with an 
introduction to the individual research clubs and respondents.   
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3.2     The Sporting Environment in Context. 
To be effective, any organisation, including a rugby club, must adapt to the demands of 
those key factors in its external environment that have a direct, or indirect, influence on 
it (Johnson et al, 2008).  The Political influences include legislation, taxation, local and 
national government policies; Economic factors covering unemployment, disposable 
income, interest rates,  inflation  and  resource  cost;  Socio-cultural   such  as   income   
distribution, population demographics, social mobility, attitudes to work and leisure and 
consumerism; Technology change such as new discoveries and developments, new 
materials and cheaper methods of production. Those PEST factors influencing sporting 
organisations can be seen in Figure 3.1 
 
  Fig 3.1:   The Sport Organisation’s General and Task Environment 
                                                                (Slack, 1997, p134) 
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3.3     What is Sport? 
Sport, both past and present, could be considered as an activity that offered people of all 
ages, and all classes, a basis for physical, emotional and social satisfaction (Johnes, 2005). 
Actions are generated that act not only to bring individuals together, in participation or 
spectating, but equally propel them apart (Adcock and Teckman, 2009).  With sport there 
is an immediate acceptance of a need for opposition, individuals or teams, to compete 
against, and to co-operate with, in avenues such as leagues.  ‘Sports organisations actively 
need to engage with one another in order to fulfil their central purpose....the heritage of 
sport in this regard was established long ago” (Chadwick, 2009, p.194).  The game itself 
was the actual ‘product’ consumed by the public, but it was also intangible (Adcroft and 
Teckman, 2008).  In any sporting contest the result is unpredictable and uncertain between 
the opposing participants.  Nonetheless, the upshot of any sporting match-up offers clear, 
tangible and measureable outcomes of performance; for rugby matches the team either 
win, draw or lose, a result that all present witness and understand (Adcroft and Teckman, 
2008).  Unlike business organisations, the nonprofit, sport club’s objective is usually to 
achieve playing success through winning league titles and cups (utility maximisation), 
rather than to benefit from earning money (profit maximisation) (Downward et al, 2009).  
Again, unlike businesses, teams are dependent on not only the survival of other clubs 
(competitors) in order to play, but also their standard of performance to ensure the 
maximisation of spectators’ interest, both in an amateur era as well as a professional era.    
3.3.1     A Sport Organisation or a Business? 
In any organisation, there are different variables to weigh up when considering its future 
direction, but in the case of a sport organisation, the first question that should be asked 
was, ‘Is a sport organisation actually a business?’  As Trenberth (2003, p.24) contended, 
 “While it is clear that sport organisations, in order to remain viable, 
should to a greater extent be run along sound business principles and 
perform financially, the debate continues as to whether sport is in fact 
a business like any other”             
Due to sport’s special characteristics, such as teams competing against and also co-
operating with each other (Stewart and Smith, 1999), denote that sport is not merely an 
alternative type of commercial activity (Appendix 3.1).   Nonetheless, it was argued that 
there is a critical need to further understanding of  management  practices  set  in  diverse  
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contexts because, “All management contexts offer different outlooks, which pave the way 
to different perceptions of what is going on” (Gummerson, 2006, p.171).  In support of 
that contention, four reasons were offered as to why a serious investigation into 
management theory’s role in the sport phenomena was warranted.  First, there were many 
common issues to both the study of sport and of management.  Second, the allocating of 
scarce and finite resources to achieve best possible outcomes was associated with both 
subjects; third, sport offered clear, tangible, measurable outcomes and fourth, sport, like 
business strategy, was about contests. In contending that ‘Sport and business are the same 
but different and also different but the same’ (Adcroft and Techman, 2009, p12) it was 
noted that concepts like strategy and organisational behaviour would manifest themselves 
differently in the dissimilar contexts.  In addition, there were differences in the nature of 
competition, and how business and sport organisations dealt with that competition.  
The universal appeal of all major sports, including Rugby Union Football, encompassed 
most elements of society and generated a unique, emotional attachment and expectation 
amongst stakeholders who frequently maintained to be ‘experts’ on the sport, but with 
different expectations  (Appendix 3.2).   With Rugby Union Football being one of the last 
global sporting bastions of ‘amateurism’, topics of interest that arose within this study,  
i) Would a comparison of how rugby clubs were run, prior to and following the 
IoP in August 1995, highlight similarities or differences? and    
 
ii) With the Game offering legitimate monetary rewards to all participants, had 
clubs been forced into adopting the characteristics and practices of business 
enterprises? (Hoye et al, 2009).  
To gain a full understanding of those topics, it was necessary to examine the context and 
characteristics of the Game since its founding since, as Polley (1998, p161) pointed out, 
“It is impossible to understand sport (rugby union football) without 
looking to history.   Such intrinsic and extrinsic features of organised 
sports as their rules and rituals, the time and place at which they were 
played, and the social, ethnic, and gender profile of the players, 
spectators, administrators, and patrons were not recreated on a daily 
basis:  they are inherited from the past, including the immediate past”  
It was within such intrinsic, and extrinsic, features that the next section examined the 
context of rugby in Wales. 
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3.4     Understanding the Rugby Context, Pre-1995. 
Rugby Football was first introduced in to Wales in 1850, at Lampeter College, by the 
newly appointed Vice-Chancellor, Rowland Williams (Richards, 2007). From that simple 
beginning, Rugby Football became established as the Principality’s National Sport (Smith 
and Williams, 1980).  The importance of Rugby to Wales was that it was not only a 
generator for the Welsh economy, but it had given people in the Principality a sense of 
national identity (Morgan, 1981).   As Andrews and Howell (1993, p.78) wrote,    
“In Wales rugby commands the national gaze, and it is the rugby arena 
where Welsh ‘hwyl’ is most evident. To the popular imagination rugby 
is as Welsh as coal mining, male voice choirs, How Green Was My 
Valley, Dylan Thomas, and Tom Jones...” 
A concise history of rugby in Wales can be found in Appendix 3.3. It covers the 
establishment of rugby football, its spread to Wales, the forming of the WFU (WRU) in 
1881, the split in the amateur rugby ranks that led to rugby league’s formation, the two 
golden eras of Welsh rugby, the fight with the religious revival, the impact of the Great 
Depression of the 1920’s and 1930 on clubs and players, the post war growth of the Game 
and the impact of IRB, WRU and Government policies since the birth of rugby.  The 
impact of those events were examined via the writings of researchers Andrews and 
Howell (1993); Birley (1993), Cains (1999); Dunning and Shread (2005);Harris (2007); 
Holt (1989); Hoye (2009);  Johnes (2005); John (1985);  Macrory (1991); Morgan (1981); 
Norridge (2008); Polley 1998);  Reason and James (1979); Richards (2007); Smith 
(1999); Smith and Williams (1980); Royds (1949); Tranter (1998); Vamplew (1988), 
Williams (1983,1985), and  Zimbalist, (2003). The histories of the clubs, Ebbw Vale 
(Boucher, 2000), Newbridge (Powell, 1988), and Llanelli (Hughes 1986) can also be 
found in Appendices 3.4.to 3.6.   
Rugby clubs were spread throughout Wales, but found mainly in the South.  The small 
community-based club provided a range of participation opportunities for the local 
population to be involved in sport, and were categorised by stakeholders as either ‘First 
Class’ or ‘Second Class’, with the category depending upon the standing of a club’s on-
field opponents.  The recognised eighteen ‘First Class’ clubs were in reality, a cartel 
because it was virtually impossible for a ‘Second Class’ class to obtain fixtures against 
the so-called ‘Merit Table’ teams (Appendix 3.8).   Although fixtures were considered as 
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 ‘friendly games’ the rivalry between teams, and the desire to win, meant that games were 
highly competitive, and on occasions violent (Smith & Williams, 1980).   
In 1990, at the third attempt spread over a century, the governing body of the sport in 
Wales, the Welsh Rugby Union (WRU), were authorised to make a major change to the 
structure of the Game by introducing a National League for all clubs in Wales.  
Unfortunately, whilst still acclimatising to the formation of leagues which offered parity, 
through promotion and relegation, to all participants, clubs were then faced, after 145 
years of amateurism, with an unprecedented change to the very core value of the Game.  
The global governing body, the International Rugby Board (IRB), made the seismic 
decision in August 1995, to make the Game ‘open’ through the IoP.  This transformation 
immediately raised widespread concern within and outside the Game; for most followers, 
it led to an intriguing, and critical, question –‘How would clubs survive?’ From an 
academic standing that question translated into ‘How did clubs create a strategy to deal 
successfully with the new professional era?’   Whilst many researchers and writers have 
contributed to the knowledge on Rugby Union Football and the Game in Wales,  little 
was known, or had been written, about SM in rugby clubs, particularly on how clubs 
managed in the context of a ‘shock event’ such as the IoP. 
3.5     The WRU National League Formation, 1990. 
Originally, it was in October 1908 that the then Welsh Football Union (WFU) proposed 
a league system, with a first Division of 10 clubs, a second Division and two district 
Divisions, East and West. There would have been promotion and relegation (two up, two 
down) but no club would have been promoted to the first Division if their grounds were 
considered unsuitable.  Alas, the senior clubs, Cardiff, Newport and Swansea refused to 
take part and the proposal collapsed, as it did again in 1975.  Finally, in 1990, agreement 
was reached with all 204 clubs (Appendix 3.7) and the WRU National League was 
established.  The initial National League comprised of four Divisions.   The eighteen First 
Class (Merit Table) clubs were divided into two Divisions of ten clubs and eight clubs 
respectively, based on their performances over the previous two seasons.   However, in 
becoming a member of the National League, each club had agreed to abide by the league’s 
constitution, bye-laws, policies and decisions thus sacrificing some of their independence 
in decision-making.  The National League had thus been embraced,  but very  reluctantly  
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by some senior clubs.  Divisions 3 and 4 were each made up of ten so called ‘second 
class’ clubs ranging from Narberth RFC in the West, Blaina RFC in the East and Ruthin 
RFC in the North.  By season 1993/94 all WRU clubs were playing in an enlarged 
National League.   Despite the formation of the league, the former merit table clubs hung 
on to their positions until season 1992/93 when Tredegar RFC became the first member 
of the old  ‘Top18’  to be regulated, based purely on playing ability and performance, 
from Division Two to Division Three.  Clubs inevitably found their playing ‘level’ within 
the League.  With positions in the National League now based on playing performance, 
Dunvant RFC based in West Wales became the champion of the non-merit table clubs by 
gaining promotion to the top Division in season 1993/94.  Rugby in the Principality was 
now considered to be truly competitive with a club’s standing in the Game based on 
performance rather than the previous socially-based determinants of status (Appendix 
3.8).   
However, despite this constructed competitive environment, the formation, structure and 
administration of clubs did not change; most were member owned clubs run by an elected 
committee.  Subsequently all WRU clubs, with the exception of some University teams, 
part-take in the National Leagues that embrace annual promotion and relegation.  Some 
people were cynical about the true meritocratic basis of the National Leagues because of 
the manipulation of competition rules by the governing body.  
3.5.1     National League Title Performances, 1990-1995. 
Just as they had succeeded in the first year of the WRU Challenge Cup in 1972, Neath 
won the inaugural National League title.  They were joined by Swansea 1992 and 1994, 
along with Llanelli in 1993.  The West Wales clubs dominance was interrupted in 1995, 
by Cardiff.  However, the very stability, and existence, of rugby itself was to be 
challenged and threatened by an IRB ruling, made in August 1995, concerning the core 
value of the global Game. 
3.6     The Watershed: The Open Game, 1995. 
Since the establishment of the Game, the amateur principles and standards had become 
institutionalised in clubs through customary, historical and time-honoured pressures  
(O’Brien and Slack, 1999).  Nevertheless, there was little doubt, that over the years, some 
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so-called’ amateur’ clubs had resorted to illegally paying players to represent their team.  
This practice was confirmed by Swansea’s International threequarter, Scott Gibbs (quoted 
in Johnes, 2005, p.87), who on leaving the club for St. Helens RLC in April 1994, said, 
 “It grates me that I am called a prostitute while players and officials 
keep on covering up what’s going on in (rugby) union.  Every player in 
Wales knows that when you play on a Saturday, if you win you could 
get a few quid.  Players get the cash after the game”  
Following the first Rugby World Cup in 1987 in New Zealand, money and payments for 
so called ‘non rugby related’ acts had been accepted by the IRB.  In July 1995, the Welsh 
Rugby Union sensed the global mood for change and issued a twenty-three point report 
warning of the consequences if the Game embraced full professionalism.  Foremost 
amongst its points was that payment for playing would fund individuals rather than 
improve ground facilities, clubhouses or player development.  It feared that only the 
wealthiest clubs would survive, eventually leading to an exodus of talented players from 
Wales (Owens, 1996).  By their clear lack of preparation, Welsh clubs evidently did not 
take the report seriously, confirming the findings of Aram and Cowen, (1990, p65) that  
“in smaller organisations the motivation to think and act strategically often follows a 
crisis, at which time it is too late”.  
However, despite that warning, on Sunday 27th August 1995, following an IRB interim 
meeting in Paris, the chairman of the International Rugby Board, Welshman, Vernon 
Pugh, announced the decision that the Game would go ‘Open’ immediately and removed 
all restrictions on payments or benefits to those associated with the game (as no guidelines 
or boundaries were issued on the word ‘Open’, national rugby unions were left to interpret 
the term independently).   Faced with the very serious threat of professionalism from the 
powerful tri-nation Southern Hemisphere countries, the IRB, in the words of many 
experienced rugby administrators, made a politically reactive choice to the monetary 
threat.  In changing the core value of the Game overnight, from amateur to professional, 
the IRB’s pronouncement, forced through by ‘politics and power’ (Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki, 1992), impacted on teams, clubs and countries throughout the world.  The IRB 
saw this strategic decision as the only way to end the hypocrisy of ‘shamateurism’ and to 
keep control of Rugby Union.   
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The ‘Paris Declaration’ was then ratified on 28th September 1995 at the full IRB meeting 
in Tokyo (Skinner et al, 1999).  The IRB could have considered staggering the 
introduction in both the Southern and Northern Hemispheres as the new season ‘down 
under’ did not start until February 1996, with an August 1996 start in the North.  Such a 
delay would have allowed all countries, and clubs, to properly prepare for such a major 
change to the Game; but no.  The IRB was willing to finally open Pandora’s Box in spite 
of the potential negative global consequences.  Clubs, at all levels in the Northern 
Hemisphere, who previously were defined as strictly ‘amateur’, (including those deceitful 
clubs who had already been paying players via permitted generous 'travelling expenses'), 
then found themselves in late August faced with squads of thirty plus players all  
demanding  payment  for  playing  rugby  union.  It was a nightmare scenario for which 
the clubs were totally unprepared, either in business skills or resources, especially as the 
new season was due to commence on the 1st September.   As the highly respected editor 
of the Rugby Annual for Wales, Arwyn Owen, stated in his editorial for season 1995/96,  
“ Money, money, money is now the official name of the Rugby Union 
game…many clubs will be unable to compete in the financial rat race 
and will either fold completely or revert to playing ‘social rugby’ just 
for the fun of it. Our Rugby Union game has been hijacked by TV big 
money. Professionalism could have a lot to answer for in the years 
ahead with the paymasters responsible for drastic changes in the name 
of entertainment”. 
In England, the governing body, the Rugby Football Union, imposed a moratorium on the 
changes to the Game, brought about by the IRB’s Paris declaration, until the end of the 
1995/96 English season.  However, a number of senior clubs in England chose to 
implement professionalism immediately, both on and off the field.   One result was that 
the formerly amateur, volunteer led rugby clubs attempted to transform themselves into 
professionally led business entities which, in itself, posed new challenges (Table 3.1). 
Crucially, private investors were allowed to inject finance into clubs which resulted in 
market forces establishing the cost and movement of players, but the return on the large 
financial investments yielded only short-term on-field success, not profit.  The new owner 
of Newcastle RFC, businessman Sir John Hall, set the precedent for player payment by 
offering former International, Rob Andrews, £750,000 for a four year contract (Richards, 
2007).  Players throughout the UK thought that utopia had arrived at even the local club!  
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Table 3.1 Comparison of Voluntary and Emergent Professional Sports 
                                                        (Adapted from Downward et al, 2009). 
     Members      Private Investors 
Ownership 
Governance 
    Clubs:   Members 
    Sport:   Governing body 
     Team Owners and 
     Governing Body 
Club Objectives 
    Non-Profit 
    Playing Success 
     Success and Financial         
     Survival 
 
Consumption 
     Consumer-Producer     
     Members 
     Free to air TV 
     Gate Paying Spectators 
     TV Subscribers 
Production 
     Amateur Players/Coaches     
     Amateur Committee 
     Members 
     Professional Athletes 
     Professional Management 
     Non-Remunerated Directors 
 
Form of 
Competition 
 
     National Cup Competitions 
     Traditional Fixtures 
     Ad-hoc Tournaments 
     European Cup Competitions 
     League Fixtures. 
 
 
In Wales, clubs in all divisions now faced the stark truth that, because of the changed 
environment, continuing to be run as an amateur organisation did not guarantee survival 
(Appendix 3.9).  Being ‘open’ meant that clubs were not being forced by the IRB, or 
WRU, to pay money to participants, but Welsh players, having seen the salaries offered 
by English clubs, had other ideas.  Playing rugby equated with monetary rewards. Rugby 
clubs, particularly those top eighteen Merit Table clubs, had to face the hard realisation 
that they no longer could consider themselves as merely NPOs, who, for well over a 
hundred years, had operated with a committee structure consisting of volunteer officers, 
including the authoritative chairman or secretary, making decisions and organising the 
club’s activities.  Clubs were moving towards becoming small business enterprises that 
needed to function efficiently, and effectively, in order to exist and survive (Table 3.4).    
On the IoP, five hundred Welsh companies were approached regarding rugby sponsorship 
but not one company took up the offer (Smith and Williams, 1999).  With such high stakes 
now being played for, the study sought to ascertain, 
a)  How did clubs go about ensuring that their performances lead to a top five 
Team finish in the Premier Division so as to gain European qualification?  
 
b)  How did the clubs take strategic decisions, and devise a strategy? and  
 
c)  How did that strategy contribute to a club’s performances? 
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The context of the clubs and the descriptions of the respondents were obtained as the data 
was gathered.  A fuller history of each of the three clubs can be found in Appendices 3.4 
to 3.6, including a breakdown of the club’s strategic decisions and winning performances.  
3.7     The Research Clubs 
3.7.1     Ebbw Vale RFC                                                  
Ebbw Vale RFC, a valley club situated in North Gwent, was founded in 1880.  The ground 
at Eugene Cross Park was leased from the local Blaenau Gwent Council and shared with 
other sports, football, cricket, bowls and tennis (Appendix 3.4). The club had been 
regarded as one of the top sixteen in Wales since the 1950s.  However, on the formation 
of the National Leagues, due to its poor playing records, it was not placed in the top 
division.  In seasons 1992/93 and 1993/94 the club only just avoided relegation to a lower 
division. However, at the end of the 1994/95 season, it gained promotion to Division One.  
3.7.2     Newbridge RFC  
  
A valley club situated some twelve miles north of Newport, established in 1888, 
Newbridge RFC leased its Welfare playing ground from the local council.  It owned the 
grandstand and clubhouse that were on site (Appendix 3.5)   Newbridge started life in the 
National Leagues in the Top Division.  Its finishing positions were 7th, 5th, 10th, 8th, 9th, 
then 9th and 12th.   After that successful 1991/92 season the club spent the next four 
seasons fighting against relegation but remained in the top division as at the IoP.  
3.7.3     Llanelli RFC  
Situated in an urban/rural area, Llanelli RFC was founded in 1872. The world renowned 
Stradey Park ground was leased with grandstands on either side of the pitch and a 
clubhouse on site (Appendix 3.6). Llanelli has a rich history of famous games against 
touring teams, particularly their win over the 1973 New Zealand All Blacks team. For the 
first three seasons of the National League, Llanelli finished either as champions or 
runners-up; then finished 5th and 7th.  Llanelli were widely regarded as the ‘Cup Kings’ 
in Wales, having won five out of the first six finals during the 1970’s and twelve times in 
all.  The club won the cup on three consecutive occasions, 1990-1992.     
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Table. 3.2     Ebbw Vale - The Actors 
 
Paul Russell 
Owner/Financial 
backer) 
 
Born in Ebbw Vale and has followed the club since a child back 
in the 1950s.  He was invited in 1994 to become club president.  
On the formation of a limited company in 1997, Paul became a 
director with responsibility for executive operations.  He is 
responsible for his brother Marcus involvement with the club. 
Ray Harris 
(Company 
secretary / DoR) 
He joined the club in 1997 at the invitation of Marcus Russell, 
whom he had known for several years, and is responsible for the 
overall day-to-day running of the club. 
Terri Morgan 
(Accountant) 
Undertakes the task of controlling the day-to-day financial 
operations.  She joined the club in 1996 to help for two weeks to 
install a new computer system.  The club kept her on producing 
the payroll and other financial aspects.  
Doug Taylor  
(Team Manager) 
His first involvement with the club was as an 18 year old, selling 
match programmes, nearly forty years ago.  He had previously sat 
on the old committee and had acted as secretary for a short period.  
He has been the team manager since 1997. 
Mike Ruddock, 
(Head Coach) 
Joined the club in July 2000 from Leinster, taking over from 
former coach, Leigh Jones.  Mike had previously been coach at 
Swansea RFC during the 1990s and the Wales ‘A’ coach.  In 2004 
he was appointed National Team coach and guided Wales to their 
first Grand Slam for twenty-seven years in 2005.   
He resigned in controversial circumstances in 2006. 
Chay Billen, 
(Senior player) 
Team captain during season 2001/2002.  He joined the club from 
Gwernyfed RFC in 1995/96.  He was one of the longest serving 
players at Ebbw Vale. 
Alun Evans, 
(former committee 
member) 
Represented shareholders and members on the Board of 
Directors.  He joined the Board in 2000.  His association with the 
club started in 1958 when he purchased his first season ticket. 
Roy Lewis 
(Press Officer) 
Followed Ebbw Vale for over sixty years and, since 1980, was 
regarded as the press officer for the club. When he left full time 
work, Roy started to work for the local paper and wrote articles 
for the Western Mail and other papers.  He is a member of the 
Rugby Writers Association.  
Ivor George 
(Supporter) 
He has served as a player, chairman, vice-chairman and secretary.  
To honour his fifty years of service, Ivor was made a life member 
in 1993.  An ex-WRU top referee, he takes responsibility for 
looking after the visiting match officials. 
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Table 3.3     Newbridge - The Actors 
 
Idris McCarthey 
(Owner/ Financial 
Backer) 
 
A former player with Newbridge and is a successful local 
businessman.  He joined the club as Vice-Chairman in 1997, 
taking over as chairman the following season. 
Graham Paterson 
(Club Secretary) 
Has been associated with the club for over 40 years.  He took over 
the role as Club Secretary in 1996, following the retirement of 
Brian Wellington.  He was Secretary of the mini rugby section for 
10 years from 1979.  He then became Secretary of the Supporters 
Club for 10 years from 1980 to 1990. 
Paul Tedstone 
(Accountant) 
A local businessman, he is the club Accountant.  He had been in 
that position for a short period, having joined the club in 2001. 
Keith Westwood, 
(Team Manager)  
 
He joined the club as an 18 year old player in 1957.  Following a 
period as a player with Ebbw Vale RFC he rejoined the club in 
1969.  He became coach in 1979 and served in that capacity for 
nine years.  In 1988 he became team manager but finished in 
1990.  He was invited back as team manager in 2000. 
Jon Westwood 
(Senior Coach) 
One of Newbridge’s senior coaches.  He is the son of the team 
manager.  He played one season for Newbridge 1990/91 before 
moving on to play for Newport, Neath and Cardiff.  He was 
previously coach at Abercarn and Cross Keys before rejoining 
Newbridge in 2000. 
Damion Cooper, 
(Club Captain) 
Joined the club at the start of 1996.  Unfortunately he broke his 
leg in 1998 and then left the club for a period to regain his 
confidence.  He rejoined the club at the start of the 2001/2002 
season. 
Brian Wellington 
(former Secretary) 
 
He played for Newbridge before joining the committee in 1964.  
In 1966 he became Club Secretary, a role that he occupied for 
thirty years until he retired in 1996.  
Geoff Champion 
(Reporter) 
Reported for the local Argus paper.  He has been a rugby writer 
for 36 years.  He has supported Newbridge RFC for the past 45 
years.  
Brian Jones 
(Supporter) 
He has followed the club since 1954.  He played for the Club in 
the late ‘50s.  He was on the Committee during the late ‘60s and 
was actively involved with the Club until 1999.  
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Table 3.4     Llanelli - The Actors 
 
Huw Evans     
(Owner/Financial 
backer)  
The majority shareholder and chairman of Llanelli RFC Ltd.  A 
Swansea born man, Huw only joined the club in 1997 during its 
financial crisis.  Mr Evans is chairman and CEO of Marlborough 
Stirling PLC based in Cheltenham. 
Stuart Gallacher, 
(CEO) 
First played for the club as a 19 year old in 1965.   He left the club 
in 1970, turning professional with rugby league.   He returned to the 
town in 1980 and became a season ticket holder for the next thirteen 
years.   In 1993 he joined the committee becoming chairman of the 
club in 1995.   He was appointed CEO in 1997.  
Colin Stroud 
(Co Sec. & Account) 
He joined the club from Swansea Sound in November 1997. 
Anthony Buchanan  
(Team Manager) 
Had been team manager since 1994.   Previously, he had held the 
position of team administration for 3 years.   He joined the club as 
a player in 1982 and finished playing in 1990.   He represented 
Wales at the inaugural Rugby World Cup in 1987, winning five 
International caps during his playing career. 
Gareth Jenkins, 
(Head coach), 
First joined the club to play for the youth team in 1966.   He played 
for the 1st XV on his 18th birthday and due to injury finished his 
playing career at 28 years.  He was assistant coach at the club from 
1980-1985 and became head coach in 1985, holding that position 
until 1992.   Gareth joined the Welsh National Team coaching staff 
for 1992-1994, and returned to Llanelli as head coach in 1995.   In 
2006 he was appointed the Welsh National Team coach but was 
sacked by the WRU following the Welsh National Team failure to 
reach the quarter-finals of the 2007 Rugby World Cup. 
Rupert Moon 
(Former Captain) 
A long-serving player and a former Welsh International with 
twenty-four caps as a scrum half.   He played for Llanelli for twelve 
seasons from 1991 to 2003.   He was captain of the club for three 
seasons from 1992 to 1995. 
Hefin Jenkins,  
(Former 
Committeeman) 
Former player, (1968-1980) and committeeman (1980 –1997) at 
Llanelli.   He was chairman of the club during 1989/1990. Since 
1997 he was one of the two ‘heritage’ directors serving on the Board 
of Directors of Llanelli RFC Ltd. 
Norman Lewis 
(Press) 
The local Evening Post newspaper rugby reporter for Llanelli for 
many years. 
Marlston Morgan 
(Supporter) 
The current president of Llanelli RFC Players Association, a post 
he has held since 1998.   He played for the club from 1959 to 
1968.   He was elected to the committee in 1971 and served on that 
committee until 1998.  During that period he was chairman of the 
club for three years. 
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3.8     Conclusions. 
“Was there ever a time when sport (rugby football) was all about Corinthian amateur 
spirit? Was playing the game ever the most important thing, more important than winning 
or losing and certainly more important than the rewards, individually and corporately, 
that ever came from winning? The answer to this is clearly “yes” and, in some sports, it 
might have still survived”  
(Adcock and Teckman, 2009, p.9).  
The chapter’s contribution to the study was placing the research in its context, via a 
detailed examination of the Game of rugby football union played within Wales not only 
during the research decade but throughout the past one hundred and thirty years 
(Appendix 3.3). The conclusion reached was that the Game has survived mainly through 
the determination displayed by the people involved, and in spite of the many social, 
economic, political and cultural constraints encountered throughout that period.  The 
unique nature of rugby had led men from varying backgrounds to combine together 
ensuring that the Game stayed alive within their villages, towns and cities.  It was 
established that from the founding days of the Game, that was based on uncertainty and 
unpredictability, where the main objective was sporting success, there was a competitive, 
but not destructive, rivalry between clubs.  Crucially there was also co-operation between 
clubs.  It was deduced that not only did the eleven original founders of the Welsh (Rugby) 
Football Union survive, but, as a result of this adopted ‘co-ompetition’ approach, they 
have been joined by over two hundred and thirty other clubs in membership, as at 2000.  
It was concluded that the first National League was established by the WRU, in 1990, in 
spite of the reluctance of the eighteen First Class (Merit Table) clubs to change over a 
century’s approach of self-determination regarding who to play, when and where the 
game would take place.  In addition, the study determined that the unprecedented, seismic 
transformation of the global Game though the IoP in August 1995, did cause enormous 
problems to, and threatened the very survival of, the Welsh clubs. In addition, it was 
determined that the inception of two European Rugby Club competitions at virtually the 
same time, had posed new challenges, both on and off the field, as the club game at senior 
level moved outside its comfortable, ‘traditional’ operating UK environment.  
In light of these changes, the methodology adopted to explore and understand the 
decisions and actions taken by clubs and their subsequent outcomes, is the content of the 
following chapter.
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“The irreducible purpose of a processual analysis           
  remains to account for and explain the what, why, 
        and how of links between context, process and 
        outcomes”. 
         (Pettigrew 1997, Vol.13, p.340)          
 
4.1     Setting the Scene 
When writing the opening paragraphs of this chapter, a smile arose when thinking of the 
diverse audience who might read this thesis, academics and rugby personnel, and the 
requirement to communicate in ‘double speak’ (Brannen, 2005);  what would the latter 
group of ‘research users’ make of the philosophical arguments contained in this section?  
Would they understand the difference between subjectivist and objectivist, positivist and 
phenomenologist, or determinism and voluntarism? Whilst acknowledging that the 
average rugby stakeholder might possibly not be endowed with an in-depth understanding 
of philosophy and social science, or the SM academic’s grasping of the sport of rugby 
union football, attempts were made to accommodate them both by keeping my writing as 
clear and succinct as possible. The challenge was how to proceed; “the choice of 
methodology is contingent on the problems and questions under study and the state of 
development of any body of knowledge” (Pettigrew, 1990, p285). The aim of the chapter 
was to select and design the most appropriate research method, based on the nature of the 
inquiry, the research questions and contextual setting within the social sciences, after 
reviewing the literature on strategy, small enterprises and nonprofit organisations. 
This chapter outlines the research strategies considered for this particular social inquiry 
to satisfy the research objectives and to collect empirical data to answer the research 
questions.  It makes clear the rationale behind the choices made. To begin with the 
philosophical assumptions concerning the research are outlined and then discussed.  
Research strategies are considered along with the criteria used to establish the quality of 
such research.  The rest of the chapter describes the research method chosen, the research 
parameters, how the study was put into operation via the clubs and the stakeholders, the 
data collection process and the resultant data analysis that was undertaken.  The chapter 
ends with a conclusion and with a table outlining the methodological approach. 
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4.2     Characteristics of Research 
 
There is no consensus in the literature on how ‘research’ should be defined (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009).  However there is general agreement that research is 
 A process of enquiry and investigation 
 A systematic and methodical approach, which results in, 
 An increase in knowledge. 
Knowledge can be acquired through various research concepts.  Induction, which is the 
creation of ‘new knowledge’ via moving from specific observations to a more general 
theory;  alternatively deduction, moving from the general to the particular, through 
analysising and interpreting existing knowledge in an attempt to create ‘new knowledge’.  
“In most real-world research contexts, induction and deduction tend to be linked together, 
almost sequentially in some cases” (Lee and Lings, 2008, p.7).  The two concepts are 
suitable to the methodology of this study, a combination of explicit knowledge (the 
literature review) and implicit knowledge (the experiences of the respondents).   In the 
context of the proposed research it was re-assuring to establish that “Strategy process 
research was capable of generating sound knowledge of ...why and how outcomes were 
differently shaped by processes” (Pettigrew, 1992, p.11).  It was also noted whilst 
reviewing the literature, that “In the end, all research is interpretive, and all 
interpretation is a combination of the systematic and objective as well as the intuitive, 
emotional and subjective” (Gummerson, 2006, p.174). 
4.2.1     Research Objectives 
 
The core aim of this research was to provide an empirical investigation into the strategy-
making process in Welsh rugby clubs during the turbulent decade, 1990-2000, and was 
reinforced through two key objectives: 
 To explore and described the strategy-making process in Welsh rugby clubs 
within the broader NPO and small business sectors within the UK, and to compare, 
contrast and evaluate the amassed empirical evidence with the mainly prescriptive 
literature. 
 
 To identify and understand the influence of a strategic ‘shock event’, the IoP, on 
the decisions and actions taken by clubs, and the resultant outcomes of any 
strategy pursued.  
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4.3     Philosophical Assumptions 
It is argued that the methodological preferences of a management researcher would be a 
reflection of his or her perceptions of the world and how it operates (Adcroft et al, 2007). 
In constructing the research methodology to be adopted in a social science study it is 
suggested that the researcher, prior to the selection of a research approach, be mindful of 
his/her ‘paradigm’; that is the assumptions about, and the way of looking at, the world 
(Cassell and Symon, 2004).  Considering myself as a ‘down-to-earth’ person, I had never 
given much thought to philosophical arguments.  Instead any question on the subject was 
usually greeted with “I’m a practical man, not a theorist” who employed simple, 
functional methods to resolve problems.  The study into research methods therefore 
started with an examination of my personal ‘paradigm’ assumptions. My belief 
concerning reality (ontology) is that each person has his/her own sense of reality, which 
is subjective due to it being socially constructed.  Personal knowledge (epistemology) is 
acquired via reliable evidence specific to a particular event, and my values (axiology) 
determine how that event is understood and interpreted.   
The events being researched concerned the relationship between human beings and the 
environment, so the researcher was facing a choice of approaches to the study, that of 
being a subjectivist or being an objectivist (Table 4.1).   
                      Table 4:1. The Subjectivist – Objectivist dimension 
                                                     (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) 
 
        A scheme for analyzing assumptions about the nature of social sciences 
 
             The subjectivist                                                          The objectivist 
                approach to                                                                approach to 
               social science                                                            social science 
 
             Nominalism        ←           ontology              →               Realism 
 
             Anti-positivism    ←       epistemology         →               Positivism 
 
             Voluntarism         ←       human nature        →                Determinism                   
 
             Idiographic           ←        methodology        →                Nomothetic 
 
 
To distinguish between these approaches to the social world it was necessary to explore  
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the philosophical issues within the two main paradigms (Appendix 4.1). Guidance to 
those researchers eager to examine management themes within a sport context, the Welsh 
Rugby industry, was offered by Trenberth (2003, p.19), who cautioned at the outset that, 
“there is no ‘pure essence’ or ‘pure nature’ of sport.  Rather sport is 
best understood as a socially constructed phenomenon, situated within 
a social context and shaped by social processes creating that context, 
and comes to mean different things within different settings over time”.   
The view of sport being ‘situated within a social context’ was supported by historians 
such as Vamplew (1988), Holt (1989), Jones (1988) and others, who did  ‘assume that 
there were links between the sport practised in a given society and the social, political, 
economic and cultural conditions of that society’ (Polley, 1998, p.4). It was also 
contended that ‘there is a curious absence of human actors and their actions in most 
strategic theories’ (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009, p69).  Therefore the research into 
Welsh rugby clubs (NPOs) involved the study of human behaviour and action, and 
therefore required ‘direct contact and involvement with the phenomena under study’ 
(Mackenzie, 2000, p124), an approach that permitted the researcher to get close to 
stakeholders. This was in order to examine clubs in their entirety through stakeholders’ 
eyes, which allowed access to their internal logic and understanding of their opinions 
regarding reality.  The focus of conducting process research was ‘to provide narrative 
accounts of the continuously developing and complex dynamic of people in organisations’ 
(Dawson, 1997, p.404). Following due consideration of the philosophical dimensions, it 
was felt that the study, and the initial research questions could be better answered, and 
understood, by adopting the subjective interpretive dimension.  A supporting view, 
offered by Huff and Reger (1987, p.227), was that,    
“…there was danger in believing that statistically rigorous, narrowly 
focused studies were superior to the rich, complicated understanding 
that results from careful study of a few organisations”.  
Nevertheless, the belief that social reality was shaped by an individual’s perceptions, 
pointed towards hermeneutics, the basis of interpretive approaches, as a method of 
research (Lee and Lings, 2008).   
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4.3.1     Why Select Interpretivism?  
The notion that social reality was the subjective experience of the individual in creating 
the social world indicated that the research approach would be primarily qualitative.  The 
interpretivist rejected the ways of the natural scientist,  maintaining that there is no 
objective social reality, as all knowledge is ‘constructed’ by social observations and 
therefore ‘the task of the researcher is to understand the multiple social constructions of 
meaning and knowledge’ (Robson, 2002, p27).   Reality is humanly created, and based 
on participants’ perceptions of situations and events (the subjective world of human 
experience), which needed to be ‘understood’ rather than trying to generate an objective 
singular ‘truth’ (Willis, 2007).  Knowledge is seen as ‘personal, subjective and unique 
...and required a (researcher’s) involvement with the subjects’ (Cohen et al, 2009, p7).  
Human beings see the world through individual ‘conceptual glasses’, so the study was 
attempting to acquire knowledge and understanding from event(s) and/or object(s), based 
upon the world as seen through the eyes of club’s  respondents  and  stakeholders.  
So in order to ‘understand the subjective experience of individuals’ (Burrell and Morgan 
1979, p253), the interpretive approach explored the feelings, emotions and values of 
respondents.   Therefore, with the main objective of the research being to understand the 
strategy-making process in clubs, it required getting into the minds of club 
committeemen, backers and stakeholders in order to glean a rich knowledge of the process 
as they perceived it from their own personal experiences (Robson, 2002).  Such an 
approach, in that, “strategy is not to be lamented or escaped or venerated, but to be lived 
and understood, as a habitat in which we discover and communicate human experience,” 
was proposed by Powell (2003, p190).  The data collected were pluralist, obtained 
through interviews, conversations and observations, from actors and stakeholders who 
had lived through the events that could provide answers to the research questions.  
Adopting an interpretive approach aligned the research with the values of the researcher. 
4.3.2     Positivism 
The positivist approach is regarded as foremost in both management and small business 
research (Grant and Perren, 2002).  Therefore it is important to clarify why this research 
approach was not selected to accomplish the aims of this study.  The positivist, a supporter  
of  methods  of  natural  science, takes  the  view of  phenomena that  knowledge is hard,  
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objective and tangible, and requires an observer role, with the capability to generate 
impartial and quantifiable explanations.  However, personal disagreement arose with the 
view that researchers are objective; rather they are part of what they observe, bringing 
their own values and interests to the research.  Positivism views the human being as a 
product of the environment, programmed like robots (determinism) rather than the 
individual producing their own environment through creativity, free will and being the 
architects of their own future (voluntarism).  Positivists, the traditionalists of the social 
sciences, believed that there was only one ‘reality’ which was external to the individual, 
and that its discovery was part of the researcher’s remit (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
However, this view has come under considerable criticism in recent decades (Popper 
1959, Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1985). The highly structured positivism research design 
placed limitations on the outcomes, and discounted other significant findings, because 
acquiring an intricate occurrence with a specific measure was unreliable (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009).  Critics, such as Gill and Johnson, (1997, p.7), argued that,  
“what may be an appropriate method in the natural and physical world 
may be inappropriate in the social world given the inherent 
meaningfulness of management action and its contextual nature”  
Positivism in qualitative research was challenged because “there is no single methodology 
that is invariably more powerful for assessing the validity of causal inferences in social 
science” (Hall, 2006, p.26).  Other researchers argued that “mainstream quantitative 
techniques…are too shallow as they can harbour too few variables, do not study 
phenomena in their proper context, and sweep persona under the carpet” (Gummerson, 
2006, p.167).  Detractors contended that it is difficult to comprehend people without 
investigating the opinions they have of their own behaviour and, therefore, it is unrealistic 
to detach individuals from the social environment  which they inhabit  (Collis and Hussey, 
2009).  Researchers argued that research was heavily influenced by a person’s world-
view or perception, beliefs and values which a detached researcher is not able to rationally 
explain in a ‘cause and effect’ way (Perry and Rao, 2007).   
Nonetheless, with regards to the domain of small organization research, the positivist 
approaches, with a strong concentration on quantitative measurement, remained 
prevalent. However, researchers into the social science world pointed not only to the 
complex causal structure that could not be tested effectively by  positivist  methods,  but  
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were also critical of the positivist approaches to small business research (Blackburn and 
Kovalainen, 2009), arguing for the use of other research methods, such as interpretivism, 
to enlarge present opinions in this discipline (Grant and Perren, 2002).  The significance 
of applying an interpretive method to management and small business research has 
strengthened in recent years due to the increasing acknowledgement that this method 
tackles many of the weaknesses of positivism research (Prasad and Prasad, 2002).  In 
attempting to appreciate the relationships between organisations, and how these are 
observed and operated by the individuals and groups involved in them, it was essential to 
use methods and approaches derived from the domain of the social sciences, to examine 
how those people think, feel and act functioning within a sport context.  Understanding 
processes and behaviours was vital.  The research, therefore, required a human face 
because, as Hall (2006, p29) contended, 
 “When the decisions or actions of key participants are crucial to the 
outcome, by comparing the statements and actions of those 
participants, the process analyst can often establish the relative 
influence various factors had over them with more precision than can 
be secured by statistical analysis”   
Therefore, after considered deliberation (Appendix 4.2), an interpretive approach was 
deemed to be the most appropriate way forward to resolve the research questions. 
4.3.3     Trustworthiness 
It was appreciated that all research designs had inherent flaws and that the quality of 
research designs had previously been judged by using four positivist tests, construct 
validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.  However, the on-going debate 
over quantitative criteria being used in qualitative research questions, “whether one 
should be concerned with issues of validity, reliability or generalisability within case 
study research” (Lee and Lings, 2008, p201).  Instead, researchers suggested that terms 
such as ‘credibility’, ‘consistency’, and in particular ‘dependability’ should be used to 
evaluate an interpretive study (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  Validity, in qualitative data, 
could be addressed through the honesty, depth, richness and scope of the data achieved, 
the ‘understanding’ of the various participants approached and the disinterestedness or 
objectivity of the researcher (Winter, 2000). Once the appropriate strategy was 
ascertained it was necessary to ensure that the  measuring  instrument(s) to be  employed  
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met the qualitative criteria of trustworthiness (Appendix 4.3).  In order to reinforce the 
trustworthiness of the study, some twenty-seven semi-structured interviews took place 
that involved financial backers (owners), chairmen, managers, team participants, 
supporters and pressmen.  In addition, prior to and during the research, data was gleaned 
from countless conversations with stakeholders.  As Yin (2008) advised researchers to 
act like an auditor, leaving audit trails to tackle the issue of authenticity of findings, in 
terms of method and outcome (Cohen et al, 2009), the case study research procedures that 
were followed were clearly documented and are covered later within this chapter. 
4.4     Research Strategy 
A methodological approach that is characterised by qualitative methods, usually adopts 
an open position to the data, is receptive to the possibility of adjustment in the work and 
follows a more repetitive, spontaneous succession of activities.  The research strategy 
adopted in this study is described in the following sequence: 
Role of the Researcher 
Research Process 
Research Method 
Research Parameters 
Data Collection  
Data Analysis 
4.4.1     The Role of the Researcher 
The researcher’s role in this qualitative study was one of seeking to understand the 
motives, actions and intentions of all those rugby club stakeholders who had found 
themselves’ operating within a complex and unique environment (Saunders et al, 2009). 
Support for such a role came from Shaw (1999, p64); 
“The subjective epistemology of the qualitative research paradigm 
views social reality as constructed by humans and maintains that if it is 
to be understood, the researcher...must adopt a role, such as 
‘researcher as instrument for data collection’, which allows them to get 
close enough to social subjects to be able to discover, interpret and 
understand participants’ perspectives of social reality”.    
Nonetheless, this approach was not without its philosophical opponents.  Positivism had 
generated a fundamental assumption that the researcher was an unconnected observer of  
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the phenomenon being researched with the capability to put together unbiased and 
quantifiable observations.  This belief suggested that the researcher had the capability to 
set aside pre-conceived notions, to isolate themselves from the phenomena under research 
and allowed the researcher to monitor, investigate and explain it in impartial terms (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009).  However, the researcher, having spent long periods in both SM and 
in the sporting environment of rugby union football, found the ability to truly ‘bracket’ 
assumptions of academic and sporting life experiences, virtually impossible.  The 
perspective that the researcher should be tabula rasa, a blank slate, before entering the 
field of study, was challenged by Lee and Lings (2008, p214) who, maintained that; 
 “It was a little naïve to imagine that a researcher was ever able to 
completely cut himself or herself off from theory about their subject for 
all kind of practical reasons.  I mean, it’s not as if researchers start off 
on research projects without first being interested in them and looking 
around for information”. 
Critics of the ‘blank slate’ assumption claimed that it ‘failed to take into account the 
significance of the organisational environment’s dynamic nature, where "unobservable 
realities" including beliefs and values could not be rationally justified in a ‘cause and 
effect’ way by an isolated observer’ (Perry and Rao, 2007: p.129).  Adding some light 
relief to the debate, it was felt that  ‘value neutral’ research could only be undertaken by 
a ‘catatonic  schizophrenic’ or the only possible ‘value free’ person, one who was actually 
dead’!  (Dunning and Sheard, 2005, p.282).    
The decision to act as the ‘instrument for data collection’ regarding the strategy-making 
process was swayed by the qualitative research approach adopted and the exploratory 
nature of the research (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992).  The investigation was conducted 
by an academic researcher who benefitted from having gained practical experience 
managing both in the business, and rugby, sectors (Adcroft and Willis, 2008).  The 
researcher was also a living archive, a life-long rugby man, being aware that, having 
intrinsic values and beliefs which could not be entirely isolated, and being involved with 
the social world that was being studied, absolute neutrality or true objectivity was 
impossible to achieve (Pettigrew, 1997).  These values and experiences could influence 
the research process from conception, throughout the research, via analysis and 
interpretation, to completion.   The challenge was to remain conscious of these pressures 
and to ensure that they did not make the study meaningless, untrustworthy or irrelevant.   
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In addition, to aid this investigation into a social phenomenon it was recommended that 
researchers placed themselves into an owner/manager’s temporal and contextual frame of 
reference (Van de Ven, 1992).   Throughout the research the words of wisdom concerned 
with research, particularly within the ‘political’ context of Welsh Rugby, that, 
"Researchers are on the side of understanding and knowledge, not of this or that group 
of people" (Curran and Blackburn, 2001, p25), were never forgotten.   
4.4.2     The Research Process 
The research process had been defined as “one of linking together the theoretical world 
and the ‘real’ world” (Lee and Lings, 2008, p.13).  Previous researchers had established  
that no approach was considered to be ‘better’ than another (Gill and Johnson, 2010), and 
that it was possible, and advantageous, if ideographic and nomothetic methodologies 
were combined within the same piece of research (Saunders et al, 2009).  In considering 
which research methodology to implement, idiographic or nomothetic (Gill & Johnson, 
2010), the desire to explore and describe how, and if, the clubs formulated strategy  
pointed towards an idiographic methodology.  A qualitative methodology was adopted 
because it provided insights that were difficult to produce using quantitative research, 
such as ‘what do individuals experience’ and ‘how?   However, strategy-making in this 
particular context had been scantily researched, so the study was also open to generating 
theory (induction).  This approach was supported because in actual research the process 
of deduction has an element of induction and vice versa (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
4.4.3     Research Method 
The primary purpose of this research was to investigate, and comprehend, if the strategy-
making process applied to small, nonprofit, sporting organisations, and by adopting this 
approach, “will be more successful in extending our understanding of where theory can 
and cannot be applied” (Adcroft and Willis, 2008, p321). It was not surprising to find 
that, as with the definition of SM, there was no universal agreement on the best method 
for undertaking research (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Saunders et al, 2009; Lee and Lings, 
2008).  The choice of the most appropriate research method should be dictated by the 
research questions and its context (Hoskisson et al, 1999).  Consideration of the objectives 
of this research, coupled with the limitations of previous process research, and that it was 
deemed that  SM was complex, meant  that researchers in this  field were encouraged  to 
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adopt a diversity of research methods (Draft and Buenger, 1990); but not all researchers 
were convinced by that argument.  Nevertheless, as far back as 1977, Bell and Newby 
(p.10) had contended that, 
"No longer could there be only one style of social research with one 
method that is to be the method. Rather there are many (methodological 
pluralism)…at the very least there are a variety of methods”.  
In light of the research objectives, it was considered beneficial to the study to employ a 
multi-method approach as part of the research strategy (Table 4.2).   
                 Table 4.2   Some associated methods of the main paradigms 
                                                         (adapted from Collis and Hussey, 2009, Chp.5)     
                                 
Positivistic Interpretivism 
 
Structured questionnaire 
surveys 
 
Structured interview surveys 
 
Cross-sectional studies 
 
Longitudinal studies 
 
Case studies 
 
Ethnography 
 
Unstructured interviews 
 
Hermeneutics 
 
 
Consideration was given to the advantages and disadvantages of each research method 
(Appendix 4.4). Using more than one method or source in investigation can have 
substantial benefits. Robson (2002, p.370) points to the following advantages:  
•      Reduction of inappropriate certainty – using additional methods may point to differing 
answers, which remove specious certainty.  
•    The ability to look at the issue from different angles (but not to establish a ‘truth’).  
 
•    Complementary purposes – use of different methods for alternative tasks (good for   
initial exploratory research).  
 
•     Enhance Interpretability – multiple methods used in a complementary fashion.  
 
•     Assess the plausibility of threats to validity (a particular pattern of findings and  
     context from one method can leave interpretation open to particular ‘threat’).  
The purpose of the research was to comprehend each respondent’s version of events, 
so in order to obtain a rich and full understanding of the strategy process, case study 
was adopted as the primary method of research. Support for using case studies into 
NPOs was offered by Kearns and Scarpino (1996),and Ghobadian and O’Regan (2011), 
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who highlighted the paucity of such case studies in that context.  However, Shanley and 
Peteraf (2006, p16) warned that ‘the richer the picture of a firm, the less possible it is to 
compare it to other firms – each is arguably unique’.   
Nonetheless, a comparative case study method was selected because it was considered 
appropriate for the topics under investigation (Pettigrew, 1990), and permitted a 
researcher to undertake a more in-depth examination of organisations within their context, 
over a period of time, and investigate a broader range of issues than was possible with a 
quantitative approach (Hartley, 2004).   This approach would provide the basis for the 
acquisition of in-depth knowledge via the collection and analysis of large quantities of 
detailed data.  Case study combined multiple forms of data collection including archival 
records, documentation, direct observation, questionnaires, semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews, conversations and physical artefacts (Eisenhardt, 1989).  These 
were employed not only to extract data over the period of the study from the clubs 
involved, but also had been used for some sixteen years prior to 1990 throughout my 
visits to all Welsh rugby clubs.   
Through the adoption of the case study method, the research aimed to gather information 
in a specific contextual situation, and then analyse the obtained data against the 
background of the literature presented in Chapter 2. Therefore, the research was 
conducted using multiple methods such as, case study, insider accounts, questionnaire, 
in-depth semi-structured interviews, observation and the critical incident technique, from 
sources within various club environments.  In addition, a literature review was conducted 
in parallel with the research. An appropriate plan that collected, analysed and interpreted 
the data concerning the study was then designed, for implementation. 
4.4.4     Research Parameters 
The research was undertaken within the following parameters. 
4.4.4.1     Sector Choice 
This investigation concerned strategy-making in a little researched sporting context.    
Interpretive research “often studies phenomena in the environments in which they 
naturally occur and uses social actors’ meanings to understand the phenomena” (Denzil  
and Lincoln, 1994, p.2); therefore in this instance the ‘environments’ were the 
surroundings  in  which the research clubs operated.  The  period  of  study, 1990 – 2000, 
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was, arguably, the most momentous decade during the long history of rugby in Wales. 
The researcher had lived and worked in the Principality throughout these years; so the 
decisions made, actions taken and outcomes concerned with the formation of the National 
League (1990) and, subsequently, professionalism (1995) were observed, and recorded, 
as they unfolded in real time. However, the formal research commenced in January 1997. 
4.4.4.2     Unit of Analysis 
‘The unit of analysis is the phenomenon under study, about which data are collected and 
analysed, and is closely linked to the research problem and research question’ (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009, p115).  As this research was interested in understanding how, and if, 
strategy arose in the nonprofit, Welsh rugby clubs, the ‘strategy-making process’ was 
selected as the unit of analysis to be studied and measured.  Having made that choice, 
decisions about the choice of club to be involved in this study were taken after the 
commencement of the research. 
4.4.4.3     Research Sites: Case Selection Criteria  
Once the decision was adopted to employ a case study approach, the choice faced was 
between a single, (intrinsic or instrumental) case study and a multiple (comparative) case 
study approach (Hartley, 2004).   Since 1990 the major impact of the National League 
and professionalism, particularly in financial terms, had been on the former Merit clubs.  
The decision was made, therefore, to examine a small number of clubs which allowed for 
in-depth interviewing of a large number of selected respondents from different positions, 
and levels, within each club.  Such a choice permitted acquisition of a greater range of 
informed opinions on strategy within the environment of a single rugby club (Eisenhardt, 
1991).  It was important that the sample plan, and parameters, fitted in with the other 
components, the purpose and research questions, of the study.  Selection of homogeneous 
clubs to include in the study meant choosing those ‘rich’ in data which were pertinent to 
the phenomenon under analysis (Punch, 2009); and, in the context in which they naturally 
occurred, provided the opportunity to gain a relevant understanding of the research 
question (Collis and Hussey, 2009). In such a case, it was determined that purposive 
sampling, which promotes the quality of data as being the major significance, would be 
appropriate (Lee and Lings, 2008).   
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The playing performances of the Merit Table clubs were considered for a term of five 
years prior to end of season 1994/95, and for five years from the beginning of 
season1995/96 to 1999/2000 (Appendix 4.5). Positions in the new National League were 
based on performances/ standing for the final two seasons of the Merit Table.  A position 
in the top two divisions for a minimum of five seasons was set as a condition for a club 
to be included in the study, simply because the League had been running for five seasons 
before the Game went professional in 1995. 
Hence, based on performances in the National League over the two specified periods, 
1990/1995 and 1995/2000, a comparative approach (Pettigrew et al’s, 2001) was adopted 
highlighting similarities and differences. 
4.4.4.4     Sample Number, Polar Types  
“There are no simple summaries of sampling in qualitative research, because of the great 
variety of research approaches, purposes and settings” (Punch, 2009, p162). Research 
had revealed that with a comparative approach there was no ideal number of cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), but that a small number allowed a more in-depth study of each club 
(Eisenhardt, 1991). If a larger number of clubs were involved, whilst the volume of data 
was less in-depth, it was more difficult to cope with (Hall, 2006). Several procedures were 
recommended in order to analyse case study data. (1) Forced comparison involved listing 
similarities and differences between each selected pairs of cases. (2) A theme (findings) 
or dimension was selected in order to ascertain similarities or differences with the group 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Comparison of a small number of cases (Table 4.3) selected via 
criterion sampling (Punch, 2009), offered the opportunity to explore holistic 
understanding and explanations, within and between the cases, and was supported by 
Pettigrew (1992).  
By using an interpretive approach, (4.3.1), the ontology, that reality is constructed by 
those who experience it, and that epistemology, is knowledge specific to a specific time 
and place, is acknowledged by the researcher, as is the uniqueness of each club. However, 
it was proposed in-depth, comparative case studies of matched pairs of contrasting 
organisations, high and low performers, in terms of their similarities and differences, were 
necessary to understand, and provide knowledge of, individual club’s actions and 
outcomes (Pettigrew, et al, 2001). 
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Table 4.3 Selection of Research Clubs for Comparison-Sample Criteria 
                                              (Pettigrew et al, 2001) 
 
Sample 
Criteria 
 
Club 
 
Establish 
Five 
Years in 
National 
League 
Comparable 
Playing 
Performance 
(High/Low) 
Location Access  
 
Travel 
Time 
to 
Club 
 
Ebbw Vale 
 
1880 Yes +69% High 
Gwent 
Valley 
Yes 
 
40 
mins 
 
Newbridge 
 
1888 Yes -92% Low 
Gwent 
Valley 
Yes 
45 
mins 
       
 
Llanelli 
 
1872 Yes 
Most 
Consistent 
S.Wales 
City 
Yes 
20 
mins 
 
Such an approach was recommended by Daft and Buenger (1990, p100), in that,   
"If successful firms are the topic, also study failures.  Contrasting 
objects and concepts helps one grasp the material and sort out key 
dimensions for comparison. Similarly, compare cross-sectional 
findings with the passage of time. People, ideas, and organisations are 
not isolated fragments”. 
The performances of the eighteen Merit Table clubs over the two periods in the National 
League and SWALEC Cup can be found in Appendix 4.5.  Within that elite group Ebbw 
Vale RFC had achieved the highest positive change of National League playing 
performance of +68% during the professional era. Lowest of the Merit Table clubs was 
Newbridge RFC, co-incidentally another Gwent valley club, with a negative change in 
performance of -92%.  Hence, based on playing performances in the National League 
over the two specified periods, a comparative approach (Pettigrew et al, 2001) was 
adopted, involving two clubs, Ebbw Vale (high performer), and Newbridge (low 
performer).  Llanelli RFC were included in the study as the benchmark club due to its 
consistency in finishing as the most successful Premier club over the two periods 
involved.  The aim of the comparative approach was to describe findings and to identify 
any patterns in the process, based on a multi-cross-case analysis (Pettigrew, 1992).   
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4.4.4.5     Access 
Access to a firm, the ability to get close to the individuals’ involved (the unit of 
information), and to uncover what is really occurring in the study, is considered as the 
researcher’s major difficulty (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995).  However, being a 
former, long serving International referee, then a club coach, director of rugby, and 
administrator, gave the researcher the distinct advantage of being known to, and ‘getting 
on’ with the senior contacts in each of the selected clubs (Easterby-Smith et al, 2004). 
Personal relationships and ‘professional’ links with many of the key stakeholders within 
the clubs clearly did help with the researcher being accepted.  It is not certain whether an 
‘unknown’ researcher would have been granted the same depth of insight by the clubs, 
the respondents or the club stakeholders (Chakravarthy and White, 2002), especially over 
the IoP, as “gaining insider information about crisis management activities seems to 
require a history of interaction between the afflicted organization and the researcher and 
a track record of trustworthiness” (Pearson and Clair, 1998, p74). 
In the first instance, the ‘gatekeeper’ to each club was contacted, either the owner or the 
CEO, and then the proposed research was outlined (Cohen et al, 2009); access to the 
personnel operating within the club was requested.  All the ‘gatekeepers’ approached 
granted the request without hesitation, and gave permission to undertake the research in 
full into their club; the only ‘pre-condition’ placed on the research was a request for a 
copy of my findings to be given to their club when the study was completed.  This was 
readily agreed.   
4.5     Data Collection 
A comparative processual case study, through involving the different strengths of various 
data collection methods (Punch, 2009), aimed to look beyond chronological accounts of 
historical and contextual realities and develop analytical themes (Pettigrew, 1990).  When 
to start, and when to end, the process of data collection did not prove to be too difficult a 
decision.  A time period commencing with the Introduction of the National Leagues in 
1990, up to the IoP in 1995, offered a contextual period of the last five years of 
‘amateurism’;  a decision was made to study an equal period, for the first five years, of 
‘professionalism, up to 2000.  The qualitative method combined multiple forms of data 
collection, primary and secondary, including documentary and historical data,  
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questionnaires, semi-structured and unstructured in-depth interviews, conversations, 
direct and indirect observational data and physical artefacts (Eisenhardt, 1989). These 
real time, and retrospective, methods were used to extract ‘rich’ data over the period of 
the longitudinal study from the clubs involved; information had also been harvested from 
stakeholders for some sixteen years prior to 1990, through visits to all Welsh rugby clubs 
(Appendix 3.4).  Data collection proved to be an iterative process. The significant pluralist 
approach involving in-depth, semi-structured interviews with the selected club 
respondents took place between December 2002 and July 2003. 
4.5.1     Process 
The research, sought to gain an understanding of the strategy-making process surrounding 
‘a sequence of events that described how things change over time’ (Van de Ven, 1992, 
p169).  As this study “recognises the need to identify and explain processes which go on 
within organizations” (Chell, 2004, p.58), the researcher was aware that problems could 
arise in investigating the stated objectives. So the difficulties or problems previously 
encountered by researchers examining the strategy-making process theory were 
established. One difficulty was the meaning of ‘process’, because the word had taken on 
such a variety of meanings (Langley, 2007).  A process had been defined as, “how 
effective strategies are shaped within a firm and then validated and implemented 
effectively” (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992, p.5), but a subsequent definition was proposed 
as ‘a sequence of individual and collective events, actions, and activities unfolding over 
time in context’ (Pettigrew, 1997, p.337).  
Having established that strategy-making was a process (Van de Ven, 1992), it was 
confirmed that organisations were entities capable of developing resources and skills in 
multiple strategy-making process modes (Hart and Banbury, 1994).  Their study of 285 
top managers revealed that organisations which used multiple strategy-making modes 
outperformed those who employed single modes. The selected process viewed an 
organisation as constructing ‘an envisioned end state and selects from... several equally 
effective ways to achieve a given goal’ (Hart and Banbury, 1994, p178).   Rugby clubs 
were goal (results) orientated, therefore focusing on a process was beneficial because 
“Processes are inherently causal because their outcomes are the result of the process” 
(Mackenzie, 2000, p110), and this theory allowed observation of the movement within a  
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club towards an end goal or state.  Further guidance for process researchers was offered 
by Pettigrew (1992, p.9), who suggested to focus on ‘real times, people and places as 
referents’  and  that  process  analysis  should be linked to the location and the outcomes.  
Encouragement for such a study was given by Shanley and Peteraf (2006), who contended 
that ‘process issues to date had been under-researched’. Potential difficulties were 
highlighted by Chakravarthy and White (2002, p183), who, whilst acknowledging the 
vast body of research on strategy process, contended that, 
 “the research suffers from the following limitations; lack of explicit 
links to strategy outcomes; focus on discrete decisions rather than in 
patterns of decisions and actions that accumulate into a strategy over 
time; failure to view the process from multiple levels (and 
perspectives); and lack of insights on how the process could be 
managed better to produce the desired strategy outcomes”.    
If the research was to be trustworthy, it would be necessary for the proposed research 
method to take into consideration the above limitations, whilst also taking into account 
the findings by researchers that context, process and outcomes (performance) were all 
linked (Pettigrew,1997).   To obtain this knowledge the clubs had to be studied mainly 
from within, and a multi-dimensional approach to strategy-making was advocated (Hart 
and Banbury, 1994). 
4.5.2     Content (Outcomes) 
As evaluated in chapter two (2.13), the appreciation of a firm’s performance needed to be 
undertaken with a multi-dimension rather than a uni-dimensional construct. So the three 
general levels of comprehending a firm’s performance i.e. financial performance, 
business performance and organisation effectiveness (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 
1986), were adopted.   However, additional specific factors were required to give a better 
understanding of the influences on a firm’s performance.  After due review and 
consideration, the elements considered by Storey (1994) to influence a SME’s 
performance, survival or failure, were included. These eight elements were management, 
planning, environment, age, firm type/legal form, size, location and finance; the first three 
elements were also found in the dimensions identified by Bailey et al (2000). The 
remaining five elements were also established in discussions with respondents when 
obtaining a background to the clubs.   
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When measuring performance, the characteristics of the industry in which the 
organisation operated also needed to be taken into consideration (Bracker et al, 1988).  
Sport organisations were involved with fellow competitors in a contest and, for that 
reason, the most natural form of performance measurement was the result of on-field 
games against other teams (Chadwick, 2009).  From the early days, rugby clubs tended 
to measure their performance based on results on the field-of-play (utility maximisation) 
rather than off the field financial performance (profit maximisation) (Sandy et al. 2004). 
With the establishment of the National Leagues in season 1990/91 measurement became 
easier and more consistent to monitor; for example, entry into the new National League 
formed in 1990, had been based on performances in the Whitbread ‘Merit Table’ for the 
previous two seasons.  The performances of all the ‘Merit’ clubs were considered for a 
term of five seasons up to the end of  1994/95, and for five seasons from the beginning of 
1995/96 to 1999/2000  (Appendix 4.5).  Secondary data (general information) was 
collected from major daily newspapers, club history books and records, Rugby Annuals 
such as Rothmans and Welsh Brewers, and investigative televised programmes.  
4.5.3     Context. 
The influence of context on the strategy-making process was given particular 
consideration because “It makes every sense to study strategy process and strategy 
practice by longitudinally tracking the actual visible activities agents engage in 
organisational settings” (Chia and McKay, 2007, p227). Contextualism analysis takes 
into account the history and future when exploring an organisation as a continuing system, 
and relates them to the present (Pettigrew, 1985).  For the eighteen Welsh Merit Table 
clubs the introduction of an official National League in August 1990 was a highly 
significant occurrence, as was the IoP, which was momentous in the history of rugby 
union football.  In both instances, it was recognised that “Events and individuals are 
unique and largely ungeneralizable” (Cohen et al, 2009). One of this study’s 
contributions to knowledge is aimed at acquiring an in-depth understanding of the 
strategy-making process, in a new context (Adcroft and Willis, 2008).    
To help researchers focus on specific issues and events, a procedural technique, the 
Critical Incident Technique (CIT), was introduced by Flanagan (1954).   This method was 
employed for collecting data about a defined activity,  or  event,  based  on  an individual  
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participant’s recollections of key details (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Through interviewing 
three or more respondents involved in a particular critical incident, possibly with different 
perspectives of the event, this offered a broader understanding of the event. CIT provided 
rich, in-depth insights into the occurrence, how the individual and others acted, and how   
the actions affected the outcome of the event (Chell and Pittaway, 1998).   
Consideration was given to the criticism of CIT, such as the misunderstanding of a story 
(Chell, 2006), whilst the retrospective, historical nature of the technique meant that the 
reporting of an event might have been flawed due to an individual’s slanted recall or 
memory lapse.  In addition, post-rationalization might have occurred because of any time 
length.  Nonetheless, in the 1990s, CIT was developed within a qualitative, social 
construction framework (Chell and Pittaway, 1998), even permitting a degree of 
replication (Chell, 2004, p.58), 
 “While the individual firm’s circumstances might have be unique, the 
type of incident, the context, the strategy and outcomes as a pattern of 
related activities might have in general terms be apparent in other 
businesses”     
In this study, the introduction in to Welsh rugby of national leagues and professionalism 
were momentous, critical incidents entailing high individual involvement.  The events 
were initiated in the external environment by the sport’s governing bodies, and in the 
wider sporting context such activities might be replicated.  
4.5.4     Stakeholder Respondents Selection 
Having accepted that the constraints of time and cost prevented interviewing or observing 
everyone connected with the clubs, the aim was to seek out informants who could offer 
‘rich’ information and shed light into the natural setting and exact phenomena being 
studied (Pettigrew, 1990). Therefore, purposive sampling was employed to select 
informants who could contribute, and were relevant, to the research questions.  The 
intention was to recognise important ‘knowledgeable informants’ whose contextual 
knowledge and in-depth understanding of the issues pertinent to the research were vital 
and data-rich (Lee and Lings, 2008).   
It became apparent that, to obtain a fuller representation and deeper understanding of each  
club concer+ning the strategy-making process, the views of  different  stakeholders  from  
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multiple levels and perspectives needed to be sought (Shanley and Peteraf, 2006). 
Therefore, internal perspectives were obtained from individual stakeholders at different 
organisation levels (Skinner et al, 1999); that is, the very top level, the owner/financial 
benefactor; next the management level, senior managers such as the CEO, company 
secretary and finance director; followed by stakeholders at the functional level, the 
‘production team’ consisting of the team manager, coaching staff and a senior player who 
had captained the team (Hart, 1992).  In order to obtain a broader insight into the club 
outside of the committee and playing staff, the opinions of a former member of the pre-
1995 committee plus those of a long-standing supporter of the club were also collected.  
An external stakeholder perspective was achieved by interviewing a local press rugby 
reporter.   
The prime objective, from this group of stakeholders, was to understand, and describe, 
the universe of interpretations, viewpoints and meanings given to events (Curran and 
Blackburn, 2001).  A benefit to the study was that the diversity of respondents would help 
increase the trustworthiness of the research (King, 2004). It was appreciated that 
“Stakeholders will have different perceptions and create their own myth about what they 
see or experience” (Adcroft et al, 2008, p44), but it was anticipated that by using 
‘knowledgeable informants’ in each club, a richer, more in-depth understanding of events 
would be obtained. An interpretive approach, which was highly contextual and subjective, 
had been +adopted, and involved an interactive relationship between researcher and 
respondents from every level within an organisation, to uncover deeper meaning of 
particular events, actions and outcomes.    
The various multiple levels respondents had ‘shared’ experiences during a significant 
period in the life of each club (Chakravarthy and White, 2002), and so the study needed  
to examine their perceptions. To that end, the proposed research was outlined, and an 
explanation given, to them as to why they had been selected.  It was necessary to ensure 
that the respondents in each club understood the relevance of the study (that this was not 
a WRU governing body instigated research agenda), so that they were encouraged to 
provide access and information (Van de Ven, et al, 1989).  All respondents who were 
selected agreed, without hesitation, to assist with the research.  A focus group method 
within each club was considered but respondents made it clear that they were not happy,  
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or comfortable, with this ‘collective’ approach.  In order to obtain in-depth data from each 
individual it was decided to employ the structured questionnaire previously used by 
Bailey et al (2000).   After making initial contact with the respondent, a letter was sent to  
the selected personnel involved with each of the clubs, clarifying the research and 
enclosing a questionnaire for them to complete along with a sae. (Appendix 4.8 & 4.9).  
This involved the distribution of some twenty seven questionnaires amongst the three 
clubs.  All the questionnaires were completed and returned promptly by respondents. 
4.5.5     Conversations 
Using the considerable freedom afforded by the researcher’s position as an International 
referee, valuable information was gleaned on how the clubs were managed via 
conversations with various stakeholders at each club during every visit. The benefit of 
talking with stakeholders, as highlighted by Jankowicz (1991, p.179) was, 
“Some of it will be gossip, some will be storytelling and some will  
involve conversations: all of it was valuable, often in a rather vague 
and unspecified way, in providing you (the researcher) with 
background about the personalities, procedures, cultures and values of 
your organisation"  
An advantage of making ‘irregular’ visits was that the researcher did not turn ‘native’ 
(Glauser and Straus, 1967), and allowed the researcher to remain detached, to take a 
dispassionate view, whilst gathering ‘rich’, in-depth data within each club. Those 
informal conversations, and observations, covered many different aspects and issues, 
internal and external, to each club and became more frequent with the commencement of 
the PhD research in 1997 (Appendix 4.6). Topics raised by stakeholders over the long 
period of visits included pressure from external forces (WRU, IRB, local council), rugby 
politics, club culture, governance, competitors, and occasionally, planning. Notes of the 
conversations held after 1997 were written within twenty-four hours of returning home 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). The information obtained via these complementary 
techniques, proved critical to the processual analysis (Dawson, 1997).  Using the major 
events of 1990, and 1995, as datum, a retrospective case history of the context, actions 
and outcomes of chronological events at each club was produced. 
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4.5.6     Insider Accounts 
The respondents, drawn from the small number of cases in this study, were able to provide 
intimate accounts of actions and outcomes concerning the exploration of their ‘social 
reality’ surrounding the National League and the IoP phenomena.  A hermeneutic 
(understanding) approach that obtained the clubs’ stakeholders explicit interpretations via 
in-depth, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, was employed (McAuley, 2004). 
The work of Hammersley and Atkinson (1997) on ‘Insider Accounts’, a very simple user 
friendly and supportive approach used in the small organisation context as opposed to the 
complex features of ethnography and grounded theory, had been advanced by Ekanem 
(2007) who combined, in-depth, semi-structured interviews, direct observations with a 
longitudinal study.  Being a person who was in full-time employment working irregular 
hours, the study had, by necessity, to be undertaken within the time constrains linked with 
part-time research status.  The researcher, whilst not being an ‘insider’ (a supporter, 
member or employee), at any of the research clubs, was a participant within the broader 
boundaries of the rugby social world, but attendance at research clubs’ games tended to 
be on an irregular, rather than on a regular, basis.   
4.5.7     The Collection Tools 
In order to account for, and incorporate, the various approaches to strategy-making within 
the three selected clubs, a research framework, or ‘instrument’, was required that could 
extract and collect the data.   
 
4.5.7.1:    The Six Dimensional Instrument (Bailey et al, 2000). 
Following a review of strategy development frameworks (Appendix 2.2), it was decided 
that the main theoretical framework employed for the investigation into the strategy-
making making process during the longitudinal research period would be the Bailey et al 
(2000), Six Dimensional Instrument, and questionnaire (Appendix 4.9). The instrument, 
supported via 5332 managers from 937 organizations, along with the content of its 
questionnaire, that had been endorsed by ten strategy academics, had been built on 
dimensions concerning strategy development that were prominent within the diverse 
social science literature (2.4.2), they had identified six discrete dimensions of strategy 
development; command (cf. Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984); planning (cf. Ansoff, 1965); 
incrementalism (cf. Lindblom, 1959); political (cf. Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003); cultural 
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 (cf. Johnson, 1987) and enforced choice (cf. Hannan and Freeman, 1989).  Importantly 
for the research, the topics on which the instrument was based, had been raised, and 
discussed, by stakeholders with the researcher within the three clubs since 1974 (4.8.5). 
The questionnaire not only formed the theoretical framework for initiating the 
investigation into the strategy-making process within each club, but also produced 
important data for the subsequent semi - structured interviews with participants.   
As strategy-making is viewed as an organization wide phenomenon (Hart, 1992), the Six 
Dimensional Instrument also permitted an examination, and a more in-depth 
understanding, of the varying roles undertaken by various management, and other club 
stakeholders, in any strategy-making process. In addition, as the research was longitudinal 
over a ten year period,  
“Importantly, the instrument also allows researchers to track changes in strategy 
development processes over time, both within organizations and within defined 
populations of organizations and to examine whether any such changes are related to 
changes in related to changes in other organizational processes, performance or in 
economic and institutional environments.” (Bailey et al, 2000, p160).   
The instrument, therefore, provided a way of ascertaining, and evaluating, not only the 
internal, but importantly the external, limitations under which the stakeholders within the 
three case studies were functioning during the course of the research decade.  
4.5.7.2      Pettigrew’s Model 
Pettigrew’s (1988) model’s three dimensional view of obtaining “depth” of understanding 
how strategies are conceived, via process, content and context, was similar in approach 
to Bailey et al (2000). The Process concerned who championed and managed new 
strategies; the Content, related to four groups of issues; the dominating frames of thought 
within the organisation; the strategy’s central objectives; the source of the strategy; and 
the extent to which the strategy anticipates the means of implementation. The Context 
referred to the inner and outer contexts of the firm. The inner consisted of the structure, 
politics and culture of the organisation whereas the outer context was the external 
operating environment, which conveniently, was divided into four areas, the economic, 
business, political and societal formations.  
Although, Pettigrew’s (1988) model was comparable to Bailey et al’s (2000) instrument,  
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it was selected specifically to examine, and concentrate upon, the research clubs’ 
management of the singular, unique ‘overnight’ strategic change to the global Rugby 
Union Game’s core value, amateurism to professionalism on 27th August 1995. For such 
a momentous development in the context of the sport within the research period, 
Pettigrew’s (1988) model provided a more detailed, and incisive, means of evaluating the 
internal strategy-making processes, in which the clubs were occupied, whilst they tried to 
adjust, with contrasting levels of achievement, to the essential needs that the 
unprecedented external change the IoP, had, without warning, imposed on them. 
“The contexts in which management operate are not inert or objective 
entities. Just as managers perceive and construct their own versions of 
those contexts, so they subjectively select their own versions of the 
competitive environment together with their personal visions of how to 
re-order their business to meet those perceived challenges (Pettigrew, 
1988, p19).  
As the strategy-making process was being fully explored within an exceedingly sudden 
transformation of a sport context (Slack, 1997), the long established rugby union 
game/industry, the researcher was attentive to the principles that underpinned such a 
contextualist approach (Pettigrew, 1990); (1) the importance of embeddedness, implying 
a need to study change in the context of interconnected levels of analysis; (2) the 
importance of temporal interconnectedness, with the need to locate change in the past, 
present and future time; (3) the need to explore context and action, and how one is 
connected to the other is vital; (4) the central assumption about causation in this kind of 
holistic analysis is that causation of change is neither linear nor singular.  Finally (5) there 
has been an explicit attempt to link process analysis to the location and explanation of 
outcomes.  
Therefore, the study aimed, by using Pettigrew’s (1988) three dimensional model in a 
specific sport context, to acquire detailed data and to understand the holistic and 
multifaceted explanations offered on the strategy-making process within the research 
clubs regarding a specific strategic issue. The probing questions for respondents, 
associated with this model, can be found in section 6.1 (p125). 
The decision was made that the study would use the two strategy frameworks. The Bailey  
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et al (2000) Instrument was selected to explore the various dimensions raised by 
stakeholders during the two distinct times, amateur and professional, over the ten year 
research period; the Pettigrew (1988) model was chosen specifically to examine the 
unprecedented changed context, the impact of the IoP, on the strategy-making process, 
action and outcomes (content), within the three clubs.  
To aid understanding, and extend more in-depth knowledge, data were also recorded via 
the strategic management frameworks reviewed in Chapter Two, and used, by Bracker 
and Pearson (1986), Venkatraman and Ramanujam, (1986), Stone and Crittenden (1993) 
and Storey (1994).  Each framework was utilised to make a positive, comprehensive 
contribution to the invaluable knowledge, and full understanding, of the strategy-making 
process in the three research clubs through, arguably, the most turbulent decade ever in 
the history of Welsh rugby.  
4.5.8     The In-Depth Interviews 
Obtaining the views of the key actors on whether or not the objectives of the firm had 
been achieved was, perhaps, the optimum and most appropriate way of judging 
performance (Beaver and Prince, 2004).  “The interview process prime purpose is to 
integrate information about the what, why and how of the process under investigation” 
(Pettigrew, 1997, p344).  Such an approach, personal interviews with respondents, would 
provide richer data for analysis (Berman et al, 1997).  After receiving the completed 
questionnaires, each respondent was contacted to arrange a meeting and it was confirmed 
that the interview would be based around the statements they had completed in the 
questionnaire.  A flexible interview plan was designed with the choice of date, time and 
venue left to the respondent.  Most interviews were conducted at the individual clubs 
offices which afforded undisturbed privacy and were appropriate for a venue where “the 
participants feel relaxed and unfrequented” (Easterby-Smith, 2004, p.93).   
The literature revealed that self-reported data could be the result of a desire to please the 
interviewer or to make a favourable image of oneself (King, 2004).  Having known most 
of the respondents for some considerable period of time, via my visits as a neutral rugby 
referee, the researcher was treated, and spoken to, as a trusted, personal friend rather than 
a stranger (Cohen et al, 2009). This was made clear by the respondents observed (and 
recorded)  non-verbal  language  such  as  relaxed  postures, ’open’ gestures  and friendly  
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facial expressions (King, 2004). Their body language was considered important in 
offering additional insights, as people’s views or attitudes are not judged solely on what 
they say (Walshaw, 2006). The enthusiasm and sincerity of respondents’ participation 
within the research, and the interest they displayed during the interviews, offered 
additional reasons to believe in the face validity of their responses.  
The interview was in two parts: semi-structured, providing the opportunity to delve 
deeper into the statements contained in the previously issued questionnaire; and 
unstructured, allowing flexibility in establishing their perception of issues surrounding 
the topics to be covered. A face-to-face interview approach, using open ended and probing 
questions, allowed the respondents to explain fully their views, in a coherent way, on the 
statements contained within the questionnaire, and permitted the researcher to ‘listen’ to 
different voices.  The aim of the interview process was to understand the respondent’s 
perspectives and actions, rather than try to establish a ‘single truth’; so posing the same 
questions covering context, process and content, to all the respondents from multiple 
levels added to the trustworthiness of the study. Having conducted management 
interviews for many years, in addition to academic research interviews for an MSc 
dissertation, the potential dangers of prejudice, from both researcher and respondent, were 
known.   
Before the commencement of the interview, each individual was thanked for assisting 
with the research, for completing the questionnaire and for agreeing to the meeting, along 
with a brief outline of the purpose of the research and what their contribution offered to 
the final thesis.  A photocopy of their completed questionnaire was then presented to the 
respondent that enabled them to recall the marks they had awarded each statement.  Time 
was then allowed for the respondent to familiarise themselves with their answers.  For 
ease of understanding, the questionnaire was broken down into the six modes of command 
(questions 1-5), planning (Q6-13), incremental (Q14-19), political (Q20-25), cultural 
Q26-32) and enforced choice (Q33-39).   
Permission had been sought from respondents at the beginning of each interview to 
record, for authenticity and trustworthiness (Gubba and Lincoln, 1994), the discussions 
‘word for word’.  Aware that the use of a tape recorder could generate a sense of formality, 
might have made  respondents feel ill at ease,  inhibited and less likely to talk  openly  if  
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they were aware that their interview was being recorded verbatim, respondents were re-
assured that a confidential transcript of the recording would be made and sent to them.  It 
was also made clear that the tape could be stopped at any time during the interview if the 
participant so wished (this happened with five respondents).  To that end the tape recorder 
was always placed within an arms distance of the respondent.  Finally, clarification was 
given of the period of time the meeting would last, approximately sixty minutes.    
Semi-structured interviews were first employed, based around the themes and statements 
contained in the questionnaire, with the unstructured interview then introduced 
concerning the critical events surrounding 1990 and 1995. Most respondents were relaxed 
and giving free-flowing narratives, especially about their version of the two crucial 
events.  Interviews actually ranged from forty-five to over one hundred minutes, with 
open-ended questions employed in an attempt to acquire a deeper, and greater, 
understanding.  When requested, specific terminology was clarified, to ensure that the 
respondent understood the question.  The researcher’s voice and body language were, as 
far as possible, projected as being neutral during the period of the interview in an attempt 
to avoid influencing the respondent’s responses. A further precaution, making notes of 
responses in the event of tape recorder failure, was taken. One benefit that emerged from 
the interview process was that some respondents, reflecting on the clarification given, 
adjusted the ‘views’ given to certain statements.  This ‘re-appraisal’ was beneficial to the 
study in that it offered the researcher a clearer understanding of the events, the ‘views’, 
as perceived by the respondent.  Once the interview was completed, the respondent was 
again politely thanked for their assistance, and the tape recorded interviews transcribed 
and subjected to content analysis (Cohen et al, 2009). The Ebbw Vale RFC respondents 
were interviewed first, and the interview process was then replicated within the other two 
clubs. 
4.5.9     The Club Story 
An important requirement, using individual clubs to research, was that the case studies 
were as descriptive as possible so as to gain a full understanding surrounding of what had 
happened (Mintzberg, 1979). Once all the respondents from each club had been 
interviewed a ‘club story’, representing the researcher’s understanding acquired from the 
respondents’ perspective, was composed from the data content collected, with the aim of 
providing an answer to the research questions (Langley, 1999). The story was composed,  
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after comparing and cross-checking the data i) within respondents’ accounts ii) between 
respondents’ accounts iii) between respondents’ accounts, and stakeholders’ 
conversations, and iv) the researcher’s personal knowledge of events.  The story not only 
described the process, or sequence of events, but also attempted to understand any 
connection between actions and outcomes (Pentland, 1999).   
Despite the time and cost involved, a copy of the story, along with the transcript of the 
individual’s own interview, was sent to each respondent to verify both their recorded 
comments and my understanding of the club.  It was made clear in an accompanying letter  
(Appendix 4.10) that if they wished to correct any part of either the transcript of their 
interview or the club ‘story’ they could do so. This was intended to prevent any 
unconscious malfeasance on my part.  The letter was then followed-up with a telephone 
call to each respondent to ascertain if they were comfortable with the transcription and 
the club story. Some respondents did make minor changes to their transcription; for 
instance, several indicated that they had not realised the extent to which they swore or 
that they repeated a particular phrase such as ‘you know’. Where requested by the 
respondent, bad language was removed and repeated phrases were deleted from their 
transcript without altering the version. The subsequent agreed club stories confirmed my 
interpretation of the data and the events.  
4.5.10     Manual or Computerized Data Recording 
The use of a computer package, QSR, NUDIST, for storing the qualitative data was 
considered.  The main advantage of this method was that even for such a large volume of 
data, none was ever forgotten or mislaid if the code and retrieval procedures were 
correctly followed.  However, the main disadvantage was the amount of time and 
resources needed to transcribe all the interviews onto this computer package.  Also coding 
categories or tagging was required for effective retrieval, particularly where not all of the 
transcription was needed for successful analysis.  After due consideration, a manual 
approach was adopted to obtain a richer and fuller ‘feel’ for the data.  With this approach, 
an additional benefit was that the time spent cutting and pasting, via Microsoft Word, 
allowed the researcher to get to know, and understand, the data ‘inside out’. 
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4.5.11     Ethical Considerations 
At the outset, it was the intention neither to identify the clubs nor the respondents and to 
that end the clubs were disguised by giving them fictitious names such as ‘the Warriors, 
Gladiators, Spartans, and Trojans’.  However, a difficulty arose when my partner was 
asked to read my initial description of each club; unfortunately, she correctly identified 
the ‘Warriors’ as Newbridge RFC.  Ebbw Vale RFC, under the pseudonym of ‘the 
Gladiators’, was also recognised, as was the real name of the remaining ‘fictitious’ club, 
Llanelli.  As a result of this inability to protect their identity, it was decided to use the 
actual names of the clubs, and thus the respondents involved, and a three year restraining 
order on public access to the thesis was obtained.  When the interviews were completed, 
and the transcripts available, all the respondents were contacted and informed of the 
difficulty in trying to protect them by concealing their identities (Appendix 4.11).  The 
financial backers/CEOs readily gave permission to produce the club’s genuine name, and 
thankfully, all respondents appreciated the difficulty of the situation, and gave verbal 
permission for their name and identity to be used in the thesis, agreeing that their 
comments were ‘on the record’. This enforced change resulted in enhancing the 
authenticity, credibility and integrity of the research.  An unexpected benefit of this 
apparent problem was, as proposed by Bowman (1990, p.24),  
             “I am not a strong advocate of case studies and case presentations per  
 se, but I would like to see some good studies on strategy that are 
‘peopled’, that is, studies that have people with names, who are doing 
things, studies that help you think about why they are doing those 
things”! 
The respondents’ ready agreement had been crucial to the continuation, and production, 
of the research dissertation, and the overall research had profited.  
4.6     Data Analysis 
Qualitative data, unlike quantitative data, was collected data in the form of meaningful 
series of words which generated value for interpretation (Lee and Lings, 2008).  Data 
analysis consisted of ‘examining, categorizing, tabulating or otherwise recombining the 
evidence to address the initial proposition of a study’ (Yin, 2008, p102).  The twenty- 
seven interviews produced over 200,000 words on the stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
club’s dimensions of strategy formulation.  Whilst acknowledging that there was no single  
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or ‘right’ way to analyse and present qualitative data, it was contended that it must abide 
by the principle of ‘fitness for purpose’, that is ‘The researcher must be clear what he/she 
wants the data analysis to do’ (Cohen et al, 2009, Chap. 22).  For this study the data were 
required in order to explore, describe and interpret actions and outcomes; to understand 
the perceptions of individuals and idiographic features; and through comparisons to 
discover patterns and to clarify ‘influences’. 
4.6.1     The Analytic Process 
The literature search on methodology revealed that there was a relative absence of well 
established, widely used techniques for qualitative analysis, thus creating difficulties for 
researchers (Curran and Blackburn, 2001).  One approach for undertaking case study 
analysis, pattern-matching, identified patterns and produced compelling analytical 
conclusions (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p.210), so, 
"one looks to see whether any interesting patterns could be identified; 
whether anything stands out as surprising or puzzling;   how the data 
relate to what one might have expected on the basis of common-sense 
knowledge, official accounts, or previous theory; and whether there 
were any apparent inconsistencies or contradictions among the views 
of different group or individuals, or between people's expressed beliefs 
or attitudes and what they do"  
Individual respondent’s perceptions and explanations of the club’s actions and outcomes 
were thus collected and arranged, with the aim being not only to compare and relate 
mutual attributes, differences and processes in homogeneous rugby clubs but also to 
recognise constant traits.  By adopting a disciplined approach, paying careful attention to 
the data, including the ability to cope with differing versions, the study intended to 
produce under thematic headings, interpretations based on the findings from the research.  
In the first instance, data collected from individual stakeholders in each club via 
conversations, and recorded in notes, were tabulated and coded under one of the above 
three perspectives which were closely related to the research questions.   
The process of analysing data began immediately when it was collected; the data were 
first analysed on an individual basis, and then grouped within each club under the same 
headings of process, content and context.  Within each case, and cross case, analysis was 
carried out  along  the  lines  recommended by  Eisenhardt (1989).  Data  gathered  on  the  
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various steps taken by the clubs before arriving at a strategy  process, were analysed 
within the six themes (headings) already established from the Bailey et al (2000) 
questionnaire, that was, command, planning, incremental, political, cultural and enforced 
choice.  The research themes were clear and precise, so the dimensional approach was 
adopted for each interview and assisted in both the collection, and analysis, of the data.  
Findings from each club were placed in additional sub-headings covering the different 
levels of financial backer, management, team management and external stakeholders.   
These sub-headings were used to compare, and triangulate, the findings of the club’s 
respondents from within each particular level (section) of the research clubs.  The findings 
on each club’s outcomes in order to try to meet objectives were recorded via a multi- 
dimensional approach (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986) employed for measuring 
financial performance, operational performance and organisational effectiveness and 
placed within content analysis.  Inside that section, the reasons offered for the increase or 
decrease in performance, were logged under the respective headings.  Under context 
analysis, data were sub-divided into either internal or external environment within each 
club.  The questions, answered via Pettigrew’s (1988) model, were also regarded as sub-
headings within this category to analyse data. Through an arduous process of re-reading 
and re-listening, to the findings, and employing data reduction techniques, such as cutting 
and pasting, a clear and detailed description of actions and outcomes was produced, that 
allowed for an in-depth understanding of the phenomena to be gained (Pettigrew, 1992). 
4.6.2     Data Interpretation:  Whose Account Matters? 
With the eventual purpose of the research being to consider the concept of strategy 
creation in the light of the research results, the theoretical context of the study, fully 
summarised in chapter two, provided the frameworks for interpretation of the findings. 
An issue that has a direct relevance to analysis in qualitative research was whose, the 
researcher’s or the respondents’, account mattered? (Curran and Blackburn, 2001). 
Regarding respondent support of the research they stated, "Who better to assess whether 
the researcher has captured the definitions, world views and their logics of action than 
those studied?" (p120).  However, as a warning to researchers of this approach, they also 
pointed out that all interpretations were provisional and that, 
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"making respondents final arbiters of the interpretations of their 
motivations and actions  ...contradicts a key epistemological principle 
of qualitative research that no account has an automatic claim over all 
others". 
In addition, criticism of qualitative research has questioned the use and intention of 
quotations from respondents to justify the findings.  Critics argued that, rather than the 
interpretation emerging from the respondents’ accounts, quotations have the reverse 
effect; of being selected to match the interpretation.  However, in this study, the 
respondents, some who were not only informants but also actors in the strategy-making 
process, expressed strong perceptions and opinions in their own words that described 
situations and actions raised by the questionnaire within the semi-structured interviews. 
So using representative, illustrated quotations from respondents were used to demonstrate 
the consistency of views found and to emphasise vividly the points the research was 
attempting to make (Walsham, 2006).  The respondents’ stated ‘situations and actions’ 
had been identified not only by the researcher, but also confirmed by other stakeholders 
both prior to the distribution of the questionnaire and once again following the interviews 
with the respondents, a threefold approach. Data collected from respondents were 
assessed against data from other participants within the club, which were the owner, 
management level and team management level (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).  The 
collected basic data afforded the researcher, to ‘enter the world of the respondents and 
see it from their point of view’ (Curran and Blackburn, 2001, p.104).   Nonetheless, in 
acquiring the data, care was taken in the thesis of making ethical pronouncements on the 
opinions and actions of the respondents.   
To overcome the potential difficulties associated with interviewing a single respondent 
(Bowman and Ambrosini 1997), it was advocated that  the  views  of  the  respondents  
were  confirmed  by  other  stakeholders within the club’s overall environment, without 
the respondents being identified (Chakravarthy and White, 2002).  The respondents’ 
opinions were more than just a simple, literary account but rather the kind of qualitative 
research termed ‘thick description’ (Gill and Johnson, 1997), aimed at establishing the 
underlying pattern of events.   The respondents’ interpretations of the context, process 
and outcomes of their clubs, represented by appropriate quotes, were chosen from the 
interview  transcripts  and  included  in  order  to  clearly   illustrate  the   findings,   and  
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understanding, from each distinct part of the analysis.  Qualitative research is based on 
narrative rather than statistical evidence, so researchers were encouraged to present their 
findings in a visual manner that makes an immediate impact on the readers of a thesis 
(Pettigrew, 1990; Stiles, 2004).  This form of communication, including both the emblem 
and colour of the club, was employed to give instant recognition to the reader in 
identifying which club’s results are being reported on each page of the three findings 
chapters.  
4.7     Justification and Limitations 
The research was carried out on a part-time basis and, as such, the key justification for 
adopting this methodology was time and access.  The clubs involved were very receptive 
to the research despite my employers, the Welsh Rugby Union, being not interested either 
in the research or in meeting any of the costs involved; and they would not allow me time 
for research purposes despite the fact that the Game was going through the most dramatic 
change that it had ever encountered.  During the initial period that the research was being 
undertaken on a part-time basis, employment with the WRU as the full-time Director of 
Referees, limited the time that could be devoted to the research.  
Support for the study itself were confirmed by the comments that   ‘the premises of natural 
studies include the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of situations, such that the study cannot 
be replicated – that is their strength rather than their weakness’ (Cohen et al, 2009, p. 
148).  In addition, the research does cover the emergence of themes amongst the rugby 
clubs that took part in this study, that Chell (2004) indicated might possibly be found 
elsewhere. 
Although the clubs and the respondents were helpful with the provision of data, the 
committees/backers were reluctant to grant me access to what they considered, ‘sensitive’ 
financial data.  The accountants in each club were happy to provide ‘general’ and ‘non-
specific’ rather than any precise financial information.  Twenty-seven individuals were 
contacted in the initial stage, and all of them completed the questionnaire and the follow- 
up interview.  Informal conversations also took place with the respondents throughout the 
period of the research. Importantly, all three financial backers were happy to co-operate 
and pleased to be involved in this study.  A final point worth noting was raised by Curran 
and Blackburn (2001, p.118) that, 
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 ‘the researcher (referee) cannot force any audience to accept an 
interpretation.  All the researcher can do is influence how an audience 
is likely to receive an interpretation by how it is presented... by 
whatever measures, indicators, data and form of presentation are 
deemed to strengthen the persuasiveness of the interpretation’ 
The data, which were obtained through a narrative based on the analysis and syntheses of 
respondents interviews rather than purely statistical data, can be found in chapters, 5, 6 
and 7.  They included information gleaned under the headings of the context, process and 
content.  In these findings chapters, the danger of interviewer, and interviewee, prejudice 
must be recognised.  A summary of the findings employing the Bailey et al (2000) model, 
and a summary of the findings using Storey’s (1994) Elements of Performance can be 
found at the end of Chapter Eight.    
4.8     Conclusions. 
The contribution to the study of this chapter was, resulting from the literature review 
chapter and the context chapter, identifying and ensuring that the methods adopted were 
suitable and feasible to meet the aims of the research. This chapter established, after 
addressing the issues, ‘what was knowledge’ and ‘what truth was’, that the selection of 
research methodology depended on the adoption of either an objectivist or subjectivist 
approach to the social world.  In order to reach a decision, alternative methods of research, 
nomothetic and idiographic, were analysed along with the research based approach to 
problem solving, and some associated methods of the main paradigms, positivistic and 
interpretive, were considered.  It was concluded that the selection of an interpretive 
approach was appropriate both to the ontological beliefs of the researcher, and to the 
exploratory investigation aim of the research.    
The research methods were dictated by the research questions and its context, the Welsh 
rugby industry. Therefore, the definition of ‘strategy process’ was further examined, and 
the assumptions and potential difficulties surrounding a process research were 
highlighted.  An examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the research 
strategies, led to the adoption of case studies as the method of research.  It was deduced 
that the case study approach was the preferred strategy due to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions being put forward, and it provided the means of collecting quality, in-depth, 
rich data, thus making available a greater knowledge and deeper understanding of the unit 
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of analysis.  After consideration, a judgement was reached concerning the selection of the 
case studies; it was based on high- and low- performing clubs over a ten year period, 
1990-2000, in the National Leagues in Wales.  The matching pair of clubs, Ebbw Vale 
(high) and Newbridge (low) from the Gwent valleys, and Llanelli (the consistent bench 
mark club) from the South Wales coast, were selected based on stipulated criterion. It was 
decided to employ purposive sampling, selecting respondents from different levels within 
each chosen club in order to shed light into the exact phenomena being studied in its 
natural setting.   
Respondents were contacted, firstly via a questionnaire (Appendix 4.9), and then by semi- 
structured and unstructured interviews based on the replies contained within the 
questionnaires.  The taped interviews were conducted over an eight month period from 
December 2002 to July 2003, and provided data for content analysis (Cohen et al, 2009).  
The twenty-seven interviews generated over 200,000 words on the respondents 
perceptions of the clubs’ process of strategy formulation and the reaction to the IoP.  This 
main source of data was complemented by additional data which were provided by 
stakeholders from within the rugby industry, including the media.  The rich data collected 
were then initially labelled under the three main themes of process, content and context. 
A transcript of their own interview was then sent to the individual respondent, with a 
constructed ‘story’ of the club, for consideration and confirmation.   
The strategy-making process involved analysis of the data gathered by the six 
dimensional instrument (Bailey et al, 2000), using the headings command, 
planning/incremental, political, cultural and enforced choice, and Pettigrew’s (1988) 
three dimensional model. Gathered outcomes regarding performance was analysed under 
the headings financial performance, operational performance and organisational 
effectiveness.  In addition Storey’s (1994) elements of performance were also utilised to 
give a greater insight into their impact on outcomes. The context was concerned with the 
National League and the IoP, the utilised actions (who, when, why) and outcomes (what, 
why, how, when).  Whilst the research was limited by having to be undertaken on a part- 
time basis, the conclusion reached was, considering that the purpose of the thesis was to 
acquire a ‘rich’ understanding of the strategy-making process and its outcomes in the 
context of nonprofit, Welsh rugby clubs, the appropriate methodology had been selected, 
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and the outlined research methods utilized for the purpose of this analysis were considered 
to be successful in achieving the research aims (Table 4.1).   
The data from the research clubs, obtained through the selected methodology, can be 
found in the following chapters five, six and seven, where the findings have been 
delineated through ‘the universe of meanings, attitudes and values’ (Curran and 
Blackburn, 2001, p.104) of the twenty-seven club respondents and many stakeholders.  
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TABLE 4. 4   THE APPROACH FOR RESEARCHING NPO, RUGBY CLUBS 
Philosophical Assumption Subjective, Phenomenology 
Qualitative Approach Interpretative 
Research Method Comparative Case Study- 
Sector Choice Welsh Rugby 
Unit of Analysis Strategy-Making Process 
Research Sites Premier Rugby Clubs 
Sample Number Three (Criterion sample) High-Low Performers 
Data Collection 
Literature Review 
Case Studies 
Insider Accounts 
Critical Incident Technique 
Questionnaire 
Semi-Structured Taped Interviews 
Unstructured Taped Interviews 
Conversations 
Observation 
 
Data Supply 
 
Primary Data    –   27 Selected Club Respondents 
                              Various Club Stakeholders 
 
Secondary Data –  The Game’s History 
                               WRU History 
                               Club Histories 
                               Players’ Autobiographies 
                               Rugby Annuals 
                               Rugby Magazines 
                               Welsh Newspapers 
                               Investigative TV Programmes 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Manual Recorded Data 
Use of Selected Theme Frameworks  
Intra-Respondent Data 
 
Data Presentation 
Written Presentation 
Diagrams 
Tables 
Figures 
CD of Appendices 
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".. it is important to understand the reality of strategy-making 
in organisations, not least because those who seek to 
influence the strategy of organisations must do so within that 
reality”  
(Bailey & Johnson, 1992, p175).     
 
5.1     Setting the Scene 
Since the 1960’s, the strategy-making process has been tackled by researchers from a 
number of different perspectives (Appendix 2.2).  Following the publication of Bailey 
and Johnson’s (1991) working paper ‘Perspectives on the process of strategic decision-
making’, their six dimension instrument was found to be comparable to the topic areas 
discussed with club stakeholders over previous years, and had in effect, formed the basis 
for gathering informal data on visits by the author to rugby clubs.  The aim of the chapter 
was to present the findings concerning strategy making in each of the three clubs pre-
1995, the last five years of an amateur era extending from 1881.   
Rugby clubs in Wales, up to the IoP, were simple structures (Hoye et al, 2009), run and 
organised by an elected members committee, who operated the club as a NOP 
organisation.  All positions of authority within the clubs were of an honorary nature, as 
such there were no full-time administrative, or playing, staff.    Individual actors, not the 
clubs, were the people who cement events in a ‘story’ because each actor has a unique 
narrative voice, relating and explaining the events, actions and outcomes from his/her 
own particular standpoint. “Data concerning the identities and relationships of the 
characters in the story (participants in a process) are required, if one is to understand 
role structure and social networks in which the process is embedded” (Pentland, 1999, 
p715).  Within each club, due to the number of respondents recounting the same events, 
it+ was possible that similar versions of events, actions and outcomes could emerge from 
the various club stakeholders; however, it was also possible that differing narratives could 
arise. The quotes displayed in the three findings chapters were selected by the researcher 
as being representative of the majority of replies to the questions and statements posed. 
A comparison between the clubs would highlight the findings, and factors, that would be 
classified either as similar or dissimilar.  The end results offered an in-depth 
understanding to the strategy-making process in Welsh rugby clubs.   The interpretation, 
and significance, of findings in relation to the literature are discussed in  Chapter  Eight.  
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5.2     The Visionary Perspective (Command) 
The traditional management structure within rugby clubs was based on a members 
committee that was endowed with the power and authority to give strategic direction to 
the club. The aim of this section was to establish if, inside or outside the committee 
structure, a club was dominated by a leader (Bennis and Nanas, 1996), or by a small group 
of individuals (Chaffee, 1985), who had a vision regarding its future and who was 
responsible for initiating any strategy process.   
5.2.1     Ebbw Vale RFC  
An analysis of the committee structure over a five year period from season 1990/91 
revealed an unsettled body charged with running the club. The club, which was a 
members club, was run by an elected committee of some twenty-two members.  There 
were changes in composition per year of nine, five, and none, twelve and seven members 
(Appendix 3.4e).   Roy Lewis described the make-up of the committee. 
“There were influential figures on the old committee of 22-24.  However, there was no 
dictator there. Meet on a Monday night, every night in the summer, then every fortnight. 
When I was on the committee the main thing was manning the gates. It was voluntary 
work see.  They were strong committees, particularly the 60s and 70s”.  
Former club secretary, Ivor George, was authoritative in his view about who were the 
senior figures at Ebbw Vale before professionalism. 
“There were three or four senior figures in those days, the chairman, secretary, treasurer 
and one or two others. There were never more than about half a dozen who were… you 
had to go to committee and justify everything you did but still you made decisions and 
stood or fell by them. Sometimes you went to committee and had a right royal rollicking.  
I worked with three or four chairmen, and it really was only a small number of people 
that drove the committee forward. The others were there and they made sort of their 
contributions and they made criticisms and the criticisms were taken on board; but it was 
only the chairman, myself, treasurer, perhaps chairman of selectors, and they were the 
people who drove the club forward”.  
There was common agreement amongst all stakeholders that the senior figures at Ebbw 
Vale were the elected officers who provided the future direction of the club.  However, 
due to politics (5.5.1) amongst the committee, it was acknowledged that there had been 
disagreement between management members, and that action was based on consensual 
decisions. 
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5.2.2     Newbridge RFC 
For many years, Newbridge had been run by a twenty-four strong committee (Appendix 
3.5e).  The respected former long serving club secretary, Brian Wellington explained; 
“I’ve been fifty years with the club and the strength of the club under the old structure 
terms, was its senior figures. I benefited from it; Mike Croad, who came on as chairman 
later, also benefited from it. The chairman, secretary, treasurer and fixture secretary had 
driven the club with a good committee coming behind them and it was a team, a strong 
team. That structure continued until about 1994 when it started to dissemble as it were. 
However, the truth of the matter is the thrust and the general complexion of it hasn’t 
changed over thirty years except for the last three years where Newbridge went askew at 
that stage. We’ve always had a strong team of about three or four people with complete 
trust in one another and in other workers, who were fluent enough to bring the committee 
with them. More importantly, fluent enough when the chips were down, for example, once 
a year at the AGM or what have you, to put the case and to drive the club forward with 
the support of its supporters at that time. The figures I’m talking about it was part of their 
duty, most certainly it was their routine, to walk the big rooms after games so if the 
supporters wanted to stop and talk to them they could. We tried to do the same with the 
players, communication and contact after each match you know. However, the last thing 
we were trying to do was to get a guy in who could provide this figurehead, like Id 
McCarthey, who in effect, became the CEO with his management team about him”.  
 Unlike the disunity between the committee at Ebbw Vale, there was harmony and 
agreement found within the Newbridge committee during the research period until 1994.    
 
5.2.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC; Comparison of Findings 
A common factor at both of the Gwent clubs, was that the elected members committee 
was recognised as the ultimate decision-makers.  However, within that structure there 
were a small band of ‘senior figures’ (Chaffee, 1985), officers of the club, the chairman, 
vice-chairman, secretary and treasurer, who did determine the future direction of each 
club (Shrivastava and Nachman, 1989).  Comparing the club committees, the difference 
between the two clubs was that whilst politics arose within the committee at Ebbw Vale, 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988), the committee at Newbridge were in harmony.  At 
both clubs, the committee members had previously either supported, or played for, the 
club, and had, therefore, been nurtured  within the club’s cultural paradigm.  As a result, 
‘decision makers’ who emerged from amongst a club’s membership had to overcome the 
established traditions, values and attitudes that had been learnt in order to attempt to 
change the direction of the club.  Another noteworthy finding, mutual to the two clubs, 
was that none of the current playing staff sat on either clubs’ committee. 
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5.2.4     Llanelli RFC 
 
The committee at Llanelli was unusually small in number in relation to other Welsh clubs, 
(Appendix 3.6e), but they did meet on a regular basis.  As Marlston Morgan pointed out, 
“Nine members who were making decisions every Monday night; the committee were 
very strong men with their own opinions. Alan James, he wouldn’t let us spend money!” 
Former club chairman, Hefin Jenkins gave a deeper insight into why the committee 
membership was reduced. 
“It was a visionary thing, I think years ago, when we had the centenary, 1972. They redid 
the constitution and they went back to a committee of nine from something like eighteen 
or twenty; and it was easier, but it meant more work for people. Unfortunately in the old 
system, I don’t think people were prepared to take on the responsibility which they 
probably do now because they weren’t paid and didn’t want to take the flak for it.  It was 
easier to make decisions, I think, rather than a committee of twenty.  The chairman 
obviously had a fair amount of autonomy in our club, although because it was a small 
committee there were a lot of people chasing a bit of power as well. So you couldn't step 
too far out of line, but having said, the chairman would have a vision or something and 
provided he had the agreement of the committee then OK he could go ahead with it”. 
Llanelli had a small committee of nine members dating from 1972, and members within 
that group looked towards the chairman to give them direction and vision. However, 
committee approval was still required for any action proposed by the chairman. 
5.2.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club. 
During the last five years of amateurism, all three clubs, in common, had continued to be 
run as a members club by an elected management committee.  The study revealed that the 
committees at both Newbridge and Llanelli were unified (Iaquinto and Fredrickson, 
1997), but at Ebbw Vale it was a divided committee.  However, the major difference had 
been that whilst the two Gwent valley neighbours were controlled by officers within a 
large volunteer committee, Llanelli had, some decades earlier, been reduced to a small 
committee of only nine members.  In all three clubs, playing, not financial performance, 
was the priority (Szymanski 2003).  From 1974 to 1995, Llanelli had won fifteen trophies, 
including four championships, and nine cups.  Ebbw Vale started in a lower division and 
could only point to being runner-up in the First Division in 1994/95 but, as a result, did 
gain promotion.  Local rivals Newbridge won the Snelling Sevens Trophy in 1990/91 
and in 1992/93, their first trophy for three decades.  
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5.3     Planning Perspective 
Through deliberate, sequential, planned procedures, organisations were able to develop 
strategies to achieve clear and well defined strategic goals and objectives that were set by 
senior figures within the organisation (Ansoff, 1988). The aim of this section was to 
understand if clubs employed SP to generate strategies capable of attaining set goals  
5.3.1     Ebbw Vale RFC 
The Planning perspective at the club was mainly operational.  Ivor George recalled, 
“We used to meet at one time once a week and then we decided we would have a sub-
committee meeting on the one Monday and the following Monday we would have a full 
committee meeting where all the sub-committees would report. And so it became 
fortnightly. There was an athletic sub-committee, finance sub-committee, and others and 
they would meet on the one Monday for an hour or so.  The following week they would 
come and the chairman of the sub-committee would give his report and it would be 
discussed, then action would be taken. We did meet regularly, I was out every Monday 
night.  Where to tour each year was a big decision, because they were financial decisions; 
can we afford a tour this year and how will we finance it, you know.  That sort of thing 
had to be arranged. I was lucky I was in school.  I was a head, and I could sort of spare 
the time to do things and organise things. My secretary was very good and did all my 
typing for me, and so I gave her International tickets and a box of chocolates at 
Christmas”! 
The research found that SP had been employed at the club, but only reactively rather than 
proactively, when the committee felt it was actually needed, such as in 1986 when the 
clubhouse burnt down and a replacement building was required. OP tended to be the norm 
5.3.2     Newbridge RFC 
Similarly, down the valley at Newbridge there had previously been SP at the club, as 
Brian Wellington explained, 
“There was one underlying objective and that was to maintain the position within the top 
16 as it stood then, the Merit Table clubs, and ensure that we performed there.  If it wasn’t 
right on the field, forget about putting it right elsewhere because that’s where it’s got to 
happen first. Planning was season to season because it was very difficult to have written 
formal plans. The only time we went into written planning mode as it were, strategic 
plans.… don’t forget we’ve had two instances of clubhouses either blow-up (early 1970’s) 
or burnt down (early 1980’s), and on that basis then we did have to sit down. But we were  
meticulous, planning purely one strand, one thread of it, to get a clubhouse back here so 
that we could function because it was an integral part of our set-up obviously.  We   sat 
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down, the treasurer, chairman and myself, and we did actually extrapolate over a period. 
We were going into the money there to in effect put a new clubhouse up. To do that meant 
investing and we had to protect that and we did it.  I must admit that worked, as we talk 
about it now. However, that was one, single project and on that basis we planned; but to 
say that it was a strategy, that the club planned with stated objectives, priorities and what 
have you, we were no different from any other rugby club;  other than where are we going 
to tour at the end of the season.  Quite apart from that you are at the beacon and call as 
it were of the economic situation and the playing strength. In terms of you had a plan that 
you’re not meeting and you’ve got to take action and change direction, I’m not saying we 
didn’t do that; but understand, we didn’t do it against the base of having had a plan. 
Rather we did it on the base that it was hitting you in the face and you had to act but you 
didn’t have the response time that some of these management jargons things and 
techniques talk about. I mean, I think this is true in the whole management game as well 
mind”.  
The formal planning at Newbridge was only undertaken, by the senior officers of the club, 
when action was necessary, as in the cases of destroyed clubhouses as described by Mr 
Wellington.   Conversations with long-time stakeholders confirmed that view. 
5.3.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC; Comparison of Findings 
Common in each of the two Gwent clubs was that SP was infrequent and necessity ‘event’ 
driven (Stone et al, 1999). There were regular meetings for the purpose of OP and 
organising, and strategic issues were occasionally discussed throughout the season.  A 
similarity found at both valley clubs was that planning was informal, not a logical, rational 
process, and was recorded in the minutes of committee meetings. 
5.3.4     Llanelli RFC 
The approach to planning at Llanelli was explained by former player and committeeman, 
Hefin Jenkins.  
“Our plans were in the minutes of meetings. They did try to develop something by 10-
year plans but it’s so far down the line isn’t it? There again you go from year to year. 
You have a bad season. All of a sudden you have no money, so all your plans are gone 
and you did not have someone like a benefactor who’d say, ‘don’t worry I’ll put another 
million in’. We didn’t have that in those days. We were lucky in Llanelli at that time in so 
much that we knew from the sale of season tickets that the costs of the season were 
covered beforehand.  Then any improvements to the ground would come out of the surplus 
profits. So from that point of view we were very lucky we didn’t really have to scratch our 
heads and think where’s the money going to come from?   It was there always for us, you 
know, strong support.  No nothing written.  
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When I was chairman we came up with the problem of having to redevelop the old terrace 
and the far side of thing.  The fire brigade had given us five years to do it; of course 
nobody did anything until the …what do you do?  At that time I think Neath had developed 
behind the goalposts and it had cost them £150 grand just putting terracing in; and then 
some report came out saying that the ground had to be all seating by the year 2000 or 
something like that, the Taylor report, I think. But the decision that had to be made then 
was do we spend £150,000.  Well we had a bigger bank than Neath had, so did we spend 
£200 grand to just put terracing in or did we spend £350 grand and put the stand there? 
And that’s what we did in the end.  Unfortunately it came at the wrong time because we 
did go into debt over it, but it was an asset in actual fact. However, professionalism came 
in then soon afterwards and that debt we had was compounded with the wage thing.  I 
think we probably could have financed it a bit better than we did at the time, and most 
clubs didn’t own their own grounds but we took pride in Stradey you know. When you 
think about what we’ve spent since the Bradford fire in 1984. We had to renew parts of 
the original stand which was timber; then we built hospitality, there’s the Carwyn James 
room and things like that. The museum was altered. We spent a lot of money on 
improvements there and they were big decisions at the end of the day, for an amateur 
club. I think we probably spent the best part of £1million in ten years just developing 
there and upgrading it you know. Which the other clubs didn’t have to do but then they 
suffered consequently. St Helens (Swansea) and the Gnoll (Neath), they had to do that 
bank and Port Talbot (Aberavon). We all had to do it”.  
The research found, via interviews and conversations, that at Llanelli planning was 
considered to be informal but strategic decisions were made when conditions and events 
demanded, such as making ground improvements. The plans developed by the committee, 
were recorded in the minutes of committee meetings. 
5.3.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club. 
Prior to 1990, it had been established that SP had been undertaken by officers’ at all three 
clubs, but merely infrequent, and only when special circumstances demanded (Stone et 
al, 1999).  Within the three research clubs, only Llanelli had employed formal SP when 
developing its ground in 1990/91, but not since that time.  The findings at the two Gwent 
clubs were similar in that neither had undertaken SP over the five years prior to 1995.  
Other than at Llanelli, no evidence was found, or produced, of any formal planning that 
had been undertaken.  Respondents, and stakeholders, at the three clubs often confused 
SP with OP, and the findings revealed that clubs were in deed occupied more with OP, 
rather than SP (Hodges and Kent, 2007). 
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5.4     Logical Incremental Perspective 
 
Unlike the formal planning process, the incrementalist view does not see strategy-making 
in terms of a tidy sequential version considering all possible options in terms of all 
possible futures.  Rather, through ongoing analysis and assessment, it includes feedback 
loops to earlier stages where the problem and solution may be redefined or reoriginated.  
The process does not function to ascertain the most favourable or optimal solution (Quinn, 
1980). The aim of the section was to comprehend if clubs used incremental planning to 
develop strategies that emerged through continual small scale changes and steps. 
5.4.1     Ebbw Vale RFC 
As the study established in 5.3.1, planning was mainly operational.  This was confirmed 
by Ivor George. 
“I firmly believed, as did the committee, that you couldn’t plan ahead too far in rugby, 
but you sort of gradually… you adjust as you go along.  Small changes to strategy, that’s 
it”. 
At Ebbw Vale, like most other clubs, planning was found to be short term, usually over a 
season. They did not practice SP but tended to adopt an incremental planning approach.  
Nonetheless, OP was undertaken weekly and focused on all aspects surrounding the 
games played by the club’s teams. 
5.4.2     Newbridge RFC 
At Newbridge planning tended to be more emergent rather than formal, a point confirmed 
by long serving, Brian Wellington. 
 “A lot of it was opportunism and having a good leader who can see at the moment this 
is the way we should be going. ‘Come on, follow me’ and people good enough to follow. 
My mind goes back to one situation in particular, where we were talking sponsorship and 
providing for the club, what have you.   The first club in Wales to have had a financial 
sponsorship was Newbridge. In 1987, a Japanese company AIWA gave £6/7,000 per year. 
Pure chance. Again it was opportunist, driving together, chairman, vice-chairman, 
secretary, treasurer. In this instance, it was our vice-chairman who got us the sponsorship 
that was of mutual benefit. AIWA had a social conscious, they wanted a focal point within 
the community that we could provide and give them other advantages as well. We had the 
sponsorship. Now that wasn’t planning, that was people being in the right place to be 
able to pick it up and run with others to say ‘this is good for us’.  
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The initial comments on planning from Mr Wellington, were echoed at other clubs. 
Formal planning had been undertaken but was rare, with informal planning being the 
order of the day. In addition, it was acknowledged that luck, chance and opportunism had 
played a part in the development of the Newbridge rugby club. 
5.4.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC; Comparison of Findings 
Both clubs employed an incremental approach to planning.  OP was undertaken on a 
weekly basis, in contrast to the less frequent SP.  Newbridge acknowledged that 
uncontrollable factors, such as luck, chance and opportunism, had influenced the planning 
process.  By comparison, at Ebbw Vale, committeemen appeared to ignore the effect of 
disharmony amongst the committee influencing any form of planning.  
5.4.4     Llanelli RFC 
 
In West Wales, at Llanelli, most stakeholders felt that the club only planned from season 
to season, a point confirmed by Marston Morgan. 
“I would feel that we looked it as an annual business. We wanted to make profit at the 
end of the year. If we didn’t make money, well we’d be very (smiles), you wouldn’t be 
down a lot of money. I think we were running it with a good treasurer there, Roland 
Hughes, who was keen. He wouldn’t let us spend money unless it was wisely spent.  So 
although we did spend money sometimes, on things we shouldn’t have, it was mainly trips, 
tours and such things on the playing side. In Llanelli the committee were very strong with 
their own opinions.  I had mine, Hefin was on it. You had people like Alan James, who 
wouldn’t let us spend money unless something urgent or unexpected arose within the club. 
So nobody was afraid to react to any unforeseen situation when action was required”. 
Incremental planning was more likely to be employed before SP because respondents 
considered a planning period to be only for the length of each rugby season. Stakeholders 
felt confident that the club committee could successfully cope with any unexpected event. 
5.4.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club 
 
Stakeholders’ opinions at the three clubs were united around the contention that trying to 
formally plan through a logical, sequential approach, SP, was unrealistic in the novel 
environment in which Welsh rugby clubs operated (Risseeuw and Masurel, 1994). During 
conversations they also questioned whether or not the ‘shopfloor workers’ who had been  
elected as amateur committee members had the necessary business analytical skills, and 
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abilities, to undertake SP. Unsuspectingly, many stakeholders used Quinn’s (1980) 
terminology of trying to ‘muddle’ through as describing the way that the clubs attempted 
to move forward.  The common environment being encountered by senior clubs within 
the new, National League, having to face possible relegation as well as promotion, 
produced uncertainty and therefore, it was argued, made any planning longer than a 
season more difficult (Covin and Slevin, 1989).  The influence on any form of planning 
by uncontrollable variables such as luck, chance or opportunism (Sharman, 1998) was 
mentioned, and readily acknowledged, by stakeholders in each of the clubs.  When 
questioned about the ‘planning approach’, stakeholders were of the opinion that the 
emergent approach was more associated with the clubs’ development as opposed to the 
prescriptive approach (Sharp and Brock, 2010). 
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5.5     Political Perspective 
The formulation of strategy can be explained in political terms because organisations are 
political entities (Chakravarthy and White, 2002), due to different stakeholders having 
diverse concerns and interests regarding strategy. Through compromise and mutual 
modification between powerful individuals, or groups of influential stakeholders, a 
generally acceptable strategy will materialise rather than through analytical appraisal and 
choice (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The intention in this section was to appreciate the 
role of political in the generation of strategy within rugby clubs. 
 
5.5.1     Ebbw Vale RFC  
The study ascertained that politics and disagreement were rife, not only in the club, but 
amongst the committee, findings that were confirmed, and explained, by Alan Evans. 
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“What I found with politics in the pre-professional days was that you would have two 
definite camps or even three definite camps. OK. You would have, let’s say, the chairman 
there, and over here you’d have the wanabe chairman and then you’d have the ones over 
here who sat on the fence. And they’d be trying to influence that one all the time, like both 
ends to stay in power, if you like, because it’s a power game. I came back from working 
abroad, working twelve years, rejoined the club as a committee member and within three 
days people were calling me to secret meetings. Seriously. You’d be in a little room, 
you’ve probably seen and heard it all before anyway, but it went on”.  
The political in-fighting found within the committee was corroborated by Roy Lewis. 
“There were political groups on the committee, yes there were.  There was an athletic 
(2nds) attitude, not allowing players to come through to the first XV, and during the late 
‘80’s, early 90s, there were virtually two clubs within a club.  The first XV is the flagship 
without any doubt, but the athletic appeared to get pushed more within the committee”.  
The study also uncovered an interesting external angle concerning politics at Ebbw Vale.  
Alan Evans revealed the impact of external politics that, 
“With the closure of the steelworks, I think we lost a bit of political influence.  To look at 
it a little deeper than financial support,  the club could go to the steelworks manager, 
who had a lot of clout politically, and the local MP was always with the steelworks, with 
the unions within the steelworks whatever, and there was a fair bit of political clout going 
around. When the steelworks closed, we lost that bit of clout because the people who had 
clout have also gone with it, you know”. 
Whilst the internal politics rumbled on, the external political environment became more  
difficult for the club with the closure of the steelworks affecting its political influence. 
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5.5.2     Newbridge RFC 
There was little internal or external political influence on strategy at nearby Newbridge.  
An insight into the reason behind that finding was offered by Brian Wellington. 
“If you have conviction in what you’re doing and the way you’re going and you can 
communicate and talk on your feet, your job is to take it with you. So you try in that 
situation to take any political group or feeling with you. Now I’m not saying that you 
don’t have splinter groups, but if you’re so solid at the centre and so united and combined 
it’s very difficult in that situation for political groups. Now that’s what happened circa 
94, at the beginning of professionalism, I would say the structure in the centre broke 
down”.  
Seeking to enlarge on why politics took hold after the long serving chairman, Mike Croad, 
resigned in 1994, Graham Paterson offered the following explanation. 
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“The period that I was on the committee, before Id (McCarthey) came, there were weak 
chairmen and they could be manipulated by particularly the playing strength for instance, 
particularly when certain individuals, like the then coach, were here.  So I would say then 
politics were here. There wasn’t a group that was trying to upset the club, but, for 
example, the chairman’s wife was the treasurer of the Supporters Club, and I’ve said it 
once or twice, that’s the only time we’ve had a female chairman of the club!! There were 
factions then that were trying to pull the club apart, yes there were”. 
After a long period, when a united, strong committee managed to keep politics out of the 
club, the opinion of respondents was that the break-up of the old committee (Appendix 
3.5e) saw politics raise its head and become more prominent at Newbridge. 
5.5.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC;   Comparison of Findings 
It was established that Ebbw Vale was more of an active political arena, both internally 
and externally, than at Newbridge. The Vale committee were representative of different 
groups of stakeholders with their own objectives and with differing views on which of 
the club’s teams should have priority. This divergence of opinion within the committee 
meant that any strategies were achieved via consensus.  Externally, the closure of the 
local steelworks led to the loss of political ‘clout’. Meanwhile, internally at Newbridge, 
the club had relied on the strength of the senior figures within a united committee to 
neutralise the political factions. This worked well until 1994 when, following the 
resignation of the strong club chairman, Mike Croad, along with several experienced 
committeemen, politics re-emerged.  There was little external politics impacting the club. 
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5.5.4     Llanelli RFC 
Llanelli was considered by its rugby followers to be the same as all Welsh rugby clubs 
with regard to politics. The well-travelled reporter, Norman Lewis, was vocal, and 
adamant, in recalling that, 
 “There was politics in the old amateur game, where every club from top to bottom was 
riddled with it”.  
In supporting that broad view, Hefin Jenkins recalled that at Llanelli, 
“There were political factions and there were a lot of people here at that time who wanted 
to show their authority. People who were benefactors of the club in small ways, quids in 
those days, and they liked to think that they were important you know. They did try and 
really rock the boat, but at the end of the day, someone has got to run the club, you know. 
You take on board what they say but you still make the decisions through my mind 
anyway.  If I thought a decision was right it was right regardless of what anybody else 
thought you know. Through experience and OK you agree to disagree at the end of the 
day as long as it’s not tragic”.  
Stakeholders agreed with the research findings that there were politics alive and operating 
within Llanelli, but that the small committee stood united in not allowing politics 
preventing the club moving forward.  External politics did not influence strategy. 
 
5.5.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club 
 
Politics had a varying influence at the three clubs. There was little or no politics within 
the small committee at Llanelli, nor the larger committee at Newbridge (prior to 1994).  
The decision-making committee at each club were united, and proved to be strong, in 
trying to exclude politics when reaching decisions for the club’s benefit.  In comparison, 
at Ebbw Vale there were internal groups with political differences within the committee 
which clearly influenced the decision-making process (Hickson et al, 1986).  Respondents 
and stakeholders at Llanelli, felt that continuing on-field successes at the club had limited 
politics raising its head. A similar view was put forward at Newbridge, where 
stakeholders were happy that the club was still in the top division of Welsh rugby.  
Conversely, members and supporters at Ebbw Vale were politically divided, like the 
committee, over the priorities at the club and the fact that the club were seen as being 
‘outside’ the elite top division.  The discontent at the club was considered to have forced 
the hand of the ‘Athletic XV’ supporters on the committee, leading to the election of new  
Committeemen in 1994.
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5.6     Interpretive Perspective (Cultural) 
Organisation culture is concerned with the influence of attitudes, values and perceptions 
which are common amongst the members and stakeholders of an organisation which have 
been gained over many years and form the ‘organisational paradigm’.  The dominant 
paradigm is built up from different influences such as history and past experience and can 
be applied to a given situation to assist managers in reaching a strategy (Schein, 1992).  
With all three clubs being in existence since the 19th century, the research sought to be 
aware of the level influence on strategy that culture had in each club.   
 
5.6.1     Ebbw Vale RFC 
The club reflected the culture of the close, tight knit community, as long-time resident 
Ivor George explained. 
 “I used to know our players’ maternal grandmother’s maiden bloody name, you know 
what I mean.  You were involved with them, every captain, every player, and every group 
of players.   You were part of them.   You knew all your boys in those days”.    
Another locally born and educated club official, the president, gave an insight of the 
club’s culture and how it had been shaped by life in the valley.   
“Ebbw Vale has always been a rough, tough place you know um, I mean I grew up there.  
The rugby team has reflected that in its ‘back-to-the-wall’ attitude and so, no one’s ever 
looked forward to coming up to Eugene Cross Park; and this wasn’t just now it’s from 
when I first started watching in 1959.  We couldn’t get fixtures with people like Llanelli 
and Swansea because they wouldn’t come up to play us”.   
It was very apparent from the attitudes and beliefs expressed by the club stakeholders that 
they considered the club to be representative of a repressed community.  The club’s 
culture had influenced strategy, as confirmed by Alan Evans. 
“So it was obviously run prior to 1995 as the old social club/rugby club. Politics within 
it, everything that goes with a rugby club, right.  It was run basically on an historical 
basis… we did this in ‘66 or we did this in ‘77 whatever, and it carried on like that”.  
Ebbw Vale had an open split on its committee, and stakeholders, over its culture, where 
some committeemen supported the ‘play for enjoyment’ Athletic XV rather the club’s 
competitive League’s team, its first XV.  Stakeholders considered that strong pressure 
had been put on the club’s rugby traditions and culture via the new external environment 
of the National League, with promotion and relegation, and it had divided the club. 
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5.6.2     Newbridge RFC 
The study found that Newbridge had also adopted a valley community culture, and as a 
resulted readily contributed back to the community.  Brian Wellington explained that, 
“In the amateur days, yes, the club made inputs here because we had ties with the schools 
and what have you and to encourage there. But there’s a bigger contribution than that 
Clive, that’s difficult to measure. Valley community, valley culture, valley thoughts. If you 
have something within a small valley area like this that was going successfully, the whole 
village tended to focus on it, and become part of it. This warmth came from a degree of 
success, and that was our contribution”.   
Graham Paterson’s thoughts on the club’s culture to visiting clubs and spectators was, 
“We’ve thought that we’ve been a very hospitable club. Whoever it is we like to make 
people welcome. I used to have a saying ‘There’s always a welcome at the Welfare’. I 
probably think that’s our strongest point. Clive Davies (player) said ‘I don’t know what 
Newbridge’s got, but if they could bottle it and give it to others they would be better off’.  
Geoff Champion also spoke on the contribution the rugby club made to the village. 
“The best thing you can say about Newbridge RFC is that it has given Newbridge an 
identity. You talk to people about Newbridge, ‘Oh you’ve got a rugby team haven’t you’? 
They wouldn’t know it if it wasn’t for that. Trecelyn, they know it because that’s the name 
of the rugby club. So they give the village an identity, and the community really ought to 
be pleased about that, otherwise they would be a total anonymous village between 
Newport and Ebbw Vale.  So I think it’s part of this social cement. The club gives us 
identity, it give us something we can be proud of from a local point of view and they give 
the opportunity to create community spirit and pride by helping community youngsters in 
a game that we all love and do it in the correct way, setting a good example. Because the 
little ones will always look at the big ones as role models, local heroes if you like”.  
Despite offering praise, Mr. Champion readily acknowledged the club’s survival attitude, 
he was also critical about Newbridge’s strong tradition preventing any change. 
 “I think during the amateur era the club was definitely high bound by tradition with one 
of the big failures to me being the club not building on that success in the 1960’s.  For if 
you and I walked around the Welfare ground today and looked at the facilities, and 
consider the structure and approach of the club, there wouldn’t be a hell of a lot different 
to when you were reffing here in the ‘70s and ‘80s”.   
The history and past experiences of Newbridge, revealed a ‘fighting against adversary 
spirit’ that had existed in the valley club since its formation (Appendix 3.5).  The research 
established that stakeholders believed the club’s culture had influenced strategy. 
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5.6.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC;   Comparison of Findings 
Faced with a similar environment, a common culture perspective was uncovered at the 
Gwent valley rivals, Ebbw Vale and Newbridge, which emanated from the local 
community; it was the typical close-knit valley village approach.  In both instances, the 
‘back to the wall’ culture had influenced strategy, and had been a constraint to change. 
5.6.4     Llanelli RFC 
Llanelli is one of the Welsh clubs with a long tradition and a very rich history (Appendix 
3.6).  Continuing his recollection of the pre-1995 period, Hefin Jenkins, remembered that, 
“We’ve had the experience, (Reads) ‘the strategy we’ve followed developed from the way 
we do things’. Well perhaps yes. I think probably we’re always looking to improve 
ourselves then. And you can’t shut yourself off if you think someone else is doing 
something differently and that’s quite successful. The fact that you’ve done it before 
doesn’t mean that is the right way. And I think you’ve got to look at things and say, ‘well 
that’s not a bad idea let’s follow it’. Yes you know, we’d be discussing about other clubs 
and obviously over the years, being rivals of Neath and Swansea, if they were doing 
something we’d look to see if it could benefit our club.  If there was a way of improving 
the club yes, we wouldn’t be hard and fast, it was not tablets of stone, you know”. 
Whilst agreeing that the culture has influenced the direction of the club, respondents and 
stakeholders stated that it had not prevented the club from either learning from other clubs 
or from changing direction. 
5.6.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club 
 
Llanelli’s success on the field of play, and its ‘First Class’ status since its formation in 
1872, had been ingrained in to all its stakeholders. Its impressive fixture list highlighted 
its standing in UK rugby.  Failure in any game was never considered as an acceptable 
option.  However, the location of the two Gwent valley community clubs, had left an 
indelible impression on everyone associated with them. Ebbw Vale and Newbridge had 
battled up to 1945 to gain acceptance as ‘First Class’ clubs.  Both had previously failed 
to attract fixtures with the bigger named Welsh and English clubs, and coupled with their 
lack of championship titles and cup trophies had seen the two clubs adopt, and integrate 
into the local community’s ‘back to the wall’ culture and ‘them and us’ attitude. 
Nonetheless, despite the different location, background and culture, at all three clubs, 
customs and tradition had clearly influenced the direction of each club.   
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5.7     Ecological Perspective (Enforced Choice) 
For some organizations the impact of the environment is significant, constraining the 
influence of managers in developing strategies (Hannah and Freeman, 1989). Factors in 
the external environment produce strategies via natural selection rather than through any 
rational and intentional process. Such strategies tend to be common to all organizations 
within the industrial sector or market (Sharp and Brock, 2010). The study sought to 
examine if the influence of the external environment was recognized as influential in the 
strategy-making process of Welsh rugby clubs?  
5.7.1     Ebbw Vale RFC 
The local environment had been beneficial to Ebbw Vale.  The club’s ground was owned 
by the welfare association and shared by other organisations, cricket, bowls, tennis and 
football; therefore the club didn’t need to spend any money on the ground. Then, when 
the Bradford disaster occurred in the 1980’s, the council took over the ground and 
facilities. When the WRU formed the National League, one of its advantages was 
removing difficulties in clubs finding fixtures, as recollected by Ivor George. 
“You know, the week by week fixtures was structured by the WRU. You knew in 
July/August that next March you were going to be playing so and so at such and such”.  
Due to its location, Ebbw Vale didn’t have to look for sponsorship because it benefited 
from the scheme operated by the local steelworks and the local authority, as Ivor George 
proudly remembered, 
“At one time it really didn’t matter how many people stood on the bank because 
everybody who went to the steelworks paid 6p per week to the rugby club. So you had 
10,000 people in the works paying 6p per week to Ebbw Vale rugby club off their ticket, 
and the same thing happened in the local authority.  After they went out of the personnel 
office I don’t know whether they knew that they were members of EVRFC except that they 
did get a season ticket every year. Remarkably, on the front of our season ticket were 
three or four pages of membership. We didn’t really rely on gates because we had that 
guaranteed income”.   
The club’s dependence on such a singular, unique income meant that any change to the 
steelwork’s status quo would hugely affect not only the club’s income but also the local 
population’s disposal income in supporting the team. So the closure of the major 
industries in the area, including the steelworks, influenced the club’s direction, 
particularly its financial strategy.  The external environment had impacted the club. 
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5.7.2     Newbridge RFC 
Being within a twelve mile radius of Ebbw Vale, Newbridge also suffered with the 
turbulent local, external environment. The local council were not considered as helpful.  
Living in the area, Brian Wellington was philosophic about the club’s environment.   
“Although we were the first club to have sponsorship, with AIWA (Japanese Company), 
within our environment if you like, the business environment, the number of sizeable 
concerns that you had that could underwrite you, just weren’t here. We had one man in 
the area, and we got kicked and kicked and kicked by supporters, because, ‘why didn’t 
we use this man to full advantage, Terry Matthews’? There was no mutuality in terms of 
tying up with Terry Matthews. We couldn’t give him anything except a certain amount of 
glory to his name, but he didn’t need it with owning the likes of Celtic Manor, and we 
suffered accordingly”.  
Being in a village where there were no large businesses or industry, Newbridge operated 
in a limited financial environment.  The one individual with financial clout, billionaire 
Terry Matthews, was not interested in supporting rugby and so the club lost a potential 
large benefactor.  The external environment did influence the club’s direction. 
 
5.7.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC;   Comparison of Findings 
Ebbw Vale benefited from the presence of the steelworks and the financial donations 
made by those workers.  Newbridge were not in the same fortunate position of having a 
'supporting' major employer within the village, and its business environment was 
perceived to be poor, despite the fact that they considered themselves ‘lucky’ in becoming 
the first club in Wales to gain sponsorship in the late 1980’s.  Both clubs felt that the 
WRU had added a structure to the season by the formation of the National Leagues.  
However, the clubs had opposing views on their local councils; Ebbw Vale felt supported 
by its local council, whilst Newbridge viewed their council as a restraining influence. 
5.7.4     Llanelli RFC 
The environment in which Llanelli operated was perceived to be harsh and difficult.  
Former player and committeeman, Marlston Morgan explained that, 
“We haven’t got a lot of companies or businesses in Llanelli that will sponsor us. We’re 
not a big area for sponsorship and the money has always been scarce, always”. 
Club stakeholders were proud of their town and team, but agreed with Mr Morgan’s view. 
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Similarly to other clubs, it was felt that the local council had been negative rather than 
positive, in its approach to the club.  Mr Morgan continued, 
“The council has been very ‘anti’ sometimes. There were certain councillors in Llanelli 
that didn’t support Llanelli and if they were seen to vote to give money to Llanelli RFC 
they would not be elected.  I know, it was very strong but they would not. There were 
always certain elements of them having a knock at Llanelli, and they wouldn’t help 
financially, no. We got money for ourselves, from generating our money. The WRU were 
giving grants but you had to pay it back, but the town never give us funding. They give us 
a set of gates as you go into Stradey, and that was for the centenary year, 1972. That was 
given by four councils, Burry Port, Kidwelly, Llanelli rural and Llanelli borough, who 
then gave those gates.  That’s it, there’s no real support or other money at all”.    
Llanelli stakeholders bemoaned the lack of business or corporate support but praised the 
actions of individual supporters, such as local farmers with tractors, who regularly 
volunteered to help the club.  The business environment was considered by stakeholders 
to be poor, and that it did influence the club’s goals and strategy. 
 
5.7.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club 
 
The study findings indicated that the three clubs had difficulties in coping with external 
pressures, and that decisions taken over courses of action had been influenced by external 
environment factors (Hannah and Freeman, 1989). There was common agreement that 
the local business environment had impacted on each club’s strategy (Di Maggio and 
Powell, 1983).  In two instances, Llanelli and Newbridge, the opinions gauged revealed 
that the local councils had not been supportive of the clubs, whilst Ebbw Vale, by 
contrast, had benefitted from a supportive local council at that time.    
The respondents and stakeholders at the three clubs were united in agreeing that the 
formation of the National League by the WRU had turned out to be positive, and 
supportive, in that it had assisted with the planning and organization of the playing season. 
The research concluded from the findings, that the external environment, the WRU, local 
councils and businesses, had influenced strategy at each of the three clubs.   
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5.8     Conclusions 
The chapter’s contribution to the study was to provide an understanding of the closing 
five years of the amateur era in Welsh rugby. The conclusion reached was that the three 
research clubs had been influenced by a combination of perspectives (Bailey and Johnson, 
1991), but that within the enforced choice perspective, the introduction of a National 
League had minimal effect, or influence, on how the clubs continued to approach the 
strategy-making process (Table 5.3).   
It was established that rugby clubs in Wales had been governed through an elected 
committee, on which the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and treasurer were seen as 
the senior figures by stakeholders (Chaffee, 1985). Whilst Ebbw Vale and Newbridge 
continued to be run by the senior figures, in contrast, Llanelli, since 1973, had placed the 
organisation and control of the club in the hands of a small committee. Llanelli had 
employed SP for a single project (new grandstand, 1990), whereas at the other two clubs 
planning was found to be informal (Stone et al, 1999). The three clubs had adopted 
Incremental planning when necessary, but OP (for each game) was employed on a regular 
basis. The study concluded that, despite the playing changes imposed on the clubs with 
the formation of the National League, politics (Chakravarthy and White, 2002) and 
culture (Schein, 1992) continued to be influential within the three clubs, and that the 
external environment had impacted on clubs’ decision-making (Tables 5.2 and 5.3).   
With regard to clubs’ performances (Table 5.4), being a NPO (Table 5.1), finance was 
not considered a priority by any of the clubs (Paton and Cornforth, 1992)  although 
each had made a profit over the period.  Playing performance was the priority 
(Szymanski, 2003) for Llanelli and Newbridge in the Premier Division clubs, but for 
Ebbw Vale in the lower Division, due to politics within the committee, the first XV 
playing aspect was not considered a priority (Iaquinto and Fredrickson, 1997).  The 
research determined that over the five seasons, 1990-1995, whilst the two Gwent clubs 
did not win any League title (or WRU Cup competition), Llanelli, were successful in 
winning League titles and WRU cup (Appendix 4.5 & 4.5e).   
In line with the chronological approach of the study, the following chapter investigates 
the decisions made, the actions taken and the outcomes resulting from the IoP in 1995. 
An in-depth discussion of the findings, and comparison, with existent theory is 
performed in Chapter Eight. 
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Table 5.1                  Characteristics of Nonprofit Organisations 
                                          (Adapted from Paton and Cornforth (1992) Osborne (1998) and Hudson, 1999) 
 
Characteristics 
Ebbw Vale Newbridge Llanelli 
Existed  primarily for social 
purpose 
Yes Yes Yes 
Small, informal structured 
organisation 
Yes Yes Yes 
Independent of the State Yes Yes Yes 
Nonprofit, all financial 
surpluses re-invested 
Yes Yes Yes 
Possible vague objectives Yes Yes Yes 
Impact difficult to measure Yes Yes Yes 
Accountable to a variety of 
stakeholders 
Yes Yes Yes 
Self-governing and are able 
to control their own 
activities 
Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntarism is essential; 
helpers, management 
Yes Yes Yes 
Purpose influences 
management 
Yes Yes Yes 
Cherished Organizational 
Values/Culture 
Yes Yes Yes 
Social Goals - financial 
‘bottom-line’ is not a 
priority 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5.2                Cross-Case Analysis; Comparison of Components of     
                                    Planning Practices & Sophistication, 1990– 1995. 
                                                                                      (Bracker and Pearson, 1986) 
 
                  
                                Club 
Component 
 
Ebbw Vale 
 
 
Newbridge 
  
Llanelli 
 
Objective Setting 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Environment Analysis 
(PEST) 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Internal Analysis 
(SWOT) 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Strategy Formulation No No  
 
Yes 
 
Financial Projections No No  
 
Yes 
 
Functional Budgets 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Operating Performance 
Measures 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Control  Corrective 
Procedures 
No No  
 
Yes 
 
     
Unstructured Plans No No  No 
Intuitive Plans  
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 No 
Structured Operational 
Plans 
No No  No 
Structured Strategic 
Plans 
 
No 
 
No 
  
Yes 
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        TABLE 5.3                                        Cross-Case Analysis; Comparison of Strategy Process by Club, 1990-1995. 
                                                                                                         (Summary of data based on conceptual framework of Bailey et al, 2000) 
           
        
       Dimension 
 
 
Club 
 
Visionary 
Perspective  
(Command) 
 
 
Planning 
Perspective 
 
Logical 
Incremental 
Perspective 
 
Political 
Perspective 
 
Interpretive 
Perspective 
(Cultural) 
 
 
Ecological 
Perspective 
(Enforced Choice) 
 
Strategy 
Followed 
 
 
EBBW VALE 
(1880) 
 
 
Chairman, 
Vice, Secretary 
& Treasurer 
 
Informal plans 
recorded in 
minutes of 
meetings 
 
Approach 
adopted when 
necessary 
 
Politics divided 
committee & 
influenced 
strategy 
 
Culture 
influenced 
Strategy 
 
Decline of local 
major industries 
 
Niche. 
Strategy was 
influenced by 
politics to 1994. 
 
 
NEWBRIDGE 
(1888) 
 
 
Chairman, 
Vice, Secretary 
& Treasurer 
 
Informal plans 
recorded in 
minutes of 
meetings 
 
Approach 
adopted when 
necessary 
 
Little politics. 
Strong commit 
defeated other 
factions 
 
Culture 
influenced 
Strategy 
 
Decline of local 
major industries 
 
Niche 
Maintain 
        
 
 
LLANELLI 
(1872) 
 
Chairman, & 
Small 9 man 
Committee 
 
 
SP in 1990 
Informal plans 
recorded in 
minutes of 
meetings 
 
Approach 
adopted when 
necessary 
 
Little politics. 
Small commit 
defeated other 
factions 
 
Culture 
influenced 
Strategy 
 
Decline of 
major industries 
and farming 
 
Niche 
Growth 
       
                 KEY         = Variance of data from other clubs.  
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TABLE 5.4                                         Cross-Case Analysis; Comparison of Measures of Performance, 1990 – 1995  
                                                                                                                                           (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986) 
 
                
                Measure 
Club 
Financial Performance Operational Performance Organisational Effectiveness 
 
EBBW VALE 
(1880) 
 
Finance was not the priority but a profit 
made each season. 
No financial planning other than basic 
income v expenditure. 
 
Playing performance of 1st XV not the 
priority. 
Second Division club for 5 years 
Politics within committee seriously affected 
playing performances. 
League Positions: 16; 14; 22; 21; & 14; 
 
No full-time staff for community work. 
Rugby club gave town an identity. 
Club looked after players’ welfare. 
 
 
NEWBRIDGE 
(1888) 
 
 
Finance was not the priority but a profit 
made each season. 
No financial planning other than basic 
income v expenditure. 
Sponsorship from AIWA plus 
National League prize money 
Playing Performance was priority. 
First Division club for 5 years. 
Club finished in lower part of Division each 
season. 
League Positions:  7; 5; 10; 8; & 9; 
 
No full-time staff for community work. 
Rugby club gave village an identity. 
Club looked after players’ welfare. 
    
 
LLANELLI 
(1872)   
 
 
Finance was not the priority but a profit 
made each season. 
Financial Planning  
National League prize money 
Large debt due to building grandstand. 
 
Playing Performance was priority. 
First Division club for 5 years. 
Club won Division once. 
League:  2; 2; 1; 5; 7; 
Cup Winners, 3 times, 1990-92. 
 
No full-time staff for community work. 
Rugby club gave town an identity. 
Club looked after players’ welfare. 
 
                        KEY  Variance of data from other clubs. 
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CHAPTER 6.0:  HOW CLUBS REACTED TO THE 
INTRODUCTION OF PROFESSIONALISM, AUGUST 1995. 
 
     "It is desirable to examine whether particular       
     strategic issues are dealt with in a similar or  
     dissimilar manner across organisations."  
      (Bailey and Johnson, 1991, p.37)         
 
6.1     Setting the Scene 
The IoP in 1995 was a watershed for the Game, a singular, unprecedented decision made 
by the governing body, the IRB, which affected all clubs and countries throughout the 
rugby world.   As stated earlier in the methodology chapter, it was contended that research 
should focus on patterns of decisions and actions that accumulate into strategy over time 
rather than discrete decisions (Chakravarthy and White, 2002). However, this 
unparalleled decision by the IRB meant that for the first time participants in the Game 
were officially permitted to be financially rewarded for being a player, coach or 
administrator.  The clubs had no previous, similar exemplar to learn or prepare from, and 
so they faced a crisis in finding the necessary finance to fund their team. Welsh Rugby 
(and World Rugby) thus became an authorised market place where a rugby player could 
be bought and sold.  To compound the difficulties facing the clubs, the IRB made the 
announcement near the end of August, just days before the start of the new season.  In 
such a situation, Chakravarthy and Doz, (1992, p.5) argued that,  
“The strategies of a firm must change in keeping with both new opportunities and threats 
in the environment and changes in its own competencies and strategic intent"    
 
The respondents’ comments to the dramatic overnight change in environment, from 
amateur to professional, indicated the disbelief in the unexpected speed of the 
transformation to rugby’s core value.  Prior to interviewing the clubs’ respondents, 
conversations with stakeholders in various Welsh clubs had unearthed negative 
descriptions of the advent of professionalism such as ‘a major shock,’ ‘critical,’ 
‘decisive’, ‘disastrous’, ‘extraordinary,’ ‘extreme,’ ‘momentous,’ ‘serious,’  
‘significant,’ ‘terrible,’ ‘unique,’ and ‘unprecedented.’  A large proportion of older club 
members actually used the term ‘catastrophic’ to describe the alteration to the core value 
of the Game, possibly because, “When sudden change does come, it is frequently 
contested by various agencies and individuals precisely because it goes against 
tradition” (Polley 1998, p.161).
  
129 
 
       
 
 
 
 
  CHAPTER SIX:     REACTION TO THE INTRODUCTION OF PROFESSIONALISM 
 
The IRB’s decision was that the Game was now ‘open’ so that participants could be paid 
if a club chose to do so.   The IRB was not forcing clubs to pay players.  However, in 
reality, players in Wales had long been receiving ‘boot money’ (Smith and Williams, 
1981), but even those clubs who were paying ‘generous expenses’ were not prepared for 
the dramatic increase in players’ demands for payment that was to follow.  Clearly, whilst 
the event was ‘critical’ in terms of financial and playing resources, it also proved to be a 
major ‘shock event’ to the unprepared clubs.  So would the IoP support Pearson and 
Clair’s (1998, p69) assertion, that “In organizations where executives believe that their 
company is relatively immune from crises, there will be fewer plans and procedures for 
crisis preparation and prevention”.  
Coupling the ‘shock event’ approach with the CIT, the following open ended questions 
were introduced during the interviews with respondents to establish how their club 
reacted to the IoP. 
The Club’s Process 
 “What action did the Club take?” 
The Outcomes as a result of Club’s Actions?   
“How was the club’s performance affected by the action taken?” 
“What was the intended/unintended outcomes for the Club?”  
 
The Club’s Internal Context  
“What was the club structure regarding governance at that time?” 
“Who decided what to do?”  
The aim of the chapter was not only to present the sequence of decisions and actions taken 
by the clubs but also to provide an understanding and insight into how the choices that 
were made influenced the clubs’ future directions.    
The findings from the respondents at each club are documented below and include quoted 
opinions covering the respective five questions via the process, outcomes and context. 
The views of respondents were coupled with those gleaned from stakeholder 
conversations in the summary of each club; so the narrative described, and explained, the 
key sequences of actions taken by critical personalities as perceived by respondents 
(Brannen, 2005).   A comparison of findings was then undertaken between the high  and 
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low performers, Gwent clubs Ebbw Vale and Newbridge; and on the West Wales coast, 
the benchmark club, Llanelli. (A discussion concerning the evidence presented in this 
chapter can be found in Chapter 8).   
Therefore, building on the contents of Chapter Four, this chapter examines in-depth, the 
sparsely researched transformational event in Welsh Rugby in 1995, especially how the 
clubs reacted to such a ‘defining episode’, a dramatic period of transition, and the effect 
it had on each rugby organisation.  The influence of other variable performance 
components (Storey, 1994) at that unique time, the ensuing decisions and actions taken 
by each club, and the resultant outcomes, are analysed, interpreted and compared.  The 
chapter is, as a result, structured in accordance with the process, content and context 
dimensions of strategy. 
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6.2     Ebbw Vale RFC  
6.2.1     Process 
The decision-makers at Ebbw Vale at the time of the IoP were the committee, as 
established in 5.2.1.  The previous year, 1994, the president, John Powell, manager of the 
steelworks, had decided to retire from the figurehead position, and the chairman, 
secretary, treasurer and match secretary, along with five committeemen, resigned 
(Appendix 3.4e).  The newly appointed club president, Paul Russell, had accepted the 
influential role after due consideration, and after his concerns had been answered.  In his 
own words, 
 “I joined half way through our last season in the second Division (1994/95). I was still 
very heavily involved with Glamorgan (cricket) at that time and when they asked me to 
become president I said, “What is it you want from me?” And they said, ‘we want four 
things.  Number one, we want you to help us with your experience in sports management 
and sports performance etc. Secondly, we need you to be there as a figure-head and you 
know, chum up the vice-presidents and all this kind of stuff. Thirdly, to help us bring the 
glad hand of sponsors what have you, and fourthly to put some money into the club’. In 
those days our income and expenditure, either side of the balance sheet was round about 
£60,000. (Laughs), and so you putting in £5,000 made a big difference”.  
With his commercial background, at the global Anderson Consultancy, Russell quickly 
realized that if the club was to survive in the First (Premier) Division in the changing 
rugby environment, then it needed a successful strategy. From the outset, he set the club 
what he felt were SMART goals   
 
“To maintain a reasonably successful top class rugby club in the Heads of the Valley. To 
granulate that further, top class would mean the top league in Wales, whatever that was, 
the first division, premier league; and then reasonable successful because we didn’t want 
to be a Cinderella club or a yo-yo club. We wanted to be finishing mid-table consistently, 
with the odd Cup Final appearance, and with the odd appearance at the top of the table. 
One top three finish in five type of thing”. 
He did not want the club to follow previously promoted clubs who had quickly returned 
to the lower Division after just one season. Therefore, he set in motion a stratagem to 
keep Ebbw Vale in the Top Division.  His abiding memory of that period was that,  
 “My first involvement in the club was, after we got into what was then the First Division, 
(August 1995), to lay down a strategy if I was going to stay there, and our strategy in the  
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first year was simply based around survival.  We developed a strategy, which was called 
the three 8’s.   We were going to win 8 games, to earn an income of £80,000 and finish 
8th. Because it was still a members club, I was dealing with a committee of twenty-four 
people and, with due respect to them, most of them were butchers, bakers and candle stick 
makers. They’d turn up at committee meetings and say, you know, ‘the boiler broken 
down or there’s no sugar for tea in the committee room again last week, and didn’t John 
have a shit game on Saturday?’ (Laughs). We had to transform them into a decision-
making body that was going to agree that we were going to act in a unified fashion, that 
we weren’t going to be political, in-fighting, we were all going to contribute and work 
towards a common goal.  So it was important we give it a tag line, which was the three 
8’s, and then we granulated that strategy.  ‘How do we raise the £80,000 income?  How 
were we going to do this and that?’  Our treasurer at the time was Steve Lewis (future 
WRU General Manager) and he was tasked with coming back with a plan to say, ‘this 
was how we get to £80,000’. There was no money from the WRU in those days, you had 
to generate it all yourself.  The coach, who was Phil Gardner, was told come back and 
tell us which eight games he was going to win, and which one he had in reserve, to ensure 
we finished 8th in the Division; and it worked”.  
To attain the on-field objectives, Russell employed a resource based strategy whereby the 
club recruited only North Gwent players with previous First Division playing experience.  
Off the field, he had talked local businessman, Malcolm Sheppard, not only in to joining 
the club but also to become its chairman.  Importantly, to develop and implement the 
strategy, he needed the support of stakeholders within the club. Agreement, and 
explanations on the success of the resource based strategy, came from within the 
Management section, via Ray Harris.  
 “Put them (Russell and Sheppard) together and all of a sudden there was an immense 
amount of energy for different reasons but wanting the club to go somewhere.  And they 
did it.  They set out a strategy where they were going to find every disaffected North 
Gwent player they could find in any club who was good but was not getting a shot. They 
made some mistakes where they brought some people in, weren’t good enough, but then 
they made really good signings as well.  And that was exactly how they succeeded”.  
Examining the reasons given by Mr. Harris for the club’s success, support was found 
from within the Team Management, via club captain Chay Billen. 
 “I think that Paul (Russell) and the people who were here then were very shrewd in the 
type of person they recruited.  They were very clever in the way they did that and, you 
know, the way that I see it, we were never going to be a side full of internationals but we  
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were a side that would always be as near to 100% together as possible. Alright, maybe, 
geographically they were not exactly North Gwent, you know on the map, but they were  
that sort of mentality of players, and that was very evident. You know, I was born in 
Brecon but this is the nearest club for me and it has been a massive feeder club for the 
area up in mid-Wales.  I think it was the fact that they recruited local people, the business 
side and I think the development of Leigh as a coach, and that everybody developed from 
the supporters, the coaching staff and the players.  The ground hasn’t changed an awful 
lot but I think that it was just a pull in the right direction from all quarters”. 
In conversations with stakeholders, Paul Russell was put forward as the individual who, 
as a result of his resource based strategy, his open communication within the club, and 
the acceptance of the committee and members to implement his plan, saw the club survive 
the transitional period from amateur to professionalism (Conversations, 8.2.97: 26.9.98: 
29.10.03).  
 6.2.2     Outcome 
One of the major outcomes was the key change to the mission statement of the club.  In 
the amateur days the mission was rugby orientated; but due to professionalism, members 
voted to relinquish ownership of the club by changing from a members club into a Limited 
Company (20th February 1997), under the chairmanship of Paul’s brother, Marcus.  The 
new organisation’s Memorandum of Association stated ‘The Company’s objects are: - 
(A) to carry on the business of a rugby club...’ (Appendix 3.4f).   Research found that 
financially, like other Top Division clubs, Ebbw Vale did not make a profit during this 
period.  On the field, the club’s playing performance increased dramatically by +68% 
over the period 1995-2000 compared to a similar five year amateur period, 1990-1995.  
The League positions were 7th, 7th, 4th, 4th, and 6th; Swalec Cup finalist (once) and semi-
finalist (twice).  Stakeholders felt that the strategy, initiated by Russell and implemented 
by the club, had resulted not only in them surviving in the Top Division but also provided 
them with the experience of playing in their first Swalec Cup final and also playing in 
Europe (Conversations 8.2.97: 26.9.98: 29.10.03).  Mr Russell’s confident body language 
throughout the interview was consistent with his upbeat responses, and his conviction that 
his business approach had paid dividends.  
“Our strategy, as I said, depended on realism and was remarkably successful.  It worked 
almost like clockwork”.  
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The positive response of the Russell brothers was seen as a case, as Ivor George related, 
of ‘local boys having done good’, of using their career experiences to help their home 
rugby club rather than for them to make money.  Reflecting on that view of the brothers, 
long serving Roy Lewis had his suspicions that, 
 “If someone is putting money into the game, I shouldn’t think that they’ve got any sense 
if they expect to have anything back.   I don’t think our owners expect a return on their 
investment.  I can’t see a time when anyone of them will ever get a return”.  
Mr. Lewis’s views were supported by findings that showed the club, even after the IoP, 
still placed playing performance above financial return as its main priority. 
6.2.3     Context 
The following interview statement from Ivor George, reflected the lack of planning 
process for the onset of professionalism, not only within Ebbw Vale, but in most clubs.  
“Nobody was ready for the sudden change from amateur to professionalism.  I don’t think 
the IRB or the WRU put enough thought in to what they were doing nor enough thought 
into what was going to happen, the outcomes and the effect on clubs”. 
It is worth recording that in the amateur era, prior to 1995, the club did not have to worry 
about finance.  In the words of Ray Harris,  
 
“Well, go out of your time scale this club was probably at one stage in the Wally Talbot, 
John Powell time was one of the richest clubs in Wales. However many people worked 
down there (the steelworks) 11,000 all paid sixpence to come into this club. That’s a lot 
of sixpences; at that stage it had a huge income.   Ebbw Vale in the 70’s & late 80’s, were 
not the poor relations, they had money then.  When they hit rock bottom, which was when 
they were put in Division Two, and the period just before that when the steelworks started 
to drop off, things went bad.  Yet in the amateur time I don’t think this club ever had an 
overdraft, and very few clubs did”.  
Due to its poor playing performance prior to the formation of the National League, Ebbw 
Vale found itself outside the Top Division in Welsh rugby.   A contributing factor to this 
position was the politics that existed amongst the committee, which was split between 
giving priority to the First XV or the Athletic XV.  When the Athletic XV was replaced 
by a Development XV at the end of season 1993/94, co-incidentally at the same time the 
club had to look for several replacement officers.  The president, John Powell,  manager 
of the  steelworks, had decided to retire from the  figurehead position, and the chairman, 
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secretary, treasurer and match secretary, along with five committeemen, resigned 
(Appendix 3.4e).   Due to the rundown of the local steelworks, the presidency of the club 
was no longer an automatic selection, i.e. the manager of the steelworks, as it had 
previously been (Conversations, 8.3.97: 8.9.98: 19.3.99).   Probing into how they 
recruited Paul Russell, Ray Harris recollected, 
     “Couldn’t remember who it was but someone approached Paul Russell in Cardiff at 
Glamorgan Cricket Club, and said, ‘you are a local boy we’re in trouble, get involved’.   
Because it was still a committee-run club, he was given the Presidency of the club and he 
also had the most power out of everyone on that committee. He is an incredible driving 
force because that’s the way he is in business”. 
        So Paul Russell’s recruitment should be viewed in the context of being one of simple 
chance, pure luck that a rugby member was going to watch the cricket in Cardiff.  The 
new president was installed at a time when the club’s operating environment had changed 
dramatically. 
6.2.4     Summary 
All respondents, and the vast majority of stakeholders, agreed with the above 
interpretations of the events surrounding the IoP at Ebbw Vale.  They concurred with the 
dimensions of the ‘shock event’, the fact that in new president, Paul Russell, the club had 
been fortunate to recruit an individual with precious business and accounting knowledge 
and experience.  They believed that the decisions and actions taken by Paul Russell, 
supported by the committee and members, had contributed significantly to Ebbw Vale 
still existing and fulfilling its prime objective of being a Premier Division club in 2000  
(Conversations, 8.9.98; 1.11.00: 21.10.03). 
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6.3     Newbridge RFC 
6.3.1     Process 
Similar to the situation at near neighbours, Ebbw Vale, Newbridge had a large committee 
of over twenty committeemen (Appendix 3.5e). Unfortunately, prior to the IoP, the long 
serving chairman and several experienced committeemen resigned their posts.  In 
researching this particular avenue, it was apparent that one of the first decisions taken 
during this period of transition by the new chairman was to bring fresh players into the 
club.  Newbridge previously had pursued a policy of recruiting players from the locality, 
but then decided for financial reasons to recruit from far and wide, and crucially, acquired 
less experienced players from the lower divisions.  The failure to acquire a main financial 
backer signified that the financial resources were initially limited to just the WRU grant, 
and contributed to the subsequent recruitment action.  The respondents’ views on this 
issue concurred with the view of Brian Jones.  
“We didn’t have the money. We couldn’t dictate from the point of view that we couldn’t 
get any player we wanted.  We started off as I already said by paying people differently 
that’s a fact.  Some were big differences but I don’t think that approach worked in actual 
fact, for a club like us.  I think it was the quality of player because we couldn’t get the 
real quality players. (Laughs).  I mean any club with money was going to get the best 
players. So our players, who were left, weren’t of the same standard as the other teams. 
I think it was as simple as that”. 
The lack of funding therefore clearly impacted on the recruitment of quality playing 
resources.  Findings showed, as at other clubs, paying different salaries to new squad 
players caused problems. Newbridge found themselves in a dilemma; closing the door to 
recruiting higher quality players due to financial constraints, thus being left with players 
of lesser ability. From within Management, Secretary, Graham Patterson’s reflections of 
that period, 
“This club certainly wasn’t ready for it (professionalism) because we, I don’t want to be 
critical of this because I wouldn’t have done the job myself, but we certainly didn’t have 
anybody to grab the nettle at that time. I know I’m talking about him (Idris McCarthey), 
but if we’d had our present chairman in position, and I’m sure if we had our coaches in 
position, we would have not run up a huge bill where we needed a loan off the WRU”.  
Pursuing further information about the club’s situation and the actions taken at that time, 
the Team Manager, when asked, expressed his deep frustrations. 
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“I think for me, as soon as it went professional the stakes went up and we just couldn’t 
match it.  We were outbid if you like and that happened to quite a few of our players.   As 
a result we didn’t have time to recover because we were never able to match them 
financially right.  So we had to look for players out of lower Divisions clubs if you like, 
not being unkind, your Abercarns, Crumlins, Riscas, and try then to improve them as 
players and generally as a team; but while you are doing that the period is f****** you 
up in the League.  And you were losing status every year because you could not get guys 
out of that Division, throw them in at the deep end, and straight away they’re good 
enough! You know you couldn’t.  It’s impossible.   Unless you could bid and you’ve got 
good bucks to throw at these boys so that they could play for you, because they want to 
play for you just for the money, you’ve had it”!  
In conversations with stakeholders regarding the recruitment of players and coaches at 
Newbridge, findings revealed that the decision-making by the two chairmen and their 
committees was considered to be, at the very least, questionable (Conversations 18.2.98; 
8.9.01: 6.9.03). 
6.3.2     Outcome 
Discussions with stakeholders unearthed a common view that because of the shortages of 
finance (no profit after 1995), and lack of quality players and coaches, plus little time to 
improve the shortage factors, the club struggled just to survive in the top Division.   In 
addition, following relegation the lack of appropriate resources stifled a promotion drive 
to return to the First (Premier) Division (24.1.98, 18.2.98; 12.5.98).  It also emerged that 
stakeholders were unsure about what the mission statement of the club should be, a view 
enlarged by Geoff Champion,  
 “You go back to why is a rugby club a rugby club?   What are you trying to do as a rugby 
club? This is the problem area about professionalism.  Is a professional rugby club there 
to play rugby or is it existing to be a business?”  
The priority within the club regarding playing performance has not changed as a result 
of professionalism.   Brian Wellington’s views of pre 95 performance were,   
“We were basically a rugby club and if you were to talk about measures of performance, 
our first measure of performance was the team, the team. We had to be there within the 
upper echelons as long as we possibly could be. Even good management would have been 
hard pressed then. Performance on the field was the prime measurement. The rugby 
clubhouse looked after its self and what we were basically looking for there was that the 
rugby clubhouse covered its costs and wasn’t a burden. Newbridge was always run as a 
rugby club”.  
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The research found that following professionalism, the club’s view on playing 
performance being the priority had not changed, as stated by Idris McCarthey. 
“The major performance measurement would be the playing performance, winning or 
loosing at the end of the season. I think what we try to do is get a club in a way that the 
players that we’ve got are happy playing; they get on with the coaches they get on with 
the people. I’m still a bit old fashioned like that I don’t believe in this that they shouldn’t 
have a pint after the game and have a laugh and a joke. For me if you can’t do that what’s 
the point in playing like? I mean by Monday, you’ve got to enjoy your weekend and you’ve 
got to get ready to get down to it again. I really don’t agree with all that not partaking”.  
The evidence revealed that the club’s decline, relegation from the top Division, plus a fall 
of -98% in playing performance over 1995-2000, compared with that of 1990-1995, in 
the on-field performances was due to a combination of factors.  Utilising his long 
association with the club, the former secretary, Brian Wellington, accounted for the 
negative change,  
 “The downturn in performance was down to a combination of no financial Godfather, 
the locality and the lack of leadership from the Union. We made not a conscious decision 
because the decisions were forced on us.  We lost players. We lost the spine of the team 
at that time, in effect. We were relegated at the wrong time just as professionalism was 
coming in and the funding went down; other clubs had benefactors coming in but we 
didn’t have one. Since the game went professional no rugby club has made a profit and 
never will do Clive.  It is impossible in the modern marketplace not only for Newbridge 
to prosper but also the vast majority of rugby clubs”. 
In contrast, Idris McCarthey disagreed with that view and offered an alternative opinion: 
 “I think that Newbridge and all the other clubs in Wales were never ever geared to run   
a professional side and giving Newbridge, or any other club £400,000 like the WRU did, 
was like giving a mad man the money, you know.  I think, that might have been the same 
for us because all of a sudden we had £400,000, everybody was giving it out like a man 
with no arms. If you didn’t give it out you haven’t got a team since you had players going 
because they were offered large lump sums elsewhere.  I just think that they had the wrong 
people coaching, wrong people playing; they just didn’t have the mix right.  We had this 
money from the WRU, paid it out to players that weren’t good enough and put up with a 
lot of nonsense.  They just didn’t realise what was going to happen if they didn’t win 
games and get the right people around them.  I don’t think it’s possible to make a profit, 
and I can’t ever see any money being in rugby union like”.  
Mr Wellington and Mr McCarthey did agree that the club’s playing resources were not 
up to standard and players were paid ‘silly money’; coaches were appointed who had no  
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idea of how to prepare teams in the top Division One.  However, disagreement arose 
between the two locally bred rugby stalwarts over financial resources.  Whilst Brian 
Wellington blamed the lack of a financial ‘godfather’, Idris McCarthy pointed the finger 
at committees who did not have experience of managing the finances of a professional 
team.   The club’s accountant, Paul Tedstone was quick to point out that paying players 
should not be allowed to threaten the financial future of the club. 
“(Pause) I would say that the playing side has got to take precedent because we shouldn’t 
be in a scenario of ‘do we pay the players at the expense of the financial position of the 
club’. So I don’t want that to be the case. But at the end of the day this is a rugby club 
and we’re here to play rugby to the best ability that we can and that’s what it’s all 
orientated around. But what I’m saying is you’ve got to play the best rugby you can but 
within our means.  Since the game went professional Newbridge has not made any profit. 
A strong balance sheet but no profit”.  
One of the reasons put forward by Brian Jones for a lack of profit since IoP was the 
raison d’etre of the club. 
 
“A rugby club. I don’t think you can look on, it can be run as a business but I don’t think 
it’s ever going to make any profit. I think it’s going to be run purely to provide a team out 
here, as a rugby club. Our gates wouldn’t cover the team. It’s got to rely on income from 
other sources to run it. It would be nice mind if it switched around but I can’t quite see 
it”.  
The club captain’s reflections on IoP were, 
 “When I was at the club, you know going back to ’96, it was all over the place, 
financially.  Even on the pitch, they did have a turnover of players and coaches in my first 
time here and the club was going really nowhere you know”.   
This downward ‘strategic drift’ was also attributed to the retirement of long serving, high 
quality administrators from their posts in the club, who were not replaced by people 
having the same knowledge, experience or feel for the Game (Conversations 24.1.98; 
18.2.98: 12.5.98). The club had been members of the Premier Division since the 
formation of the National League in 1990.  Despite the instability within the club caused 
by limitations on the playing and financial fronts, and the loss of experienced 
administrators, the club survived the first two seasons of professionalism, the team 
finished 9th and then 12th in the Premier Division. However, as a result of the latter 
position, the club was relegated from the Top Division in 1997.  As an  ‘outsider’  Geoff 
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Champion expounded his view, 
“They were relegated at the wrong time after they’d had a good run in the Premier 
Division.   I think the emphasis after relegation was on survival in Division One rather 
than promotion but in terms of why they declined might have been that’s got something 
to do with the club, not having a longer-term strategy and if that’s the case you have got 
to blame the club, haven’t you?”   
Subsequently, Newbridge struggled to survive in the First Division finishing 18th, 20th, 
and 16th.  The widely held view by the majority at the club was that not enough was done 
to find a financial backer, and reliance on the grant from the WRU was not enough to 
recruit the high priced quality players needed to remain in the Premier Division.  The 
financial decisions and the decisions to recruit lower quality playing resources were 
strongly criticised by stakeholders.  Whilst accepting that a club was only a collection of 
people, and that a committee was elected to represent members and make decisions on 
their behalf, stakeholders were quick to point the finger of blame at the then committee, 
especially the two ‘inexperienced’ chairmen  (Conversations 18.2.98: 8.9.01: 29.10.03).  
As at 2000, Newbridge had failed to recover its treasured playing position in the Top 
Division in Wales.   
6.3.3      Context 
The long serving pressman, Geoff Champion, recalled the unexpected IoP,      
   “I don’t think anybody was ready, not even the biggest clubs were ready.  I think the 
WRU took the brakes off overnight and I don’t think there was preparation and 
Newbridge and other clubs like them suffered badly because of that.  Everybody was a 
professional, wonderful!   You know you had the nonsensical situation where very small 
valley clubs were paying significant amounts of money to people for sitting on their 
bottoms!  So I don’t think any club was ready, certainly not Newbridge.” 
In the amateur days, the club had always managed to cover its costs, so finance had not 
been a major issue.  Former secretary Brian Wellington observed that,  
“We were always looking to plough any profit back into the team. We were looking to be 
in the black rather than the red, but never in the position where we were really quids in”. 
The structure and legal status remained the same at Newbridge after the Game went 
professional.  The club, like Ebbw Vale, had to replace established committeemen, prior 
to and just after the watershed in the Game.  The break-up of the previous committee took 
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place at the end of season 1992/93 when the president and chairman stood down along 
with nine other committee members simply because of their long length of service 
(Appendix 3.5e).  In the view of the former secretary, there was no member who had 
developed the capabilities to replace long-serving chairman, Mike Croad.   However, over 
the next five seasons two members of the committee were elected to lead the club.  
Enquiring into the backgrounds of the two replacement chairmen, it was contended by 
Idris McCarthey that,  
“The one guy was a baseball player who didn’t know a lot about rugby, and the other 
guy was an insurance bloke who didn’t know the game; nice enough people but just didn’t 
have any vision on how the game was.  Somebody would tell them there was a good 
player, they didn’t know what a good player was, and they’d pay him a lot of money. 
Players came here with injuries and other things. No bloody good at all”! 
Stakeholder conversations (18.2.98; 8.9.01: 6.9.03) confirmed Mr McCarthey’s critical 
view of the two chairmen. 
6.3.4     Summary 
The preceding interpretations of the events surrounding the IoP at Newbridge, were 
confirmed and agreed by respondents and the majority of stakeholders.  They concurred 
with the dimensions of the ‘shock event’, and the fact that it was unfortunate that, prior 
to the IoP, the club lost its long-serving, high respected chairman, Mike Croad, along with 
several experienced committeemen.  Whilst appreciating the financial difficulties at the 
club, the decisions and actions taken by the chairmen and committee were strongly 
criticised by the stakeholders.  Long serving Newbridge members were ‘saddened’ at the 
demise of the club and the outcome that had resulted from the unexpected IoP that of 
being relegated from the elite division of senior Welsh rugby clubs (Conversations 
18.2.98: 8.9.01: 29.10.03).  
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6.4     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC;   Comparison of Findings 
6.4.1     Process 
The abilities of the decision-makers, senior figures, differed at the two Gwent clubs.  At 
Ebbw Vale, it was experienced businessman, Paul Russell, who immediately set the club 
a clear objective, and that was to survive in the First (Premier) Division.  To achieve that 
target,  the ‘three 8’s’ goals were set and met in the first season, with all the stakeholders 
being aware of, and accepting the goals and ‘buying in’ to the proposed strategy (Bailey 
et al, 2000).  Through employing a resource based strategy of recruiting North Gwent 
players with Premier Division experience and a local ’back to the wall’ attitude, the club 
achieved a competitive advantage and survival (Porter, 1991).  The president did not rely 
just on his intuition but also chose a survival strategy based on his personal rugby 
knowledge and experienced business background (Sharman, 1998).   
Judged against local rival Newbridge’s actions, who also encountered financial 
constraints, where any stated strategy or goals were noticeable by their absence (Inkpen 
and Choudhury, 1995).  The action arising from the two chairmen at Newbridge was to 
replace those quality players who left the club with players, not only from outside Gwent, 
but crucially, from lower Divisions in an attempt to create a worthy team through 
‘bricolage’ (Langley, 2007). Nevertheless, the differential payments offered to new 
outside players caused discontentment amongst its local players in the squad and its 
recruitment actions contributed to the club being relegated from the top Division after just 
two seasons of professionalism in 1997 (Conversations, 24.1.98: 18.2.98: 8.9.01).   
Whereas various stakeholders at Newbridge questioned as to whether or not the two 
chairmen had the required rugby and, more importantly, managerial experience and 
competence (Jennings and Beaver, 1997), stakeholders at Ebbw Vale were delighted that 
the club had fortunately recruited such an experienced accountant as president (Lockett 
et al, 2009). At Newbridge, it was felt that the two chairman had displayed their 
inexperience through the recruitment of poor quality players and coaches, and also they 
lacked the necessary expertise needed in financial management (Gorton, 1999), especially 
cash, that had become such a major priority following the IoP.  A common factor was that 
the two clubs had retained the committee structure; but under the new leadership of 
individuals (Bennis and Nanus, 1996), who had vastly different business experience. 
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6.4.2     Content (Outcomes) 
In contrasting the subsequent performances of the two clubs, both depended on respective 
individual decision-makers and the quality of their pronouncements (Paton and 
Cornforth, 1992).  In order for the rugby clubs to survive, the ability to set goals and 
achieve them was considered important, but setting goals required strategic awareness, 
which was evident at Ebbw Vale but not at Newbridge. The method employed by Ebbw 
Vale, the ‘goal approach’, measured progress towards the achievement of a firm’s goals, 
and reflected the principal’s role in determining the direction and performance of the firm 
(Pfeffer and Salanckic, 2003).  Placed side by side, with Ebbw Vale surviving in the First 
Division and Newbridge being relegated, it is contended that the survivor, through its 
president, had showed evidence of rugby and managerial competence and expertise in 
financial management in contrast to the relegated club that struggled badly in both areas 
(Beaver, 2002).   
The evidence also showed that Ebbw Vale, due to improved performance over the first 
five years of professionalism, increased its on-field results by +68%, whereas at 
Newbridge the on-field results fell -92%. The findings in playing performance supported 
the selection of comparing case studies of a ‘high performer’ against a ‘low performer’. 
Another of the outcomes was the change in the clubs’ governance structure, the legal 
format. Ebbw Vale, although achieving success in its first two years in the Top Division, 
in 1997 turned its members committee into a limited company in order to access more 
financial resources from the Russell brothers (Appendix 3.4f). Newbridge, even though 
lacking financial streams, kept the same structure as the amateur years with a twenty-one 
member management committee until 1998.   
6.4.3     Context 
In comparing the actions of Ebbw Vale and Newbridge, the evidence indicates that the 
common major concern, the ‘shock’ IoP, had pushed both clubs towards immediate, 
short-term planning and decision-making (Matthews and Scott, 1995).  Equally, both 
clubs had to replace established committeemen pre-professionalism; and in Newbridge 
again after the first season of the new era (Appendix 3.5e).  Whilst Paul Russell at Ebbw 
Vale was recruited more by luck than judgment, a ‘garbage can’ decision (Eisenhardt and 
Zbracki, 1992), he brought both a rugby and business background to the role of president.   
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Stakeholders at Newbridge, questioned the decision making of the committee in 
appointing two relatively inexperienced chairmen to lead the club.   Decision-making in 
the two Gwent clubs was strongly influenced by the experience of those individuals who 
were put in positions of authority surrounding the IoP. 
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6.5     Llanelli RFC 
6.5.1     Process 
The investigation into Llanelli found that structurally, when the Game went open, the 
club initially kept its nine man decision-making management committee (Appendix 
3.6e). However, going into a new era the club had to make an unexpected change at the 
helm, as explained by Marlston Morgan. 
 “Stuart (Gallacher) became chairman after Roy Bergiers (both former players).    Roy 
wasn’t well at the time and he stood down and Stuart took over.  We were lucky to have 
him; he’s not everybody’s cup of tea, but I think he’s done a tremendous job at Llanelli”.  
On visits to the club, many stakeholders put forward that one avenue the club was 
considering was to recruit a financial backer to make up the shortfall of funding from the 
WRU (Conversations 7.11.95: 3.5.97: 18.10.97). One potential backer had been pin-
pointed by Stuart Gallacher and the committee, as elaborated by Rupert Moon. 
 “A money man by the name of Mel Davies came here.  I sat on the bus with him (Mel 
Davies) and his accountant, when he said he was pumping in all this money from an 
offshore trust, £3 million over five years, for all these players. Even Steve McDowall, the 
NZ prop was going to come here; but then he (Mel Davies) decided overnight, ‘I'm not 
joining’, and he left us with all that huge debt because the club had spent large amounts 
of money on players that it didn’t have. It was by no means the lack of planning because 
the fact was that the club had done a lot of research on this guy, from Tenby, checked 
he’d got the money, and checked what he was all about.  They did real stringent tests on 
him, being very aware of what could happen, but he was, you know, underwriting a lot, 
Frano Botica and that entire incident.  In fairness to the club, they could have left certain 
individuals go, you know, saying, ‘we’re not honouring you’,   someone like Frano, but 
then they didn’t.   They were true to their word.”  
The club had already decided to contract its players, with competitive high salaries, to 
ensure that it didn’t lose those quality players but it did so prior to actually having the 
funding in the bank to pay the players’ salaries.  Faced with a very difficult situation, the 
loss of their major backer, the club claimed it had no choice but to ask all squad members 
to reconsider their contracts (downward) and eight players actually left the club (Parry, 
1997).  At the end of the 1996/97 season even club captain, International and British Lion, 
Ieuan Evans, left the club for more lucrative rewards at top English club, Bath Rugby.  
Fortunately, unlike the other two research clubs, Llanelli had capital assets, its ground  
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 (field and large car park) and stands that it could utilise to raise funds.   Taking those 
factors into account, former committeeman, Hefin Jenkins, acknowledged that, 
“Professionalism came in; and the grandstand debt we had was compounded with the 
wages issue.   We probably should have financed it a bit better than we did at the time”.   
Elsewhere during the interviews, long-standing local reporter, Norman Lewis, critically 
questioned the club’s financial decisions directly following the Game going open.  
“Llanelli made shocking financial decisions in the first year of professionalism.  They 
misused professionalism in an appalling way. If any club needed to change immediately 
it was Llanelli.  The business sense was lacking before Huw Evans arrived.  Llanelli had 
to do something quickly and I think that they’ve done it quicker than most”. 
The committee appreciated that it was crucial to hold onto its quality players if it was to 
maintain the club’s standing in the Game in Wales, but they appeared blinkered to the 
huge cost and the consequences of its pre-emptive actions with players. 
6.5.2     Outcome 
By 1997 the club’s perilous financial position forced the sale of its beloved Stradey Park 
ground to the WRU.   Having been close to the action, Anthony Buchanon explained that, 
 “The market place dictated everything and we sold our ground to purely stay in business, 
because if you couldn’t pay your players they were going to go and play somewhere else. 
That would mean that we’d have less quality players, we’d achieve less, we’d have less 
support and then that would be a knock-on effect.  So we had to take the gamble. We knew 
we had the ground, we knew we had assets. The sale of it wasn’t ideal but at least it still 
kept us afloat and at the top and trying to achieve.  There have been mistakes there’s no 
doubt about it. It’s obviously somebody’s fault but those people shouldn’t have put us into 
this hole and we had to dig ourselves out”.  
Exploring the situation at the time led to uncovering a remarkable co-incidental state of 
affairs.  Research into the club’s history (Appendix 3.6a), had uncovered the fact that in 
1898 Llanelli were in a perilous financial condition and so the club’s committee appealed 
to Swansea RFC to provide monetary assistance, which the ‘All Whites’ duly supplied.  
By a twist of fate, in 1997, almost one hundred years later, it was a Swansea rugby 
supporter, international businessman, Huw Evans, who offered to become its financial 
backer; once accepted, he promptly changed the members club into  a Limited Company.  
However his arrival, along with a new  Board  of  Directors,  did not alter the priority of 
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those people running the club, as the CEO made clear. 
“To be quite honest the board were more interested in the rugby, that’s why they were 
involved; they love the game, they love this club, the whole meeting was about two hours 
and it’s all armchair rugby critics. I’d be in the minority of one if I said commercial 
success (was the club’s priority).  I think the rest of them (the Board) would rather win 
the Heineken Cup and lose £1million to win it but I would rather have a solid profitable 
business than win the Heineken Cup at all costs.  Now that’s is the complete opposite 
view to the chairman, I can tell you.  He said, you know, ‘I make the money from my own 
business’, but he doesn’t treat this as a business.  He expects me to, but he doesn’t.  He 
indulges himself a bit for all the right reasons, it’s not for ego or anything like that”.   
The club’s mission had always been rugby orientated.  The Memorandum of Association 
of the new company revealed Huw Evans’s intention by stating its objects as ‘to promote, 
encourage and foster the game of Rugby Union Football at all levels...’ (Appendix 3.6f)     
In effect, there had been no change to the philosophy or purpose at Llanelli RFC.  The 
united view within Llanelli RFC seems to be performance on the field before performance 
off it.  Huw Evans spelled out the club’s priority. 
  “We see it (the club) as both a rugby club and a business but the predominant culture 
must be the rugby, and true rugby ethics and ethos; the business is a way of supporting 
that.  So we see them as two distinctly different things”.  
Perhaps not unexpectedly from the playing side, the chairman’s view is supported by the 
head coach. 
“When you’re talking like the rugby club, to me probably 90% of the effect of the club is 
about winning performances, results.  So I think rugby, the rugby mentality, has to drive 
the rugby club. If you get your performances on the field right, other aspects of the club 
develop and grow, but the most important focus has to be the rugby environment”. 
The club’s priority, playing performance, saw it finish 4th, 3rd, 6th, 1st, and 5th in the League 
from 1995, and, in addition, it maintained its record as the ‘Welsh Cup Kings’ by winning 
the SWALEC cup in 1997/98 and again in 1999/2000.  During his interview the CEO sat 
back in his chair, exuding confidence with his hands behind his head, and critically 
defended the decisions and actions that he had instigated.  
 “When the game went professional we were at our weakest, the clubs.  I’ll give you an 
example. I offered a 21 year old Welsh player £5 grand, and he went to an English club 
for £50 grand  a  year.  We  didn’t  have  any  money.  That was the time for the Union to  
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centrally contract the players and there would have been none of what we’re doing now. 
I definitely think in 1995 none of us had the experience. The only way I had experience 
was because I’d been a professional rugby player. So what I’m saying is we all 
mismanaged, and we all over inflated the market, including Llanelli, but by our actions 
the club survived and is still playing in the Premier Division and in Europe. However, I 
think there is no question in my mind that rugby, as its present structured, cannot survive 
financially.  It is unsustainable”. 
The CEO was forthright in his justification of the decisions and actions taken on the IoP. 
He acknowledged his, and the committee’s, lack of experience in dealing with such a 
‘shock event’ but was very direct in pointing out that, through the decisions taken, the 
club had achieved its goals of survival and maintaining its Premier Division status. 
6.5.3     Context 
As with other clubs at that time the IoP was neither expected nor planned for, as Marlton 
Morgan described.     
      “Wherever I was I just heard it on the radio, ‘we’re going professional’.    It was never 
discussed or talked about, or even planned, just like ‘we’re going to go in a year’s time 
at Llanelli, get prepared’.  It was hard, you know, because we took a lot of stick about it.  
I did personally, and all the committee at Llanelli, because you know what happened, we 
just lost all our money because we had to buy players because if we didn’t buy them then 
they would have gone somewhere else.  We would have gone down”. 
Reflecting upon the question of ‘luck’, the club had benefitted by replacing a chairman 
who was a teacher and was absent due to illness, with another chairman who had a 
business background.  Questioning the club captain, who had first-hand knowledge of 
that change-over event, he confirmed that, 
 “Stuart Gallacher came in when the world went bad in 1995, when we had to plead to 
the public to help us and a few players left because there was more money down the road.  
Stuart had come from a small business background, some success, but what he was, he 
was a strong character, very vocal who didn’t stand for any shenanigans” 
Widespread press coverage at that time stated that clubs believed that much of the 
uncertainty that existed in the Game in Wales was generated by the WRU, mainly because 
the governing body could not decide on the amount of funding to be given to support the 
Premier Division clubs. The press reports were corroborated by Hefin Jenkins, 
“I remember Stuart Gallacher going to meetings with Vernon Pugh   (WRU Chairman),  
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and Glanmor (Griffiths, WRU Treasurer) there as well.  I recall he came back after the 
meetings and said ‘we’re going to have £400,000 each’, and all our players were leaving.  
Phil Davies was going, Tony Copsey and other players were going, so we didn’t have a   
team.  So we went out to spend based on this £400,000, and we’d agreed contracts at 
these prices, when all of a sudden the WRU said ‘you’re only having £200,000 now’.  So 
we’re £200,000 down to start with plus we had the problem with the debt of the stand.  
Suddenly you’re up to half a million before bloody starting you know.  Oh, it was a shock 
because we didn’t think it would come in overnight.   I thought we’d have had a year, or 
two years, to plan it, you know.  Treasurers everywhere were shitting themselves”!  
 
The club, like all others, found itself operating in an uncertain, turbulent environment, 
trying to manage a unique event, the IoP, without having any previous experience of such 
a change in the core value of the Game.  It was in this novel context that decisions about 
the future direction of the club were made. 
6.5.4     Summary 
Stakeholders at Llanelli were critical of the committee spending money which the club 
did not have and felt decisions were made on a last resort basis, that was, selling the 
ground to raise the necessary players’ recruitment and retention’ money (Conversations  
18.10.97:  1.3.98: 9.1.99).  The result of the decisions made at the club during the IoP, 
was that it had lost ownership of its treasured Stradey Park ground to the WRU, but it had 
achieved its primary objective of survival in the top Division.  
 
 
  
150 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER SIX:  REACTION TO THE INTRODUCTION OF  PROFESSIONALISM  
 
6.6     Comparisons with Benchmark Club. 
None of the research clubs were prepared for the advent of professionalism which, 
respondents all agreed, displayed the characteristics of Ansoff’s (1988) ‘Shock Event’.  
The findings provided the opportunity to analyse and understand ‘how’ the decisions and 
actions taken by individuals, and clubs, contributed to ‘what’ outcome occurred.    
6.6.1     Process 
Whilst the clubs’ committees were seen as the decision-makers, behind the scene, due 
mainly to a lack of any crisis management team or crisis plan (Hale et al, 2006) at each 
club, it was an individual who was responsible for guiding the club through the minefield 
of professionalism.  It was intuitive for Paul Russell at Ebbw Vale, being an experienced 
businessman, to adopt a SP approach, and he produced a survival strategy for the first 
year of professionalism, in order to meet the ‘3 x 8’ goals (Pfeffer and Salanckic, 2003), 
he had set for the club to remain in the Premier Division; this the club successfully 
achieved.  By contrast, the two chairmen at Newbridge decided that to survive as a rugby 
club, and unable to find a financial backer, they decided to initially operate within the 
bounds of the WRU grant, but through choosing this strategy the team lost quality players. 
Not being able to compete financially with the other premier teams, their less talented 
replacement  players, recruited from lower Division teams, could not challenge either on, 
or off, the field.  Llanelli, with chairman, Stuart Gallacher at the helm, was set a goal by 
its stakeholders of maintaining its position as a Premier Division club (Freeman, 2010). 
This pressure contributed to the committee meeting the fresh financial demands of the 
players they wanted to represent their club. 
The governing body might have been expected to give a definitive lead with financial 
matters but instead they misled the senior clubs over the amount they intended to give to 
them.  This unexpected reduction in funding had a dramatic, and negative effect on clubs’ 
cashflows.  Ebbw Vale raised the necessary funds to recruit elite North Gwent players; 
Newbridge saw its survival as spending money only from within the WRU grant, limiting 
the quality of player at the club’s squad.  Llanelli had already signed players, and the 
huge increase in players costs, coupled with the six figure debt outstanding on the 
grandstand led stakeholders to believe that the club was in dire financial difficulties and 
in danger of going out of business (Conversations, 7.2.98: 1.3.98; 15.5.99). 
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Despite its ‘external’ control over clubs, the lack of leadership and guidance from the 
WRU, combined with the threatening environment and the high level of uncertainty it 
could be argued, led to decreased rationality in decision-making in such a context (Dean 
and Sharfman, 1993).  Short-term decisions were taken without considering the long term 
implications (Mathews and Scott, 1995, Westhead and Storey, 1996).   
 Nonetheless, in the unprecedented circumstances facing the new ‘professional’ rugby 
clubs at that unique time, what in all honesty could committees and decision-makers 
consider a ‘rational’ decision (Mintzberg, 1985)?  As such the study’s finding of the 
clubs’ lack of any previous, frequent formal planning merely supported previous literature 
in this area, that strategic decision-making in small firms was limited or non-existent 
(Schrader et al, 1989).  The clubs’ decision-making was made for survival out of 
operational necessity (Beaver, 2003).  The outcomes that arose from the resultant 
different decisions are examined in the next section. 
6.6.2     Outcomes 
It had been contended by Aram and Cowen, (1990, p65) that strategic action in small 
organisations only occurred belatedly following a crisis, by which time it was too late. 
Equally, where an event was not anticipated or expected, the response was reactive 
(Atherton, 2003).  Previous research by Eisenhardt (1989) had found that fast decision-
making was positively related to performance in a dynamic environment.  The intended 
and unintended consequences of the clubs’ decisions and actions revealed patterns of both 
continuity and change (Pettigrew, 1997).  The prime intended consequence demanded by 
stakeholders was the prolonged survival of the club (All clubs’ conversations post-2000). 
The three clubs were still existence at 2000, albeit with Ebbw Vale and Llanelli still in 
the Top Division, but with Newbridge demoted to playing in a lower division.  Inside 
each club, only Ebbw Vale escaped the wrath of stakeholders concerning the 
‘unintended’ outcomes of decisions and actions taken within the clubs around 1995.  
Critics within the other two clubs angrily pointed out that as a result of the choices made 
by their management, Newbridge (6.3.2) were relegated and still played in a lower 
Division, whilst Llanelli (6.5.2) had to sell its treasured Stradey Park ground to the WRU.  
Further club transformations are covered overleaf in the context section.   
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6.6.3     Context 
All three clubs were united in conceding that within the external environment, the IoP 
was neither expected nor planned for by club committees. In addition, there was no 
previous similar event for the clubs to have learned from, and thus there was no ready-
made solution for adoption (Schon, 1991).   The research also unearthed another common 
factor in that none of the clubs had established a crisis management team, nor produced 
a crisis management plan (Hale et al, 2006). Comparing the clubs internal environment, 
initially when the Game went open in 1995, not one changed their structure, legal format 
or the size of their management committee.   At Llanelli the management and decision-
making of the club had been entrusted to a small committee of nine members since 1974, 
and the size and unity of the committee was put forward as one reason why the club had 
been so successful over the years (Iaquinto and Fredrickson, 1997).  By contrast, Ebbw 
Vale and Newbridge had retained their committees composed of over twenty members; 
but unlike the Newbridge committee who were united, the committee at Ebbw Vale were 
not always united in their decisions (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Irrespective of the 
size of the committee, the clubs, excluding Ebbw Vale, appreciated that they lacked 
personnel with the necessary financial experience of such a critical event to overcome the 
difficulties thrust upon them by the IoP (Gorton, 1999).   
An important issue that was common to the research clubs was that, within the committee 
structure, they all underwent a change of decision-makers.  In their search for a new 
president, Ebbw Vale had, through luck and by chance, recruited a very successful 
accountant and businessman, Paul Russell.  In comparable circumstances, Newbridge 
lost not only established committeemen, but also a long serving chairman, Mike Croad, 
who was then replaced by a less experience committee member.  At Llanelli, the club’s 
chairman resigned through ill health and was replaced by a self-employed businessman 
and former player.  All the new leaders at the three clubs influenced the decisions made, 
and actions taken, regarding the future direction of their club (Jennings and Beaver, 
1997).  Within the changed environment, the decision-makers at the nonprofit clubs, 
where the mission was still rugby orientated, immediately realized that players would 
orientate themselves towards the highest payer.  Nonetheless, the decision-makers at each 
club decided that instant action was better than any delayed decisions (Hale et al, 2006).  
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The committees at Ebbw Vale and Llanelli were clear on their immediate goal; survival, 
yes, but in the Premier Division. Newbridge committee’s attitude was concerned only 
with one objective, the club’s survival (Beaver, 2003).  Ebbw Vale, and the benchmark 
club, Llanelli, knew if they wished to maintain their goal of playing at the top end of the 
Game, they would be faced with having to compete for individual players (resources) 
who possessed the ‘magical’ rugby flair and ability.  In the short term, clubs would have 
to pay the new market’s ‘panic’ high salaries for the human resource, both for their 
registered players and to secure high quality new recruits (Collis and Montgomery, 1995).  
Ebbw Vale and Llanelli were, unlike Newbridge, prepared to take the high risk of 
signing contracts before accumulating cash.  These adaptive and immediate response 
decisions and actions, were taken because of the rapidly changing environmental 
circumstances (Byers and Slack, 2001). 
6.7     Conclusions 
The quotation at the head of the chapter, from Bailey and Johnson (1991), reinforced the 
decision to investigate how the IoP was handled by homogeneous Welsh rugby clubs.   
As a result of the findings, it was deduced that, in spite of the clubs being similar ‘simple’ 
structures, the means adopted to achieve the ‘end’ objective of survival were divergent at 
each club (Hoye et al, 2009). 
Despite having the committee structure, it was individuals at the research clubs who made 
the important decisions (Jennings and Beaver, 1997).  At  Ebbw Vale, Paul Russell 
‘planned’ a resource based strategy, founded on local players who gave the club a 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1991), and survival, which resulted in an increased on-
field performance of +68%, over the comparative periods.   In contrast, respective 
chairmen at Newbridge elected to be ultra-conservative with finances, and as a result, 
lost their place in the Premier Division, and the club dropped -92% in performance. At 
the benchmark club, Llanelli the chairman, Stuart Gallacher, exploited their capital assets 
to keep themselves afloat, and they proved the most consistent performer over the 
research decade.  Nonetheless, in comparing the three clubs’ alternative decisions, it was 
ascertained that because professionalism was unanticipated, novel, and a critical event 
(Ansoff, 1988), it had propelled the clubs towards immediate,  short-term  planning  and  
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decision-making (Matthews and Scott, 1995). Interestingly for the study, the decisions 
and actions taken within the clubs were dissimilar, and had resulted in differing outcomes. 
Based on the evidence that all three research clubs survived, and were still in existence, 
and with the exception of Newbridge, still playing in the Premier Division in 1999/ 2000, 
(the intended outcomes), it was difficult to disagree with the conclusions maintained by 
the decision-makers in each club; they subsequently argued that the quick response 
‘survival’ decisions taken were the appropriate ones for each club, and in their eyes at 
least, the ‘ends had justified the means’ (Hale et al, 2006).    
The course of action taken by each club in this study in response to the IoP (Research 
Theme 1) has been interpreted, analysed, and compared in this chapter, and makes an 
important contribution to the study.  Summaries of the comparative findings can be seen 
overleaf, displayed in Tables 6.1, and 6.2, and an in-depth discussion, and comparison, 
with existent theory is performed in Chapter Eight. A closer examination of the strategy-
making process employed by clubs post-professionalism is undertaken in the following 
chapter. 
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Table 6.1             Cross-Case Analysis: Comparison of the Summary of                      
                                    Findings from Clubs regarding Professionalism. 
 
              
                             Club 
Findings 
Ebbw Vale Newbridge 
  
Llanelli 
 
Was the Club prepared for the 
IoP? 
No No 
 
No 
Did professionalism prove a 
major ‘shock event’? 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Club Objectives/Goals 
(Short-term) 
Survival in 
Top Division 
 
Survival 
 
Survival in 
Top Division 
Did Club have a ‘crisis team’? No No 
 
No 
Who made the strategic 
decisions? 
Individual  
Paul Russell 
Chairman, with 
Committee 
 Individual  
Stuart Gallacher 
Were the strategic decisions 
planned? 
Planned No – emergent 
 
No – emergent 
Did the Club have the 
required Financial Expertise? 
Yes No 
 
No 
Did Club operate only within 
the WRU Grant? 
No Yes 
 
No 
Did Club have Capital Assets 
to help Finance? 
No No 
 
Yes 
Did Club Recruit a Financial 
Backer? 
Yes (1995) 
Paul Russell 
No  
Yes (1997) 
Huw Evans 
What was the Club’s Strategy 
regarding players? 
Keep quality 
and recruit. 
High cost. 
Let quality  
players go to a 
higher payer 
 
Keep quality 
and recruit. 
High cost. 
 
What was the Club’s 
Recruiting Player Strategy? 
 
 
Recruited 
players from  
North Gwent  
with  
Top Division 
Experience 
 
 
Forced to recruit 
inexperienced 
players from 
outside area, and 
lower divisions. 
  
Paid high 
salaries to 
recruit quality 
players. 
Outcome of Actions Taken. 
Survival in Top 
Division 
Survival  
Survival in Top 
Division 
   
                       Key  = Differentiation with evidence from other clubs. 
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Table 6.2                                                      Cross-Case Analysis: Comparison of Research Theme.   
                                                              The Clubs Reactions to the Introduction of Professionalism, 1995 
   
 
           Action 
 
Club 
 
Who decided 
what to do? 
 
What action did the Club take? 
 
How was the club’s performance 
affected by the Action taken? 
 
What was the outcome for 
the club? 
 
EBBW VALE 
(1880) 
 
 
Paul Russell 
(President) 
 
President set goals (The ‘3 x 8s’) 
strategy.  Members got behind it. 
Recruited North Gwent players. 
Formed Limited Company in Feb. 1997. 
 
No profits 
Top Division; 7th, 7th, 4th, 4th, 6th 
 
 
Achieved prime objective of club 
of surviving in Top Division.  
 
 
NEWBRIDGE 
(1888) 
 
 
Two Chairmen 
 
Stayed within budget. 
Recruited lower quality players and 
coaches. 
+Remained a members club. 
 
No profits 
Top Division.  9th 12th  
Relegation to First Division.  
18th 20th 16th  
 
Actions unsuccessful.   
Relegation to lower Division end 
of season 1996/97. 
 
     
 
LLANELLI 
(1872) 
 
 
 
Stuart Gallacher 
(Chairman) 
 
Tried to recruit a financial backer. 
Failed. Overspent on players. 
Paid high salaries to recruit and hold on 
to players. 
Formed Limited Company in June 1997. 
 
 
No profits 
Top Division 4th 3rd 6th 1st 5th  
Won League 1998/99 
Won Cup 1997/98, & 1999/00 
  
 
Financial Crisis 
Club survived in Top Division.  
In 1997 club had to sell its ground 
to WRU to meet its debts. 
 
                    Key  Variance with other comparative clubs 
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CHAPTER 7:  THE STRATEGY PROCESS, POST-1995 
      
“The relationship between enterprise performance and 
management actions (or inaction) and the value and 
contribution of strategy is extremely tenuous and very 
difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate conclusively. 
Only those persons immediately affected by organisational 
events have sufficient knowledge of the precise 
circumstances to be able to suggest cause and affect 
relationships”. 
 (Beaver and Jennings, 2000, Vol, 9. Iss.7).   
  
 
7.1     The Sequence of Events 
This chapter aimed to examine the presence or absence of strategy-making processes in 
sport organisations (Welsh rugby clubs) following the IoP in 1995.  Within the clubs, 
stakeholders viewed strategy as ‘a course of action to achieve a goal’.  Being a sporting 
organisation, operating in a new, uncertain environment, each of the research club’s 
primary goals was to survive the IoP, but Ebbw Vale, and Llanelli also stove to survive 
in the Premier Division.  The benchmark West Wales club in particular, with a long 
traditions of success, saw the ultimate achievement as winning the League title and/or the 
WRU Swalec cup.  In order to attain those goals, successful performances needed to be 
produced over a ten month season, not only within the numerous competitive games, 
where individual ‘battles’ had to be fought and won, but also off the field with financial 
performances. The competitive games required different ‘tactics’ to be employed against 
diverse opponents, with the capture of the trophy, and the subsequent financial reward, 
an indication of success for the successful team.   
The Bailey et al’s (2000) six dimensional instrument was employed to determine the 
establishing of ‘who’ determines the strategic direction, the approach to strategy 
formulation, planning or incremental; the influence of any political and cultural aspects 
on strategy and finally the factors in the environment that limit the choice of strategy 
(Enforced Choice).   In investigating the reactions of the clubs, it was highlighted that ‘At 
its core, the strategy process involves decisions and actions, although not necessarily in 
that sequence’ (Chakravarthy and White, 2002, p187).  Data were extracted from the 
purposive sample of respondents at each club by means of a thirty-nine statements 
questionnaire, and subsequent interviews.  Each of the six dimensions included relevant 
constructed statements that were pertinent to the individual dimension.     
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Delivery of the findings, under each heading of the six dimensions, was not only 
presented in words but also visually via tables because, as Pettigrew (1997, p346) stated, 
“visualisation of the evidence not only cuts down on word length but also acts as an 
important attention director in what are often qualitative arguments.  With visualisation 
can also come verification, the amassing of evidence to consolidate an argument and 
establish an analytical theme”  
In addition, questions of interest to this study arising from the literature review for 
consideration within this Chapter are: 
 What were the Roles of Managers and Club Members in the Strategy-making 
Process? 
 Did Managers within same club agree/disagree on the patterns of process at work 
within the club? 
 Did the perception of the patterns of process differ across managerial groups? 
Whilst appreciating that ‘Respondents’ accounts are the key resource of the qualitative 
researcher and need to be treated as central to any interpretation’ (Curran and 
Blackburn, 2001, p127), it was the purpose of the qualitative investigation to gain a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon, rather than attempt to uncover a quantitative ‘singular 
truth’.  Therefore, the findings are first contrasted by each respondent, then compared 
within levels (management, team management and external), then cross-analysed 
between clubs.  The findings at each club, based on the Six Dimensional Framework 
(Bailey et al, 2000), are described, interpreted and compared in the following sections.    
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7.2     Command Dimension 
In a small organisation, such as a rugby club, it might be expected that the committee 
would be regarded as the dominant decision-making body within each club (Chaffee, 
1985).  Prior to 1995 that was generally the case, but within each committee the senior 
figures tended to be the chairman, secretary, treasurer and fixture secretary (5.2.1; 5.2.2; 
5.2.4). Such a structure was to be found in nearly every Welsh rugby club since the 
establishment of the sport in the 1870’s (Smith and Williams, 1981).  However, the 
investigation aimed to gain an understanding about whether or not the introduction of 
National Leagues and/or professionalism had changed the decision-making structure 
within each club.   Had those major changes led to any alteration in the legal format of 
the club that contributed to the rise of new senior figures?  To answer those questions, 
and to achieve the aim of this section, the following statements were put to each club 
respondent to seek, and determine, their opinions via agreement/disagreement levels. 
1. A senior figure’s vision is our strategy. 
 
2. The chief executive determines our strategic direction. 
 
3. The strategy we follow is directed by a vision of the future associated with the 
chief executive (or another senior figure). 
 
4. Our strategy is closely associated with a particular individual. 
 
5. Our chief executive tends to impose strategic decisions (rather than consulting 
the TMT) 
 
The findings from each club are presented overleaf. 
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7.2.1     Ebbw Vale RFC  
The views held by the respondents regarding Command statements were divided, and are 
found below in Table 7.2.1.  Interestingly, whilst all respondents disagreed with statement 
5, ‘CEO imposes strategic decisions’ possibly because there was no CEO in place, only 
the owner and captain disagreed with all the statements in this section. 
                              Table 7.2.1   Ebbw Vale Command Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
KEY 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
It was acknowledged by stakeholders (Conversations 8.2.97: 26.9.98: 29.10.03) that when 
Paul Russell took over the role of Ebbw Vale RFC club president in 1995 he was 
considered as the senior figure on the Committee, who initiated and drove strategy 
forward until 1997.  However, Paul Russell, in disagreeing with all command statements, 
played down the role of being the only senior figure, (Table 7.2.1) 
“Senior figures?  Myself, Marcus and Mike Ruddock.  Mike is the guy who keeps us 
honest; he tells us what is possible. You can set a strategy that says we’re going to spend 
£100,000 a year on players and we’re going to top the League, but Mike says that’s 
strategy is unobtainable and not implementable on that kind of money”. 
Other respondents (management, team management and external) clearly had no doubt 
about who were the club’s leader(s) as the following quotes indicate.   From within the 
Position                   Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Owner                               
Financial Backer                       
Management                    
Company Secretary                 
Accountant                              
Team Management         
Team Manager                         
Coach                                       
Captain                                     
External Stakeholders                          
Former Committeeman           
Press Reporter                         
Long Serving Supporter         
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external group, Ivor George recalled,  
“The strong figure initially was obviously Paul Russell”.  
Nonetheless, not every respondent agreed with that view, as Ray Harris revealed,   
“Paul plays an important part, but Marcus is the strategist, the senior figure”.   
Since the limited company was established in 1997, Paul, and subsequently his brother 
Marcus, have been seen by stakeholders as the senior figures holding the purse strings 
and initiating strategy (Conversations 2.5.98; 19.3.99; 1.11.00).  The following quotes 
were representative of that view. First, long serving Alan Evans clarified his disagreement 
with the statements.  
“A particular individual I would say ‘no’, but if you put three people, the executive, I 
would agree with it.  Paul, Marcus and Ray Harris… were an executive directorship if 
you like, obviously decide some sort of strategy between the three of them.   They would 
then come back to the board very quickly; they usually have that meeting just prior to a 
board meeting anyway.” 
In Mr. Evans’s opinion, the ultimate decision on strategy was the responsibility of the six-
member Board of Directors (Table 12a). Club Captain, Chay Billen, explained his 
reasoning for his disagreement with his fellow Team Management colleagues. 
“If it was on the playing side I wouldn’t agree with the statements but if it was on the 
business side I would agree that obviously since (CEO) Tony’s left, it’s Marcus and Paul.  
You know as players, we’ve sat down in years gone by and we decided our vision, come 
up with mission statements and that sort of side of it”. 
It was rather surprising therefore, that nobody from the playing staff was a Board member.   
Nevertheless, Mike Ruddock confirmed that he, as coach, was consulted by the Board on 
whether or not a strategy was viable and feasible in playing terms.   
“So, basically, they were looking to implement the strategy, and then they called you in.   
‘How can you help us to deliver that strategy?’  
Paul and Marcus Russell saw the involvement, and empowerment, of all full-time staff 
having complete day-to-day responsibility for the operations, as essential for any strategy 
to succeed.  Conversations with stakeholders (2.5.98; 19.3.99; 1.11.00), confirmed the 
findings that the two Russell’s provided the direction, via the Board, and that other 
organisational members were expected to follow.  
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7.2.2     Newbridge RFC   
The club, not having a CEO, meant majority disagreements against statements two         
and five, whilst there was majority agreement with statements one, three and four.   The 
external respondents were united in naming Idris McCarthey as the senior figure. 
       Table 7.2.2   Newbridge Command Responses 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Stakeholders perceived problems at the helm with the committee, and the club struggled 
to remain in the top Division for the first two seasons of the professional era (Appendix 
3.5a). Since the club was relegated, there was agreement on who has been the senior 
figure since 1998 (Table 7.2.2).  Idris McCarthey’s view on the ‘senior figures’ were, 
“Well I’d say myself, Paul Tedstone, and Graham Paterson.  The majority… would say 
that it’s me.  I know where we’re going and what we want to do but I do discuss it; I even 
talk to supporters about things”. 
Within the Management section, disagreement arose between the club accountant and 
general secretary on there being just one senior figure.  Paul Tedstone pointed out that, 
“I think that the three main people here are the chairman, secretary and myself, and we 
all come up with ideas.   We’ll discuss them between ourselves and put them forward to 
the Board.   When I was looking at  ‘a senior figures vision’,  it’s  not  the  case  because 
Position                   Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Owner      
Financial Backer      
Management      
Company Secretary      
Accountant      
Team Management      
Team Manager      
Coach      
Captain      
External      
Former Committeeman      
Press Reporter      
Long Serving Supporter      
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we’ll talk it around the table and agree the best route forward.   Then we’ve got like three 
or four different opinions or we’ll all agree on the same opinion, but at least we’ll look 
at all the options and then think which one is the best way forward”. 
Graham Paterson, one of the ‘trio’ of senior figures, viewed it slightly different. 
“Our chairman Idris McCarthy, is the senior figure without doubt.  Why do I think Idris?   
Idris came into the club six years ago.  He’s been chairman five seasons, and it’s his know 
how, his contacts, he’s got the time, because he’s running a business that allows him the 
time to do things.  I couldn’t put it strong enough that HE’S our driving force. He’s got a 
management board of six people who assist him and there’s an additional ten people who 
form the General Committee.   Idris is not over powering but he is a strong character and 
we get on like a house on fire”. 
Externally, long serving supporter, Brian Jones, did see one leader but then took a 
pluralistic view of the command statements, 
“There are senior figures.  I’d say, the executive, the management committee; they are 
the lead body but they do certainly speak to others.   They don’t sort of take anything on, 
as I see it, purely on their own say so, they do discuss things; so it was a Board sort of 
approach to it.  I’d see Idris as the leader, but he’ll make decisions based on discussions 
though mind.   So it’s not like a one-man thing”.  
Within the Team Management, coach Jonathan Westwood disagreed with the statements 
but his explanation was somewhat contradictory,  
“Really in terms of one senior figure, no one’s very, very powerful in as much that they 
drive the club single handed.  It seems to be done very much in conjunction with the team 
management as much as the club, if you know what I mean.  You’ve obviously got the guy 
who makes all the decisions in terms of bringing order to the club, for a better word, and 
that is Idris”.  
Whilst Idris McCarthey was acknowledged as the senior figure by most respondents, not 
everyone saw strategy as solely his vision or choice (Table 7.2.2); equally, stakeholders 
(Conversations, 8.9.01: 22.10.02: 29.10.03) felt that the decision-making process was still 
the responsibility of the management committee and that was why the chairman 
appreciated the need to get the management committee on board with him.   However, 
there was no-one from the playing staff on the management committee.  The TMT at 
Newbridge saw their role as providing direction for the club, with organisational members 
then implementing the actions required.  
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7.2.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC; Comparison of Findings 
Arising out of both the questionnaire and interviews was that the two financial backers, 
Paul Russell at Ebbw Vale and Idris McCarthy, Newbridge, had opposing views on the 
Command statements.  Whilst the management and team managements at Ebbw Vale 
disagreed over the command statements, respondents within the management and team 
management were united in disagreeing not only with the statements but also with the 
views of the owner.   
                  Table 7.2.3   Comparison of Command Responses 
 
            KEY  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Prior to the IoP, at Ebbw Vale and Newbridge, the committees were similar, made up of 
over twenty+ members (Appendix 3.4e & 3.5e).  Post 1995, strategy-making at Ebbw 
Vale continued to be top down (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984), but from an individual 
rather than a committee.  Paul Russell possessed both legitimate and expert power 
(Trenberth, 2003) through his appointment as the autocratic decision-making president 
(Yukl, 1998), but interestingly, from 1997, he did not see himself as the one single leader 
when his brother joined the club (Table 7.2.1).  The various levels of management within 
the club were divided over the command statements.  The club accountant and company 
secretary were in agreement with each other, but disagreed with the owner.  The team 
management were divided amongst themselves but overall were narrowly in agreement 
with the owner. The group of external stakeholders were also divided over their responses. 
                                
Position                   
Ebbw Vale  
 
Newbridge 
 
    
Owner                             
    
Management                  
    
Team Management       
    
External Stakeholders                       
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There was no united response to the command statements. 
By comparison at Newbridge, up to 1998, the deductive management ‘top down’ 
approach to strategy (Nonaka, 1988) was still found at the club.  The club’s officers were 
responsible for making strategy with the management committee giving its support 
(Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984).  However, since 1998, the new chairman (and financial 
backer), had assumed responsibility of driving the club forward along with a reduced 
management committee of six members.  By comparison to the financial backer at Ebbw 
Vale, Idris McCarthey did not play down the fact that he considered himself the leader 
at the club (Bennis and Nanus, 1996), but consulting with senior colleagues before 
reaching a final decision. Strategy was initiated by the small committee, with some 
members feeling it was reached through a joint decision-making process, and then with 
other organisation club members implementing the policy.  The management level at 
Newbridge disagreed with the statements and with the view of the owner.  Whilst 
disagreement with the owners’ views was common to both clubs, there were opposing 
reasons for the disagreement.  Similar to Ebbw Vale, the Newbridge team management 
disagreed with the command statements; but they also disagreed with the owner’s views.  
Idris McCarthey’s views did find agreement from the external stakeholders.   Findings 
revealed disagreement amongst the various levels at both clubs over the command 
statements. 
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7.2.4     Llanelli RFC 
At Llanelli there were considered to be ‘senior figures’ at each level of management i.e. 
financial backer, CEO and head coach.  Nevertheless, the chairman and backer, Huw 
Evans was viewed by stakeholders as the senior figure (Conversations, 9.1.99: 23.12.00: 
20.9.03).  
  Table 7.2.4   Llanelli Command Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Illness had forced club chairman, ex-teacher Roy Bergiers, to resign and he was replaced 
by self-employed businessman Stuart Gallacher, who took over the mantle of guiding the 
future of the club.  After two seasons of financial difficulties, a member of the club, Peter 
Jones, saw the opportunity of bringing in a sound financial backer but one who was a 
rugby supporter from local rivals Swansea. The backer, Huw Evans explained, 
 
“I thought they (Llanelli) were sorted.    I had no idea that this was not the case.    I was 
fed up at watching the demise of Welsh rugby, wanting to do something and here was an 
opportunity to go in and help.    I went in very, very hands off but I found myself drawn 
in more and more to the survival strategy for the club, and that initially meant having 
some very hard conversations with all the players, lowering their salaries, voluntary 
reductions, and helping the club on their business planning; but again only in survival 
mode.   So the  strategy  has  been  to  survive.  We’ve  all  got  a  vision  of  the club, it’s 
Position                     Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Owner      
Financial Backer      
Management      
CEO      
Accountant      
Team Management      
Team Manager      
Coach      
Captain      
External      
Former Committeeman      
Press Reporter      
Long Serving Supporter      
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everyone’s vision that we would be the leading European rugby club, and that was deep, 
so deeply rooted in each of the individuals involved; it’s actually been our biggest 
component for survival.  People believe in the club in a way that I find is unique.  The 
reason I personally got involved was because I sensed that these people were fighting for 
something that they felt was very special”.   
The chairman’s strong disagreement that ‘strategy is closely associated with a particular 
individual’ or ‘a senior figure’s vision was our strategy’ was not supported by responses 
gathered at interview from any other club respondent except the CEO, Stuart Gallacher. 
“The strategy is actually developed by the Board and I certainly wouldn’t say that the 
strategy is implemented by one individual.  I think it’s more of a team effort”.   
When Llanelli RFC Ltd was formed in 1997 (Appendix 3.6a), the WRU had put a ‘golden 
share’ of £500,000, into the company on its formation. On the Board of Directors, 
stakeholders acknowledged there were three senior figures; the chairman, who was the 
major shareholder, the CEO and the head coach; but, as Norman Lewis pointed out,  
“Huw Evans is obviously the major figure by a long, long way because without him there 
would be no Llanelli. An all-powerful figure who actually pulls all the strings particularly 
the purse strings.  He’s the man who actually keeps Llanelli afloat.”   
This view of the major figure in the club was put to stakeholders in conversations.  There 
was little doubt that they considered Huw Evans as THE main man at Llanelli, whose 
power came from having that most essential resource – money (Llanelli Conversations 
18.10.97: 1.3.98: 9.1.99)   During discussions,  Hefin Jenkins offered an interesting 
insight into the early involvement of Huw Evans.  
“I think probably the broad decision is made by the board.  Obviously more now by the 
chairman than the chief executive, but it’s obviously the chief executive that follows it 
through then.  Huw is a rugby man but probably hasn’t had the experience of running a 
club as such, as most businessmen who came in when it went professional; and a lot of 
them learned by mistakes.  So, as in Huw’s case, he listened to advice probably from 
Stuart (CEO) and other people who had been associated with the club over a period,    
and he’s learned that you know”. 
Probing deeper around this subject uncovered a comparative view to that of Hefin 
Jenkin’s.  The captain, Rupert Moon, appeared happy to explain that,  
“Huw Evans is very much the silent partner, but through Stuart his voice can be heard.      
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He is a very shrewd businessman, and recognises there has to be accountability and 
responsibility, but recognises that we didn’t have any of that before. It was very much 
shouldered, prior to professionalism, on Gareth Jenkins, to manoeuvre and sort 
everything out.  Then, when Stuart came in earnest, it started with Stuart trying to do a 
bit of everything, but he was the real guy that stepped up to the plate when needed, 
really”.       
Questioning of the captain revealed that he considered Stuart Gallacher as the leader of 
the club when Huw Evans rescued them.   In addition, Rupert Moon also disclosed the 
investment that the chairman had put into his CEO. 
“Huw Evans wanted to see what Stuart was like, what he was capable of.  Definitely. 
Huw had guided him and pointed him in the direction and what he did, he very wisely 
trained Stuart up.  He sent Stuart off on a CEO course.  Not many people know that he 
actually went on a chief executive course for football clubs, and with CEOs from other 
sports, and he came in some ridiculously high percentage of all the chief executives.  
Behind the scenes without the publicity, Stuart was getting additional skills, to improve 
his own skills but that was through Huw you know, who built a steady team around him.  
Nonetheless, it was basically Stuart who was having to make some hard decisions” 
The findings from the interviews and from stakeholders (Conversations 1.3.98: 9.1.99: 
20.9.03) revealed that whilst there were deemed to be leaders at Management level, CEO 
Stuart Gallacher, and at Team Management level, coach Gareth Jenkins, the collective 
view at Llanelli clearly placed Huw Evans as the dominant powerhouse, THE ‘senior 
figure’ since he joined the club. 
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7.2.5     Comparisons with the Benchmark Club. 
 
The contrast between the management level in each club, and between the three clubs, on 
their perceptions of senior figures is clearly highlighted below in Table 7.2.5.   
Table 7.2.5   Comparison of Command Responses by Levels 
       
KEY 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The overall reply from respondents was agreement that there was a senior figure(s) who 
was closely associated with a ‘vision’ at each club (Shrivastava and Nachman, 1989).  
Llanelli, were the only club who had a CEO at the time the questionnaire was issued; 
respondents from the other clubs at their interviews pointed to the lack of a CEO being 
the reason for the low agreement with some statements from different levels of respondent 
amongst the clubs (Table 7.2.6 overleaf).  The financial backers, the chairmen, at Llanelli, 
Ebbw Vale and Newbridge, were considered to be the ‘power brokers’ by stakeholders 
(Hickson et al, 1986). At Ebbw Vale and Newbridge Team Management felt they were 
involved with strategic decisions, those affecting the team rather than the entire club. 
Whilst views differed on the Command statements at the various levels at the two Gwent 
clubs, all the levels at Llanelli were in agreement on a senior figure (Table 7.2.5).
                                                
                                                 Club 
Position 
Ebbw Vale Newbridge 
 
Llanelli 
     
Owner   
 
 
     
Management   
 
 
     
Team Management   
 
 
     
External Stakeholders   
 
 
     
Overall Acceptance of Dimension   
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  Table 7.2.6    Cross-Case Analysis: Comparison by Club of  
                         Command Statements  
                  
 
                          Club 
 
Ebbw Vale 
(n=9) 
Newbridge 
(n=9) 
 
Llanelli 
(n=9) 
Statements      
1. A senior figure’s vision is our 
strategy.     
2. The CEO   determines our 
strategic direction.     
3. The strategy we follow is 
directed by a vision of the future 
associated with CEO (or other 
senior fig.) 
    
4. Our strategy is closely 
associated with a particular 
individual. 
    
5. Our CEO tends to impose 
strategic decisions (rather than 
consulting the TMT). 
    
 
KEY: 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
As is evident from Table 7.2.6 above, the overall responses from those interviewed at 
Llanelli were in agreement with the statements on the Command dimension, whilst there 
was disagreement at the Gwent clubs concerning some statements.  The disagreement 
with statements 2 and 5 found at Ebbw Vale and Newbridge was due, as stated by 
respondents, to there being no CEO at either club. 
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7.3     Planning 
Planning is an intentional process involving a logical, sequential, analytic and deliberate 
set of procedures where the internal and external environments are systematically 
analysed.  The organisation evaluates many alternative strategic options before selecting 
the strategy that maximizes the value of outcomes in relation to the organisation’s 
objectives.  The selected strategy is then detailed in the form of precise implementation 
plans and is subsequently monitored and controlled (Chaffee, 1985).  It is assumed that 
the TMT develop the strategy and those lower down the organization implement it (Hart, 
1992).  However, in a small rugby club, is there a need for such formal planning?  Does 
the club have the necessary time, resources and ‘visionary’ leader(s) to plan?  As such, 
could it be expected that operational (day-to-day) planning takes priority?  To 
comprehend the degree of planning in the research clubs, the following statements were 
put to each respondent to determine their agreement or disagreement. 
6. Our strategy is made explicit in the form of precise plans 
 
7. When we formulate a strategy it is planned in detail. 
 
8. We have precise procedures for achieving strategic objectives. 
 
9. We   have well-defined planning procedures to search for solutions to strategic 
problems. 
 
10. We meticulously assess many alternatives when deciding on a strategy. 
 
11. We evaluate potential strategic options against explicit strategic objectives. 
 
12. We have definite and precise strategic objectives. 
 
13. We make strategic decisions based on a systematic analysis of our business 
environment. 
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7.3.1     Ebbw Vale RFC  
As seen in Table 7.3.1, out of the nine respondents’ replies there was just one 
disagreement with any statement. Otherwise all the respondents completed questionnaires 
showed agreement regarding formal planning within the club. Nonetheless, the interviews 
did reveal some differences in respondents’ perceptions of planning. 
 
              Table 7.3.1   Ebbw Vale Planning Responses    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Appreciating the dynamic changes and uncertainty that existed in Welsh rugby following 
professionalism, the new president directed the club along a business path that led to the 
production of a strategic plan.  He strongly agreed with the statements in this section. 
“We produce a strategic plan each year, which is discussed by the Board and, formally 
adopted is too strong a word, but we decide to go with them.   We say ‘right, this is the 
strategy we’re going to follow,” 
Interviewing the Club’s full-time company secretary, and the club’s accountant, 
established that they agreed with the president but had somewhat different views on the 
formulation.  Ray Harris recalled that, 
“The plans would be in the minutes of the Board meeting. Again, are plans formulated? 
Yes, we are all realists, striving for the same thing, making it very easy”.  
Position                   Statement 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Owner                                        
Financial Backer         
Management         
Company Secretary         
Accountant         
Team Management         
Team Manager         
Coach         
Captain         
External         
Former Committeeman         
Press Reporter         
Long Serving Supporter         
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The club accountant, Terri Morgan, offered her interpretation of the planning period. 
 “To a certain level I think they do plan although they don’t formulise it. Plans are made 
and, depending on what is happening within that particular season, then we try to 
implement them as fast as possible.  We do look at a longer term but that’s not always 
feasible as things change from season to season, so annual was probably correct”.  
Looking at the responses to the formal Planning section of the questionnaire found strong 
agreement from the club respondents on nearly all the statements. Answers obtained 
clearly revealed that detailed, precise plans were formulated for meeting explicit strategic 
objectives (Table 7.3.1).  Pursuing the talk of a Strategic Plan with Alan Evans, he 
confirmed the presence of a Five Year Plan to meet objectives. 
“There was a five year plan to get us a deal on the Heineken Cup level, to get us as far up 
the Premier Division as we could.  We got to fourth a couple of years ago, but were piped 
because Swansea and Cardiff came back one year. So the five year plan actually did go 
a bit astray because we ended up in the Heineken Cup once one year and we failed on the 
other two occasions.  To go up the table I think we really succeed for a few years because 
we were getting about an average of fourth, somewhere around that like, which suited us; 
but because of cash flow problems things changed dramatically the five year plan.  
Basically it came to an end I suppose, and it went out of the window by just not achieving 
what we set out to do.  So  instead of having a five year plan, all of a sudden, ‘God we’ve 
got to do a one-year plan and survive’, and that’s been the case ever since”.  
When considering the players perspective, the captain, Chay Billen, explained that, 
“As club captain I was involved with the Board of Directors meeting up, myself and Mike 
were involved with them.  Wouldn’t say I had a lot of input into it but I obviously saw 
what was going on and listened intently to what was being said. So it was evident from 
the meetings that it was a pretty professional planning set-up”. 
Whilst all respondents believed the club did plan (Table 7.3.1) some questioned the depth 
of the planning.  Working at the coal-face, the team manager offered a critical alternative 
view that had not been reflected in his questionnaire.  
 “We send a lot of time firefighting. Whether you call that adjusting, on-going adjustments 
or anything, it’s firefighting in reality”.  
Stakeholders spoke of the ‘Russell strategy’ (the 3 x 8’s goals) but none recalled seeing 
a written plan (Conversations, 8.3.97: 2.5.98: 29.10.03).  Transmission of ‘the plan’ was 
through verbal, rather than written, communication. No evidence of any detailed written 
plans was produced, or seen during, throughout the research. 
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7.3.2     Newbridge RFC 
Whilst most internal respondents mainly agreed with the statements, (Table 7.3.2), two 
of the external respondents clearly disagreed with the statements on planning. However, 
during interviews some respondents appeared to contradict the marks awarded to the 
various statements. 
             Table 7.3.2   Newbridge Planning Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 It was established that there was no planning at Newbridge for the IoP, and neither had 
relegation influenced or changed the planning process.  The opinion of Idris McCarthey, 
club chairman, regarding planning was, 
 “In minutes of meetings, yer, you know.  We know generally where we want to go but we 
know what’s going on with all the plans.  We have meetings and we minute it, as and 
when we need to have them meetings really; there’s a plan but not in writing.  That is a 
change from the old committee who’d talk about anything and take all night to do it.  
There’s no point was there”?  
During questioning of the club accountant, he confirmed the chairman’s view of the 
informal approach. 
Position                    Statement 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Owner                                        
Financial Backer         
Management         
Company Secretary         
Accountant         
Team Management         
Team Manager         
Coach         
Captain         
External         
Former Committeeman         
Press Reporter         
Long Serving Supporter         
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“With regards to strict precise plans, there’s a plan but not in writing.  There’s a plan of 
what we’ve discussed and a budget in terms of ‘we couldn’t achieve that and we couldn’t 
achieve this, etc”.  
In contrasting the views of club respondents, disagreement with the statements came from 
different levels. The Team Management’s views, including captain Damion Cooper, on 
recording a plan, agreed with those of the club’s Management, 
“We don’t have written plans as such”. 
As evident from Table 7.3.2, two of the external respondents disagreed with the majority 
of statements on planning. Reporter, Geoff Champion questioned if, throughout his long 
forty-five years of association, the club ever had a ‘planned’ strategy. 
 “I’m not convinced. I haven’t seen it personally, and I don’t think the people of 
Newbridge have seen a clear strategy.  If it’s there it’s not visible; and if they want to 
have a much clearer focus, in my view they’ve got to make it visible”.  
Without knowing what any plan aimed to achieve and not understanding the strategy to 
attain any goals set, people might decide not to support the club.  Former secretary and 
committeeman, Brian Wellington, was of the same opinion, casting doubts as to whether 
or not the club practiced formal planning.    
“You’ve got to take action and change direction.  I’m not saying we didn’t do that, but 
we didn’t do it against the base of having had a plan”. 
Following relegation from the Premier Division in 1997, the club did set itself a new 
objective, that of returning to the Top Division (Graham Paterson Interview).  
Nevertheless, the situation at Newbridge was found to be that, due to the changing and 
uncertain environment, they did not have formal, written plans but relied on the minutes 
of weekly committee meetings. Stakeholders confirmed that formal planning had only 
previous taken place when necessity demanded, as in the case of having to replace, and 
rebuild, two destroyed clubhouses (Conversations, 3.5.97: 24.11.01: 29.10.03).  No 
written evidence of SP was produced. 
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7.3.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC;   Comparison of Findings 
 
Both the financial backers at ‘high performing’ Ebbw Vale, and ‘low performing’ 
Newbridge, agreed with all of the statements on planning.  However, when interviewed, 
all respondents indicated that neither club had a ‘crisis management committee’ that had 
planned for any unexpected event such as IoP (Hale et al, 2006).  
             Table 7.3.3   Comparison of Planning Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               
 
 
            KEY  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Planning at Ebbw Vale came from the top down in the shape of new president Paul 
Russell.  It was his fresh vision and strategy, employing a (3 x 8’s) goal approach (Pfeffer 
and Salanckic, 2003), that members believed contributed to the club’s survival in the Top 
Division by adopting a structured development plan (Bracker and Pearson, 1986).  On the 
other hand, Newbridge continued to look to the committee, including the chairman, to 
move the club forward. There was no clear survival strategy planned due, it was said by 
stakeholders, to the lack of financial resources and poor decision-making (Conversations 
3.5.97: 24.11.01: 29.10.03).   
Following the club becoming a limited company, Ebbw Vale did produce a five year,  
written  strategic  plan  in  1998  but  owing  to  the  dynamic  environment  the  plan was  
                                 
Position                   
Ebbw Vale  Newbridge 
    
Owner                           
  
    
Management                  
    
Team Management       
    
External Stakeholders                        
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scrapped and a shorter, annual plan took its place.    As shown in Table 7.3.3, most of 
Ebbw Vale responses were in agreement with the Planning statements.  (At Newbridge 
less responses were in agreement with the same statements).  The plans were not 
formalised, rather they were intuitive plans of a short duration but were part of the minutes 
of Board meetings. 
At Ebbw Vale and Newbridge, there was no evidence produced or found regarding any 
formal, written plans; in fact, several respondents confirmed that formal, written plans 
were absent, not produced, within the clubs (Inkpen and Choudhury, 1995).  Rather what 
little planning was undertaken at each club was recorded in the minutes of committee 
meetings.  Paul Russell at Ebbw Vale did plan amidst the turbulent environment and 
achieved the objectives set by the club (Hart and Banbury, 1994). At Newbridge, the 
chairman contended that it was impossible to plan in such a dynamic environment 
(Risseeuw and Marsuel, 1994) but not supporting that view with any facts or figures.  
Whilst stakeholders had difficulty in seeing a clear, visible strategy (Conversations, 
18.9.96: 3.5.97: 29.10.03), members of the club’s executive management committee 
confirmed, during interviews, that there was a strategy based on an emergent approach 
(Idenburg, 1993).  
Ebbw Vale had experienced difficulties in implementing operational plans.  Interviews 
uncovered that poor fixture planning by the WRU had seriously affected the club’s bank 
overdraft and there were occasions when revenue streams were badly hit due to the fact 
that the club had only one home League fixture in sixteen weeks. The Board of Directors 
reaction had to be quick and decisive to resolve this critical financial problem (Matthews 
and Scott, 1995). Whilst the club did plan, it was not formal or written, and due to a 
dynamic environment the club adopted more of an emergent approach to strategy 
(Richardson, 1995). At Newbridge, it was appreciated that OP was important to the 
survival of the club. 
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7.3.4     Llanelli RFC   
With the odd exception, particularly the views of the captain, respondents were in 
agreement with the statements regarding formal planning (Table 7.3.4). However, the 
benchmark club did not have a ‘crisis management plan’ (Hale et al, 2006). 
 
               Table 7.3.4   Llanelli Planning Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The belated entrance in 1997 of Huw Evans as financial backer, brought an experienced 
businessman into the club with strategic thinking and vision; he revealed that, 
 
“There were plans which support our current budgets, and tactics around how we create 
or control those revenue and cost lines.  That’s on an annual basis. And our survival 
plans have been reviewed on a regular basis and modified on a regular basis.  But now 
we’re getting into true ‘how to survive’, with true SP and we were developing written 
strategies to support the delivery of our objectives and so forth.    So that’s the phase 
we’re now going into.  There are real strategic objectives now, and a vision. We have lots 
of strategies about our survival”.  
It was evident from interviews and conversations that, since the arrival of Huw Evans, 
the club had followed a survival strategy. The CEO, coach and team manager in 
particular,  strongly  agreed  that  the  club  had  moved  into  planning  mode  since  1997,  
Position                    Statement 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Owner                                        
Financial Backer         
Management         
Company Secretary         
Accountant         
Team Management         
Team Manager         
Coach         
Captain         
External         
Former Committeeman         
Press Reporter         
Long Serving Supporter         
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because previously the club had no formal, written plans.  The Board intended to move 
towards developing written strategic plans to achieve the club’s objectives, which 
undermined those respondents who said that the plans were currently visited on a regular 
basis and modified where necessary.  Nonetheless, when interviewed the club captain 
Rupert Moon, disagreed with comments of the Owner, Management and Coach, openly 
stating, 
“From a business plan point of view only, I’ve not seen a business plan for the future but 
I understand they do have one.  You know they’re talking about moving stadium but they 
are thinking about five years down the line and what benefit it could be further on” 
However, his view point was similar to that of most respondents from within the Team 
Management section at each club. The emphasis of this particular group of individuals 
was on OP and not SP.  The captain’s thoughts on planning once again, 
“Yea, when I first started here, Phil Davies (Coach) was meticulous in keeping detailed 
information, forward planning and his thinking about rugby. Gareth (Jenkins) didn’t 
translate well, because he’s not particularly good at the old writing and everything like 
that, but he articulated well, and he’s always had a second in command like Buc (Team 
Manager) to write it down. He always thought further down the line. What he (GJ) was 
always very good at, he was strong in his opinion but would listen and make people know 
that he would listen to what they had to say. He’d like to have generals around him that 
would help in guiding him but he is very visionary in what he thought was needed to 
succeed on the field”. 
During his interview, the CEO gave a unique insight into the priorities of Directors at 
their Board meetings. 
“We have had to put a business plan together, for two reasons; firstly, so the Chairman 
knows how big his bond has got to be for another year.  Secondly, we do it for the bank.    
I present it to the board and it’s a break-even position for next season if all the cards turn 
over the right way. Then I do another business plan, worse scenario which was a 
£1million loss. So what I’m trying to say is that we do definitely have a strategy in writing 
which is in place from 1st July, and I put in that things like increases in prices and what I 
think we’re going to get from these, going forward.  Sometimes it’s a load of bollocks, it’s 
not achievable. We have a quarterly board meeting. To be quite honest the board are 
more interested in the rugby, that’s why they are involved.  They love the game, they love 
this club; the whole meeting is about two hours and it’s all armchair critics.  They go 
through my chief executive commercial report in about ten minutes. “Well done Stuart, 
good fine, that’s it.  Now Gareth, about the rugby side…”. 
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The CEO’s description of the Board meeting was confirmed by Hefin Jenkins. 
“The objective of the current board is to be successful on the field, there’s no two ways 
about that. The people that came aboard were rugby people then and that was a good 
thing.  Obviously the heritage directors, were put there to ensure that whoever did come 
in as directors didn’t just come in, strip the club of assets, and walk away.  I think coming 
back again to the point of view of being a rugby club,  the people in charge of the side 
have got goals; the rugby this year where we more or less threw the league away for the 
sake of concentrating on Europe. We saw that as a goal.  We had a strong side and you 
know that the side was going to develop to a certain point and then it will disappear. So 
I think they aimed for Europe this year, but unfortunately they didn’t achieve it. The cost 
is we could have lost out in the placement for Europe next year because the WRU hadn’t 
decided on the league strategy, position, sorry.   So there is a plan from that point of 
view”.       
Since the arrival of Huw Evans, stakeholders stated that they had heard of ‘a plan’ but 
had not seen any evidence (Conversations, 22.4.00: 28.4.02: 20.9.03).   For whatever 
reason, no solid evidence of a formal, written plan was produced.   
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7.3.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club 
Both the high, and low, performers from Gwent were in agreement with the Planning 
statements (Table 7.3.5).    
Table 7.3.5   Comparison of Planning Responses by Club Levels 
  
KEY  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Ebbw Vale planned a survival strategy to remain in the top division, whereas at 
Newbridge, despite the united responses, neither planned nor adjusted following the IoP.   
The undeniable outcomes were that Ebbw Vale achieved their goal of top division 
survival, but that Newbridge were relegated to the lower division.  As at Ebbw Vale, 
management respondents at Llanelli were in strong agreement with the planning 
statements, yet described reactions to events through intuition and ‘gut feeling’ 
(Chakravarthy and White, 2002) rather than through a formal planning process.  
Nonetheless, the club survived in the Premier division.  Within each club, the statements 
on formal planning were either agreed or strongly agreed (Table 7.3.6) although no 
evidence was produced of any written SP.  Stakeholders agreed with respondents that the 
standard timeframe for strategy-making was determined by the seasonal nature of rugby.  
     
Position                   
Ebbw Vale Newbridge  Llanelli 
     
Owner                    
     
Management                   
     
Team Management        
     
External Stakeholders                         
     
Overall Acceptance of Dimension     
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    Table 7.3.6      Cross-Case Analysis: Comparison by Club of  
                            Planning Statements 
 
                             
                                      Club 
 
Ebbw Vale 
(n=9) 
Newbridge 
(n=9) 
 Llanelli 
(n=9) 
Statements     
6.   Our strategy is made explicit 
in the form of precise plans   
 
 
7. When we formulate a strategy 
it is planned in detail.   
 
 
8.   We have precise procedures 
for achieving strategic objectives.   
 
 
9.   We have well-defined 
planning procedures to search for 
solutions to strategic problems. 
  
 
 
10. We meticulously assess many 
alternatives when deciding on a 
strategy. 
  
 
 
11. We evaluate potential 
strategic options against explicit 
strategic objectives.  
  
 
 
 
12. We have definite and precise 
strategic objectives.   
 
 
 
13. We make strategic decisions 
based on a systematic analysis of 
our business environment. 
  
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The comparison of the overall responses from the respondents at each club revealed 
general agreement with the statements on planning.  However, the written and verbal 
evidence did not always match up with the actual research findings. 
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7.4     Incremental Planning   
Planning can be either intended or emergent. This section sought to examine the findings 
concerning the incremental perspective. Previous research had found that planning could 
adopt various characteristics i.e. written/unwritten, formal/informal, flexible/inflexible, 
complex/simple, and structured/unstructured. With limited resources, skills and time 
available, it could be argued that the small organisation was constrained from engaging 
in the rational, intended mode of formal planning (Table 2.14).  Hence the rugby club 
should engage in the incremental, emergent approach to planning as it responded to the 
need to change. Strategy develops through continual small-scale adjustments and 
experimenting, responding to the need to change and subject to review.  
The study aimed to search for, identify, then describe and evaluate, incremental planning 
characteristics found in rugby clubs.  The statements for consideration, and subsequent 
discussion, in this section were, 
 
14. Our strategy develops through a process of ongoing adjustment. 
 
15. Our strategy is continually adjusted as changes occur in the market place. 
  
16. To keep in line with our business environment we make continual small- 
 scale changes to strategy. 
 
17. Our strategies emerge gradually as we respond to the need to change.   
  
18. We keep early commitment to a strategy tentative and subject to review. 
 
19. We tend to develop strategy by experimenting and trying new approaches in the 
market place. 
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7.4.1     Ebbw Vale RFC   
The view, the body language and vocal tone of the financial backer, Paul Russell, on 
disagreeing with the incremental planning statements, was strong and unmistakable. 
 
“I’m a great believer in having a plan and sticking to it. So the small incremental changes 
we tend to make at Ebbw Vale are a very tiny number”.  
 
The president’s view was not fully supported by other respondents, especially those in 
Team Management and External (Table 7.4.1). The exception was statement 19, on 
developing strategy by experimenting and using new approaches. 
 
             Table 7.4 1   Ebbw Vale Incremental Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
At the coalface, the reality of the problems faced by the club in trying to approach 
planning rationally, were explained, with some animated feeling, by Ray Harris. 
“When I first started, within three months we really had to grasp and alter the way the 
club was running. We then put forward a three-year plan, which was a good plan. It relied 
on certain things; it relied on the Union delivering their bit, and it relied on the Premier 
Clubs realising that to take Welsh rugby forward that we had to be looking to strengthen 
the whole base of the league.  That has not gone ahead; the environment out there has 
made it impossible to follow through any plan.  (Reads), ‘to keep in line with our 
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 business environment we might have continue small-scale changes of strategy’, we have 
to.  ‘Our strategies emerge gradually’; we don’t have time, for example, there you were, 
planning a year ahead and suddenly you end up with one home fixture in four months.  
So this time you look at your cash flow situation which was what we did.  At one point 
within that period we were £250,000 overdrawn with a £5,000 facility with the bank.  
Marcus and Paul don’t have the money to put in to get us through that.  We had three 
days to come up with a strategy to solve that. That is just one example.  I could think of 
loads such as losing players, losing coaches, the council taking the lease off us.   When 
that happens you again have the ability within the Board of Directors to be able to 
respond very, very quickly and whilst we still have the ultimate aim we have got to take 
these steps, but we don’t have time for them to emerge gradually.  We couldn’t wait a 
month for a meeting, its people on the phone straight away. ‘This was happening. How 
do we do this?   What do we do’?  It might have involved a Board meeting it might have 
not, and, (reads) ‘we keep early commitment tentative, subject to review’, we don’t have 
time.  When you got to react in that situation, once you decide you have to have a 
confidence in the ability of the people that have been involved to come up with the right 
strategy”. 
Despite the quoted situations seriously affecting the cash flow and bank overdraft, the 
Board of Directors had the ability to react very quickly and resolve the resulting 
threatening financial situation.  Whilst interviewing Alan Evans, he expressed reasons for 
the lack of formal planning, and also to some extent incremental planning.  
“There were two basic aims; keeping professional rugby and keeping a Premiership team 
in Ebbw Vale, but of course things come in your way and I wouldn’t say its panic 
management, it was certainly (pause)… ‘stop the rot’ management for want of a better 
word.  Yer, you have to change small things, which could have been mountains if they’d 
been allowed to grow and that’s the way it was done otherwise we would have been out 
of business the next day.  It was that close.  You’ve got no time to bloody experiment; you 
had to do it, literally.  Then it was down to creating a strategy whereby we were, at one 
stage it was bad enough, we were surviving month by month, if not week by week.  And I 
certainly know… Novemberish… of the first year we were going from day to day, the 
basic walk was from day to day.  You know that if you had x amount of cash in you could 
pay x amount of cash out and if you didn’t have it, boy you didn’t pay out; and you literally 
went for about a month, we went from day to day, where plans were restructured every 
morning.   First thing that Ray Harris, not Ray, Tony Dillaway (then CEO) and Terry 
(accountant) did was go through what they actually had to play with at 9:00 o clock in 
the morning and that went on for quite some time, but we had to be honest”.  
        Equally, from within the Team Management, Doug Taylor was quick to point out that, 
       “The Club just has not had the time to experiment; it’s firefighting in reality” 
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       In spite of the views held by Paul Russell, stakeholders at Ebbw Vale believed that rapidly 
changing circumstances had pushed the club into adopting more of an emergency, rather 
than an emergent, approach to strategy (Conversations, 15.4.00: 24.3.01: 29.10.03). 
Whilst there were verbal examples of planning presented by the club respondents, no 
written documentation was produced.  Rather it was said to be found, recorded, in the 
minutes of meetings, which were not seen by the researcher.    
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7.4.2     Newbridge RFC   
Overall there was strong agreement from respondents for statements 14 to 17, and whilst 
agreement was reached on 18, there was disagreement, as at Ebbw Vale, regarding 
statement 19 (Table 7.4.2). 
 
              Table 7.4.2   Newbridge Incremental Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
There was general agreement from respondents for the club to develop strategy through 
small, continuing adjustments to respond to the changing rugby environment. The 
chairman, Idris McCarthey, during his interview, explained that the club had a strategy 
and that it followed the emergent approach rather than the planned approach. 
“The strategies tend to emerge.  It’s like trying to plan games isn’t it?  Things change as 
you go along and you have to catch on to it as you’re going like.   I couldn’t see how you 
can plan for the long-term”. 
Pursuing the view that long-term planning was difficult in a rugby environment, an 
explanation was offered by club accountant, Paul Tedstone; 
“I think cash flow in a club like ours dictates strategy and dictates lots of issues because 
for example, members say could afford to give us £3000 from the member’s charities. So 
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we say great £3,000, right it’s going towards painting the roof, but it went to propping 
up the salaries because we couldn’t pay the boys on time.  So there all of a sudden, where 
you’ve said this year we’re going to paint the roof, it didn’t happen, change of strategy, 
change of a priority in the list of maintenance towards the club.   So we said ‘we need a 
new physio area and we need to improve facilities for the referees’ and we spent £5-6,000 
on doing that.   However, that’s the night we listed down items of importance and items 
3, 4, 5 didn’t occur because we had to put the money towards the cost of the players.  So 
I wouldn’t say strategy, but planning, the same thing I know.  In terms of planning it’s 
very…what we tend to do is firefight, for example, because the club was in arrears to the 
tune of £70-80,000 owed to the Inland Revenue we’ve brought that down to probably £5 
– 6,000.  That’s great”. 
When researching the view from the supporters’ terrace via Brian Jones, he believed that 
the arrival of the chairman and accountant had helped the Club with making incremental 
changes. 
“Yes, I think that the people who are there at the moment can cope with change.   I think 
the introduction of Idris and Paul, as businessmen, has helped a great deal with that.  
Certainly with young Paul, who’s also the marketing guy, he’s a good lad, got his own 
business and he’s a good catch to come on the committee”. 
Whilst agreeing with that view, the Team Manager’s vocal tone was despondent when he 
offered up reasons for the club adopting an Incremental approach,  
“I think from my days, the interest in rugby football in Wales has been dying and dying. 
As a result the financial stability of the club, if you like, has been put under pressure 
because we don’t get anyone in here.  The gates are down, not just in Newbridge, this is 
general isn’t it, the bar takings are also down. Not that I’m saying the club is broke 
because we’re not.   I mean the club is just about keeping its head above water in terms 
of, Idris could tell you far more about this than I can. They are working hard to keep the 
ship f*****g stable, know what I mean; to keep us in business so that we are able to 
continue playing as Newbridge rugby club”. 
Stakeholders at Newbridge maintained that formal SP was not appropriate in the 
uncertain, dynamic environment that existed in Welsh rugby and there was more support 
for the incremental approach rather than the formal planning approach  (Conversations, 
19.4.97: 19.12.98: 29.10.03).  
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7.4.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC;   Comparison of Findings 
As can be seen in Table 7.4.3, the two owners, Paul Russell at Ebbw Vale and Idris 
McCarthey at Newbridge took opposite stances on Incremental Planning.  Mr. Russell 
preferred having a plan and sticking to it, as shown by his low agreement with statements 
on incremental planning; whereas Mr. McCarthey, with his strong agreement, confirmed 
his belief that strategies at Newbridge emerged incrementally.    
               Table 7.4.3   Comparison of Incremental Responses 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
 
            KEY 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
A closer examination of the Ebbw Vale owner’s views saw Management, the Team 
Management and the External stakeholders out of line with the owner’s views.   These 
findings revealed that the full-time staff, who are fully empowered by the Board, saw 
Incremental Planning as a necessity because of the external environment impacting on 
the club.  However, the situations described by staff revealed that decisions were based 
on the event requiring emergency, rather than emergent, action.  Respondents believed 
that reaction had to be instant if survival was to be the order of the day.    
By comparison, at Newbridge agreement with the chairman’s views were consistent with 
the Management,  the Team Management  and the External stakeholders concurring with 
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the financial backer.  So whilst there was a very noticeable difference between the two 
financial backers’ contrasting views regarding Incrementalism, there was agreement by 
the management and team management respondents at each club for the statements on 
Incrementalism reflecting the empowered ‘hands-on’ approach at both clubs.   
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7.4.4     Llanelli RFC   
At Llanelli it was found (Table 7.4.4), that with the odd exception, there was overall 
strong agreement reached on the statements. 
 
              Table 7.4.4   Llanelli Incremental Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Asked about this dimension, Huw Evans confidently revealed his broad business 
knowledge in talking about incremental planning since his arrival at the club. 
“I think we respond very well to incremental change, both on and off the field. I think 
we’re very responsive. We’re very much attuned to what is happening around us and what 
we need to do.  We work very hard on relationships with everyone around the club and if 
there is a change in that relationship we move very quickly, with our sponsors or 
suppliers, to mend whatever is wrong. So I think incrementally we are very, very 
responsive and I think that’s a lot to do with the characters of the people involved”.   
The chairman felt that the club had the ability to react to changes in difficult 
circumstances and that the club was able to meet any necessary unforeseen events.     
Comparisons of his views were made with those of the club accountant, the local press 
and the supporter.  Accountant, Colin Stroud offered an internal perception of this topic, 
 “We haven’t got the time to experiment.   If we change something the inevitably was we 
need to change  fairly  quickly  rather  than  experiment over a period of months…I mean  
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we were not against change – obviously, we were always looking to improve things.     We 
do try and change things”. 
Quick change was sometimes needed at the club and the accountant believed that the club 
was able to meet any such changes.  Local reporter, Norman Lewis, was not sure,  
 
“Firefighting ….If it’s not one thing it’s another… it’s a constant battle.   How good they 
were was very difficult to quantify but I think they were good as most, both on the playing 
side and on the business side ….there was a willingness there to respond to events.  The 
appearance was that they responded as well as anybody else”.  
Having been involved with the club for over forty-four years, Marlston Morgan stated,  
 
“You’re on about changing something in mid-stream which often happens in rugby; 
something can happen and you’ve got to change it as you go along”.   
The CEO, Stuart Gallacher agreed with the importance of the impact of results.  
“I look back at last year’s business plan.  If you actually look at the plan, I’ve failed, 
we’ve failed, because we haven’t delivered what we said we would to the Board.  The 
business is as fallible as the weekly results”    
It was pointed out by stakeholders that rugby was a sport, and therefore was subject to 
uncertainty and unpredictability on the field (Conversations, 21.9.96: 2.5.01: 8.11.03).  
As full-time staff, who were responsible for implementing operational plans and 
achieving results, the Team Management were united in supporting all the statements. 
Questioning the coach, Gareth Jenkins, he revealed the incremental approach to ‘pro-
active’ OP.  
“So it’s no longer like the old philosophy said, ‘you’ll have a great team if your players 
could go on the field and don’t need the coach to talk to them’. We’ve realised that the 
game is about people in the stand; making sure the people on the field realise and 
recognise ‘are they on course’ and are ‘they reacting the way we’ve agreed they should 
be reacting’?  It might sound bullshit, and it all goes on, but I’ve got Mark Davies 
(computer statistician) who sits next to me and every minute of the game I know exactly if 
we are on course or aren’t we on course”. 
Operationally, plans to win the game re-emerged throughout the eighty minutes of play    
with the players receiving factual information during a game on which to base their 
decisions and resultant actions.  Both on, and off the field, it was the belief of stakeholders 
that the club had the ability to make incremental changes (Conversations, 3.5.97: 8.9.98: 
20.9.03).        
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7.4.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club 
As can be found below in Table 7.4.5, Llanelli had the highest percentage of respondent 
agreement with the Incremental statements.   .     
    
   Table 7.4.5   Comparison of Incremental Responses by Club Levels 
  
                                 
KEY  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The overall position at each club saw respondents agree with the statements concerning 
Incrementalism.  The exception within the findings was the Ebbw Vale president and 
financial backer, Paul Russell, who strongly believed in formal planning, unlike the other 
owners who appreciated the need to have the ability to react to events outside formal 
planning.  The Team Management at all three clubs argued that being reactive, and having 
the ability to change a plan, was essential for an effective operational performance on the 
field-of-play.  Planning in the clubs was found to be on a short-term, ‘muddling through’ 
basis. The response to the statements on incrementalism by each club can be found in 
Table 7.4.6 overleaf. 
                
Position                   Ebbw Vale Newbridge  Llanelli 
     
Owner                             
     
Management                   
     
Team Management        
     
External Stakeholders                         
     
Overall Acceptance of Dimension     
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Table 7.4.6     Cross-Case Analysis: Comparison by  
                        Incremental Planning Statements 
 
  
                            Club 
 
Ebbw Vale 
(n=9) 
Newbridge 
(n=9) 
 
Llanelli 
(n=9) 
Statements      
14. Our strategy develops 
through a process of ongoing 
adjustment.  process  
    
15. Our strategy is continually 
adjusted as changes occur in the 
market. 
    
16. To keep in line with our 
business environment we make 
continual small-scale changes to 
strategy. 
    
17. Our strategies emerge 
gradually as we respond to the 
need to change. 
    
18. We keep commitment to a 
strategy tentative and subject to 
review. 
    
19. We tend to develop strategy 
by experimenting and trying 
new approaches in the market 
place. 
    
 
KEY: 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
As the findings show, the clubs’ were in agreement with most of the statements except 
statement 19, where the two Gwent clubs overall, disagreed with that statement.  A 
common approach that was more incremental, an emergent approach to planning, was 
found at all three clubs. 
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7.5     Political Dimension 
It was established from the literature, that organisations were political arenas where 
strategic decision-making was a political matter. As such strategy formulation could be 
susceptible to both internal and external influences by powerful stakeholders.  Strategies 
might have emerged as a result of bargaining, negotiation and compromise amongst the 
stakeholders. However, it could be expected that within the context of a small 
organisation, the owner/manager usually exerted total control over decision-making.  As 
a result, was there little or no disagreement from the organisation members?     
This section sought to identify and appreciate the level of political influence within the 
clubs by asking respondents their views on the following statements. 
 
20. Our strategy is a compromise which accommodates the conflicting interests of 
powerful groups and individuals. 
 
21. The vested interests of particular internal groups colour our strategy. 
 
22. Our strategies often have to be changed because certain groups block their 
implementation. 
 
23. Our strategy develops through a process of bargaining and negotiation between 
groups or individuals. 
 
24. The information on which our strategy is developed often reflects the interests of 
certain groups. 
 
25. The decision to adopt a strategy is influenced by the power of the group 
sponsoring it. 
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7.5.1     Ebbw Vale RFC  
The results of the questionnaires showed that the backer strongly disagreed with most 
statements (Table 7.5.1). Other respondents were divided in their views regarding the 
statements with overall disagreement from Management and External stakeholders but 
Team Management in agreement with the statements. 
 
              Table 7.5.1   Ebbw Vale Political Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The new president, having a local background, was well aware of the politics within the 
club.   He spelt out his, and the club’s, approach to tackling rugby politics. 
“There’s a difference between disagreeing with someone and using the unofficial 
organisation to undermine what’s going on.  Politics is the shorthand, the unofficial 
organisation.  They could say “Members are very upset because you’ve put the admission 
prices up from £8 to £10 per week’ and we can say ‘tough’.  We’ve decided to do it and 
that’s it”, but, politically that’s unacceptable.  So whilst we encourage debate at meetings 
to discuss both strategy and operations, we seek not to stifle opposition and we say ‘yes 
we heard you and we’ve changed our mind’ or ‘we heard you but we’re still going to go 
ahead’.   The people feel that they’ve had an opportunity to put their case and that tends 
to nip in the bud anything, ‘he doesn’t listen to us enough’ because that’s when you get 
the political stuff and we don’t set our strategy to keep people happy.  We have just been 
in the bottom of the success zone for a large majority of the time.  And that was the most 
Position                   Statement 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Owner                                      
Financial Backer       
Management       
Company Secretary       
Accountant       
Team Management       
Team Manager       
Coach       
Captain       
External       
Former Committeeman       
Press Reporter       
Long Serving Supporter       
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political place to be. It’s when you’re in trouble and people think things should be 
changed that the politics happen, but when you’re at the top you’ve got time to indulge 
in it”.  
Since the arrival of Marcus Russell, and the formation of Ebbw Vale limited company in 
1997, it was established that there was very little political influence either within the club 
or on strategy.  Contrasting the two periods, pre- and post-1995, Alan Evans explained,  
“There were probably still factions within the club, I would go that far, but since Marcus 
arrived there’s been a distinct lack of politics, definitely.   I mean he’s been so open that 
he doesn’t give people room for bloody politics.  You get your gossip, and you get your 
little factions saying ‘oh, we do this and we do that’ but what I found with politics, say in 
the pre-professional days, was that you would have two definite camps or even three 
definite camps because it’s a power game.  That doesn’t exist.  THAT DOES NOT EXIST!  
Certainly pre-Marcus Russell, yes it did, but it just does not happen now.  People seem 
to have taken on board that they have a route into the Board of Directors, and that’s the 
key, that’s the bloody secret.   They know they’ve got a way in, and they know they are 
getting answers as well because Ruth (Director) and I go back, we give the members the 
answers.  Brilliant.  It works a treat”.  
Roy Lewis confirmed that view of politics within the club, stating that,  
“It’s much better nowadays, post 1995, with a smaller board of directors.   There’s no 
politics and that’s all you need because in a way it’s simpler now”. 
The majority of respondents had indicated that there were now no internal, powerful 
groups that influenced strategy.  The Company Secretary explained the split in his 
responses to the politics statements based upon where the threat came from. 
“Within the club, politics never happens; outside the club it does happen”. 
The unity within the Board, and an acceptance by stakeholders of the new regime’s 
approach, was cautiously confirmed by the Team Manager. 
 “The main decisions are made at board level.  Decisions are not always imposed, people 
do have the opportunity to air their views; but the reality of the situation is if it doesn’t 
suit what the club wants to do then…”  (Shrugs with arms out wide). 
As the major shareholders and main financial backers, the two Russell brothers were the 
power brokers in the club. That has been recognized by other stakeholders in that if the 
brothers were to walk away then the club would be in serious financial difficulties, 
threatening its survival; hence no politics (Conversations, 7.5.99: 24.03.01: 29.10.03). 
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7.5.2     Newbridge RFC  
Respondents were split on their views over political influences at Newbridge (Table 
7.5.2). The backer, and the long serving supporter, were definite in their responses - no 
politics.  Nevertheless, other respondents varied with their replies; Management and 
Team Management agreed with the statements, but the External stakeholders disagreed.  
              Table 7.5.2    Newbridge Political Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
KEY 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Research showed since Idris McCarthey took over as chairman, there was less political 
activity within the club.  Explaining the differences from the previous committee:  
“We haven’t got any politics where one lot fights another lot. They (the previous 
committee) all were hanging onto their bit of power. The old committee used to 
deliberately fall out with each other”.  
When asked about club politics prior to the chairman’s arrival, the secretary described the 
political situation as,  
“In a period prior to Id, there were two weak chairmen. The chairman’s wife was the 
treasurer of the Supporters Club, and I’ve said it once or twice, that’s the only time we’ve 
had a female chairman of the club! There were factions then that were trying to pull apart, 
yes there were.   Now there’s not.   THERE DEFINITELY WAS NOT  (strong  voice  and  
Position                    Statement 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Owner                                      
Financial Backer       
Management       
Company Secretary       
Accountant       
Team Management       
Team Manager       
Coach       
Captain       
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Former Committeeman       
Press Reporter       
Long Serving Supporter       
  
199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN:  THE STRATEGY PROCESS POST  1995 
 
with feeling)!   I think at the moment we’re probably happier than we’ve been for many 
years. I couldn’t stress the fact that this was down to our chairman”. 
The coach agreed with the view of a lack of political interference and suggested a reason 
why supporters backed the reduced executive committee.  Jonathan Westwood explained, 
 
“No, our strategies never get changed or blocked. There’s a supporters club but they’ve 
got no influence on things. It’s a very slim line operation really, so we get very few 
influences outside of the people who make the decisions to change plans really”.  
Probing the contrasting responses that arose from within the Team Management, the club 
captain saw ‘political interference’ from a different angle. 
“I mean, what I read into that was, we’ve had meetings with supporters.  I’m not saying 
that they had an impact on strategy but they kicked up enough fuss to drag Id, some of 
the committee, myself, and the coaches in because they were concerned about the 
performance of our three-quarters at that time.   And I could understand why they wanted 
to do it, to improve the club because at the end of the day we play for the supporters and 
the club.  Nonetheless, it wasn’t great for team spirit because same of the three-quarters 
were saying ’why were they having a go at us for’?  That did have a bit of an impact on 
performance anyway. There was a certain cliché there”. 
Paul Tedstone exposed feelings on ‘politics’ concerning previous committee members. 
“I’d be there watching the game, for example, you hear former committee members who 
think they walked on water, and they’d get my back up.  I’d say that if they were so good 
in ‘the great old days’ how did they leave the club in such a bloody awful state”?   
Seeking an explanation for his strong disagreement with the statements on politics, Brian 
Jones revealed his perceptions of the executive committee. 
“If there was politics within the club nowadays, it’s not really apparent because the 
relations between people are very good.  I mean in the past there’s been politics, and 
recently it was quite strong, but I think this executive runs very well because they meet 
with the supporters and they talk to the supporters. Therefore, although the executive 
makes the decisions, I don’t think they’ve got those political factions”.  
Mr Jones observations were supported by the local press, Geoff Champion. 
 “People within the club are saying ‘If it wasn’t for that little group (executive) we’d be 
stuffed’.   Therefore we swallow our pride and give them our support”. 
Stakeholders agreed that as a result of Idris McCarthey’s arrival at the club, politics had 
taken a backseat at Newbridge (Conversations 20.3.02; 28.9.02; 29.10.03). 
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7.5.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC;   Comparison of Findings 
As is evident from Table 7.5.3, the respondents at the high performing club, Ebbw Vale, 
did not agree that politics influenced strategy, and only a narrow majority of respondents 
at Newbridge thought that politics played a part in strategy-making (Hickson et al, 1986). 
                   Table 7.5.3   Comparison of Political Responses 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
 
 
 
         
  KEY 
 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Unlike the period prior to the formation of the limited company in 1998, when there were 
two or three political factions, the arrival of Marcus Russell at Ebbw Vale as the financial 
backer, and the club’s dependency on him, had seen a marked decrease in politics within 
the club (Freeman, 2000). Stakeholders also realized, and appreciated, that they had been 
provided with a direct route into the Board of Directors (Peattie, 1993), having received 
regular feedback from the two supporters’ directors, and that the Russell brothers had 
been very open in their dealings.  Externally, the club had lost political clout with the 
closure of the steelworks (5.5.1).  The club president, who had always been the manager 
of the steelworks, had a large amount of political clout when it came to matters affecting 
the rugby club.  The club found itself having to turn to local councillors who did not have 
the same level of political clout to battle on the club’s behalf (Parent and O’Brian, 2003).     
                                 
Position                   
Ebbw Vale  Newbridge 
    
Owner                           
  
    
Management                  
    
Team Management       
   
External Stakeholders                        
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The arrival of Idris McCarthey in 1998 as chairman also produced a dramatic decrease in 
politics at Newbridge, because, as at Ebbw Vale, there were political factions at the club 
before his arrival, creating in-fighting on the committee.  The establishment of a six man 
committee in 1998 helped to reduce the disagreements within the club, and it also 
shortened the chain of command.  There was a supporters association within the club who 
had met with the small management committee on a few occasions.  Their views were 
listened to by the committee, but they did not really influenced strategies (Freeman, 
2000).  Equally in conversations held at both clubs, stakeholders at Newbridge, just like 
Ebbw Vale, appreciated that if the powerful financial backer walks away then the very 
survival of the club would have been at severe risk (Hickson et al, 1986). 
In comparing the two clubs, there did not appear to be any political influences impacting 
on strategy in the professional era following the arrival of, and the dependency on, a 
financial backer(s) (Freeman, 2000).  At Ebbw Vale there was an avenue for supporters, 
via the two member’s directors, to get their view presented to the Board.  In a similar 
approach at Newbridge, the supporters met direct with the management committee to 
present their views.  Whilst acknowledging the views of stakeholders, it was made clear 
to me by the owner/ managers at each club that such views were heard, but did not 
necessarily influence strategy.  
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7.5.4     Llanelli RFC   
In comparing the responses to the statements on the influence of politics (Table 7.5.4), 
the backer, team manager, the pressman and the CEO saw politics dictating strategy; other 
respondents at the club, the coach, captain, former committeeman and supporter disagreed 
with the statements. 
 
              Table 7.5.4   Llanelli Political Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
There was common agreement at Llanelli that since Huw Evans joined the club and the 
limited company was formed, everyone was pulling in the same direction.  Nonetheless, 
as could be seen above, even the chairman indicated in his questionnaire replies that there 
was politics. However, at his interview these matters were clarified. 
“I’m not saying that there wasn’t some dissent but internally a political compromise 
wasn’t a problem. Externally, we do have the influence of the WRU and other club 
owners”. 
The lack of politics within the club, and the influence of Huw Evans, was presented by 
the well-respected, and widely connected, Norman Lewis; 
“Llanelli are very open.  There’s  not as much  politics as  there was in the  old  amateur 
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 game, where every club from top to bottom was riddled with it. Outwardly, the front is 
united because supporters know that if Huw Evans ever walks away, the gates of Stradey 
Park will close”.  
Unlike the amateur era, when the club saw a lot of politics, stakeholders have realised 
that with professionalism the person who provided the money acquired the power to 
decide how it should be spent.  There was considered to be no political groups within the 
club because of the strength of the financial backer and his authoritative power (his 
financial resource). A relaxed Hefin Jenkins spelt out the internal political situation,  
“It’s a case of individual people trying to pull a bit of power. I know some of the old 
committee, association, like to think they’ve got authority and they’re nothings, you know. 
I know that, I think they know that really (Laughs) but they try to throw their weight 
around and that’s about it. The rest of it was, yes we all want Llanelli rugby club to do 
well. There might have been some negotiating, yes everybody has his view, but I mean.no 
real politics”. 
The experienced coach, supported by the captain, offered a reason as to why there were 
few politics following the chairman’s arrival.      
 “The best thing we ever had is Huw Evans. There were people who were in the club who 
could have been politically active had Huw Evans not come along; he stopped all the 
little bickering. Also, because we’ve been so successful, I don’t think anybody has the 
courage to really have an opinion about something that is quite successful anyway, and I 
think that keeps the politics out.”  
The coach’s view was that by giving stakeholders success where it really mattered, on the 
field, had resulted in politics within the club being kept to a minimum.  Discussing politics 
with the CEO, in agreeing with the two respondents above, he spelt out, in his usual 
forthright manner, the main reason for the lack of any politics within the club. 
“It (politics) is non-existent.  The shareholders if they want to, get ten shareholders 
together and force an EGM for anything they wish to do. They all vote together and if 
1000 shareholders voted together they’ve got 500,000 shares.  Huw’s got two f***ing 
million. End of story.  Politics:  What politics?’  
As a result of the share imbalance, the chairman had no need to fear any pressure, politics 
or challenge, from any other shareholder on how the club was being led and managed. 
Stakeholders (Conversations, 9.1.99: 23.12.00: 20.9.03) agreed that, because of the 
importance to the club of retaining Huw Evans, there was no internal politics.   
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7.5.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club 
In the amateur era, it was acknowledged that most rugby clubs were riddled with politics 
(Smith and Williams, 1980). However, following the IoP and with the appearance of the 
all-powerful financial backer, the influence of politics in clubs appears to be on the wane 
(Table 7.5.5). 
 
  Table 7.5.5   Comparison of Political Responses by Club Levels 
  
                           
KEY  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
                       
Ebbw Vale (high performer) was confident enough about politics not influencing 
strategy. By contrast, Newbridge (low performer) indicated that there was politics within 
the club that could possibly influence strategy.  However, at Llanelli, the influence of 
external politics was acknowledged, but due to the recognition by stakeholders of the 
importance, and power, of the club’s financial backer, Huw Evans, there was no internal 
politics.  The breakdown by statement and club can be found overleaf in Table 7.5.6. 
 
 
 
 
               
Position                   
Ebbw Vale Newbridge  Llanelli 
     
Owner                             
     
Management                   
     
Team Management        
     
External Stakeholders                         
     
Overall Acceptance of Dimension     
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Table 7.5.6    Cross-Case Analysis: Comparison by Club of 
                       Political Statements 
 
 
Club 
 
Ebbw Vale 
(n=9) 
Newbridge 
(n=9) 
 Llanelli 
(n=9) 
Statements      
20. Our strategy is a 
compromise which 
accommodates the conflicting 
interests of powerful groups and 
individuals. 
  
 
 
21. The vested interests of 
particular internal groups colour 
our strategy. 
  
 
 
22. Our strategies often have to 
be changed because certain 
groups block their 
implementation. 
  
 
 
23. Our strategy develops 
through a process of bargaining 
& negotiation between groups or 
individuals. 
  
 
 
24. The information on which 
our strategy is developed often 
reflects the interests of certain 
groups. 
  
 
 
25. The decision to adopt a 
strategy is influenced by the 
power of the group sponsoring 
it. 
  
 
 
  
KEY  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
There was a mixed result from clubs concerning politics.  Respondents at Ebbw Vale and 
Newbridge were divided on their responses, whilst at Llanelli most were in agreement 
with the statements on politics. However, conversations with all clubs stakeholders 
following the arrival of the clubs’ financial backers revealed little enthusiasm for politics. 
 
 
  
206 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN:  THE STRATEGY PROCESS POST 1995 
 
7.6     Cultural Dimension 
An organisation’s paradigm was underpinned by the routines, rituals, attitudes, beliefs, 
stories and other symbolic artifacts and could influence strategy (Schein, 1992).  
Adherence to these cultural influences could lead to an organisation being resistant to 
change (Johnson, 1987). With the three clubs all being founded over one hundred and 
twenty-five years ago, did the culture that had been established over that period, help or 
hinder progress?      
The following statements were aimed at recognizing and understanding the influence of 
a club’s culture on its strategy. 
 
26. There is a way of doing things in this organisation which has developed over the 
years. 
 
27. Our strategy is based on past experience. 
 
28. The strategy we follow is dictated by our culture. 
 
29. The attitudes, behaviours, rituals, and stories of the organisation reflect the 
direction we wish to take it in. 
 
30. Our organisation’s history directs our search for solutions to strategic issues. 
 
31. There is resistance to any strategic change which does not sit well with our 
culture. 
 
32. The strategies we follow develop from ‘the way we do things around here’. 
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7.6.1     Ebbw Vale RFC  
The interviews revealed (Table 7.6.1), that whilst the respondents respected the history 
and traditions of the club, culture would not prevent the club moving forward in the 
professional era. 
  
              Table 7.6.1   Ebbw Vale Cultural Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Born and bred in Ebbw Vale, the president expressed his opinion on the club’s culture. 
“We’ve maintained the old traditions.  When the Gang of Six (clubs**) formed there was 
no question of inviting Ebbw Vale, ‘bloody Ebbw Vale’, to join the Gang and we rather 
liked the image.   In our first season in the top Division, we were the second most written 
about rugby club after Cardiff; and so, you might have not liked us but you knew about 
us, you knew about us.   People would say ‘Who’ve you got on Saturday?  Bloody Ebbw 
Vale’, (Laugh), because they weren’t looking forward to it”. 
Local boy, Mike Ruddock acknowledged the strength of this ‘back to the wall’ culture 
and a repressed community mentality. 
“I’m from the area originally …having played rugby in that area there was always a lot 
of pride about the area and local community.  Yea, definitely..definitely”.    
**Gang of Six were Premier teams who joined together to confront the WRU. 
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However, the thoughtful coach offered a futuristic view on the club culture, 
“I think that we have got to be prepared to change our culture as and when we are in a 
position to actually move it on.  I would like, in four or five years, to start thinking about 
our culture changing from like the underdog nuisance value of tripping up a few people 
to becoming a bigger player and adopting that ‘big player’ mentality”.  
Stakeholders agreed that the culture and traditions had previously influenced the strategy 
process (Conversations, 8.2.97: 11.9.99: 29.10.03), but the change to a limited company 
had changed their views of the club’s culture.  The company secretary made known that, 
“It’s the way we are; so we do things within the culture we are from, but, every one of us, 
and again we have shown it, we have the guts to say ‘This is what we are.  We will try 
and do it this way, but if it needs a strategy which is totally alien, if we have to join with 
Newport, if it is the right thing to do for the survival of this club, we will do it’.  I know, 
Ivor (George) has a different slant on this”. 
 Ivor George did indeed take the opposite view on culture, and defended the club’s 
traditional view; 
“I still think we try to keep the sort of old Ebbw Vale flag flying. Professionalism has 
changed the social culture within rugby, absolutely.  It’s gone from some clubs. Some of 
us here are trying desperately to keep it afloat. We’re a close community but that sort of 
thing is going out of rugby now”.  
Taking into account the old and new approach on culture, Alan Evans explained the 
transition between past and present opinions. 
“When Marcus came on board it became a limited company, which was the first change; 
and people became shareholders, that was the second change. So it took people a bit of 
time to get used to it but OK they didn’t have any choice anyway so they accepted it 
eventually.  So what was happening there…the old ways were basically turfed out, the 
old culture was basically going.  The management style changed totally, but the Ebbw 
Vale amateur rugby style remained the same; that’s still in vogue”.   
The strength of the valley’s culture was such that it united people in Ebbw Vale and 
surrounding districts. This helped ensure that the rugby club played in the Premier 
Division but continued to keep pace with the changing rugby world.  The vast majority 
of stakeholders (Conversations, 7.5.99: 29.10.02:  29.10.03)  held the view that culture 
and tradition would no longer stand in the way of progress, but a very small minority of 
older supporters still longed for the traditions and history of the club to be upheld.   
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7.6.2     Newbridge RFC  
The findings in Table 7.6.2 showed that whilst the owner disagreed with the statements, 
others, the management, team management, and the external respondents, perceived the 
club’s culture somewhat differently. 
              Table 7.6.2   Newbridge Cultural Responses 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
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Strongly 
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The collected data revealed that, whilst acknowledging its history and traditions, the club 
was not restrained by its culture. The main disagreement with the culture statements, 
Table 7.6.2, came from the financial backer. 
“I don’t know what it is with people in rugby clubs, they have their likes and dislikes, 
‘we’ve always done things this way’ ‘there’s no need to change’.   I’m not interested in 
all that.  I disagree with that because I think you’ve got to change if it doesn’t suit you.  I 
mean you couldn’t say ‘because I’ve done that and I’ve done it wrong for twenty years 
we’ll keep doing it’.  I don’t see the point of doing anything like that.  If somebody has 
got a better idea let’s use it.  When I came in here as vice-chairman, it was already 
professional.  I knew at one stage, we were fourth off the bottom, and I thought… I could 
see that we would have gone down a league if we didn’t change.   I said to them, ‘This is 
what I want to do’ and if they hadn’t accepted it, well that would have been that.  There 
was no problem, and then we started to go forward”.   
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Supporting the chairman’s view of a change of culture was the coach, Jon Westwood. 
 
“We’ve changed here without a doubt; there’s a huge change in Newbridge itself”. 
The stakeholders view (Conversations 8.9.01; 22.10.02; 18.1.03) in the professional era 
was that the club’s culture, whilst respected, would not prevent the club moving forward. 
The club members’ current thinking on culture was spelt out by the Club Accountant, 
“What we’re saying is this ‘Let’s learn from the past what was right, and learn from the       
past what was wrong, take the benefit of both and take it forward’. So we’re 
acknowledging what’s gone on but taking the best bits to set our plan for the future”.  
Having experienced a long association with the club’s culture, local reporter, Geoff 
Champion, argued its case; 
 
“Believe it or not, tradition is highly thought of (laugh); it’s not always a negative term.   
It can be a constraint but it can also be cement, which holds the club together.  I’m very 
positive in one sense about Newbridge because they are survivors and they’ve proven it 
through some of the hardest times. Their rugby club has blown up twice and for a club to 
survive like that then there’s something there that’s worth hanging on to.  I think 
Newbridge has got that sort of, if you like, a line of steel in them; they’re survivors.   Even 
through the really bad times they seem to hang on in there, they know how to fight with 
their back against the wall and they come through”.  
Newbridge’s culture has been adopted from its locality; the club has demonstrated its 
‘back to the wall’ culture, and therefore, this common culture should have been the 
mainstay to get the whole community behind them, keeping the villagers on their side 
(Conversations: 18.2.98: 24.11.01; 29.10.03).   Like other clubs post-1995, the culture 
would not be allowed to hold back the club. 
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7.6.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC;   Comparison of Findings 
Whilst overall both clubs showed agreement with the statements on Culture, different 
levels of respondents within each clubs did disagree (Table 7.6.3).  
       Table 7.6.3   Comparison of Cultural Responses by Levels 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Despite the agreement by the owner, team management and external stakeholders with 
the statements on culture shown above in Table 7.6.3, since the IoP, all stakeholders at 
Ebbw Vale had indicated that it would not let club culture interfere with progress or 
strategy (Johnson, 1987).  All stakeholders were agreed on moving the club forward and 
to keeping the club in the top Division (Conversations, 7.5.99: 24.3.01:  29.10.03). The 
arrival of the Russell brothers had ensured that nothing, not even the club’s culture, stood 
in the way of progress.  Being a Gwent valleys club, Newbridge too had developed a 
‘back to the wall’ attitude and culture.  With the loss of major industries within the area, 
the club similar to Ebbw Vale saw itself as the flag bearer of the local community and 
with the same attitude and culture.  The owner at Newbridge clearly disagreed with the 
statements but the management, team management and external stakeholders took the 
opposite view and agreed with the statements.  But, similar to Ebbw Vale, all 
stakeholders in conversations stated that the club’s culture would not hold back progress  
                                                        
Position                   Ebbw Vale  Newbridge 
    
Owner                           
  
    
Management                  
    
Team Management       
    
External Stakeholders                       
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in the future (Johnson, 1987). 
In comparing both clubs it could be seen that Newbridge and Ebbw Vale had a common 
Gwent valleys culture.  The two clubs had to battle to break into, and be accepted by, the 
elite clubs at the top of Welsh Rugby. However, whilst being aware of their history and 
traditions, and the previous influence of culture on strategy, neither club would allow 
culture to stand in the way of its future strategic direction. The research findings also 
discovered that the clubs ‘paradigms had proved resistant to change (Johnson, 1987), and 
that shared beliefs and assumptions did exist on a ‘rugby industry’ wide basis (Spender, 
1989).  
Following the arrival of the financial backers, stakeholders at both clubs recognized that 
club culture should not be allowed to influence future progress. 
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7.6.4     Llanelli RFC 
Llanelli RFC’s history was rich in success (Llanelli Conversations, 9.3.99).  Whilst most 
respondents did agreed with the statements on culture, the accountant and coach did not 
agree with most statements (Table 7.6.4). The interview with the coach unearthed an 
interesting, alternative perception of how club culture should be viewed. 
              Table 7.6.4   Llanelli Cultural Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Having played for Llanelli, Team manager Anthony Buchanon believes “… tradition and 
what has gone before has laid the platform for the future of the club”.    However, two 
differing views on culture and strategy were offered by club chairman, Huw Evans and 
head coach, Gareth Jenkins.   The chairman interpretation of the club’s culture and 
tradition; 
“One of the key things has been the continuity of the ethos of the club through the people 
involved with the club. If you look at the main players, the main people in the rugby 
business of Llanelli, they’ve all had long-term playing careers, coaching careers, 
international careers, based from Llanelli. There is something about the way in which the 
ethos of the old rugby club and the view of all aspects of performance has been unaffected 
by commercialism and so  it’s  as  though  the  rugby  club  itself  has passed through this  
period   of professionalism largely untainted. The performance requirement, and the way 
Position                    Statement 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
Owner                                       
Financial Backer        
Management        
Company Secretary        
Accountant        
Team Management        
Team Manager        
Coach        
Captain        
External        
Former Committeeman        
Press Reporter        
Long Serving Supporter        
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that was asked for from Gareth Jenkins and the coaching staff, was exactly the same now 
as it was when we were amateurs. They’ve been, because of the way Stuart and I run the 
club, largely insulated from the financial, professional pressures; so the ethos of the club, 
its huge tradition, has been the dominant factor throughout the professional era and it 
hasn’t changed or it’s changed very marginally. I think the core to our strategy was 
largely based on our culture but there were elements of our culture which we would have 
to put to one side in favour of progress. So the supporters had a huge say in which the 
club was run. Some old players had a huge say and continued to want to have a say and 
we couldn’t regard them all in terms of some of the changes that we’ve got to make. We 
see fairly big changes ahead. Based on our culture it will be new, it will be different; but 
based on our culture and carrying that strong core through what we do”.  
Despite coming from Swansea, Huw Evans stoutly defended the culture and tradition of 
the club, stating that it had not changed despite the arrival of the professional era.  
Nonetheless, he stated that the club would not be bound by its culture in order to move 
forward. The CEO, whose body and verbal language got very animated when talking 
about the club’s culture, clarified his perception of the club’s values and beliefs.  
“What upsets me more than anything here – and I understand why they do it – I think I’d 
have been just as bad as them when I left here... I’m sick of hearing about New Zealand 
and Llanelli 1972 – over thirty years ago. I mean Phil Bennett’s still talks about it every 
time we’re speaking and I understand how proud they are. I’ve never had that approach 
– I never talk about rugby whatever I’ve done or not done in the game.  I think we get too 
– like I said to Huw (Evans)  when we were doing this strategy – for the AGM, I said 
‘don’t ram down people’s throats we’ve beaten all the touring sides; don’t ram down 
we’ve had fifteen cups, that’s f*****g history’. We’re proud of it. It has got nothing to do 
with what we’re trying to achieve. What we are trying to achieve is for the company to 
break even, in a professional sport with players at the highest level”. 
The club had big changes planned for the future, such as moving ground, but it would 
respect the club’s culture in any decision.  Interestingly, the coach offered an alternative 
view, in that the current stakeholders influenced the culture rather than the reverse role. 
“Well probably, and it’s an awful thing to say, we probably influence the culture as 
oppose to culture influencing us, because at the end of the day our rugby performance 
here is a positive performance.  I’ve always said it quite clearly, I think the difference is 
when you’ve got the right dynamics, the right focus, the history and tradition and the core 
in your club has got a constant that have been involved along an inherited route.     For 
example, Wayne Proctor, Nigel Davies, Anthony Buchanon and Gareth Jenkins (team 
management) all  were  here  right  through the route.  Now  we  understand  what  we’ve 
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 done and we understand what it means. We’re very responsible really to our region and 
its identity, but we keep that constant we don’t leave people move from that.    So the 
strong influences in there again are us, right? Then we could actually say then that we’re 
successful. People attach themselves and are associated then with the success. Now it’s 
not by accident we’ve got a Welsh anthem.  You know on the television when we score a 
try right, we’ve got a Welsh anthem.  It’s not by accident we are Welsh speaking.  North 
Wales appreciate that; we’re successful now; we’re playing well now. We say, ‘boys, 
Llanelli is Welsh; we’re regional for God’s sake’.  
History, tradition and culture, has all been ingrained into the team management, who all 
represented the club as players.  The coach had a wider, and imaginative, vision of the 
team as representing not just the town of Llanelli but also a very large West, Mid and 
North Wales region.  So when visiting teams came to Stradey Park, the patriotism of the 
venue, the tradition and the culture, were proudly displayed and employed to unnerve 
opponents. The coach’s animated, and passionately expressed, explanation was, 
“I’ve said when we played Leicester here right, we had Dafydd Iwan (Welsh folk singer) 
here, and we had a male voice choir here.   It was an attractive game, of course it was.  
We took Leicester on the 2nd field; we didn’t even train out here, so by the time Leicester 
came out onto the pitch we had a full stadium. We sang Welsh bloody songs. It was 
England against bloody Wales.   Now all that was staged, so when people on Grandstand 
TV saw it they said, ‘Jesus Christ, look at those down there’.  I said then the difference 
was on big occasions, when Llanelli in particular as far as I am concerned, I don’t worry 
too much about others, we’re no different to Munster right.  The game is bigger than the 
Game.   When you play in these places, in these regions, in these environments with the 
mentality that we’ve been able to create down here – you play against a cause that’s 
bigger than the Game.  It’s bigger than the club, yes, but it’s manufactured as well – 
because which came first; the culture doesn’t drive us WE drive the culture”.  
Since the IoP, and in 1996 the Heineken European Cup, the games that Llanelli played 
became bigger and more important, both in status and financially. This led to the coach 
firmly believing that in a new era, the club drove the culture, and in the process created 
tradition and history.  Within the club, a more traditionalist’s view of culture was 
presented by the former captain/committeeman,  
“We build on the heritage of the club, that’s what Llanelli RFC is, you know, 130 years.   
We want to keep that… I think the culture is the area, its different types of people.  We 
got the best players because they wanted to come down here because the culture at 
Llanelli was always open rugby at that time.   I don’t say it is now, but we’re  still  trying  
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to play open rugby and that’s the way it’s always been”. 
However Mr. Morgan’s ‘cultural’ reasons for why players from outside Llanelli joined 
the club was completely opposite to the CEO’s ‘monetary’ opinion.  Colin Stroud had the 
strongest disagreement against the statements on culture. 
“I mean we were not against change – obviously, we were always looking to improve 
things.  That’s why I strongly disagree with those statements.  We do try and change 
things. I’ve got a proposal here for new catering arrangements for next season, catering 
in all the bars, decent caterer, because it has got to become more than the old way of 
going to the game, as we said earlier, arriving ten minutes before kick-off and then 
walking away from the ground at the end of it.  Rugby’s got to be more attractive, it’s got 
to make more of a day out of it for our customers.” 
The club accountant introduced a business and financial perspective to the club’s long 
held view of match day.  Professionalism had forced the club to examine all their long 
held views and traditions, and to realize that the new playing environment required new 
approaches and solutions.  Stakeholders (Conversations, 1.3.98: 9.1.99: 20.9.03) agreed 
that despite the enormity of the influence of culture on the club, it should not be allowed 
to hold back future progress.  
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7.6.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club 
Shared beliefs existed on an industry wide basis (Spender, 1989), ‘this is a rugby club not 
a business’.   Nonetheless, the IoP had changed stakeholders’ views on culture. 
 
  Table 7.6.5   Comparison of Cultural Responses by Club Levels 
  
                                 
 
KEY  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
As can be seen in Table 7.6.5, the overall response from each club was agreement with 
the statements on culture.  Comparing the responses from the various levels in each club 
reveals disagreement from at least one level; the financial backer at Newbridge, and from 
within the management at Ebbw Vale and Llanelli.  The team management and external 
stakeholders in the three clubs had a common level of agreement concerning the influence 
of culture.  A broader examination of overall clubs’ responses to the statement on culture 
is found overleaf in Table 7.6.6. 
  
 
 
 
               
Position                   
Ebbw Vale Newbridge  Llanelli 
     
Owner                             
     
Management                   
     
Team Management        
     
External Stakeholders                         
     
Overall Acceptance of Dimension     
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Table 7.6.6   Cross-Case Analysis: Comparison by Club of  
                      Cultural Statements 
 
 
                                   Club 
 
 
Ebbw Vale 
(n=9) 
Newbridge 
(n=9) 
 
Llanelli 
(n=9) 
Statements (N=27)     
26. There is a way of doing 
things in this organisation which 
has developed over the years 
  
 
 
27. Our strategy is based on past 
experience.   
 
 
28. The strategy we follow is 
dictated by our culture.   
 
 
29. The attitudes, behaviours, 
rituals and stories of the 
organisation  reflect the 
direction we wish to take it in. 
  
 
 
30. Our organisation’s history 
directs our search for solutions 
to strategic issues. 
  
 
 
31. There is resistance to any 
strategic change which does not 
sit well with our culture. 
  
 
 
32. The strategies we follow 
develop from “the way we do 
things around here”.   
  
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Whilst there was common agreement on most of the statements, it was evident from the 
responses of respondents (and stakeholders) to statement 32, that the three clubs were 
united in their disagreement with the view on statement 32, that the strategies they 
developed came from “the way we do things around here”.  This was a major 
transformation to the influence of the club’s culture on its strategies and future direction. 
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7.7     Enforced Choice 
It was argued that due to factors in the environment those organisations had little or no 
control over their strategic options (Bailey et al, 1990).   Organisations operating within 
the same sector, therefore, tended to follow a common strategy.  The impact of the 
environment was such that strategy was forced on the organisation rather than arrived at 
through any rational and intentional choice.   Organisations were encouraged to adopt 
structures and strategies that best fit that environment (Hannah and Freeman, 1989).   The 
aim of this section was to ascertain, and appreciate, if the external pressures limited the 
role that organisational members played in the selection of strategy and restricted the 
strategic alternatives available to clubs.  The study investigated how the environment 
impacted on the clubs, located in close proximity to each other, in first, a valley context 
and then an urban context.    
In order to achieve the aim, the following statements were put to respondents to indicate 
whether or not they agreed/disagreed with them. 
33. Our freedom of strategic choice is severely restricted by our business 
environment. 
 
34. Forces outside this organisation determine our strategic direction. 
35. Barriers exist in our business environment which significantly restricts the 
strategies we could follow. 
 
36. We have strategy imposed on us by those external to this organisation, for 
example the government. 
 
37. We were not able to influence our business environment; we can only buffer 
ourselves from it. 
 
38. Many of the strategic changes which have taken place have been forced on us 
by those outside the rugby club. 
 
39. We are severely limited in our ability to influence the business   environment in 
which we operate. 
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7.7.1     Ebbw Vale RFC   
What Table 7.7.1 is unable to show was that this dimension, Enforced Choice, within the 
club provided more ‘strength of feeling’ responses than any of the other dimensions.  
Throughout this section of the interviews, the intensity of respondents’ body language 
and verbal replies revealed the deep, emotive feelings they held on those ‘outside 
influences’ that were not under the club’s control. 
              Table 7.7.1   Ebbw Vale Enforced Choice Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
 
Following the IoP, the external environment severely impacted on the Ebbw Vale club’s 
strategy.  Having assumed control in 1995, Paul Russell explained, demonstrating strong 
feelings, how the club had been adversely affected by several external factors; 
“Well you see we’ve had three quite serious readjustments of strategy forced upon us by 
external bodies that we could exert no control over, we have no blocks over.   The first of 
these was the Blaenau Gwent Council.  Now it was always our strategy that we were 
going to improve Eugene Cross and Tony Dillaway (former CEO) came up with a...we 
spent a long time piloting… came up with a plan which extended the stand, put the 
clubhouse as a wrap around so that you came in under an archway with restaurants and 
stuff on top.   And we had £400,000 worth of business enterprise money.   So that was  the  
execution  of the  strategy to make this a  top  class  stadium,  multi-use,  but we needed  
Position                   Statement 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
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a twenty-one year lease on it.  We pay £5 to rent Eugene Cross each Saturday. So we put 
a plan together and we went to see the council, both councillors and paid employees, and 
we put this plan to them.   We talked for a while and then the Head of Leisure or whatever 
said ‘No’.  He said ‘We couldn’t do this’.   I said ‘Why ever not’. He said, ‘Well if we do 
this for you we’ll have to do it for Nantyglo, Brynmawr, Tredegar….’ I mean our reaction 
was incredulity.   So my brother, (Marcus) we said ‘thank you very much’, he ripped the 
presentation in half, threw it in the bin and we walked out.  That meant we were unable 
to spend money on the ground ourselves because you need permission.  Constantly we’d 
have trouble with the council.  They would send people down on a Wednesday to say you 
couldn’t play in the evening because the pitch wasn’t fit despite the referee passing it as 
playable.  So the council are a tremendous influence on us from that area”.  
This was a clear example of strategic vision and planning from the two business-
orientated Russell brothers who wanted to spend £1.7 million on developing the ground 
and its facilities.  Unfortunately the council refused the detailed plan.  Their rejection was 
based on the fear of attracting similar requests from other clubs in the region; there were 
twenty-nine WRU clubs, including four former Merit Table clubs, within a twelve mile 
radius of Ebbw Vale.  So a powerful external stakeholder, the council, had prevented the 
implementation of the club’s plan to develop and grow. Paul Russell continued explaining 
in a thoughtful, but still agitated, manner; 
“Secondly, the closure of the steelworks was a body blow to us.   We didn’t know it was 
coming and it immediately… and it happened just before season tickets went on sale. And 
it just knocked a hole in our budget.  So we had to re-evaluate our financial strategy for 
the whole of that year and not sign players that we had lined up and not do a pre-season 
tour that we were going to do and also not improve the toilets upstairs that you couldn’t 
go into without risking berri.  So that again was an external factor.  
Thirdly, the WRU, who have never had any sympathy with the Premier League club who 
they see as fat cats, and worked against us.   So you’ve got the position where your 
governing body was working against you.   The WRU showed no leadership at all.   We 
were the first club to give players contracts and I was the first ever benefactor of a first 
Division club in Wales.   We had no direction, no leadership at all and everything that 
came out from the WRU said ‘This was what you couldn’t do’; and even now there’s some 
WRU committeemen who have said ‘F**k them, leave them go to the wall’.   Well, we’re 
the shop window of Welsh rugby and club rugby is televised, and watched by people, 
more often than internationals”.  
In  addition to the  above  perceived faults of the governing body listed by  Paul  Russell 
above,  the  WRU also  had a  major impact  on the  club’s  development by affecting its  
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ability to play in Europe.  A reflective Ray Harris clarified exactly what happened; 
 “We qualified for Europe back in 1998 but then had the place taken away by the WRU 
because Cardiff and Swansea were rushed back into the equation.   In recruitment terms 
it was a huge blow; financially it wasn’t because we got compensated.   To be honest that 
was the end of us as a force for a while.  We had to change our strategy then because the 
income just…because again by that time the gap between (European) Shield and Cup had 
grown so big that once you fell, and unless you had a really big investor like Tony Brown 
(Newport RFC), to get back it was impossible, and it has been impossible for us.  The 
whole thing was a total mess and the WRU would have to hold its hands up and say as 
much as anyone else, ‘we were to blame”. 
The large part played by the WRU in not offering leadership and, ‘robbing’ the club of a 
European place had caused great anger and animosity at the ‘Steelers’ club.   Ebbw Vale’s 
members rage with the Union resulted in the club taking the WRU to court on two 
occasions during the late 1990s.  Roy Lewis was not as critical as Ray Harris, but he 
pointed out the power of the governing body.  
“The main thing was the structure of the leagues.  The WRU controls everything when it 
comes down to the structure.  Financially, I’m not sure of what they contribute… but they 
do control us in a way.  I think the Union has been unfairly criticised in some ways, but 
the whole professional thing has been too much for them”. 
One of the few disagreements within the club to the statements on Enforced Choice came 
from Terri Morgan,  
“Well I think that EVRFC could influence its business environment.   The people who are 
running things here are quite sort of forceful characters and have an insight into the ways 
things should be going and I think they could be quite influential and persuasive”. 
Nonetheless, the actual strength of feeling displayed by members and supporters 
throughout the club was summed up by Doug Taylor, 
“Yes, feelings were very strong.  I could have marked four 7s on statements 33 to 36.  
Actually if there was a 10 on the questionnaire, I would have marked 10 because it was  
far worse than even a 7”!     
Stakeholders (Conversations, 8.3.97: 15.4.00: 29.10.03), confirmed the views of the 
majority of respondents, that the external environment had influenced the club’s strategy.  
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7.7.2     Newbridge RFC  
There was strong agreement from management, team management and external 
stakeholders on the influence of external forces (Table 7.7.2); but in contrast, equally 
strong disagreement from the backer on statements 37 and 38.   
              Table 7.7.2   Newbridge Enforced Choice Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
KEY: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
The investigation sought to establish if the Gwent Valley’s external environment had also 
impacted further down the A4046 at Newbridge.   The team manager, who lived locally, 
expressed strong feelings regarding the local environment, 
“The committee all worked in the mining industry.  That was the valleys environment 
right throughout Wales unless you played in the towns.  The valleys environment was 
industry and coal, now that’s gone.   The steelworks has gone, mining industry has gone 
and you look at it; it hit the area and people stopped watching rugby, which then filtered 
through to what we’re talking about now and on top of that then they (WRU) throw this 
‘we’re going to play rugby for money’ caper”.  
Newbridge was hit by the demise of all the major industries.  Unemployment in the valley 
rose and the lack of a regular wage meant that people did not go to support the rugby team 
(Conversations, 18.2.98: 22.10.02: 29.10.03). The difficulties of operating from within a 
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village environment were pointedly interpreted by Geoff Champion. 
 “I think that’s where the sponsorship issue comes in as well, because it’s only a small 
village.   We know that Welsh Rugby generally is not able to draw upon the same financial 
resources as clubs in England can, for example, so if the cake is very small and you come 
from a relative small village as well, if you’re not in the centres of population such as 
Cardiff, Newport, Swansea to a certain extent, then you’re always going to struggle”. 
The inability of the club to find a financial backer in the area meant that it had to rely on 
the WRU grant to pay players.   Brian Jones agreed, referring to the club’s location. 
“I would say our financial support basically isn’t local, it comes from a bit further afield 
than Newbridge.   Here you’ve got limited businesses; I mean our main business at one 
time IWOA was pretty good to us and we were getting decent sort of money from them, 
but that faded away.  Now we’ve got nothing really big here and of course you’ve got 
other smaller clubs around here as well. You know there are too many people drinking at 
the same well”.   
Situated amongst a small population, the club couldn’t match the big money being offered 
by those town/city clubs who also had a financial backer.  Newbridge, therefore, had to 
rely on lower quality players in its team. In addition, the impact of professionalism and 
the state of Welsh Rugby was reflected in the size of the crowd at games which badly 
affected gate revenue.  Reflecting on past crowd attendances, Brian Wellington contrasted 
them against current support;  
“It was about 3-5,000 on average, and could be up to 10,000 against local rivals 
Pontypool and Newport, but membership is now only 350. Today’s crowd reflects the 
quality of our team, the club’s charges and the quality of the lesser teams that you are 
playing against”. 
Searching questions about the local council unearthed the fact that outside of maintaining 
the playing enclosure, the local council had not supported the club.  In confirming that 
data, Idris McCarthey was disappointed and adamant that, 
“The local authority does hold you back.   I don’t think they realise the importance, if you 
like, of a good class rugby side in the village that’s of the size of Newbridge”. 
However, the relationship with the governing body, the WRU, was perceived differently  
by Graham Patterson, who explained his positive opinion of the WRU, 
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“Well I’d say that when we had a spot of trouble with the taxman a couple of years ago 
they lent us £40,000 and we were very appreciative of that especially as we had a good 
rate of interest. So I think the only way the WRU have affected us was restricting the 
number of teams in the Premier Division, but other than that, no real problems”.  
The secretary’s view of the WRU was, he admitted, influenced by the financial assistance 
that the WRU had given to Newbridge.  A contrasting view of the WRU was offered by 
Idris McCarthey, whose critical voice and body language revealed his frustration with the 
Union’s initial financial actions when the Game went professional. 
“I think that Newbridge and all the other clubs in Wales were never ever geared to run a 
professional side.   I think giving Newbridge, or any other club, £400,000 like they (WRU) 
did, was like giving a mad man the money you know because, and I think, that might have 
been the same for us, because we all of a sudden had £400,000 everybody was giving it 
out like a man with no arms and if you don’t give it out you haven’t got a team.   I think 
that was a huge mistake to give that amount of money to anybody”. 
A common theme, concerning the negative view of the WRU, which arose amongst all 
the clubs was offered by local businessman Paul Tedstone, the club’s accountant, 
“In order for member clubs to function they’ve got to have answers and guidance from 
above and that hasn’t been happening to the extent that it needed to.  I also couldn’t see 
how the WRU could ask the clubs to have a three year plan in place when it didn’t have 
a strategy in place itself.  The WRU haven’t given leadership or governed”. 
Somewhat surprisingly for the Welsh Rugby press, the local reporter was found to be a 
supporter of the governing body. 
“.. the WRU were always going to influence that overall climate.  Believe it or not I am a 
supporter of the WRU; I think they make lots of mistakes but I do believe in the structure 
you see.  I believe you need a body like the WRU” 
Geoff Champion acknowledged the need for a structure to rugby in Wales which the 
WRU provided.  He accepted that the clubs WERE the Union and therefore WRU funding 
should be used to keep clubs, like Newbridge, in existence. As with most clubs, discussion 
regarding the WRU brought out strongly held, heated feelings and opinions from 
stakeholders; some supported the Union but the majority strongly criticised the governing 
body.  Nonetheless, stakeholders (Conversations18.2.98: 22.10.02: 29.10.03), were 
united in agreeing on the negative impact of the external environment on the club.  
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7.7.3     Ebbw Vale RFC v Newbridge RFC; Comparison of Findings  
The nearness of the two Gwent Valley clubs indicated that they operated virtually within 
the same external environment that influenced their strategy (Harris and Jenkins, 2001). 
           Table 7.7.3   Comparison of Enforced Choice Responses 
 
                          
 
 KEY  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
As is evident from Table 7.7.3, Ebbw Vale respondents were united in their criticism of 
the WRU over several key issues. The Union’s lack of leadership; not placing a pay cap 
on players; no modernization of the structure for player’s registration, affected the club’s 
ability to cope.  The two Russell’s believed that WRU committeemen were even prepared 
to leave the club go to the wall.   Perhaps the governing body’s biggest impact was in 
1998 when the club had qualified for the European Heineken Cup and then had its place 
in Europe taken away by the WRU to accommodate ‘rebel clubs’, Swansea and Cardiff, 
instead.  This had a devastating effect on player recruitment, and although the club was 
financially compensated, it did lose money from lost income, sponsorship, TV revenue 
and other sources.  Stakeholders felt that the club did not recover from this decision by 
the governing body for several seasons (Smith and Williams, 1999). 
By comparison, the Newbridge secretary’s view of the governing body, WRU, was very 
positive due to the fact that the club had been rescued by a  £40,000 loan when it was in  
                                  
Position                   
Ebbw Vale  Newbridge 
     
 
Owner                           
  
     
 
Management                  
     
 
Team Management       
     
 
External Stakeholders                        
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financial trouble with the Inland Revenue.  The only criticism he offered against the WRU 
was on the low number of teams allocated to the Premier Division.  However, the club 
chairman had an opposite, less supportive opinion and lambasted the WRU for giving a 
grant of £400,000 per year to ‘amateur committeemen’ to spend.  He was joined by the 
club’s accountant, who sided with Ebbw Vale’s comments in being highly critical over 
the lack of leadership or guidance from the WRU when the game turned Professional. 
Ebbw Vale also experienced a greater impact of local council decisions on its future 
plans.  The council rejected the Russell’s business plan to re-develop Eugene Cross Park 
at a cost of £1.7 million, and in a ‘catch twenty-two’ scenario, the brothers could not even 
spend money on ground improvements because they needed council permission.  In 
contrast, the impact of the same Blaenau Gwent council was not as great at Newbridge, 
because the club was content to continue using the same ground and facilities that it had 
for decades.   Nevertheless, stakeholders did feel that the local council had held back the 
club’s progress over the years and had effectively done nothing, but help pressurize the 
club’s strategy.  
Both  Ebbw  Vale  and  Newbridge  suffered  body  blows  with  the  closure  of  major  
industries within the same area, such as the steel and coal industries.  This meant that 
local unemployment was high and disposable income was at a premium which affected 
crowd attendances at home games.  At first, Ebbw Vale was hit harder by the closures 
with the loss of a guaranteed annual revenue stream from the steelworks dramatically 
affecting player recruitment and the pre-season tour.  The fact that both Ebbw Vale, and 
Newbridge were not situated in a major population centre, such as Cardiff or Newport, 
had impacted on obtaining sponsorship and financial backing (Porter, 1991).  However, 
‘Lady Luck’ had stepped in but with opposing results for both Gwent clubs (Eisenhardt 
and Zbaracki, 1992); Ebbw Vale acquired the financial support of the Russell brothers, 
whereas Newbridge could only rely on the reduced grant from the WRU and were 
relegated.  The lack of acquiring funding meant that the club could only afford players 
from lower Divisions (Gorton, 1999), and thus the poor quality of the team meant lower 
crowds watching their games.  The business environment in both places was considered 
to  have   influenced   strategy  and  was  perceived  by  stakeholders to  have  negatively  
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impacted on the two clubs.  Being ‘niche’ clubs, their ability to influence their 
environment was limited (Byers and Slack, 2001).    
The evidence showed that external forces had influenced the strategic approach within 
the two valley clubs (Harris and Jenkins, 2001).  Ebbw Vale, in spite of the external 
influence of the WRU, the local council and the major loss of the local steelworks, did 
plan (the 3 x 8’s), and survived in the Premier Division, thus achieved its goal.  On the 
other hand, Newbridge failed to capture and convert its local billionaire, Terry 
Matthews, and accordingly decided to operate in a dynamic environment within the 
financial constraints imposed by the WRU grant.  They did not survive in the Premier 
Division. 
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7.7.4     Llanelli RFC 
Whilst the majority of respondents at Llanelli agreed with the statements (Table 7.7.4), 
the exception was the coach who disagreed with over half the statements concerning 
outside influences. 
              Table 7.7.4   Llanelli Enforced Choice Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The interview with the chairman, on the factors in the external environment that had 
impacted on the club, saw Huw Evans, in a calm, thoughtful voice, recalling that, 
“Sponsorship, I mean generally the demise of farming in particular and the removal of a 
lot of the industry that supported Llanelli over the years has had an impact on our ability 
to create revenue. That inability to create revenue comes from two areas, one was just 
the lack of sponsorship, the lack of big businesses on the one hand and people not having 
a lot of money in their pocket in the other. It’s a very small town, as you know and the 
outlying districts, where a huge number of our fans come from, our supporters come from, 
have been hit very badly. The farming community, which it was predominantly, has been 
hit very badly.  So it’s a massive area that we serve but it’s not one that’s the wealthiest 
in the UK.  However, it is one of the most loyal, and there’s a big trade off there, and they 
undoubtedly see, the sponsors and the supporters, probably go to greater lengths to 
support Llanelli because it is their flagship for West and Mid-Wales. So it’s not all doom 
and  gloom but it has had a very  serious  impact  on our  ability to  drive  revenue to the  
Position                   Statement 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
Owner                                       
Financial Backer        
Management        
Company Secretary        
Accountant        
Team Management        
Team Manager        
Coach        
Captain        
External        
Former Committeeman        
Press Reporter        
Long Serving Supporter        
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extent we’d like.  We’ve also had two sets of people who have been very problematic.  
One was the WRU and I don’t think I need to say much more about that as they haven’t 
adjusted to the pace, as everyone knows, of professionalism in any sense.  They have been 
reticent in moving to the changes that we as a nation need and that has been a very big 
controlling influence over any strategy that we could put in place. They’ve controlled and 
stifled revenue streams as well. Our position is that we are a factory and we pay our 
employees; those employees make a product for us but they also make it for the WRU.  A 
lot of them will go and play for the WRU and there are not many factories where you 
could manufacture a product for £100 (that’s what we’re paying these players).  A 
franchise sells that product for £200 and gives you £75 back. So we’re actually funding 
internationals and the WRU who have free access to our assets, are not paying adequate 
funds for those assets when they use them. So that’s been a massive controlling influence 
on our strategy”.  
The chairman clarified why there was a major disagreement with the WRU; from revenue 
streams generated by International games, to who actually controls the club’s 
International players.  The latter disagreement was the focus of much debate amongst 
Premier Division clubs.  Interestingly, Huw Evans also offered a unique insight into the 
difficulties he encountered with other professional clubs financial backers. 
 
 “The other one’s been the owners. My personal view is, and this is what was very 
different about Llanelli as well, is that you can’t own a rugby club. A rugby club is owned 
by the community in which it serves and by the ex-players, by the supporters, the sponsors. 
It is a community based ownership scheme, and anyone who thinks that they own a rugby 
club is making a huge mistake because they own nothing. So we've been trying to bring 
about change with the WRU, which is one of the slowest moving unions, but we’ve had a 
lot of people, who are owning clubs and like to see themselves as owners, who have been 
equally as difficult as the union. Therefore the development of Llanelli’s strategy has been 
buggered up on two sides; one by a limited number of egotistical owners who haven’t got 
rugby at heart and the development of rugby in Wales at heart and two, the union, who 
are not responding in the way that they could have. So we’ve been heavily compromised”.   
These were critical words about fellow financial backers.  Mr Evans made it very clear 
that some owners were as difficult as the WRU in bringing about, and implementing, 
change.  Regarding uncontrollable external factors the CEO, Stuart Gallacher, displayed 
rising vocal emotions, and got quite animated, in offering an example of how just one 
incident could affect a club’s financial strategy.      
“To be honest, I know it sounds dramatic, to put it into context, when the Leicester full 
back, Stimpson,...when he kicked that penalty against us, (two minutes from the end of 
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the semi-final of the European Cup game from over fifty metres to win the game) that 
cost this club half a million pounds. The business is as fallible as the results. Very often 
during the season things happen which impact on your business plan and you’ve 
absolutely f***ing no control over it”! 
The fact that rugby is an uncertain, unpredictable game, subject to so many variables such 
as the weather, the opposition, the match officials, and many other influences, makes 
planning the outcome very difficult and nearly impossible.  The CEO acknowledged that 
decision-makers within the clubs are sitting in the grandstand when the result of the game 
is determined on the field. Team performance was the crucial success factor, but the 
Board had no control whatsoever on how the team performed during the eighty minutes, 
or the end result.  Nonetheless, a professional rugby club was results driven in order to 
obtain the necessary cashflow via supporters watching games, sponsorship, TV revenues 
and WRU grant.  In trying to obtain that funding from within the local business 
environment, Hefin Jenkins was critical about Llanelli’s actual location. 
“It’s difficult for us because when you compare with the likes of Cardiff and Newport, 
where there’s a lot of industry, we’re out on a limb really. Industry has gone from the 
area.  So it’s a difficult area to get business into, you know”. 
Off-the-field activities might have been difficult for which the Board might have 
attempted to plan, but they could only react to the circumstances they found themselves 
operating in.  Nonetheless, when interviewed, the coach’s perception was that the 
business environment had not affected the team, as opposed to the club. 
“My strategic choice, if I decided now - rugby strategy I’m talking about here now – that 
I’m going to change my game plan,  I’m able to make a case to do that but the business 
environment doesn’t have a bearing on that. The way that the team wants to play is not 
affected.  Llanelli is probably not a dynamic area as far as sponsorship and business is 
concerned any longer. If we had to be dependent on local business we wouldn’t be in 
existence”. 
In spite of Gareth Jenkin’s OP views, both management and stakeholders agreed that the 
external environment had influenced, and had a pronounced impact on, the club’s strategy 
(Conversations, 18.10.97: 9.3.99: 20.9.03).  
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7.7.5     Comparison with the Benchmark Club 
It was evident that the turbulent external environment, especially the IoP, had affected all 
three research clubs (Hannah and Freeman, 1989).  Major environmental influences 
identified were the governing bodies (IRB & WRU), the local councils, other club owners 
and the local business environment.     
 
Table 7.7.5  Comparison of Enforced Choice Responses by Club Levels 
  
           
   KEY                 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Almost all respondents in the three clubs showed more strength of feeling, both in voice 
and in body language, over this section than the previous five dimensions.  The results of 
the questionnaire responses to the Enforced Choice dimension statements (Table 7.7.5) 
showed strong overall agreement in each club with the statements stating that the external 
environment, factors outside the club over which they had little control or no sway, did 
have a major impact and influenced strategy.  Within this dimension, the governing body 
(WRU), the local authorities, other financial backers, coupled with the uncertainty 
surrounding the future of rugby union proved to be key influences to planning, and 
implementing, any course of action. 
 
Position                   
Ebbw Vale Newbridge  Llanelli 
     
 
Owner                             
     
Management                   
     
Team Management        
     
External Stakeholders                         
     
Overall Acceptance of Dimension     
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Table 7.7.6   Cross Case Analysis: Comparison by Club of                 
                      Enforced Choice Statements 
 
                                          Club 
 
 
Ebbw Vale 
(n=9) 
 
Newbridge 
(n=9) 
 
Llanelli 
(n=9) 
Statements (N=27)     
33. Our freedom of choice is 
severely restricted by our 
business environment 
 
  
 
 
34. Forces outside this 
organisation determine our 
strategic direction. 
  
 
 
35. Barriers exist in our business 
environment which significantly 
restricts the strategies we can 
follow. 
  
 
 
36. We have strategy imposed on 
us by those external to this 
organisation, e.g. WRU 
  
 
 
37. We are not able to influence 
our business environment; we can 
only buffer ourselves from it. 
  
 
 
38. Many of the strategic changes 
which have taken place have been 
forced on us by those outside the 
rugby club. 
  
 
 
39. We are severely limited in our 
ability to influence the business 
environment in which we operate. 
  
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The respondents at the three clubs, with a few individual exceptions, all expressed the 
view that the external environment had impacted on strategy. 
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7.8     Conclusions 
The chapter examined the process of strategy formation by using the Bailey et al (2000), 
six dimensions framework of command, planning, incremental, political, cultural and 
enforced choice.  The findings within each club were then compared, Ebbw Vale v 
Newbridge, and then against the benchmark club, Llanelli.  Tables 7.8.1 and 7.8.2 
provide a summary of the findings for each of the six process dimensions. An in-depth 
discussion, and comparison, with existent theory is performed in Chapter Eight. 
Table 7.8.1   Cross Case Analysis: Comparison by Club of 
                      Evidence of the Six Dimensions 
 
                                           
                                  Club 
                                 
 
Ebbw Vale 
 
 
Newbridge 
 
 
 
Llanelli 
 
Dimension High Performer Low Performer  Consistent 
COMMAND 
SENIOR FIGURE(S)      +      +       + 
  
FORMAL PLANNING  -   
INCREMENTAL 
PLANNING      + -   
POLITICAL INFLUENCE -    
CULTURAL INFLUENCE 
     +        + 
ENFORCED CHOICE 
INFLUENCE      +        + 
 
               KEY: 
- 
Little 
Evidence 
 Some 
Evidence + 
 
Strong 
Evidence 
  
235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN:     THE STRATEGY PROCESS POST 1995 
 
The chapter’s contribution to the study is that of describing, examining and interpreting 
the first five years of the new professional era in Welsh rugby. Having first established 
that the characteristics of Welsh Rugby Clubs matched those of nonprofit organisations, 
pre -1995 (Table 3.2), the strategy-creation behaviour of the three Clubs were then 
evaluated against the characteristics of the planning processes in small businesses (Table 
7.9).  
The strategy process, post-1995, related club opinions and behaviour to the six 
dimensions of the strategy-creation process.  Evidence from the three case studies was 
displayed within the chapter under the six main dimensions (themes), and the method 
adopted, analytical comparison, allowed an in-depth examination of each dimension. 
First, findings from the intra-case analysis were generated via multiple club levels, data 
triangulation. Second, findings from the cross-case analysis were displayed for the 
purpose of extracting similarities and differences between the high, and low, performing 
clubs employing both data and methodological triangulation.   
The conclusions arising from the study’s findings, were that the strategy process in Welsh 
rugby clubs post-1995 was one strongly influenced by enforced choice (Hannah and 
Freeman, 1989), but that political (Hickson et al, 1986) and cultural (Schein, 1992), 
influences were no longer the dominant characteristics that they had once been prior to 
the IoP.  The demise of the two dimensions had been the outcome of a new dominant 
participant (Freeman, 2000) in Rugby Union Football, the owner/financial backer (THE 
senior figure). There was little physical written evidence to support the formal planning 
dimension (Rue and Ibrahim, 1998), although verbal evidence was strong regarding the 
use of some strategic tools and techniques such as SWOT, PEST, and Competitor 
Analysis.  Incremental planning was indicated as the preferred approach (Quinn, 1980), 
although OP was employed on a weekly basis throughout the rugby season by the 
personnel within the Team Management level in the three clubs (Shrader et al, 1989).  
The deduction drawn from the findings was that the ‘rugby’ game was still very much the 
main reason (mission) for a club’s existence.  In spite of the transformation of the Game, 
from amateur to profession, “This is a rugby club, not a business” remained the mantra 
from many stakeholders in all clubs to my management enquiries throughout the research 
period (Hoye et al, 2009). 
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Table 7.8.2   Cross Case Analysis: Comparison by Club of the 
                  Respondents Views of the Six Dimensions: Rank Order 
 
                                             
                                     Club 
 
Ebbw Vale 
(n=9) 
Newbridge 
(n=9) 
 Llanelli 
(n=9) 
Dimension High Performer Low Performer  Consistent 
COMMAND          
SENIOR FIGURE(S) 
5th 5th  2nd  
                    
                          
     
FORMAL                 
PLANNING 2
nd 
 
3rd  4th  
     
INCREMENTAL           
PLANNING 
3rd 2nd  3rd  
     
POLITICAL          
INFLUENCE 
6th 6th  6th 
     
CULTURAL                       
INFLUENCE 4
th 4th  5th 
     
ENFORCED CHOICE 
INFLUENCE         
1st  1st  1st  
 
 
KEY: 
 
Strong 
Disagree 
 Disagree  Agree  
Strong 
Agree 
 
 
The composition of the table was based on the questionnaire findings, where statements 
had been marked 1 – 7 by the respondents. However, what the table cannot convey is the 
strength of feeling expressed by respondents commenting on each dimension. The 
strongest agreement within the clubs, and the greatest display of emotion, were the 
statements concerning the Enforced Choice dimension, which proved to be the top ranked 
dimension in each club.  Of interest for the research that the political dimension, post-
1995, was considered the dimension to be the lowest concern within the clubs. 
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Table 7.9       The Small Business Planning Perspective 
 
Characteristics 
EBBW VALE NEWBRIDGE LLANELLI 
Informal, flexible, 
incremental,  irregular 
process 
Yes Yes Yes 
Lack of formal analysis Yes Yes Yes 
Limited objectives   Yes Yes Yes 
Importance of improving 
financial management 
Yes Yes Yes 
Planning concerned with 
limited/scarce resources 
Yes Yes Yes 
Participants outside of 
owner/manager 
Yes Yes Yes 
Judgement, experience and 
intuition more important 
Yes Yes Yes 
Short-term, functionally 
focus   
Yes Yes Yes 
Focus on OP   Yes Yes Yes 
Inability to cope with 
external pressures 
Yes Yes Yes 
Lack of time for planning   Yes Yes Yes 
Time horizon should be 
short 
Yes Yes Yes 
Planning adaptive in nature Yes Yes Yes 
Success was due to luck 
rather than planning 
Yes Yes Yes 
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
 
“All research is incomplete.  No project ever provides a 
definitive answer to the problems it seeks to understand. 
What sound research achieves is more understanding not 
complete understanding.  Those who expect research to 
always provide conclusive answers are asking for the 
impossible”.  
(Curran and Blackburn, 2001, p.25)   
 
8.1     Introduction 
The final chapter’s input to the study is to consider the comprehension acquired from the 
study, and the conclusions reached. This includes a discussion, and comparison, of the 
key research findings with the existent literature, thus examining practice with theory, 
within the unique context of the investigation. The process by which strategies are 
developed is important, particularly as an organisation attempts to produce strategies 
which match the organisation with its operating environment (Bailey et al, 2000; 
Pettigrew, 1988).   
The research was designed to provide insights, and understanding into two main areas.  
First, this thesis aimed to explore, during a decade of turbulence, the process of strategy-
making in Welsh rugby clubs.  Second, this study was aimed at developing an insight 
into, and be cognizant of, how rugby clubs reacted to a ‘shock event’, the IoP, the 
decisions made, the actions taken, and the resultant outcomes.  
The chapter commences with a synopsis of the completed thesis via its research 
objectives. In the introduction to this thesis, specific research questions were identified, 
and it is these that will be used to generate a discussion of the main findings of the study 
with the existent literature. These are followed by the conclusions, the major contributions 
and the implications of this study. Completing the chapter, is a self-critique of the 
limitations of the research, and suggestions for future research arising from the subject of 
strategy-making in nonprofit, rugby clubs.  
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8.2       Research Objectives 
The core aim of this research was reinforced through two key objectives: 
 To explore and describe the strategy-making process in Welsh rugby clubs within 
the broader NPO and small business sectors within the UK, and to compare, 
contrast and evaluate the amassed empirical evidence with the mainly prescriptive 
literature. 
 To identify and understand the influence of a strategic ‘shock event’, the IoP, on 
the decisions and actions taken by clubs, and the resultant outcomes of any strategy 
pursued.  
8.3    Understanding Acquired of the Research Topic.  
This investigation followed two clear pathways in order to fulfil the rationale of the 
research.  First, a review of the secondary literature, abstract and applied theoretical 
works, to ascertain both the conceptual framework concerning the process of strategy- 
making (Chapter Two) and the historical, and current, contextual setting of the study 
(Chapter Three).  Secondly, within the social constructivist ontology, a subjective, 
interpretive approach, adopted the stance that knowledge was constructed by those 
individuals who were part of social situations reflecting upon their experiences (Chapter 
Four). In this longitudinal study, therefore, an understanding of the strategy-making 
process in nonprofit rugby clubs was obtained from various individuals within each of 
the three research clubs (Chapters Five, Six and Seven).  
8.3.1     Research Question One: 1990 - 2000 
Was there a presence, or an absence, of a strategy-making process in Welsh rugby 
clubs during the decade, 1990-2000? 
 
As stated in Chapter One, this question, arose from the recommendations for future 
research posed by the research of Bailey and Johnson (1991), Hart (1992), Kearns and 
Scarpino (1996), Slack (1997), Bailey et al (2000), and supported by the views of 
Ghobadian and O’Regan (2011).  The discussion regarding this question compares, and 
contrasts, the key findings from the amateur period in Chapter Five, and the professional 
period in Chapter Seven, along with the existent literature in Chapter Two. The findings 
are structured employing the headings of Bailey et al (2000) six dimensions of strategy.  
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8.3.1.1     Command Dimension (Visionary Perspective) 
Emerging from the review of literature, Chapter Two, was the argument put forward by 
Bennis and Nanus (1996) that strategy was formulated under the direction of a central, 
powerful leader; however, Chaffee (1985) contended that strategy arose from within a 
small group of senior individuals within the TMT.   
The study established that, pre-1995, the management of the three ‘members clubs’ lay 
in the hands of individuals elected from within the membership.  These volunteers then 
formed the management committee, and in line with Shrivastava and Nachman (1989), 
provided the future direction of the club.  However, within the management committee 
of the three clubs, it was the small group of officers on each committee who were the 
decision-makers, as put forward by Chaffee (1985). The composition of the elected 
committee sometimes meant that individuals, who had emerged to achieve the senior 
positions and were empowered with authority, may not have possessed the required 
decision-making qualities and abilities.  The research findings were consistent with those 
of Paton and Cornforth (1992) in that at NPOs, leaders might have no experience of 
business management.  
The elected committees at Newbridge (5.2.2) and Llanelli (5.2.4) were united in 
representing the collective values and beliefs of the club, which was positively reflected 
in the clubs’ performance, as proposed by Iaquinto and Fredrickson (1997).  On the other 
hand, at Ebbw Vale, (5.5.1) disagreement amongst the senior figures on the committee 
impacted on the First XV’s difficult struggle in the second division of the newly formed 
National League, thus supporting the findings on the negative impact of divided views on 
performance by Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988). Organisational members were 
responsible, as suggested by Hart (1992), for ‘making it happen’ by implementing any 
functional or operational aspect of the plan. 
During the IoP, and post 1995, the findings offered support to Bennis and Nanus’s (1996), 
contention that it was an individual who assumed control within each club, making the 
decisions to ensure the clubs’ survival.  However, the enormous financial impact of the 
IoP had led to the arrival, and emergence, of a new influential actor, the financial backer, 
who possessed the necessary scarce resource – money (7.2.1; 7.2.2; 7.2.4). These 
experienced  businessmen  took  control, and then  oversaw a  change to the management 
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and the structure at each of the three clubs. These actions aligned with the findings of 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), that decision making is influenced by power, in this 
case a senior figure who the club is reliant upon for a strategic resource, money; but the 
actions also challenged the findings of Schrader et al (1989), that the small firm owner 
tendency to practice strategic decision-making was somewhat limited, or even non-
existent, through the decisions taken by the new financial backers. 
A comparison of the two periods, 1990-95 and 1995-2000, revealed that there were clear 
changes in ‘who’ were acknowledged as the senior figures, those involved in the 
leadership position(s) responsible for the decision-making process.   
8.3.1.2     Planning Dimension (Perspective) 
The writings concerning planning (2.7.2) covered the influence of its context, one that 
within the rugby industry had been both a stable, and then, a turbulent environment.  The 
external environment was deemed by the clubs’ stakeholders to be reasonably stable 
during this first period, a factor that Risseeuw and Masurel (1994) and Fredrickson and 
Iaquinto (1989), considered appropriate for SP.  The case studies (5.3), during the last 
five years of amateurism, did reveal variations in the degree of planning undertaken but 
common to all the research clubs was a paucity of formal SP. The planning tended to be 
informal, and no club could produce evidence of any business plan.  Some confirmation 
of SP, as suggested by Argenti (1992), was found but only at certain times following, and 
reacting to, specific events. These actions by rugby clubs sided with the findings of Sharp 
and Brock (2010) that formal planning processes were rare in NPOs, and also the findings 
of Stone et al (1999), that nonprofit organisations only plan when they have to plan.   
Those writers who had advocated a formal planning process in a dynamic, turbulent 
environment, McKiernan and Morris (1994), Hart and Banbury (1994), and Slevin and 
Covin (1997), would not have found any solace with the decision-makers’ responses to 
the unforeseen changes in the IoP environment at either Newbridge or Llanelli. The 
exception was found at Ebbw Vale (7.3.1), where the club had adopted a SP approach as 
proposed by Rue and Ibrahim, 1998.  In a sport context, data revealed that the clubs did 
employ OP (game/competitor analysis) prior to each match played.  Contrary to Perry’s 
(2001) assertion about the difficulty in linking planning and success, respondents (5.3.5)  
pointed to the part weekly planning played as a contribution to the team winning, and its  
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role in ensuring the club performed successfully (Shrader et al, 1989).   
Employing Bracker and Pearson’s (1986) framework (Tables 8.3.1 and 8.3.2), the clubs’ 
planning practices and sophistication, 1990-2000, were compared. The clear inference 
from the data collected on the Planning dimension was that the clubs only employed SP 
when necessary (5.3; 7.3). SP was reactive, not planned or structured in advance.  
However, strategic goals were identified in situations where immediate action was 
required, such as ‘survival’ following the IoP. The academic debate, over whether or not 
formal SP influenced performance, had, as Perry (2001) contended, proved inconclusive, 
and proved to be the situation found within this study. 
8.3.1.3     Incremental Dimension (Logical Incremental Perspective) 
As with the previous section on the Planning Dimension, the writings on the Incremental 
Dimension (2.7.3) covered the influence of its context, both a stable and turbulent 
environment.  The results from this section are equated with, and judged against, the 
conclusions of previous investigations.  
Evidence found, thus aligning with Mathews and Scott’s (1995) contention, that the 
clubs’ planning horizon was short-term (seasonal) rather than long-term in nature. SP 
only took place when unforeseen events in the environment compelled the committees 
within clubs to plan (5.3), so the process was imposed on the nonprofit clubs, thus 
supporting the findings of Stone et al (1999). In stable environments, as stakeholders 
perceived the period 1990 – 1995, Bailey and Johnson (1990) contended that strategies 
did not need to change, and therefore strategy formulation in the clubs was not an 
established, regular, and sequential process.   Clubs adopted the view that ‘this is the way 
things have always been done at this club’ and saw no reason to change that approach.   
Any changes were small in nature and infrequent, benefitting, it was claimed by 
stakeholders, from Quinn’s (1980) “learning through doing” approach. Various 
stakeholders also confused SM with operational management, as revealed by Hodges and 
Kent (2007). Some basic SM tools and techniques operated within the clubs, but there 
was little structured SP employed.   
The in-depth interviews with respondents from within each of the management and team 
management  levels,  (Section 7.4),  had revealed a  subtle,  but  important  difference  of  
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stakeholder perceptions pre-1995 as opposed to post-1995.  The view that ‘the Team is 
the Club’ was prevalent throughout all clubs in the amateur era, and planning revolved 
around that belief, as described by Smith and Williams (1980).  However, following the 
IoP, whilst those associated directly with the team still held that view, the management 
staff appreciated that without the necessary finance raised through the club’s business 
activities, the existence of the team would be seriously threatened.  Quinn (1980) had 
recommended incrementalism for the more uncertain and rapidly changing environments. 
However, rather than a slow incremental process, action taken had emerged in response 
to urgent demands, and problems, facing the clubs, on a day-to-day operational basis, as 
asserted by Carsons and Cromie (1990).  Management stated that it was “learning through 
doing”. 
8.3.1.4     Political Dimension (Perspective) 
The review of literature (2.7.4) established that strategy-making is an inherently political 
process (Chakravarthy and White, 2002) where powerful groups of stakeholders, internal 
and external, influenced strategy (Hickson et al, 1986) through negotiation, bargaining 
and compromise (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).   
No common agreement emerged, pre – 1995, from the research clubs on Chakravarthy 
and White’s (2002) contention that strategy making is an inherently political process, and 
whether or not politics influenced strategy (5.5.1; 5.5.2; 5.5.4).  During the period from 
1990 to 1995, because of the nature of the ‘amateur’ Game, most of the required resources 
were available. So there was no demand for any single, dominant stakeholder who had, 
as argued by Hickson et al (1986), the precious scarce resources that the clubs desired, 
and who could therefore influence strategy.  
Following the events of August 1995, with the clubs facing turbulent times and 
uncertainty, the process of decision-making did become more prone to power, in line with 
the findings of Bailey and Johnson (1991).  It was uncovered (7.5) that, with the clubs 
now desperately seeking scarce resources (quality players and finance) to survive, the 
influence and power of any stakeholder possessing those unique resources inevitably 
grew, supporting the proposition by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003).  These findings (7.2.1; 
7.4.1; 7.2.2), were consistent with those of Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), and 
Eisenhardt  and  Zbaracki (1992),  that  power  and  politics  influenced  decision-making  
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within organisations.  As a result of these controlling new actors entering the sector, 
internal politics at the three clubs became virtually non-existent, and accordingly 
supporting Eisenhardt’s (1999) findings. The consensus amongst supporters and members 
concerning the political dimension was that it did NOT influence strategy post-1995, as 
much as it had done previously, during the amateur era. It was also evident that external 
politics (IRB and WRU) beyond the control of the club had strongly influenced the 
internal demand, at each club, for specific resources, concurring with the findings of 
Harris and Jenkins (2001). The longitudinal study supported the findings of Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois (1988), that strategic decision making is influence by power.   
8.3.1.5       Cultural Dimension (Interpretive Perspective) 
‘The strategies an organisation follows can be seen as more attributable to culture and 
cognition than to any objective planned response to the environment’ (Bailey and 
Johnson, 1991, p.18).  The discussion in this section concerns the influence of culture on 
the strategy-making process. 
The different cultures found in the research clubs, had been established via a lengthy 
historical research undertaken on each club (Appendix 3.4 - 3.6), and through many visits 
to the clubs (Appendix 4.6).  The study provided invaluable data, especially in 
understanding the basis of the cultural dimension.  In line with the research of Schein 
(2004), Spender (1989), and Johnson (1987), the findings (5.6) did reveal that up to 1995, 
the strong culture within each club had established norms such as rituals, routines and 
symbols, and that club expectations based on ideology, values and beliefs (the paradigm) 
had acted as guides for action, suppressed deviance and had greatly influenced how events 
were perceived and the strategy adopted. The study concurred with Bailey and Johnson 
(1991, p20) that “the culture and dominant paradigm of an organisation can only direct 
strategy through the individuals who take decisions and implement the strategy”.  At each 
club, former players and long-time supporters who had been subject to the club’s culture 
had, in time, become members of the decision-making management committee.  
Of interest to this research were the notions that if the comparable clubs were located in 
the same area, operated in an almost exact external environment, and their ages were 
similar that the clubs would exhibit an analogous rugby club culture. The fact that the two 
Gwent  clubs   (5.6.3)  were  located  near  to  each  other  did  lead  to  a  similar  culture  
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developing, as proposed by Spender (1989). However, there was, no common shared 
industry wide ‘image’ of on-field play in Wales despite the closeness of  the clubs’ or the 
fact they all played the same game, rugby union football (5.6).  Nevertheless, common to 
all clubs, culture was a respected, cherished, individual characteristic that was revealed 
in a club’s holistic approach to the Game.  Thus, the influence of attitudes, values, ideas, 
and perceptions, was shared by the stakeholders and members, as advocated by Freeman 
(2000), and did contribute to the production of a club’s strategy.  The strategies followed, 
therefore, were more attributable, as Bailey and Johnson (1991) argued, to culture and 
collective shared assumptions of the clubs’ than to any objective planned response to the 
environment, typified by adjustments over a period rather than by major change.  The 
differences between the research clubs’ strategies resulted from a diverse view held on, 
and interpretation of, the external environment.    
However, following the IoP, within the clubs’ it was not only the decision-makers who 
understood and appreciated that, unlike the pre-1995 era, culture should not be allowed 
to hold back the future progress and development within the clubs (Kono, 1994), but 
stakeholders had also accepted and adopted that view (7.6). Culture, developed within 
each club for over a century, would no longer be permitted to influence strategy. 
8.3.1.6     Enforced Choice Dimension (Ecological Perspective)  
The literature concerning the influence of the external environment upon the strategy-
making process was examined in Chapter Two (2.7.6). The majority of Welsh clubs, pre-
1995, being small, niche structures, were unable to influence their environments (5.7), 
thus supporting the proposition of Bailey and Johnson (1991). Since all member clubs of 
the WRU were treated as equal, the senior, first class clubs, being a minority, were 
relatively powerless, individually, to affect the strategy environment selection process; so 
they reacted through a “collective response” via a cartel in a form known as the ‘Merit 
Table’ clubs, as found by Smith and Williams (1980).  A realised strategy was more likely 
brought about by the possibilities and limitations that were posed by the (competitive) 
environment, as opposed to what happened within the boundary of the clubs.  Freedom 
of choice existed, but only within limits determined by the external environment, as 
purported by Bailey et al (2000).  Whilst the actual playing environment was considered 
stable, individual clubs were found (5.7) to be restricted in their capacity to make strategic  
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decisions within the Welsh Rugby sector.  Club respondents acknowledged that they 
perceived the environment, post-1995, as turbulent and unpredictable (Section 6.7) with 
the IRB, introducing professionalism, the WRU being indecisive and not showing 
leadership, and local councils being unsupportive, being external forces influencing and 
restricting strategic choice. So in line with the findings of Hannah and Freeman (1989), 
outside factors external to the organisations, imposed strategy on clubs which best fitted 
the transformed environment.   
In the literature, it has been claimed by Minzberg and Lampel (2001) that in turbulent and 
unpredictable environments, such as the IoP, organic rather than rational processes should 
be employed.  In such environments, it was advocated by Westhead and Storey (1996) 
that small firm managers favoured short-term planning because of concerns with short 
term problems and issues.  The study’s findings were mixed on this subject.  Planned 
decisions, as advocated by Hart and Banbury (1992), were employed at one club (6.2). 
Conversely, strategic decisions were made (6.5) which, were not based on either formal 
or emergent planning, proved to be high risk, reactionary decisions, corresponding to the 
findings of Dean and Sharfman (1993).  Nonetheless, strategic decisions were made, as 
suggested by Beaver (2003), in order to endure the pressures from the external 
environment, but the clubs had employed different approaches to implement and achieve 
a common strategy, survival.  Despite the arrival of financial backers (7.2.1; 7.2.2; 7.2.4), 
the external environment continued to make an impact at each of the clubs. The research 
established that, the strategies that the clubs could follow were severely limited, and were 
indeed, an enforced choice, as contended by Harris and Jenkins (2001).  
The employment of the Six Dimension instrument (Bailey et al, 2000), matched the topics 
previously raised by stakeholders (4.5.5) and proved ideal for extracting and collecting 
the necessary data required to respond to this research question. A summary of the 
findings within the six dimensions of strategy development, 1990 – 2000, at each club 
can be found in Tables 8.3.3, 8.3.4 and 8.3.5. 
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8.3.2     Research Question Two  
How did clubs react to the IoP to Welsh Rugby in August 1995, and what were the 
resultant outcomes?  
 
The section is structured as per Chapter Six, employing the headings of Pettigrew’s 
(1988) model, the three dimensions of strategy, the process, content and context.  The 
study focused, as advised by Sminia (2009), on the unique and extremely contextual 
situation of rugby clubs at a specific moment in time.  Research was considered desirable, 
by Bailey et al (1990), in to examining whether such a particular strategic issue (in this 
study, professionalism) was dealt with in a similar or dissimilar manner within the 
industry (rugby).  The research questions (6.1) were focused on understanding and 
attempting to explain the club’s actions and outcomes emanating from external pressure. 
This section, evaluates, and concentrates on, the findings – literature association 
specifically surrounding the IoP. 
8.3.2.1     Process 
It had been contended by Aram and Cowen, (1990, p65) that strategic action in small 
organisations only occurred belatedly following a crisis, by which time it was too late. 
Equally, Atherton (2003) reasoned that where an event was not anticipated or expected, 
the response was reactive. It was found that the IoP did match the frequently cited 
definition of organizational crisis, offered by Pearson and Clair (1998, p60).  In addition, 
the study found that there was no comparable prior event, as recommended by Schon 
(1991), for the clubs on which to base decisions.  However, the unforeseen crisis that the 
IoP had caused within each club had the effect of challenging, and changing, 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the club’s culture.  This was not a routine, operational, day-
to-day decision that clubs had grown accustom to making (Table 5.4).  Rather  it  was  
one  that,  because  of  the  clubs’ rapidly  changing circumstance, and the uncertainty, 
made rational decision-making unrealistic, as argued by Sminia (2009) but, one that still 
required an immediate response, as contended by Mintzberg (1973).  There was little 
time, as put forward by Bailey and Johnson (1991), for pursuing a strategy of adjustments 
or incremental change.  With no history of dealing with such an uncertain, threatening 
environment, as found by Dean and Shaftman, (1993), clubs, in line with Eisenhardt’s 
(1997)  recommendations,  had  to  make  speedy  decisions  flexible  enough  to   permit  
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adaption.  A closer examination of the claims found that senior figures were in a ‘no-win’ 
situation: damned by stakeholders if they were perceived as taking no action, as at 
Newbridge (6.3), and damned if they were perceived as taking the ‘wrong’ action, as at 
Llanelli (6.5). Conversations with stakeholders at that time found that members, in 
particular, were more than content not to be involved with the decision-making, contrary 
to their involvement that was recommended by Freeman (2000), and adopted the ‘nothing 
to do with me, guv’ attitude. Nonetheless, they were quick to point out, subsequently, that 
the officers of the club had been elected to make the ‘right’ decisions, even though, as 
proposed by Schrader et al (1989), their skill of strategic decision-making was limited or 
even non-existent.  It was established that the decision-makers, who were in contrasting 
positions of power at each club  (6.2.1;6.3.1;6.5.1)  had no previous experience of dealing 
with such a crisis, and not one of the clubs had implemented Hale et al’s (2006) 
recommendation of having a crisis management team.  It had been maintained by Paton 
and Cornforth (1992), that in NPOs, leaders might not have business experience, and in 
two out of the three research clubs that was found to be the case on the IoP (6.6). 
It was highlighted by respondents that luck and timing, as contended by Eisenhardt and 
Zbracki (1992), had played its part in the selection of each decision-maker. The 
conclusion reached was that, whether or not it was considered ‘good’ luck, at Ebbw Vale 
(6.2.3), and at Llanelli (6.5.1), or ‘bad’ luck at Newbridge (6.3.1), circumstances, fortune, 
had inadvertently played a major part in influencing clubs’ strategy and the subsequent 
outcomes.  Facing an unprecedented event, some of the senior figures, were still expected 
by stakeholders to make the ‘right’ decision for the survival and future of their clubs.  The 
decision-makers’ actions were in line with the findings of Byers and Slack (2001) who 
found that, because of rapidly changing circumstances, the actions taken were via 
immediate response decisions. However, at variance with their findings that decisions 
were ‘adaptive but not strategically oriented’, was that Ebbw Vale (6.2.1) had made 
decisions placing their strategic goal of continuing in Premier Division Rugby, as their 
top priority, as recommended by Pfeffer and Slack (2003).   
Remarkably, there was no-individual within two of the three clubs, Ebbw Vale being the 
exception, with the necessary critical financial experience to overcome these unique 
difficulties as proposed by Gorton(1999). With limited financial resources in an uncertain 
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changing environment, decision-makers were stuck between following the considered 
‘sensible’ course of waiting until they acquired the necessary funding, or alternatively, 
securing their players immediately through signing contracts by gambling on finding a 
financial backer in the near future (Hoye et al, 2009).  Clubs were really between a rock 
and a hard place, and decision makers were faced with taking unprecedented, practical, 
and financial, decisions in an uncertain, dynamic environment, 
as established by Smith and Williams (1999). 
Desperate to raise the vital life providing funds, the clubs did seek backers with financial 
clout (6.2.1; 6.3.2; 6.5.3); however, on such an important and delicate issue, and contrary 
to Freeman’s (2000) contention, stakeholders said they were not consulted.  Nevertheless, 
when the question of alternative action to survive in the Premier Division was raised, very 
few stakeholders at the three clubs had been prepared to offer any other solutions.    
The decisions made, and the actions taken, by all the clubs were intended to meet, as 
Beaver (2003) argued, the most basic of organisational goals, that of ensuring survival.  
A significant inference, from the research surrounding the IoP, was that the approach to 
the strategy process, pursued and directed by individuals, varied in each of the research 
clubs. 
8.3.2.2     Outcome 
Previous research by Eisenhardt (1989) had found that fast decision-making was 
positively related to performance in a dynamic environment. In this study, the playing 
outcome for each club 1995-2000 is ‘a matter of record’ (Appendix 4.5), following each 
club’s speedy decisions taken (6.2.3; 6.3.3; 6.5.3), as recommended by Hale et al (2006). 
The alternative courses of action open to the clubs were limited, as contended by Harris 
and Jenkins (2001).  Their decisions revolved around resource availability; it was a 
chicken and egg scenario, choosing the financial resource before playing resources, or 
simply acquiring players before the necessary finance.  All clubs were chasing the same 
scarce resources, high finance and quality players.   
The ‘shock’ of the IoP, had affected the three comparable Welsh rugby clubs in different 
ways. None of them subsequently made a profit. Two clubs did survive in the Premier 
Division,  and  those  two  did  change  their  legal  status; so the  outcomes at Ebbw Vale 
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(Table 8.3.6) and Llanelli (Table 8.3.8), supported Pearson and Clair’s (1998) assertion 
that the social-political perspective suggests that crisis management is unlikely to be 
successful without a reformation of organizational leadership and culture.   
So in answering the question did the ‘ends justify the means’, one could always debate 
an alternative ‘what if’ scenario.  However, there is little concrete evidence to support the 
view that pursuing a different path would have ensured the same outcome, that of 
survival.  Nevertheless, in resolving the crisis, and achieving their main goal outcome of 
survival, the clubs created conditions that resulted in further constraint to their overall 
degree of strategic freedom, as contended by McCarthy and Leavy (2000).   
8.3.2.3     Context 
The IoP, initiated by the iRB, and its aftermath was consistent with Ansoff’s (1988) 
dimensions of a ‘shock’ event, and was a critical strategic event both for the Game and 
the clubs.  The three research clubs (6.1) agreed that the IoP was a major ‘shock’, basically 
because of the speed of change.  The findings (6.1) established that no club in Wales was 
prepared for such a sudden change to the core value of the Game in spite of the warning 
from the WRU to the IRB in July 1995, coupled with the earlier changes to the amateur 
regulations (Appendix 2.23).  It was argued by Covin (1991), that employing greater 
strategic vision could possibly prepare firms for any future changes, in this case the 
transformation to the core value of the rugby union Game.  Throughout the rugby 
‘industry’, the warning issued by Kallenberg and Leicht (1991), concerning the adoption 
of a single measure of performance (playing results each season, especially winning 
outcomes), was ignored.   Such a single measurement would not reflect a club’s ability to 
either cope with any ‘shock’ event, or even to survive its impact in the long term.  
Within the internal context, the clubs’ committee structures and decision-making 
processes, aligned with Fredrickson’s (1986) view that organisations with similar 
dominant structures were likely to make strategic decisions using a similar process.  These 
processes did not change until after the first full season of professionalism (6.2).  Contrary 
to the findings of Brouthers et al (1998), but supporting the results of Eisenhardt and 
Zbracki (1992), politics and power did influence decision-making in Welsh rugby clubs 
surrounding the IoP.  Although the IRB had pronounced the Game ‘Open’ meaning that 
financial  payment  was  allowed  ‘but  not  compulsory’,  the  future  performances,  and 
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existence, of the clubs were now very dependent on the quality of decisions made by the 
senior figure, as claimed by Atherton (2003). Clubs, like small firms, were, due to the 
IoP, now faced with managing limited and scarce resources as maintained by Gibson and 
Cassar (2002). To acquire the scarce resources, the study findings supported those of 
Matthews and Scott (1995), that the IoP did push the clubs towards immediate,short term 
decision-making.  It was evident from the study that the context, professionalism, in 
which clubs operated had strongly influenced the way in which their strategies had 
developed, thus concurring with Pettigrew’s (1985) research on a firm’s environment. 
8.3.2.4     The Influences on Performance 
A timeline for each club from 1988 to 2000 can be found in figures 8.3.1, 8.3.2, and 8.3.3. 
Whilst the clubs’ characteristics, pre-1995, were confirmed as those of a nonprofit 
organisation (Table 2.2), following the IoP, clubs showed planning characteristics similar 
to those of small businesses (Table 2.3). Rugby clubs tended to focus on operational 
planning that had short term goals, similar to small organisations (Tables 8.3.1; 8.3.2).   
A comparison of SM within each club was conducted via Stone and Crittenden’s (1993) 
framework (Tables 8.3.9, 8.3.10). In common with the findings of Mount et al (1993), the 
clubs had not wished to optimise profits or follow a growth strategy, but all wished, as 
Porter (1996) contended, to outperform rivals and to improve performance.  
As proposed by Szymanski (2003), the single most influential benchmark was found to 
be victory over rival competitors. Within the rugby industry, it was acknowledged that 
playing performance (utility maximization) was considered more important than financial 
results (profit maximization) (Hoye et al, 2009), and that performance implications could 
be outdated within weeks or months, as contended by Schrader et al (1989).  Regarding 
the goals set by clubs post-1995, significantly playing performance was still a priority, 
despite the IoP. The goals displayed respectively by the three clubs revealed a marked 
difference in each club’s ‘confidence’ that extended throughout the first five years of 
professionalism.  The elements considered by Storey (1994) that affected small business 
performance produced a mixed bag of findings (Tables 8.3.6, 8.3.7, and 8.3.8).  No 
association was found between age, size, and legal form, influencing club performance; 
but, importantly, location, management, environment, finance and planning were found 
to have influenced decisions taken at each of the clubs that had impacted on performance.  
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8.4     Conclusions 
The investigation into the strategy-making in Welsh rugby clubs, 1990-2000, via three 
distinct periods, provided rich data, an in-depth insight and detailed understanding of the 
process. It was established, via research into the history of each club (Appendix 3.4a; 
3.5a; 3.6a), that the decision-making officers of the clubs had been responsible for making 
strategy, that was influenced by politics, culture and the external environment. Through 
examining the first period, the last five years of amateurism (Chapter 5) it was concluded 
that the six dimensions of strategy development, proposed by Bailey et al (2000), had 
remained unaffected by the introduction of the first National League in 1990.  
It was also determined that the unexpected, and transformational IoP (Chapter 6), an 
enforced choice, was THE most influential dimension concerning decision-making and 
actions at the three research clubs for well over a century. The clubs had previously tried 
to pursue, and defend, a ‘maintain niche’ strategy but the IoP had coerced the clubs to 
pursue a ‘survival’ strategy essential for their continued existence.  However, each club 
employed different approaches to making, implementing, and achieving that strategy. 
The conclusions arising out of research into the post-1995 period (Chapter 7), was that 
the change in the Game’s core value, from amateur to professional, had generated the 
need for vital increased funding. This requirement lead to the introduction of a powerful 
individual, the financial backer, who immediately became the senior figure.  It was 
established that the new decision-maker’s arrival was responsible for the dramatic decline 
in the influence of politics and culture on strategy-making within each of the clubs.  
It was concluded that the strategy-making process, involving decisions, actions and 
outcomes, had been influenced by various dimensions, in different periods, throughout 
the research decade. (Tables 8.3.3; 8.3.4; 8.3.5).   
A considered opinion, from a very respected New Zealand captain, and Rhodes scholar, 
Chris Laidlaw (1973, p.126), offered a reason as to why the research clubs had been in 
existence for in excess of a hundred years, and had withstood the demands and 
problems posed by the unique, transformational decade; ‘In the Welsh environment the 
activities of the Rugby enthusiasts were interwoven with most other aspects of local 
life, and thus the club helps rugby to survive in Wales.’  
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8.5     Contribution to Knowledge 
The contribution to knowledge is made within the field of strategy development.  The 
recent assertion by Ghobadian and O’Regan (2011, p.423), that ‘there are very few cases 
that examine strategy, strategic decisions, and strategic management in not-for-profit 
organisations’, promotes the need for such a study.  This research concerning the 
strategy-making process, in the specific context of non-profit Welsh rugby clubs, 
involved the application of Bailey et al’s (2000) Six Dimensional model, Pettigrew’s 
(1988) model, and the acquisition of empirical evidence from a purposive sample of three 
rugby clubs. The major contributions are as follows; 
8.5.1   Fills a research gap in strategy-making in nonprofit organizations in general,  
           and in sport clubs in particular. 
 
This study sheds light on a group of sport NPOs in a new and interesting way, thus adding 
to the understanding and knowledge of strategy-making in NPOs.  This study builds on 
the research undertaken by Bailey et al (2000, p159), who advocated that ‘one area of 
research may seek to understand the relationship of strategy development processes to 
differing contexts’.  The major review and analysis of empirically based research on SM 
in NPOs, carried out by Stone et al (1999, p416), highlighted ‘major research questions 
raised by the analysis’. Those questions were concerned with strategy formulation, 
strategy content, strategy implement and performance in NPOs.  It would be impossible 
for one study to tackle such an exhaustive list, but this research’s contribution was to 
concentrate on examining, and advance understanding, theoretical and practical, in the 
following areas, 
 i)   The patterns of process in each club. 
 g)     ii)       The  role  of  managers  and  club  members  in  the  strategy- making  
h)                process, and revealing the critical personalities. 
 i)    iii)       Establishing if  managers within same club agree/disagree on the   
j)                pattern of process at work within the club? 
k)    iv)       Considering   all  alternative  explanations  of the process that resulted in   
l)                strategic action, and the features of context and action drove the process. 
                       iv)      v) How clubs measured  performance, and the intended  and unintended    
v)                  consequences of any revealed pattern of continuity and change?  
  
254 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT:   DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study supplements, and advances, academic knowledge on strategy theory in a 
previously little researched context, nonprofit Welsh rugby clubs, and offers additional 
evidence to the strategy – performance debate in a novel context.   
8.5.2       Makes a contribution to knowledge, and understanding of the strategy  
               development process, and decision-making, made prior to, during, and    
                following, a crisis in a NPO. 
To develop further knowledge on strategy making processes, Bailey and Johnson (1991, 
p37) encouraged researchers “to examine whether particular strategic issues are dealt 
with in similar or dissimilar manners across organisations”.  The study took advantage 
of such a unique event to make a contribution to the research gaps that existed, by 
providing a conceptual clarification (8.3) on, 
 The roles of goals in the decision-making process in NPOs surrounding a crisis 
(6.2.2; 6.3.2; 6.5.2). 
 The type of strategic decisions taken during a crisis, planned or emergent (6.2.1; 
6.3.1; 6.5.1), 
 The comparability of the strategy-making process in each club during a crisis 
(6.6.1). 
The knowledge and theoretical insight acquired via the important ‘coal face’ accounts of 
the strategy development process, and decision-making, during a common sector ‘crisis’, 
adds to, and provides a fresh understanding of, crisis management in NPOs.  In addition, 
by focusing on the interactions between actors and context, strategy as practice, the 
‘micro’ study contributes to the understanding of the performance of strategic work by 
individuals in a unique context. 
8.5.3      Contribute through findings that situate historically the clubs’ actions and   
               outcomes during a turbulent period, and key ‘turning points’, for the Welsh  
               rugby industry. 
The research time-frame embraces a very significant, unique transformation period in 
Welsh rugby history (Smith and Williams, 1999). The introduction of the first ever 
National League structure in 1990, and the unprecedented transition of the Game’s core 
value, from that of amateur to being ‘open’, professional, in 1995, can never happen 
again, hence the importance of evaluating, and documenting, its impact. 
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8.5.4      Methodological Contribution 
The study makes the following methodological contributions to knowledge. 
Firstly, the research provided empirical support for Bailey et al’s (2000) theoretical 
instrument on strategy development, whose noteworthy contribution to the literature on 
strategy-making was extended in to the field of non-profit, sport organisations, especially 
rugby union.   The dimensions of the instrument aligned themselves with the issues raised 
by stakeholders in conversations (Section 4.5.5).  The instrument permitted examination 
into the questions posed of whether or not strategic issues/events were dealt with in a 
similar or dissimilar manner within the clubs, whether managers within the same club 
agreed or disagreed on the patterns of processes at work within their club, and whether 
this perception differed across managerial groups.  Secondly, no previous longitudinal 
study using this qualitative methodology, 'insider accounts’ from multiple club levels, 
linking in-depth, semi-structured interviews, conversations, and direct observation, 
within a case study approach, had been found in this research context. The privileged 
access granted to the researcher because of my history and biography was significant, and 
a real strength in enhancing the trustworthiness of the study, in acquiring the in-depth, 
detailed data given by the respondents, and stakeholders, which permitted the actions and 
outcomes of each club to be enumerated.   
Secondly, employing a multi-method approach, Pettigrew’s (1988) model, combining 
multiple ‘insider accounts’, ‘shock event’, and the ‘CIT’, the study contributes to 
methodological development for examining a crisis in small, sport NPOs.  This 
combination facilitated the recording for posterity, of the monumental change to the core 
value of the Game, from amateurism to professionalism. The respondents and 
stakeholders interviewed and spoken to, had experienced the spontaneous change and 
thus offered the research the benefit of their individual perceptions of the unexpected, 
critical event.  
Lastly, the study takes account of the perceptions, and behaviour, of different managerial 
levels of internal respondents, along with the views of external respondents, within the 
distinctive nature of the small, nonprofit organisation’s context, process and content. The 
study therefore contributes to knowledge by employing a data collection process from 
multiple levels within an organisation to enable the adoption of a comparative approach  
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on performance related case studies (high and low), that has been previously unused in 
the context of understanding strategy-making in small, nonprofit, rugby organisations. 
8.6      Implications  
 
In light of the discussion initiated in the previous chapter, a number of interesting 
implications can be extracted for the findings summarised above, particularly for 
practising managers; “the main reason managers should pay attention to scholarly 
research is that actions based on sound evidence trump those based on intuition” (Sutton, 
2004 p.27). 
 
8.6.1     Research. 
This study has identified both theory and research gaps in the strategy-making process in 
the nonprofit management literature.  In addition, the researcher acknowledges the 
encouragement for future research given via the recommendations within the studies of 
Bailey and Johnson (1991), Bailey et al (2000), Kearns and Scarpino (1996), and 
Ghobadian and O’Regan (2011).  The findings of this study have contributed in a small 
way by unearthing some of the missing knowledge.   The emphasis of nonprofit amateur 
rugby clubs was on OP, rather than SP, findings which adds fuel to those critics of ‘fits- 
all’ SP.   A planning approach, identified and understood by decision-makers in clubs to 
be ‘SP’, was only employed when necessary, not continually.  The rugby clubs’ unique 
mission, goals, values, strong culture, politics and their accountability to a wide range of 
stakeholders, revealed a theoretical difference from those business organisations seeking 
profit. Such differences, therefore, undermined the advocated use in the literature of 
established strategic tools and techniques in nonprofit organisations; and even during the 
first five years of professionalism, where clubs were considered to be small businesses, 
few actually employed acknowledged business tools and techniques.  Thus caution and 
deeper understanding is required by researchers, of the specific internal and external 
context of dissimilar organisations, when attempting to develop feasible theoretical SM 
models and conceptual frameworks aimed at encompassing all organisations.   
8.6.2     Rugby Clubs 
Rugby union football has a predetermined annual cycle, which has influenced clubs 
towards  a  short-term  focus  that  has  been  based  upon  a  playing  performance (utility 
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maximization) that was considered to be more important than financial results (profit 
maximization). However, since the IoP, clubs have been faced with a realisation that 
short-term seasonal sporting success, and long term survival, both require considerable 
financial investment.  Clubs have to balance conflicting on-field and off-field goals and 
objectives. Whilst the lack of formal approaches to strategy-making does not represent a 
major difficulty, the requirement that club decision-makers have the necessary  business 
experience, commercial skills and strategic vision has become paramount in the 
professional era.  The days of the club members electing volunteer amateur 
committeemen, and officers, being totally responsible for the inputs and outputs of a 
rugby club are seriously threatened.   
Due to a more competitive environment, both on- and off- the field of play, rugby clubs 
need to closely examine, and understand, the potential influence of culture and politics 
on future developments and direction. Professionalism has affected not only the senior 
clubs, but clubs at all levels within Welsh rugby. The stark choice facing many smaller 
clubs is to continue struggling to meet the financial demands of mercenary players, or to 
return to the amateur fold as a community club. The inability to attract a large financial 
backer, means clubs will have to consider acquiring finance by diversifying into social, 
commercial, and other community activities. In order to survive, clubs’ decision-makers 
should be aware not only of the military approach to strategy, but also the biological 
version, Darwin’s natural selection theory, where only the fittest species adapt, and 
survive, the changing environment. 
8.6.3     Governing Bodies. 
The narratives of the respondents highlighted the general critical view of the governing 
bodies held by club stakeholders. Both the IRB and the WRU had not strategically 
planned for the change to the core value of amateurism, and it could be argued that the 
lack of any strategy by the governing bodies not only had major implications for all clubs, 
but also weakened rugby union’s position in the competitive global sports arena.   In 
Wales, as in most other countries, rugby clubs are not cash rich.   Expecting players (or 
their new agent) not to put a high value on their heads sounded as if the IRB were harping  
back to the 19th century self-funded ‘gentleman’ players with their amateur standards.  
Emerging countries like Argentina, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Namibia and Romania have lost 
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their role-models, their top players, to high paying countries like England, France, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.  There is still disagreement in those cash poor 
rugby countries as to whether or not the Game in those nations have actually benefitted 
from the IoP.   
Rugby’s governing bodies, especially the WRU, failed to ensure that all member clubs 
had the necessary resources, skills and abilities to implement the changes that they 
instigated and inflicted on clubs.  Even in 1997, the WRU did not have a strategic plan, 
which spoke volumes of the governance by Welsh rugby’s ruling body. The governing 
bodies in other sports should learn the lessons from rugby union football, of introducing 
such fundamental structural change to a game without discussion, by forewarning, and 
offering appropriate, specific preparatory training programmes to all its members. 
8.7       Limitations of Research and the Need for Further Investigation. 
Whilst this study achieved its research objectives, there are several limitations within the 
research design and method.  For instance, the study was undertaken on small, nonprofit, 
sporting organisations within a single sport industry.  The sample of organisations was 
considered as undersized to perform a statistical analysis, whilst the data collected was 
restricted to three ‘First Class’ clubs, out of a possible eighteen, at the senior end of Welsh 
rugby.  The number of respondents, twenty- seven, might be criticised for being too small 
for such an in-depth study.  Had findings established widely differing views amongst 
respondents, it is accepted that the selected number would have proved problematic and 
would have been a cause for concern.   It is acknowledged that, whilst the achievement 
from the clubs and respondents is in-depth, the study is lacking in the breadth required 
for comparability with other organisations in different sectors.  Nonetheless, the study 
was designed to discover, and then present, rich and deep findings rather than to claim 
universal application, and so qualitative accounts and unconfirmed relationships have 
been described.  
The specific methodology, because of the small sample, resulted in the research passing 
up the generalisation offered by large quantitative studies. These in-depth findings from 
Welsh clubs are informative and need to be tested, via further investigations, within other 
Six Nations  countries,  and  possibly  Southern Hemisphere  countries, to consider if any 
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important disparities occur, to ascertain an explanation for the disparities, and the 
implications for research in this subject area. Due to the subjective nature of the 
interpretive research method employed, caution should be used when considering the 
findings of this study.  Therefore, decisive conclusions on the nature of the strategy-
making process in rugby clubs are not possible to be applied to all nonprofit, sporting 
organisations. With respect to research into small enterprises, Curran and Blackburn 
(2001, p.7), stated that, 
“there are no perfect, unchallengeable outcomes from research on 
SMEs (or any other business phenomena).....but the findings from any 
research are never more than provisional if only because the real world 
is constantly changing". 
This study’s contribution, focusing on a small sample of three sporting NPOs, should also 
be located within the framework of the “real world constantly changing”. 
It was in the recognised background of larger (for profit) business organisations that many 
existing theories and research had originated, and as pointed out in the summary to 
Chapter Two, the literature centred on strategy and SM was enormous. When this research 
into this specific sporting sector originated, knowledge concerning strategy-making in 
this particular non-profit environment was limited.  However, the paucity of empirical 
research undertaken indicates that any study that can contribute to producing "hard" 
evidence about strategy-making should be of benefit to both the non-profit and sporting 
sector literature. This would support the recent observations by Ghobadian and O’Regan 
(2011), that there is a need for case studies in NPOs to examine all aspects surrounding 
strategy. 
From the start of the investigation through to its completion, academic journals and 
university websites were regularly searched for any newly published work linked to the 
research questions.   In spite of a regular search pattern, no fresh academic research in the 
area in which this study was concentrated, was found.  Although Adcroft and Teckman 
(2008, p.622) had highlighted that, “Most management research is context-specific”, as 
far as could be determined, this particular sector in Wales had not benefitted from further 
empirical examination throughout the duration of the study.  It is appreciated, therefore, 
that the research study, and the findings put forward in this thesis, are not wide- ranging, 
but actually are intended to offer an  informative  insight into the  nature of this  complex 
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subject in a non-profit, sporting context.  Nonetheless, owing to its holistic, contextual 
approach, and comparative case study method, this research can make assertions about 
the veracity of its findings that might be considered to provide the groundwork for 
additional research. 
Emerging from the thesis, consideration could be given to pursuing a number of different 
research directions such as decision-making, strategy-making, strategy implementation 
and crisis management in nonprofit and sporting organisations. However, the potential 
topic areas summarized above represent direct challenges.  This on-going research could 
offer empirical data that might ultimately lead to the progression of a theory on strategy-
making processes that particularly tackles the requirements of sporting organisations, 
both non-profit and for-profit. 
8.8       Final Remarks 
As a researcher (and especially as a referee), it is to be expected that other individuals 
will review, and then either support, or challenge, the findings and interpretations of this 
study. Nonetheless, as Adcroft et al (2007, p4) stated, 
“At the end of the day, management research is about the search for 
some kind of truth... Whether it is our or someone else’s truth, whether 
that truth is real or imagined, if it raises debate it will always have some 
value”   
It now seems a lifetime ago, back in 1995, that many passionate Welsh rugby supporters,  
including myself, had serious concerns relating to “How would amateur clubs approach, 
and cope with, the demands of the new professional era?’  The evidence presented in this 
thesis has attempted to offer an answer to that question and, in doing so, has provided the 
foundation, and themes, for fellow researchers to develop. 
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TABLE 8.3.1 Cross Case Analysis: Comparison  
                        of Components of Planning       
                        Practices and  Sophistication  
                        in Small Firms, 1990– 2000. 
                  (Bracker and Pearson, 1986) 
 
                     
             Club 
 
Component 
 
Ebbw 
Vale 
1990/95 
 
Ebbw  
Vale 
1995/97 
 
Ebbw 
Vale 
1997/00 
  
Newbridge 
1990/95 
 
Newbridge 
1995/98 
 
 
Newbridge 
1998/00 
 
Objective 
Setting 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Environment 
Analysis 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
SWOT 
Analysis 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Strategy 
Formulation 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Financial 
Projections 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Functional 
Budgets 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Operating 
Performance 
Measures 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Control  
(FSA) 
Corrective 
Procedures 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
No 
 
No 
 
No 
        
 
Unstructured 
Plans 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
  
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Intuitive  
Plans  
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Structured 
Operational 
Plans 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
  
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Structured  
Strategic 
Plans 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
  
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
                    KEY  Changes to Components of Planning Practices and Sophistication 
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TABLE 8.3.2  Components of Planning Practices          
                         & Sophistication 1990 - 2000 
                                                   (Bracker and Pearson, 1986) 
 
                    
                     Club 
Component 
 
Llanelli 
1990/95 
 
Llanelli 
1995/97 
 
Llanelli 
1997/2000 
Objective 
Setting 
Yes Yes Yes 
Environment 
Analysis 
Yes Yes Yes 
SWOT 
Analysis 
Yes Yes Yes 
Strategy 
Formulation 
Yes Yes Yes 
Financial 
Projections 
Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Budgets Yes Yes Yes 
Operating 
Performance 
Measures 
Yes Yes Yes 
Control  (FSA) 
Corrective 
Procedures 
No Yes Yes 
    
Unstructured  
Plans 
No No No 
Intuitive  
Plans  
No Yes No 
Structured 
Operation  
Plans 
No No No 
Structured  
Strategic  
Plans 
Yes No Yes 
 
Key  Changes to Components of Planning Practices  
and Sophistication 
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    TABLE 8.3.3  Comparison of Ebbw Vale’s Six Dimensions 
                            of Strategy Development, 1990 – 2000.    
                                                (Bailey et al. 2000) 
 
 
             
          Years 
Dimension 
1990 to 1995 
 
1995 to 1997 
 
1997 to 2000 
 
Command 
(Senior 
Figure(s). 
 
 
Chairman, Vice, 
Secretary, Treasurer 
 
President Paul Russell 
plus committee 
 
Financial Backers 
Paul & Marcus 
Russell 
Planning 
(Formal) 
Informal Plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meeting 
Informal Plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meeting 
Minutes of Board 
meetings.  
Budgets produced. 
 
Incremental 
(Emergent    
  Planning) 
 
Approach adopted 
when necessary 
 
Approach adopted 
when necessary 
 
Approach adopted 
when necessary 
 
Political 
Influences 
 
Politics divided 
committee and 
influenced strategy 
 
Little Politics 
 
None that influenced 
strategy. 
 
Cultural 
Influences 
 
Culture influenced 
strategy 
 
Culture influenced 
strategy 
 
Some influence on 
strategy but does not 
hold back club. 
 
Enforced 
Choice 
(External 
Influences) 
 
Stable Playing 
Environment,  
Loss of major 
industries 
influenced strategy 
 
Turbulent Playing 
Environment  
WRU;  
Council;  
Location, influenced 
strategy 
 
Turbulent Playing 
Environment  
WRU;  
Council;  
Location, influenced 
strategy 
 
Strategy 
 
 
 
Niche 
Do Nothing 
 
Niche 
Survival.  
Resource Based 
Strategy. 
 
Niche 
Survival. 
Consolidation. 
Resource Based 
Strategy 
 
 
           KEY  Change to Element or Performance Measurement 
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TABLE 8.3.4 Comparison of Newbridge Six Dimensions  
                        of Strategy Development, 1990 -2000.   
                                                     (Bailey et al. 2000) 
 
                                        
          Years 
Dimension 
1990 to 1995 
 
1995 to 1998 
 
1998 to 2000 
 
Command 
(Senior 
Figure(s). 
 
Chairman, Vice, 
Secretary, Treasurer 
 
Chairman, Vice, 
Secretary, Treasurer 
 
Financial Backer and 
Chairman; Idris 
McCarthey 
 
Planning 
(Formal) 
 
Informal Plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meeting 
 
Informal Plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meeting 
 
Informal Plans 
recorded in minutes 
of six man 
committee meeting  
Budgets produced 
 
 
Incremental 
(Emergent    
  Planning) 
 
Approach adopted 
when necessary 
 
Approach adopted 
when necessary 
 
Approach adopted 
when necessary 
 
Political 
Influences 
 
Little Politics Strong 
committee defeated 
other factions. 
 
Politics within club 
and committee during 
this period 
 
None that influenced 
strategy 
 
Cultural 
Influences 
 
Culture influenced 
strategy 
 
Culture influenced 
strategy 
 
Culture did NOT  
influence strategy 
 
Enforced 
Choice 
(External 
Influences) 
 
Stable Playing 
Environment,  
Loss of major 
industries 
Influenced strategy 
 
Turbulent Playing  
Environment  
WRU,  
Council,  
Location Influenced 
Strategy 
 
Turbulent Playing  
Environment  
WRU,  
Council,  
Location Influenced 
Strategy 
 
Strategy 
 
 
 
Niche 
Stability/  
Do Nothing/ 
Consolidate 
 
Niche 
Survival/ 
Consolidation. 
 
Niche 
Do Nothing/ 
Consolidation. 
 
                 KEY  Change Over Study Period to the Six Dimensions.  
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TABLE 8.3.5    Comparison of Llanelli’s Six Dimensions  
                           of Strategy Development, 1990-2000 
                                                                  (Bailey et al, 2000) 
 
                   
          Years 
Dimension 
1990 to 1995 1995 to 1997 1997 to 2000 
Command 
(senior 
Figure(s) 
Chairman then 
Committee 
Chairman then 
Committee  
Huw Evans, Backer. 
Stuart Gallacher, CEO 
Gareth Jenkins, Coach 
The Board 
Planning 
(Formal) 
Informal Plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meeting 
Informal Plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meeting 
Minutes of Board 
meetings. Budgets 
produced. 
 
Incremental 
(Emergent) 
 
Approach adopted 
when necessary 
Approach adopted 
when necessary 
Approach adopted 
when necessary 
 
Political 
Influences 
 
Small Committee 
kept politics at bay 
 
Small Committee 
kept politics at bay. 
Some politics within 
Club  
 
No politics due to HE.   
No influence on 
strategy. 
 
Cultural 
Influences 
 
 
Club’s Culture & 
History  influenced 
strategy 
 
Club’s Culture & 
History  influenced 
strategy 
 
Culture did not hold 
back change. 
 
Enforced 
Choice 
(External 
Factors) 
 
Stable Playing 
Environment,  
Planned Season 
Loss of major 
industries 
influenced  strategy 
 
Turbulent  Operating 
Environment 
WRU,  
Other Club Owners 
influenced strategy 
 
Turbulent Operating 
Environment. 
WRU,  
Other Club Owners 
influenced strategy 
Strategy 
 
Niche 
Growth/ 
Consolidation 
Niche 
Survival 
Niche 
Survival/ 
Consolidation 
 
                       KEY  Change Over Study Period to the Six Dimensions. 
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TABLE 8.3.6   Comparison of Ebbw Vale’s Elements and  
                        Measurements of  Performance, 1990 – 2000 
                                                  (Storey, 1994:  Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986) 
 
             
            Years 
Elements 
 
1990 to 1995 
 
1995 to 1997 
 
 
1997 to 2000 
 
Age 
 
1880 
 
1880 
 
1997 
Size 
 
Council owned 
ground 
Council owned 
ground 
Council owned 
ground.  
 
Location 
 
North Gwent Valley 
 
North Gwent Valley 
 
North Gwent Valley 
Legal Form Members Club Members Club Limited Company 
 
Management 
 
Officers of Club with 
Committee 
 
Paul Russell with 
Committee 
 
Paul+Marcus Russell 
with Board of 
Directors 
 
Planning 
 
 
Informal Plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meetings 
 
Informal Plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meetings 
 
Informal Plans in 
minutes of meetings. 
Financial Plans 
 
Environment 
 
 
 
Stable Playing 
Environment. 
Loss of major 
industries 
 
Turbulent Playing 
Environment. 
Loss of major 
industries 
 
Turbulent Playing 
Environment. 
No major industries 
in area 
    
Finance / 
Financial 
Performance 
Profitable  
Funding from 
Supporters. 
Non Profitable. 
Funding from 
National League.  
Non profitable 
Funding from WRU, 
backers, sponsors   
Playing 
Performance 
2nd Div, club for 5 yrs  
Playing perform 
NOT a priority. 
Affected by politics 
Club 1st Div for  2 yrs  
Playing perform a 
priority. 
North Gwent recruits 
Club 1st Div for 3 yrs 
Playing perform a 
priority. 
North Gwent recruits 
Organisation 
Effectiveness 
No F/T staff to do 
community work. 
Club gave town an 
identity. 
Club looked after 
players welfare 
 
No F/T staff to do 
community work. 
Club gave town an 
identity. 
Club looked after 
players welfare 
F/T staff did 
community work. 
Club gave town an 
identity. 
Club looked after 
players welfare 
 
       KEY  Change Over Study Period to Element or Performance Measurement 
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 TABLE 8.3.7   Comparison of Newbridge’s Elements and 
                         Measurements of Performance, 1990 – 2000 
                                          (Storey, 1994:  Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986) 
 
                              
            Years 
Elements 
1990 to 1995 1995 to 1998 1998 to 2000 
 
Age 
 
1888 
 
1888 
 
1888 
Size 
 
Council owned 
ground 
Council owned 
ground 
Council owned 
ground 
 
Location 
 
North Gwent Valley 
 
North Gwent Valley 
 
North Gwent Valley 
 
Legal Form 
 
Members Club 
 
Members Club 
 
Members Club 
 
Management 
 
Officers of club with 
Committee 
 
Officers of club with 
Committee 
 
Idris McCathey,  plus 
committee six membs 
Planning 
 
Informal plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meeting 
Informal plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meeting 
Informal plans 
recorded in minutes 
of meeting 
 
Environment 
 
 
 
Stable playing 
environment. Decline 
of major industries. 
 
Turbulent playing 
environment. Decline 
of major industries. 
 
Turbulent playing 
environment.  
Decline of major 
industries. 
    
Finance / 
Financial 
Performance 
Finance not priority 
Profits for 5 years 
No Fin. Planning 
Rec’d Sponsorship 
Finance not priority 
No Profits over 2 yrs  
No Fin. Budgets 
 
Finance not priority 
No Profits over 3 yrs  
Financial Budgets 
Limited funding 
Playing 
Performance 
 
 
Playing Performance 
was priority. 
1st Div Club for 5 yrs   
Local players 
Playing Performance 
was priority. 
1st Div Club for 2 yrs 
Lower Div. players 
from far & wide. 
Playing Performance 
was priority. 
2nd  Div Club for 3 
yrs  Players who 
wanted to play for 
club. 
Organisation 
Effectiveness 
No F/T staff to do 
community work. 
Club gave town an 
identity. 
Club looked after 
players welfare 
No F/T staff to do 
community work. 
Club gave town an 
identity. 
Club looked after 
players welfare 
No F/T staff to do 
community work. 
Club gave town an 
identity.   
Club looked after 
players welfare  
 
                  KEY  Change to Element or Performance Measurement 
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TABLE 8.3.8     Comparison of Llanelli’s Elements and 
                       Measurements of Performance, 1990 – 2000 
                                          (Storey, 1994:  Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986) 
              
              Years 
Element 
1990 to 1995 
 
1995 to 1998 
 
1998 to 2000 
Age 1872 1872 1998 
 
Size 
 
Club Owned Ground 
 
Club Owned Ground 
 
WRU Owned Ground 
Location Urban Town Urban Town Urban Town 
Legal Form 
 
Members Club 
 
Members Club 
 
Limited Company 
Management 
Chairman with Small 
Committee 
Chairman with Small 
Committee  
Board of Directors 
Planning 
 
Informal plans 
recorded in minutes 
of committee 
meetings 
Informal plans 
recorded in minutes 
of committee 
meetings 
Informal plans 
recorded in minutes 
of Board meetings 
Environment 
 
 
Stable playing 
environment. Decline 
of major industries. 
Turbulent playing 
environment. Decline 
of major industries. 
Turbulent playing 
environment. Decline 
of major industries. 
    
 
Finance / 
Financial 
Performance 
 
Profits made 5 yrs. 
No financial budgets  
Finance was not 
priority 
 
No profit made 3 yrs 
Financial budgets. 
Finance was not 
priority 
 
No profit made 2 yrs 
Financial plans but 
financial difficulties. 
Finance 2nd  priority 
 
Playing 
Performance 
 
 
 
Playing was priority. 
1st Div. club for 5 yrs 
League title once 
Cup winners 3 times 
 
Playing was priority. 
1st Div. club for 3 yrs  
Club mid table. 
Cup winners once. 
 
Playing still priority. 
1st Div. club for 2 yrs 
League title once. 
Cup Winners once  
 
Organisation 
Effectiveness  
 
 
No F/T staff to do 
community work. 
Other orgs in area 
used facilities.   
Club looked after 
players welfare 
 
F/T players did 
community work. 
Club gave global 
identity to town. 
Club looked after 
players’ welfare. 
 
F/T players did 
community work.  
Club gave global 
identity to town. 
Club looked after 
players welfare.  
 
                  KEY  Change to Element or Performance Measurement 
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Table 8.3.9   Cross-Case Comparison within the Framework for the Analysis of Strategic Management  
                                                                                 as at September 1990 
(Stone and Crittenden, 1993) 
 
                                               
                                              Club 
Research Category 
Ebbw Vale Newbridge 
 
Llanelli 
Strategy Formulation     
Mission Rugby Orientated Rugby Orientated  Rugby Orientated 
Goals Not Clear Remain in Top Division  Win National League and Cup 
Strategy Initiators Divided Committee Committee  Coach with Committee 
Information Use Competitor Analysis Use Competitor Analysis  Use Competitor Analysis 
Contingencies Environment influences 
planning 
Environment influences 
planning 
 Environment influences 
planning 
Process Formalization Informal and sporadic Informal and sporadic  Informal and sporadic 
Strategy Content     
Typologies Competitive and Co-operative  Competitive and Co-operative   Competitive and Co-operative  
Contingencies Resource Availability Resource Availability  Resource Availability 
Strategy Implementation     
Communication Goals not understood by all 
stakeholders 
Goals not understood by all 
stakeholders 
 Goals not understood by all 
stakeholders 
Structure Structure determines strategy Structure determines strategy  Structure determines strategy 
Contingencies Steelworks/WRU influence  WRU influence  Council/WRU Influence 
Club Performance Playing Results Playing Results  Playing Results 
Governance President, chairman and 
committee influences strategy 
Chairman and committee 
influences strategy 
 Committee looks to coach to 
determine strategy 
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Table 8.3.10       Cross-Case Comparison within the Framework for the Analysis of Strategic Management  
                                                                                as at September 1995 
(Stone and Crittenden, 1993) 
 
                                               
                                              Club 
Research Category 
Ebbw Vale Newbridge 
 
Llanelli 
Strategy Formulation     
Mission Rugby Orientated Rugby Orientated  Rugby Orientated 
Goals Remain in Top Division Remain in Top Division  Win National League and Cup 
Strategy Initiators Paul Russell, President Committee  Coach with Committee 
Information Use SWOT, PEST and 
Competitor Analysis 
Use Competitor Analysis  Use Competitor Analysis 
Contingencies Environment influences 
planning 
Environment influences 
planning 
 Environment influences 
planning 
Process Formalization Rational Informal and sporadic  Informal and sporadic 
Strategy Content     
Typologies Competitive and Co-operative  Competitive and Co-operative   Competitive and Co-operative  
Contingencies Resource Availability Resource Availability  Resource Availability 
Strategy Implementation     
Communication Goals understood by all 
stakeholders 
Goals not understood by all 
stakeholders 
 Goals not understood by all 
stakeholders 
Structure Structure determines strategy Structure determines strategy  Structure determines strategy 
Contingencies WRU influence  WRU influence  Council/WRU Influence 
Club Performance Playing Results Playing Results  Playing Results 
Governance President’s  business training 
influences strategy 
Chairman and committee 
influences strategy 
 Committee looks to coach to 
determine strategy 
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Table 8.3.11   Cross-Case Comparison within the Framework for the Analysis of Strategic Management 
                                                                                      as at May 2000 
(Stone and Crittenden, 1993) 
 
 
                                            Club 
Research Category 
Ebbw Vale Newbridge 
 
Llanelli 
Strategy Formulation     
Mission Rugby Business Rugby Orientated  Rugby Business 
Goals Remain in Top Division 
Get into Europe 
Promotion to Top Division  Win ERC Heineken Cup 
Strategy Initiators Board of Directors Executive Committee  Board of Directors with coach 
Information Use SWOT, PEST and 
Competitor Analysis 
Use SWOT, PEST and 
Competitor Analysis 
 Use SWOT, PEST and 
Competitor Analysis 
Contingencies Owners Business Knowledge:   
WRU 
Owners Business Knowledge:   
WRU 
 Owners Business Knowledge:   
WRU 
Process Formalization Rational Informal and sporadic  Informal and sporadic 
Strategy Content     
Typologies Competitive and Co-operative  Competitive and Co-operative   Competitive and Co-operative  
Contingencies Resource Availability Resource Availability  Resource Availability 
Strategy Implementation     
Communication Goals understood by all 
stakeholders 
Goals understood by all 
stakeholders 
 Goals  understood by all 
stakeholders 
Structure Structure determines strategy Structure determines strategy  Structure determines strategy 
Contingencies Council/WRU influence  WRU influence  Club Owners/WRU Influence 
Club Performance Playing Results Playing Results  Playing Results 
Governance Owners business training 
influences strategy 
Owner’s business training and 
culture influences strategy 
 Board looks to coach to guide/ 
determine strategy 
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Figure 8.3.1    EBBW VALE RFC TIMELINE  1988 – 2000 
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Figure 8.3.2     NEWBRIDGE RFC TIMELINE  1988 – 2000 
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Figure 8.3.3       LLANELLI RFC TIMELINE  1988 – 2000 
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Appendix 1.1a 
                             Curriculum Vitae 
Name Clive Norling 
  
Age 63 years                            Date of Birth:    5th April 1950 
  
Address 50, Smiths Road 
 Birchgrove 
 Swansea 
Post Code SA7 9DY 
  
Tel & Fax 01792-815983 (home)       E-mail:  big_refcn@yahoo.co.uk 
  
QUALIFICATIONS  
Academic  
1974 B.A. Business Studies (CNAA) Portsmouth Polytechnic 
1993 P.G.C.E.  (University of Wales) 
1995 MSc. in Entrepreneurial Studies, Stirling University 
1996 TDLB 32, 33, 34 & 36.  Swansea Institute of HE. 
1997 to date PhD Research; Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University 
  
Professional  
1979 Diploma of Finance Houses                                             (FHD) 
1983(Ass) 1993(F) 
Up to 2008 
Fellow of Institute of Financial Accountants.                  (FFA) 
1984 up to 2008 Member of British Institute of Management                   (MBIM) 
1985 up to 2008 Member of Chartered Institute of Marketing                  (MCIM) 
1987 Associate of Chartered Building Societies Institute*      (ACBSI) 
1992 up to 2008 Associate of Chartered Institute of Bankers*  (Merged) (ACIB) 
1994 to date Member of Chartered Institute of Personnel & Development   
(MCIPD) 
  
EMPLOYMENT  
1998 – 2003 Director of Referees, Welsh Rugby Union, Cardiff 
1993 – 1998 Principal Lecturer in Business, Swansea Institute of H.E. 
1986 – 1993 Senior Lecturer in Business Policy & Marketing,  S.I.H.E. 
1983 – 1986 District Manager, Gateway Building Society, Swansea 
1982 – 1983 Senior New Business Executive, NWS Ltd, Swansea 
1976 – 1982 New Business Executive, UDT Ltd, Swansea 
1975 – 1976 Assistant Cost Accountant, BSC, Port Talbot 
1974 – 1975 Credit Controller, TRW Ltd, Resolven, Neath 
1986 to date Small Business consultant 
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                                          Appendix 1.1a 
          
   Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
Work Experience (Six month placement as requirement of BA Degree) 
1973 Finance Department, TRW Ltd, Resolven, Neath 
1972 Finance Department, Parkinson Cowan Ltd, Blackburn 
1971       Finance Department, British Petroleum Ltd, Kent 
1970 Stores Department, British Petroleum, Llandarcy, Neath 
 
Rugby Career 
Clubs/Organisations  
Since 1968 Neath Athletic RFC:                    Life Member 
1987 -2012 
Since 2012                             
Birchgrove RFC;                         Vice-President 
Birchgrove RFC                          President 
Since 1993 West District Referees Society:  Life Member 
Since 2010 Glamorgan County RFC;            Honorary Vice-President 
Since 2011 
Since 2012 
Ospreys Referees Society            President. 
Welsh Society R. U. Referees     Life Member 
    
Playing Career  
1959 – 1961 Alderman Davies Primary School 1st XV, Neath 
1961 – 1969 Neath Grammar School 1st XV 
1968 – 1969 Neath Athletic Colts XV 
1969 – 1972 Portsmouth Polytechnic RFC 1st XV 
1972 – 1974 Neath Athletic 2nd XV 
  
Refereeing Career  
1967 -  1992 Refereed over 1,050 games, including 35 Internationals 
1967 – 1969 Neath & District Refs Society/ West District Refs Society 
1969 Qualified as a WRU Referee 
1969 – 1974 Hampshire Referees Society. Left on RFU A1 List (Top 9). 
1974 – 1992 WRU Listed Referee 
1977 – 1992 WRU International Referee   (35 Tests) 
1987 Referee at 1st Rugby World Cup in New Zealand. 
  
Coaching Career  
1973 Assistant Coach, Havant RFC, Hampshire 
1975 Qualified as WRU Coach 
1977 – 1978 Coach, Neath Athletic RFC 
1992 – 1994 Director of Rugby, Bridgend RFC 
1975 to date Assisted many schools, youth, clubs in Wales & globally 
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Rugby Administration 
Appendix 1.1a 
1972 – 1974 Hon. Secretary, Portsmouth Polytechnic RFC 
1975 – 1986 Committee Member, Neath Athletic RFC 
1982 – 1986 Hon. Treasurer, Neath Athletic RFC 
1992 – 1994 Director of Rugby, Bridgend RFC 
1996 -  199 Member of the WRU Forum 
1997 – 1998 National Representative on WRU General Committee 
1997 – 1998 Vice-Chairman, WRU Referee Affairs Sub-Committee 
1998 – 2003 Director of Referees, WRU 
  
Referee 
Administration 
 
1976 – 1996 Member of WSRUR Laws Committee 
1985 – 1990 Hon. Secretary, WSRUR Laws Committee 
1990 – 1993 Chairman, WSRUR Laws Committee 
1996 – 1998 Chairman, WSRUR Laws & Technical Committee 
1977 to date Committee Member West District Referees Society 
1984 – 1997 Hon. Treasurer, West District Referees Society 
1994 – 2003 WRU Referee Advisor 
1975 – 2003 Referee Coach on WRU Referees Beginner Course 
2010 to date M.O. Trainer to Neath & District Referees Society 
2009 to date Referee consultant to individual Welsh Referees 
 
Other Rugby Aspects 
The  Press  
1980 to date Various newspaper articles e.g. The Times, Western Mail, etc.  
1995 – 1997 Weekly Rugby Columnist for South Wales Evening Post,  
(Saturday Sports Edition). 
  
Journals/Magazines  
1978 to date Contributor to Rugby World Magazine 
1978 – 1984 Contributor to Rugby Wales Magazine 
1984-1986 Contributor to Welsh Rugby Magazine 
1981 Contributor to American Rugby Magazine 
1990 Contributor to WRU Dragons Annual 
1991 Contributor to ITV Rugby World Cup Magazine 
1995 Contributor to South African Airways RWC In-Flight Magazine.   
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Books 
 
1983 Contributor to The Principles of Rugby Football; ISBN 0047960671 
1985 Co-author of Rugby Union Laws;           ISBN 0720716225 
1986 Contributor to Rugby Wales ’87:            ISBN 0715406817 
1989 Contributor to Rugby Union Yearbook: ISBN 1852270128 
1990 Contributor to Giants of Post War Welsh Rugby: ISBN 0951657003 
1991 Contributor to Rugby World Cup 1991. ISBN 009174882X 
2009 Contributor to Best of the Best:              ISBN 09781848511033 
 
Television 
 
1975 – 1992 Appearing as Referee for Games throughout the world 
1978 to date Contributions to various rugby programmes, BBC, HTV & NZ. 
1978 Wore microphone for Japanese TV,  (Japan v England) 
1988 Wore microphone for HTV;   (Llandovery v Abertillery) 
1989 Wore microphone for BBC;  (Bath v Toulon) 
1989 – 1990 BBC Rugby Special;  Weekly section on Laws 
1989 Wore 1st microphone for New Zealand TV;  ( NZ v Argentina) 
1991 Commentator for ITV coverage of Rugby World Cup 
1994/95 Commentator for Chrysalis TV coverage of Welsh Premiership 
1995 Commentator for ITV coverage of Rugby World Cup 
  
Radio  
1978 to date Various broadcast with BBC Wales,  BBC,   
1990 Autobiography on Radio Auckland, NZ 
2009 Programme with BBC Radio Wales on Depression   
(Finalist in Best Radio Programme, 2009). 
  
Conference Talks  
1975 – 2003 Lecturer at WRU Referees Beginner Course, Aberavon/Cardiff 
1976 Speaker, Staffordshire Coaching Conference 
1978 Keynote Speaker, RFU International Congress, Twickenham 
1979 Keynote Speaker, JRFU Referees Conference, Japan 
1980 
Keynote Speaker  WRU Centenary International Conference for 
Coaches/Referees in Cardiff 
1980 Keynote Speaker. IRFU Coaching Conference, Dublin 
1980 Contributor, FFR Senior Referees Conference, Paris 
1981 Speaker, Wellington Referees Course, New Zealand 
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                  Appendix 1.1b 
Researcher’s  Rugby Background 
   
History and biography are essentially connected to the lenses through which individuals’ 
view the world, and due to the fact that I am a living archive of the decade which the research 
covers, it is important at the outset of the study for the reader to understand my biographical 
background.  Although the research project commenced in January 1997, my ‘unofficial’ 
analyse of rugby clubs in Wales extends back well before that start date. Since 1959 my 
participation in Welsh rugby has been as a player, referee, coach and administrator (Appendix 
1.1). My working connection with strategic management has been for over thirty years.  
From September 1967 to September 1992 my involvement with rugby was mainly as a 
referee. Due to a back injury, I had to give up all refereeing in September 1992 after fifteen 
years at International level, and some twenty five years with the whistle in total.  During that 
quarter of a century, I was visiting clubs every Saturday, and sometimes mid-week, during 
the rugby season. Through pre- and post-match informal conversations, I got to know players 
and committees exceptionally well, not only throughout Wales but beyond. My opening 
question was mostly “Is this a rugby club or a business”?  Stakeholders were always eager to 
engage with conversations around this topic out of which arose rich data on the raison d’être, 
of the club; decision-making on and off the field and internal and external influences on the 
club that included politics, culture, WRU, local councils.  Club performances it seemed, 
depended upon many variables; quality of playing resources, skills, abilities and attitude; the 
opposition’s related strengths and weaknesses; the style of play of both teams, running or 
kicking, fifteen-man or nine- man orientated; the importance of game, league, cup, local 
derby, friendly; the referee; ground conditions, firm; muddy, even if the field had long or 
short grass;  weather conditions, dry, raining, windy; the list of factors influencing the result 
of a game was long. But the information collected from stakeholders enhanced my 
knowledge of both the playing and management side of each club.  Therefore my long, active 
experience with rugby plus all the knowledge I had gained about the sport, the clubs and the 
individuals involved, could be seen as an advantage to my research (Robson, 2002). This is 
discussed further in Chapter Four.  
Premier Club Experience 
At the time I stopped refereeing in 1992, I was offered the part-time position of Director of 
Rugby at Premier Division club, Bridgend RFC. The club were second from bottom of the 
Premier Division and were facing the real prospect of relegation from the top tier of Welsh 
Rugby. Before accepting the position, I asked a senior committeeman, who is an experienced 
businessman, and who had once been captain of the club, his views on the decision-making 
process within the committee. 
 “The committee consists of 38 people" he said. "some are elected 
annually, and others are life members. All decisions are made by the 
committee. But let me give you an example of their priorities in decision-
making”.  
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                        Appendix 1.1b 
Rugby Background 
“Last season at one meeting, item 5 concerned dogs getting onto the 
playing area and fouling the pitch. The dogs were getting into the ground 
via an entrance that had no gate on it. The answer appeared simple. Just 
put a gate on the entrance to prevent the dogs from entering the ground.   
It was eventually agreed to put a gate on the entrance but this item was 
discussed for well over an hour because every committeeman knew and 
wanted to speak about dog shit!  
Item 6 concerned finance, spending £600,000 on a clubhouse extension. 
This was agreed in about thirty seconds flat! Does that give you an in-sight 
into the customary level of decision-making by the committee?"  
 
As my full-time occupation remained as Principal Lecturer in Business at Swansea Institute 
of Higher Education, one of my first courses of action as Director of Rugby was to get the 
80 final year BA Business Studies students taking the strategic management module to 
undertake a strategic audit on the club. It was not surprising when reading their reports that 
the weaknesses of the organization far outweighed the strengths (See Appendix   ). The 
strategic audit identified poor decision-making, no formal planning, weak financial 
management, too large a committee, poor use of resources, plus other concerns. Using this 
information I was one of a small management working party that succeeded in reducing the 
committee from thirty-eight people to only seven (with much opposition) by the time I made 
my post redundant and left the club in 1994. This foray with a Premier club, playing in a 
National League with promotion and relegation had, unexpectedly, afforded me an invaluable 
insight into all aspects of a senior club in Wales. With the knowledge gained in rugby, and 
management, from my limited experience as Director of Rugby, I stated  correctly, in national 
newspapers in 1993, that within  three years the IRB would have made the Game ‘open’ and 
also that there would be established a European Competition involving the top 4/5 Clubs 
from all the Five Nations.  In July 1997, I was elected as a National Representative to the 
General Committee of the Welsh Rugby Union, the governing body of rugby in Wales. My 
first request was to obtain a copy of the WRU’s Strategic Plan and Organization Chart but I 
was informed that, despite being in existence since 1881, the Union had never produced a 
strategic plan!  Although I was only on the Committee for nine months (due to taking up the 
paid position of Director of Referees with the same organisation) it afforded me invaluable 
experience into the way the Game was governed in Wales.  
 
In March 1998, I accepted the full-time position of Director of Referees at the WRU.   For 
just over five years, until June 2003, I was responsible for all match officials throughout 
Wales.    The job allowed me to visit clubs throughout the Principality on a regular basis.     
Sadly, the stress and conflict of the position, caused me to have a nervous breakdown and 
severe clinical depression in January 2004, which lasted for nearly seven years. 
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                                                                                                                    Appendix 2.1 
                                       Selected Definitions of Strategic Management. 
                                (Adapted from Nag et al, 2007) 
 
Author       Definition 
Learned et al. (1965)  [This definition is of business policy, the precursor of 
strategic management.] ‘Policy is the study of the functions 
and responsibilities of general management and the problems 
which affect the character and success of the total enterprise’ 
 
Schendel and Hofer (1979)  ‘Strategic management is a process that deals with the 
entrepreneurial work of the organization, with organizational 
renewal and growth, and, more particularly, with developing 
and utilizing the strategy which is to guide the organization’s 
operations’ 
 
Bracker (1980)  ‘Strategic management entails the analysis of internal and 
external environments of firms to maximize the utilization of 
resources in relation to objectives’ 
 
Van Cauwenbergh and  ‘Strategic   management   deals   with   the  formulation and 
Cool ( 1982)                            aspect (policy) and the implementation aspects (organization) 
of calculated behavior in new situations and is the basis for 
future administration when repetition of circumstances occur’      
  
Teece (1990)  ‘Strategic management can be defined as the formulation, 
implementation, and evaluation of managerial actions that 
enhance the value of a business enterprise’ 
 
Rumelt, Schendel,  ‘Strategic management is about the direction of  
and Teece (1994)             organizations, most often, business firms. It includes those subjects 
of primary concern to senior management, or to anyone 
seeking reasons for success and failure among organizations’ 
 
Bowman, Singh, and  ‘The strategic   management   field   can  be  conceptualized 
Thomas (2002)   as one centered on problems relating to the creation and 
sustainability of competitive advantage, or the pursuit of 
rents’. 
 
Hoye, Smith, Nicholson ‘Strategic    management    involves    the    analysis    of an        
Stewart and Westerbeek         organization’s  position   in  the  competitive environment, 
(2009)    the determination of its direction and goals, the selection of  
an appropriate strategy and the leveraging of its distinctive 
assets’. 
 
Ghobadian and Regan ‘Strategy is not something we have, it is something we do and 
(2011)   have to keep doing in order to support and grow a successful 
business or organization. Strategy is a continuous 
evolutionary process rather than an outcome or end point’. 
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                                                                                                                                                                 Appendix 2.2 
                       Selected Strategy Development Process Frameworks 
(Adapted from Feurer and Chaharbaghi, 1995: p18). 
  
Bourgeois 
Brodwin 
 
  
Mintzberg, 
Waters 
  
Mintzberg 
        
 Commander 
Change 
Cultural 
Collaborative 
Crescive 
 
 Entrepreneurial 
Planned 
Ideological 
Umbrella 
Process 
Consensus 
 Plan 
Position 
Ploy 
Perspective 
Pattern 
        
   Unconnected 
Imposed 
    
 
Nonaka 
  
 
Hart 
  
 
Idenburg 
 
  
 
Bailey et al 
       Deductive 
Compressive 
Inductive 
 Command 
Symbolic 
Rational 
Transactive 
Generative 
 Rational planning 
Logical 
incremental 
Guided learning 
Emergent 
 Command 
Planning 
Incremental 
Political 
Cultural 
Enforced Choice 
 Grandori 
 
Optimizing 
Satisficing 
Incremental 
Cybernetic 
Random 
 Chaffee 
 
Linear 
Adaptive 
Interpretive 
 Ansoff 
 
Systematic 
Ad Hoc 
Reactive 
Organic 
        
 
  1984                      1985                            1987                      1988                       1992                       1993                           2000 
                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                 
                                                      
 
 
        
TIME  
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                                                                                                Appendix 2.3 
 
                    Categorizing the Strategy-Making Process Typologies 
                                            Themes from the Literature         
     Hart (1992, p.331). 
 
Rationality 
Citation Comprehensive Bounded Vision Involvement 
Allison 
(1971) 
Rational 
 
Organizational 
Bureaucratic 
  
Mintzberg 
(1973, 1978) 
 
Entrepreneurial; 
Planning 
Adaptive 
  
Nutt (1981, 
1984) 
 
Normative: 
Bureaucratic 
 
 
Behavioural; 
Group; 
Adaptive 
  
 
Bourgeois & 
Brodwin 
(1984) 
Commander; 
Change 
Collaborative Cultural Crescive 
 
Grandori 
(1984) 
Optimizing 
 
Satisficing; 
Incremental 
Cybernetic Random 
 
Chaffee 
(1985) 
Linear Adaptive 
Interpretive 
 
 
Shrivastava 
& Grant 
(1985) 
 
Managerial 
autocracy; 
Systematic 
bureaucracy 
 
Adaptive 
planning 
 
Political 
expediency 
 
Mintzberg & 
Waters 
(1985) 
 
Entrepreneurial; 
Planned 
Process; 
Consensus 
Ideological; 
Umbrella 
Unconnected; 
Imposed 
 
 
Ansoff 
(1987) 
 
Systematic 
 
Ad Hoc; 
Reactive 
 
Organic 
Mintzberg 
(1987a) 
 
Plan;   Ploy;  
Position 
 
Pattern Perspective 
 
 
Nonaka 
(1988) 
Deductive 
  
Inductive; 
Compressive 
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                                                                                                    Appendix 2.4      
Strategic Planning Levels. 
(Bracker and Pearson, 1986, p.507) 
 
Types of Planning: 
Please indicate which of the following type of planning can be attributed presently to your club. 
 
Structured Strategic Plans  
(SSP) 
 
 
Formalized, written, long-term plans covering the  
process of determining major outside interests focused 
on the club;  
 
expectations of dominant inside interests;  
 
information about past, current and future 
performance;  
 
environmental analysis;  
 
determination of strengths and weaknesses of the club 
and feedback;  
 
typically the plan is 3-15 years in nature. 
 
Structured Operational Plans 
(SOP) 
 
 
Written short-term operation budgets and plans of  
action for a financial period.  
 
The typical plan of action would include basic output  
controls such as cost constraints, production quotas  
and personnel requirements. 
 
Intuitive Plans  
(IP) 
 
 
These informal plans are developed and implemented 
based on the intuition and experience of the owner of 
the club.  
 
They are not written and are stored in the memory of 
the club’s owner.  
 
They are of a short-term duration, no longer than one  
year in nature.  
 
They depend on objectives of the owner and the firm’s 
present environment. 
 
Unstructured Plans  
(UP) 
 
 
No measurable structured  planning in the firm. 
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                        A Resource-Based Approach to Strategy Analysis: 
                                              A Practical Framework. 
                                                           (Grant, 1991) 
 
4.  Select a strategy which best 
exploits the firm’s resources and 
capabilities relative to external 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
  Strategy 
 
 
      
 
3. Appraise the rent-generating 
potential of resources and 
capabilities in terms of: 
(a) their potential for sustainable 
competitive advantage, and 
(b) the appropriability of their 
returns. 
 
 
 
 
    Competitive 
            Advantage 
4. Identify resource 
gaps which need to 
be filled. 
      Invest in  
      replenishing,         
      augmenting and    
      upgrading the  
      firm’s resource  
      base. 
 
 
              
 
2. Identify the firm’s capabilities: 
What can the firm do more 
effectively than its rivals? Identify 
the resources inputs to each 
capability, and the complexity of 
each capability. 
 
 
 
 
    Capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
 
1. Identify and classify the firm’s 
resources. Appraise strengths and 
weaknesses relative to competitors. 
Identify opportunities for better 
utilization of resources. 
 
 
      Resources 
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                                                                                                               Appendix 2.6 
 
 
                  A Summary Model of the Elements of Strategic Management. 
                                                                       (Johnson and Scholes, 1988)  
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                                                                                                                    Appendix 2.7  
 
Summary of Strategic Decision-Making Patterns 
(Collated by Liberman-Yaconi et al, 2010) 
 
 
 
Rational 
 
Bounded Rational Intuitive 
• Comprehensive 
• Perfect information 
• Systematic 
• Step-by-step 
• Logical, analytical 
• Linear 
• Phasic 
• Utility maximization 
• One optimal solution 
 
 
• Bounded by time and 
resources 
• Limited ability to be 
comprehensive 
• Incomplete information 
• Incremental 
• Non-linear and iterative 
• Complex, inter-related 
combination of steps 
• Utility maximization 
not always ultimate goal 
• Accept an alternative 
that is “good enough,” 
“satisficing” 
 
• Sudden, ready insight 
• “Gut feeling” 
• Seemingly independent 
of empirical knowledge 
• Absence of analysis or 
formulae 
• No conscious 
deliberation 
• Automatic 
• Random guessing 
• Thoughts, conclusions, 
or choices produced by 
subconscious mental 
processes 
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                                                                                                                            Appendix 2.8 
                   Characteristics of Six Dimensions of Strategy Development 
(Bailey, Johnson and Daniels (2000) 
 
Command 
 
 
 
 
A particular individual is seen to have a high degree of control over the 
strategy followed: for example the chief executive or a similar figure with 
institutionalised authority. Less commonly, such influence may relate to 
the power of a small group of individuals at the top of the organisation. 
Control and influence may be exercised in different ways for example 
through personality, the rigid enactment of rules or through expertise. 
Alternatively, strategic aspirations and strategy may emerge from a vision 
associated with the powerful individual(s), which represents the desired 
future state of the organisation 
Bennis and Nanus 
(1985) 
Shrivastava and  
Nachman (1989) 
Westley and  
Mintzberg (1989) 
Kotter (1990) 
Hayward and  
Hambrick (1997) 
Planning 
An intentional process involving a logical, sequential, analytic and 
deliberate set of procedures. The organisation and its environment are 
systematically analysed. Strategic options are generated and 
systematically evaluated. Based on this assessment, the option is chosen 
that is judged to maximise the value of outcomes in relation to 
organisation goals. The selected plan option is subsequently detailed in 
the form of precise implementation plans, and systems for monitoring and 
controlling the strategy are determined. There is an assumption here that 
strategy is developed by top executives and implemented by those below. 
Ansoff (1965) 
Mintzberg (1978) 
Steiner (1969) 
Argenti (1980) 
Rowe, Dickel,  
Mason and  
Snyder (1994) 
Incremental 
Strategic choice takes place through ‘successive limited operations’. 
Strategic goals and objectives of the organisation and not likely to be 
precise but general in nature. The uncertainty of the environment is 
accepted and as such managers are not able to know how it will change: 
rather they attempt to be sensitive to it through constant scanning and 
evaluation. Commitment to a strategic option may be tentative and subject 
to review in the early stages of development. 
Lindblom (1959) 
Mintzberg et al  
(1976) 
Quinn (1980) 
Quinn (1982) 
Johnson (1988) 
 
Political 
Organisations are political arenas in which decision-making and strategy 
development is a political matter. Differences amongst stakeholders are 
resolved through bargaining, negotiation and compromise. Coalitions may 
form to pursue shared objectives and to sponsor different strategic 
options. The level of influence these stakeholders are able to exercise is 
conditional upon the organisation’s dependency upon such groups for 
resources. Further information is not politically neutral, but rather is a 
source of power for those who control it. 
Cyert  &  
March (1963) 
Hinings et al 
(1974) 
Pfeffer and  
Salancik (1978) 
Feldman (1986) 
Hickson et al(1986) 
Cultural 
Strategy is influenced by taken for granted frames of reference shared 
amongst organisational members. These frames of reference help to 
simplify the complexity of situations, provide a ready-made interpretation 
of new situations, enable decisions to be made in a way which makes 
contextual sense and provides a guide to appropriate behaviour. Their 
usefulness increases as situations become more ambiguous and the 
efficiency of formal decision-making processes decreases. These frames 
of references are underpinned by routines, rituals, stories and other 
symbolic artefacts which represent and reinforce the organisational 
activities and provide a repertoire for action: but are in turn likely to be 
resistant to change. 
Weick (1979) 
Deal and  
Kennedy (1982) 
Schon (1983) 
Gioia and  
Poole (1984) 
Trice and  
Beyer (1985) 
Johnson (1987) 
Spender (1989) 
Enforced 
Choice 
Factors in the environment encourage the adoption of organisational 
structures and activities which best fit that environment. These external 
constraints may take the form of regulative coercion, competitive or 
economic pressures or normative pressures as to what constitutes 
legitimate organisational action. These pressures limit the role 
organisational members’ play in the choice of strategy. So the strategies 
an organisational can follow tend to be common to organisations within 
their industrial sector or organisational field; with changes coming about 
through variations in organisations’ processes and systems which may 
occur unintentionally or through imperfect imitation of successful 
structures, systems or processes. 
Aldrich (1979) 
DiMaggio and  
Powell (1983) 
Hannan and  
Freeman (1989) 
Deephouse (1996) 
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                                                                                                                           Appendix 2.9 
 
 
 
              Criteria for Effective Strategies. 
                       (Thompson, 2001, p532) 
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                                                                                                                  Appendix 2.10 
 
 
              Testing the Quality of Your Strategy. 
                   (Hambrick and Fredrickson, 2005) 
 
Key Evaluation Criteria 
 
1.   Does your strategy fit with what’s going on in the environment? 
             Is there healthy profit potential where you’re headed? 
             Does your strategy align with the key success factors of your chosen      
             environment? 
 
 
2.   Does your strategy exploit your key resources? 
             With your particular mix of resources, does this strategy give you a              
             good head start on competitors? 
             Can you pursue this strategy more economically than competitors? 
 
3.   Will your envisioned differentiators be sustainable? 
             Will competitors have difficulty matching you? 
             If not, does your strategy explicitly include a ceaseless regimen of   
             innovation and opportunity creation? 
 
4.   Are the elements of your strategy internally consistent? 
             Have you made choices of arenas, vehicles, differentiators, and staging        
             and economic logic? 
             Do they all fit and mutually reinforce each other? 
 
5.   Do you have enough resources to pursue this strategy? 
             Do you have the money, managerial time and talent, and other   
             capabilities to do all you envision? 
             Are you sure you’re not spreading your resources too thinly, only to be  
             left with a collection of feeble positions? 
 
6.   Is your strategy implementable? 
  Will your key constituencies allow you to pursue this strategy?   
  Can your  organization make it through the transition?  
  Are you and your management able and willing to lead the required    
  change? 
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          Strategic Choices Matrix for Voluntary Nonprofit Organizations 
                                                             (Courtney, 2002, p.207/8) 
Strategy 
 
 
Client Group 
 
Services 
 
Geography 
 
Retrench 
 
Reduce, divest or close 
services to particular 
client group(s) 
Reduce, divest or close 
particular 
services/activities 
Reduce, divest or close 
services in a particular 
geographical area 
Reduce Costs 
Reduce costs of 
services to particular 
client group(s 
Reduce costs of 
particular service(s) 
Reduce costs of 
services in a particular 
area 
Maintain 
Continue services to 
existing client groups 
Continue existing 
services 
Continue services in 
existing areas 
Improve  
Quality 
 
Improve the quality of 
services to particular 
client group(s) 
Improve the quality of 
particular service(s) 
Improve the quality of 
services in particular 
area(s) 
Experiment 
Pilot service(s) to a 
new client 
Pilot new kind of 
service(s) 
Pilot service(s) in a 
new geographic area. 
Quantitative 
Expansion 
Increase the number of 
clients served 
Increase the extent of 
provision of particular 
service(s) 
Increase the provision 
of services in a 
particular area. 
Expand 
Boundary 
Extend the boundary 
of particular client 
group(s) 
Extend the amount of 
particular service(s) 
that is provided 
Extend the boundary 
of the geographical 
area covered. 
Change Strategy 
- switch to new 
related 
Switch services to a 
related client group 
Switch to delivering a 
related type of 
service/activity. 
Switch to delivering 
services in a related 
geographical area. 
Radical Change 
Strategy- switch  
to new unrelated 
Switch services to an 
unrelated client group 
Switch to delivering an 
unrelated type of 
service/activity. 
Switch to providing 
services in an 
unrelated area. 
Piggybacking 
 
Develop fee-earning 
service(s) to a 
particular customer 
group to earn income 
to subsidize other 
programmes 
Develop particular fee-
earning services to 
subsidize other 
activities. 
Develop fee-earning 
service(s) in a 
particular geographical 
area to subsidize other 
activities. 
Partnering 
 
Develop a closer 
partnership with 
another agency in 
relation to particular 
client group(s) 
Develop a closer 
partnership with 
another agency in 
relation to particular 
service(s) 
Develop a closer 
partnership with 
another agency in  
particular geographical 
area. 
Unrelated 
Expansion 
Expand to provide 
services to an 
unrelated client group 
Expand to provide 
unrelated types of 
services/activity 
Expand to provide 
services in unrelated 
area(s). 
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                                                                                                              Appendix 3.1  
                                  The Unique Features of Sport  
                             (Adapted from Paton and Cornforth, (1992)  Stewart and Smith, 1999). 
                              
Characteristics 
 
Nonprofit Organization 
 
For-Profit Organization 
Service/ 
Product 
 
Irrational Passions Rational Passions 
Judging 
Performance/ 
Goals 
Social Goals 
Winning Leagues/Cups. 
Stakeholders measure success by 
number of trophies at end-of-
season. 
Optimise Profits. 
 
Increasing wealth of owner(s) / 
shareholders. 
Interdependent 
Relationship 
Dependent upon competition.  
 
Defeat all competitors; aim for a 
monopoly. 
 
Competitive  
Behaviour 
 
 
Co-operation with rivals. 
Unpredictable outcomes best. 
 
 
Largest Market Share 
Predictable outcomes. 
 
 
Quality of  
Product/ 
Resources 
 
 
Uncertain outcomes 
 
Resource acquisition issues 
 
Guaranteed quality, reliability and 
consistency 
Regular Resource Supply 
 
Brand Loyalty 
 
Hard to substitute.  
Emotional and personal energy 
attachment 
 
 
Substitutes available 
 
Vicarious  
Identification 
 
 
 
 
Influences sports consumers. 
 
 
Businesses recognises the 
power of sporting identification by 
marketing their productions 
via sporting heroes 
 
Optimism 
 
 
 
High Degree despite team/ 
individual losses 
 
 
Consumer expects satisfaction at 
every purchase. 
 
 
New 
Technology 
 
 
Reluctant to accept.  
Resist change. 
 
 
Readily accepted.  
Gain USP in marketplace. 
 
 
Supply of  
Service/ 
Product 
 
 
Limited due to length of playing 
season. 
 
 
Readily available. 
Can increase production to meet 
demand anytime. 
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                  Stakeholder Expectations of Sport Organizations 
(Hoye et al, 2009) 
 
Stakeholder Type 
 
Expectations of Sport Organization 
 
            Members 
 
     Services and benefits 
     Overall Satisfaction 
 
 
            Fans 
    
 
     Game Quality and Excitement 
     High Win-Loss Ration 
 
 
            Players 
 
     On Field Success 
     Low Injury Rates 
     Appropriate Pay and Benefits 
 
 
          Community/Society 
 
     Civic Pride 
     Provides Role Model for Young Adults 
 
 
            Competitors 
 
     Fulfil Fixtures 
     Provide Quality Team as Opposition 
 
 
            Media 
 
     Mass Market 
     High Level of Public Interest 
 
 
            Owners/   
            Shareholders 
 
     Return on Investment 
     Public Recognition of Club  
 
 
            Employees 
 
     Appropriate Pay and Benefits 
     Job Security 
     Professional Development 
 
 
            Players Agents 
 
     High Player Morale 
     Payment of Market Rates 
 
 
            Sponsors 
 
     Positive Reputation of Club 
     Brand Awareness and Recognition 
 
 
            Equipment      
            Suppliers 
 
     Reliability of Demand 
     Player Endorsement 
     Brand Awareness 
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The Early Days of Rugby  
The origin of the game of Rugby Football Union is shrouded in mystery. Various arguments 
had been put forward that rugby football evolved from the early Romans  and  their  handling  
game  of  harpastum  (derived  from  a  Greek word meaning ‘to snatch’). The game was 
played between two teams who contested possession of a large ball in order to carry it forward 
to the opposition’s line similar to rugby football (Reason and James, 1979).  Nearer to home 
it was suggested that the Irish, with their native game of caid or the Welsh, playing cnapan, 
were the founders (Smith, 1999).  Cnapan was originally founded over 2,000 years ago in 
Pembrokeshire and consisted of handling and passing a ball, contested by two teams, 
sometimes made up of over a 1,000 players on each side.  Local village rivalry ensured that 
winning the game was the overriding objective (John, 1985). Researchers, such as Tranter 
(1998), Birley (1993), and Vamplew (1988), acknowledge that,   
‘For 2,000 years men in Britain, as well as in Brittany in northern France, 
had been playing a robust, free-for-all form of football, which involved 
kicking, running, hacking, mauling, wrestling, tackling, carrying, passing 
and doing whatever else was needed to get an inflated pig’s bladder from 
one designated goal to another, very often in different villages’  
(Cain, 1999, p.6). 
Any game played between two teams where a ball was central to the game, and whether or 
not it was kicked or handled, was commonly known as ‘Football’  (Morgan, 2003).  Whilst 
‘football’ was popular, and various forms of ‘folk football’ had been played throughout 
Britain, monarchs from the days of Edward II (1314) had tried to outlaw each form of the 
‘football’ game, because it was disorganised, very unruly and extremely violent.  The Shrove 
Tuesday game in Derby  was  an  example  of  a  mass  participation  carrying  game  where 
two neighbouring teams (villages) took part in a hard fought contest in which neither quarter 
was given nor expected in an often violent, hard fought game (hence the modern expression 
a ‘local derby’).  The game still exists today.      
The rules of ‘football’ were unwritten, highly localised, varied in every town, and most likely 
every village, and was based on customs and informal agreements (Johnes, 2005).  In  some  
places,  kicking  (the ball)  was seen as central to the game, in others it was carrying the ball. 
The one thing they had in common was the resemblance to a mass scrimmage which included 
extreme violence where everything was considered fair bar murder and manslaughter 
(Norridge, 2008). However, “there was no uniformity in football played before the second 
half of the nineteenth century” (Macrory, 1991, p.14). The elements of these games shaped 
the widespread tradition for every one of the current codes of football .
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that were moulded as a result of the shifting social, economic and political conditions caused 
by an ever more urbanised, organised and industrialized population  (Macrory, 1991).  Many 
followers of the handling code of football promote the colourful idea that the Rugby Football 
Game started at Rugby School in 1823 with a magical, mythical moment when it was alleged 
that a schoolboy, Williams Webb Ellis, ‘with a fine disregard for the rules of football as 
played in his time, first took the ball in his arms and ran with it.’ (Royds, 1949, pii).      
Over time there arose a disagreement between football participants who wanted a ‘kicking’ 
or ‘dribbling’ game as opposed to those who preferred a ‘handling’ game.  This inevitable, 
but natural, dispute came to a head on 26th October 1863 at the Freemasons Tavern, Lincoln’s 
Inn Fields, London.  Those eleven London clubs that wanted a ‘dribbling only’ game, no 
handling and definitely no ‘hacking’, formed the Football Association (Dunning and Shread, 
2005). In due course, in 1871, their opponents preferring to play under the ‘handling’ rules, 
established the Rugby Football Union. This division, concerning the approach to the old ‘folk 
football’ sport, determined the future of how the two global sports of association football and 
rugby union football should be played  (Cain, 1999). 
The Development of Rugby Football in Wales. 
Rugby football was a predominantly middle class game almost unknown in Wales before 
1850 (Boucher, 2000). It was the public schools in England that championed the new sport 
of ‘handling rugby’. And it was their former pupils, sons of rich and prosperous men, 
ingrained with the concept that playing was for fun and not material reward, who brought 
rugby in to Wales as teachers at Welsh schools. It was the Cambridge educated Rev. Rowland 
Williams who, on his appointment as Vice-Principal of St. David’s College, Lampeter in 
1850, introduced rugby into the Principality. During the 1850’s and 1860’s, the grammar 
schools from Cardigan to Chepstow, along with the public schools at Llandovery, Brecon, 
and Monmouth, ensured the rapid expansion of the still haphazard game (Birley, 1993).  On 
leaving school, these so called ‘middle-class old boys’ tended to comprise the core of the 
founder players of many Welsh clubs, so that by the mid- 1870s the handling game of rugby 
was already being embraced by the wider community as an important part of life.  
During the 1880s, Welsh rugby, and industrial towns, expanded rapidly as a result of the 
growth of the Welsh economy via the migration of people from rural areas to the iron and 
coal industries. Many of the over one million migrants between 1871 and 1911, came from 
the dominant rugby playing West Country (Williams, 1983). It was no surprise, therefore, 
that there was an upsurge in the popularity of rugby, particularly amongst the strong and 
tough working classes located in the mining and new industrial areas. In spite of playing on 
rough pitches built on parks, scrubland  and  mountainsides,  rugby  was  fast  becoming  the 
sport of the people and the basis of substantial physical and emotional reward for the  
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rough, but proud and highly localized male population (Johnes, 2005, p.1).  A new Wales 
was ready to embrace a new pastime, rugby football. Once established the game, which had 
been the privileged domain of public schoolboys, would become the communal winter, 
sporting obsession of most of South Wales, and eventually an esteemed source of national 
pride (Holt, 1989).  Kenneth O. Morgan, in his celebrated masterpiece, ‘Rebirth of a Nation’ 
(1981, p.25), observed that,   
 
“The eighties in Wales proved to be, more than any other region of Britain, 
a major turning-point in a special sense.  They provided the springboard 
for an age of national growth, dynamism and prosperity unknown since the 
union with England under the Tudors – and certainly without parallel 
since.  This industrial watershed brought enormous changes to the Welsh 
economic, social and environmental landscape”. 
The growing demands of industrialisation placed enormous time constraints on the conditions 
of employment of the working classes. At first, there was little time for sport, but by the late 
nineteenth century, the working week averaged fifty-four hours including the half day 
working on Saturday permitted leisure time to be extended (Vamplew, 1988). Coupled with 
the rise in disposable income, these changes allowed the urban working class to turn to sport 
and, in Wales, rugby in particular (Holt 1989). Sport became a part of urban working class 
life, along with pubs, chapels, and working-men’s institutions. In addition, due to the 
generosity and philanthropic approach of the local owners of these Welsh industries, many 
clubs were formed to provide sporting and social facilities for their workers.  ‘Caring’ owners 
had a self-interest and practical purpose in establishing rugby. It kept their workforce happy, 
loyal and fit for work, and give them something legal to keep their hands busy (Vamplew, 
1988). This emergence of a distinct philanthropic organisation form reflected the  owner’s 
dedication to a social principle. It could be argued that these benefactors of the newly formed 
rugby clubs, these increasingly mobile English gentlemen from the public schools, seeking 
their fortunes especially in Welsh mining and coal, proved to be the forerunners of the 
modern day entrepreneurial owner. Oxford educated, William   Neville,   inherited   the   
directorship   of   the Wern Engineering Works and founded the Llanelli  club in 1875. At 
the same time, the proprietors of the Mansel Tinplate Works in Port Talbot, Col. D. R. David 
and Sir Sydney H Byass, encouraged the formation of Aberavon RFC (Johnes, 2005).      
Clubs also emerged as a result of the working classes founding teams from streets, churches, 
villages and industrial works.  In Pontypool and district in the 1890s there were over fourteen 
neighbourhood teams formed by local miners and metalworkers. Larger areas like Swansea, 
Llanelli, and Newport also had many works and street teams.  
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The Rugby Club  
The number of clubs in membership with the WFU* were twenty-three in 1895, and more 
than doubled to fifty by 1900.  Many of the new community rugby clubs were established in 
the thriving industrial areas (Smith and Williams, 1980). They had become the centre of 
many village and parish environments, built around a strong sense of community and local   
identity by people who shared a passion for rugby, particularly those situated in the Welsh 
valleys (Harris, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the majority of newly established rugby clubs, existed in name only through a 
team of players representing the club. Clubs did not even own the necessary basic facilities. 
The ground was often a hired farmer’s field, with changing facilities and after-match 
hospitality being provided by the local public house.  Newbridge RFC, established in 1888, 
found that “the difficulty of obtaining a suitable ground and acceptable playing facilities, 
prevented the admission of the club to the Welsh Rugby Union until 1911” (Powell, 1988).     
Facilities for most valley clubs’ supporters were also very poor with only the principal clubs 
having enclosed grounds with grandstands and pavilions which allowed them to charge 
spectators watching their games. For example, at Llanelli in 1881, admission was 6p, 
working-class 3p, and ladies allowed in free. Season tickets were 5s to ground, 10s 6d to 
ground and pavilion (Smith and Williams, 1980, p.9).  
The ‘intangible’ rugby club became a powerful focal point of community life in many towns 
and villages offering a sense of civic pride, self-esteem and identity to all its members and 
supporters. The club’s small, volunteer committee, made up of local people, had 
responsibilities which were mainly restricted to organising fixtures against other teams, 
ensuring that the match day organisation was undertaken without problems including 
marking the pitch and pumping up the match ball and importantly raising finance to fund the 
various club teams (Hoye, 2009). The main objective of the club was to achieve playing 
success (utility maximising) rather than profit maximising, and having enough money to 
achieve that objective and cover their running costs each season (Zimbalist, 2003). This 
committee structure, President, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer plus elected 
members,  and its ‘not-for-profits’ approach and remained the same in most clubs for well 
over 100 years. As such, it is questionable, with its nonprofit making approach, whether or 
not the rugby club could ever be seen as a ‘small business’ prior to 1995. Rather the club, 
which was based in a given locality, had probably been established by local workers and 
residents, and inevitably it was run and ‘owned’ co-operatively by its members who either 
played for, or supported the team. These days, such an organisation would be classified as a 
‘social enterprise’ (Spreckley, 1981). It took the introduction of professionalism to change 
‘historical’ attitudes in the majority of clubs, but still not all. 
 
*The Welsh Football Union was formed in 1881. The name changed   in 1934 to the Welsh Rugby Union. 
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The clubs in Wales, unlike the socially exclusive English clubs, attracted its playing and non-
playing members mainly from within the working class population in its locality. The team 
was made up of macho, competitive young men, eager to display their power, courage, 
stamina and fortitude, from the village or town who ‘had to pay club membership 
subscriptions if they wanted to play the sport’ (South Wales Daily News, 1880). Due to the 
numbers of spectators following the principal clubs by the mid-1880s, the clubs’ found 
themselves in a position to defray players’ expenses despite the amateur rules on such 
payments.   At this time, rugby football was considered to be a sport for players rather than 
spectators, reflected by the Laws and its amendments. Within each locality, competition was 
intense and winning against rivals was important and moreover, demanded by the community 
(Johnes, 2005). The public’s expectations of its team are summed up by the Llanelli County 
Guardian newspaper quote, telling players that their task was; 
 “not one of merely beating 15 picked men from each of the other teams in 
the Western District of South Wales. It means much more. It means 
vindicating the honour of Llanelli against her many detractors…It means 
raising her name and her fame amongst the towns. It tends to bring more 
trade, a more vigorous public spirit and a healthier social life. 
(Quoted in Richards, 2006, p.73).  
But whilst the village club aspired to win its local league and cup, the perceived glory was 
found in its players moving on to play for one of the recognised senior teams such as Llanelli, 
Swansea, Cardiff or Newport.  The ultimate honour was the village player being selected to 
play for his country and to appear on the International field wearing the red shirt of Wales.  
Former Welsh International and British Lion wing, Gerald Davies (1999, p.x ) who was born 
in the small village of Llansaint, Carmarthenshire and went to University under the local coal 
miners scholarship scheme, describes perfectly the unique feeling of a player’s first 
International cap*.    
 
 “He’s playing for Wales’. The words, as evocative now as they ever have 
been, first uttered as a modest whisper, grow into an almighty roar of back-
slapping acknowledgement of the great deed. And the village and the whole 
surrounding countryside echoes in glorious salute to the boy. The longing 
is made good. He will feel as one with the stars....the sport needs no 
mention at all. In Wales, it could be soccer. But it isn’t....To play for Wales, 
whatever the aficionados of the other games might think, can only mean 
Rugby Football”   
The demands and pressures on so-called ‘amateur’ players in the late 19th century, were 
further highlighted by William Wilkins, chairman of Llanelli (and future WRU Treasurer), 
at the club’s 1893/94  AGM.   
*The quote expresses exactly what I experienced on being appointed to my First International game as a Welsh referee 
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“Those (players) unwilling to devote the necessary time for training and 
preparing for a match are not required.  Players should be prepared to go 
in for strict training and remember that total abstinence is absolutely 
necessary.  The good of training is all thrown away if a player got drunk 
after a match.    Players need to attend the weekly players’ meeting on a 
Friday night so that the club would be better able to cope with their 
opponents”  
(Hughes, 1986, p.49).   
The players were competing, not individually but collectively, for a team identified by a 
geographical location, which thus evoked passion, emotional and vocal expression, 
communal pride and loyalty, and a sense of belonging and camaraderie not only amongst the 
players but also the local populace who supported and followed the team (Johnes, 2005). 
Being a team sport, supporters were attracted by the quality of the game (contest) and the 
uncertainty of the outcome. However, rugby clubs concentrated on the ‘niche’ market, its 
locality, because, 
 
“While demand for quality and uncertainty of outcome may play a role, 
fans tend to form attachments to particular teams, typically on the basis of 
geographic proximity, and to follow ‘their team’ almost regardless of the 
quality of the team or uncertainty of the outcome”   
(Szymanski, 2003,p.471). 
Players tended to spend their entire playing career with one club, with loyalty to the team, 
the club and the community, being an attribute taken for granted by most clubs and its 
steadfast supporters. However, players did sometimes move clubs because of incentives such 
as jobs being offered to attract those talented individuals to switch their ‘loyalties’.    What 
was regarded as a ‘heinous crime’ created such animosity that the player not only moved 
clubs but also had to inevitably move villages and often valleys (Harris, 2007).     This 
switching to rival clubs by players because of 'incentives', showed up the falsity of, and 
questioned, the entire ethos of amateurism.  The English ‘gentleman’, in particular, prided 
themselves on the manner in which the new rugby game should be played i.e. fair play, 
abiding by the ‘Corinthian’ spirit of the Game and that partaking was more important than 
winning. The mere thought of financial reward for playing and winning was anathema to a 
Gentleman. Money in sport was considered to be a corrupting influence (Vamplew,1988).  
The Welsh working class, on the other hand, had a lengthy custom of approaching any game 
as a contest, where winning was everything, gambling was encouraged and material rewards 
given to the victors. This highlights the difficulty of the amateur ethos; the middle class 
philosophy of ‘playing for its own sake’, in stark contrast to the working class emphasis on 
‘winning at all costs’ (Williams, 1985). 
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Club Competition 
Remarkably even before the establishing of a governing body, the South Wales Challenge 
Cup was introduced in 1877 to promote the growth of the game in South Wales,  with  a  50  
guineas  prize  and  trophy  for  the  winners,  with  a 2 guineas  entrance  fee  per  team.  
Eighteen  teams entered the first competition organized by the South Wales Football Club. 
This was the earliest example of clubs ‘pot hunting’,   entering   competitions  beyond  their  
immediate  locality,  searching  for success and glory. By 1885 local challenge cups had been 
established in Cardiff, Swansea, Llanelli and Monmouthshire resulting in developing 
competitive district club rivalries even deeper (Boucher, 2000). Similar to the cup 
competitions amongst the working class North of England clubs, the Welsh cup games,   
“...attracted large, partisan crowds which identified strongly with their 
representatives on the field, seeing matches not just as exciting spectacles 
but as tests of virility between their community and another. The depth of 
identification of town with team meant that players were constrained to 
play, less for their own enjoyment and more for the glory which victory 
would bring to the community as a whole”  
(Dunning and Shread, 2005, p.124). 
 
A Game for All - ‘Welshness’ 
The new game of rugby football had become an expression of a unique kind of ‘Welshness’, 
an integral part of Welsh communities along with the chapel, its choirs and socialism.  Thus 
the resultant ‘modern’ Welshman worked, played socially inclusive rugby, attended chapel, 
was able to sing and inevitably had been educated by the mining union (Holt, 1989). This 
was in marked comparison to the class hostility towards the working class experienced in 
England, Scotland and Ireland, where the game tended to be restricted to the ‘amateur’ 
gentlemen of the middle and upper classes (Hargreaves, 1986). In Wales rugby quickly 
became a ‘democratic’ sport for all classes, especially a growing working class participation, 
who were easily absorbed into the Game with little difficulty (Cain, 1999). There was, 
initially, a composition difference within teams. With a smaller band of individuals to select 
from, middle class teams were based on ties of education, status and occupation rather than 
location. Valley communities were quick to establish local clubs made up of close-knit 
groups of working class men eager to play this new popular team sport (Holt, 1989).  Rugby 
clubs  established  in  the  valleys  of  South Wales inevitably had ready-made  local  
competition  with  other  village  teams  within  a  few  miles.  In these localities, the recent 
improvements to transport meant that travel to fixtures was not a problem.  With the rapid 
growth of the Game, moves were put in place for rugby to have a common code of play 
centrally organised, managed and controlled by a responsible governing body that itself was 
acceptable and accountable to all clubs.  
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The Governing Body 
With the South Wales Football Club (founded 1875) being superseded by the South Wales 
Football Union in 1878, the demands for an organised body to represent the increasing 
number of clubs in South Wales and regulate competition and representative sides had 
increased.  On 12th March 1881, at the Castle Hotel, Neath, the Welsh Football Union was 
formed by  eleven  clubs,  Llanelli, Swansea, Cardiff, Newport, Pontypool, Bangor, Brecon, 
Lampeter, Llandeilo, Llandovery and Merthyr, to provide rugby with a wider ambition and 
more business like footing (Birley, 1993).  The growth, and annals, of the organised version 
of the sport of rugby football in Wales can be traced from this meeting. It is ironic that, what 
is regarded as the ‘birthplace’ of Welsh rugby, its oldest senior club, Neath, was not 
represented at the meeting.  The members of the WFU governing body were drawn from 
amongst the young men who were players and committeemen of those clubs affiliated to the 
Union. The first secretary and treasurer was Richard Mullock, club secretary of Newport 
RFC, only thirty years old, whose family ran a printing company and published the local 
paper, The  Newport  Advertiser.  Mullock selected the first  team to play England and all 
selected players were ‘educated’, not working class.  
The ‘players game’ in the Principality showed that, unlike other home Unions’ governing 
bodies, Welsh rugby attempted to be egalitarian not only in its participants but also its 
governance.  Researchers Andrews and Howell (1993), Tranter (1998)  and Harris (2007), 
have contended that the WFU was run solely by the social elite alone.  However, others 
investigating the formation of the Welsh Football Union committee were not convinced by 
the ‘elitist’ findings  (Dunning and Sheard, 2005). If the governing body was ‘elitist’ in 
composition, why did it then adopt such a lax approach to the (illegal) actions of its member 
clubs in being overgenerous with so-called ‘working class players’ expenses?      Adopting 
this attitude put its association with England, Ireland  and  Scotland  in  serious peril. 
Therefore, could this approach be interpreted as a committee empathetic with the needs of 
working players and the pressures and demands on its constituent clubs’ to survive? This 
view of a classless, governing WRU committee was confirmed some fifty years later by 
Swansea and Wales player, Rowe Harding, who wrote in 1929; 
“An organization with an income of over £10,000 a year, and which is 
responsible for the prestige of a national sport, should attract men of social 
standing and business ability, and unfortunately the number of such men 
on the Union is too small. Of course, every member of the Union does his 
best; but some members are not fitted either by education or experience to 
guide the destiny of Welsh Rugby and they should be supplanted by men of 
better social standing and with a better grasp of affairs…..”  
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The International Board (IRB) 
Within the Four Home Unions games took place under each country’s established laws.  
Scotland saw no difficulty with this, but constant pressure for change by the other three 
Unions saw the Scots agree to the establishment of an International Board (IB) only if its 
functions were limited to "the settlement of any dispute which may arise in future 
International Matches on the Construction of the Laws of the Game."   This  was  agreed  to  
by  the  powerful and dominating  RFU  and  a  board  was   formed consisting of the four 
Home Nations in March 1886.  However within a year there was a fall-out over the method 
and points awarded for scoring and the RFU dropped out of the IB. In March 1887 at 
Manchester, the old International Board was dissolved and a new one formally established 
with representatives from the three Celtic Unions (England re-joined in 1890).  It was agreed 
that no financial gain or reward be obtained by those who participated in the Game Rugby 
football was deemed a pastime involving unpaid players and was therefore strictly amateur. 
Amateurism, based on the middle class principle adopted by the RFU, indeed appeared to be 
a means of social exclusion and enclosure.    The English Northern clubs felt that the RFU 
were preventing working class players having the opportunity to compete on the same basis 
as the sons of the liberal professions and the landed gentry (Holt, 1989).    The IB’s stance 
on amateurism eventually caused a schism with the Northern Clubs, who demanded ‘bona 
fide broken time payments’ for players who inevitably had to forfeit part of their wages.  And 
so it was on 29th August 1895, that twenty-two dissenting Yorkshire and Lancashire clubs 
met at the George hotel, Huddersfield and broke away to form what became known as the 
Rugby League.  The split opened the door for mass defections from Wales, e.g. in 1896 six 
Llanelli players joined Rochdale RLC all at once (Johnes, 2005). 
 
The Welsh Approach to Amateurism 
The Welsh attitude and approach towards rugby was different from the other Home Unions. 
The Game’s development in the mining communities had a social impact on the requirement 
for expenses to be paid (Polley, 1998).  In many clubs there is little doubt that the permitted 
‘reasonable’ expenses were interpreted very liberally because of the fear of losing their 
players and the resultant downfall of the club. Rumours abounded that working class players 
received ‘broken time’ compensation in order to play, claims that the WRFU were not eager 
to investigate, and suspicions that the other three Unions could not prove (Johnes, 2005).  If 
working men were not being paid, how did clubs such as Swansea and Llanelli tour the North 
of England, Ireland and France with working class players taking ‘unpaid time’ off from their 
jobs? The question was answered by former Welsh International, W. M. McCutcheon, who 
wrote in 1905 confirming that this practice regarding ‘broken-time’ expenses had existed in 
his old club, Swansea, since the early 1880s. The leading pre-war senior club was accused of 
paying expenses equivalent to wages, so that players only went North because of the large 
lump sums offered to them for 
342 
 
Appendix 3.3 
Background to Rugby 
 
signing. The WFU took no action regarding this allegation (Williams, 1983).  In addition, 
and despite the IB agreement on amateurism, in 1897 the WFU sanctioned a testimonial game 
(and donated £50) that raised £600 for the Welsh captain, Arthur Gould, enabling him to 
purchase the deeds of his rented house. Gould was suspended by the IB as a ‘professional’ 
and banded from the game. The WFU promptly withdrew from the IB saying that the IB had 
no laws about amateurism (Vamplew, 1988).  This pressurised action by the WFU forced the 
IB to rescind the ban but also led to the IB bringing in strict amateur laws in 1900/01, 
“Any player will become a professional who receives from or is given 
money or other valuable consideration by any person or persons as an 
inducement towards playing football…….any player will become a  
professional who signs any form of the Northern Football Union”  
(Richards, 2006). 
 
Religion and Rugby 
Since its establishment rugby had an uneasy association with religion.  The nonconformist 
chapels, in particular, fearing the sport’s popularity, bitterly condemned the game.  Rugby 
was perceived as a clear threat to the chapels, with the residual religious community shifting 
to a more secular Welsh society created by the new capitalist economy (Andrews and Howell, 
1993).  The WFU, gauging the mood of the people, promptly banned Sunday football 
(Farmer, 1996). If the Game had been officially permitted to be played on a Sunday, then the 
difficulties of the  working  class  player  getting  time off work on a Saturday might have 
been avoided and as such the need for ‘broken-time payments’ to be paid to working class 
players (Smith and Williams, 1980).  The great religious revival of 1904-05 led by the collier-
blacksmith turned lay preacher, Evan Roberts, identified rugby as an enemy warranting 
denunciation. In West Wales, particularly, clubs came under enormous pressure to 
discontinue playing. Several clubs, including Loughor, Ammanford, Morriston, Crynant and 
others, did succumb to the Revival and closed.  But the new order of Welsh rugby withstood 
the criticism from the old religious order and within a decade all of the clubs had reformed 
(Smith and Williams, 1980). The Welsh, now obtained their spiritual sustenance not only 
from religion but also from a sport (Morgan, 1981).  
The First Golden Era 
In spite of the various setbacks, both on and off the field, Wale’s National team enjoyed its 
first ‘Golden Era’.  Between 1900 – 1911 Wales  won thirty-five out of forty-three games 
including seven championships and six triple crowns.  They were the only team to beat the 
1905 New Zealand ‘All Blacks’ at Cardiff (3pts – 0pts) in front of a packed, nationalistic, 
record crowd of 47,000 Welshmen, which produced gate receipts of £2,600 (Andrews and 
Howell, 1993).  What winning, and rugby, meant to Wales was best summed up, not by a  
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Welshman, but rather by the reporter from the Lyttleton Times, the paper with the largest 
circulation in New Zealand; 
 “The scene at the ground was unique in New Zealanders’ experience……It 
was a wonderful revelation of the serious spirit in which the Welsh take 
their football”.  
(Smith and Williams, 1980, p.159).  
Following that dramatic victory, the National Team became the standard bearer for all the 
growing number of clubs, players and supporters in Wales.  Rugby was, and still continues 
to be, a charismatic, integral part of the national character of Wales (Morgan, 1981).  The 
victory over New Zealand enhanced the growing authority and power of the WFU. If any 
threat to the Game arose, such as violence at games, swift action was taken. Even senior clubs 
like Aberavon, Llanelli, Neath, in the West and Abertillery, Cardiff in the East saw their 
grounds temporarily closed (Andrews and Howell, 1993).  Unlikely as it may seem amateur 
rugby was saved by Wales, where the game was seeing huge growth.  At this time the native 
population of Wales was unable to meet demand for workers in the south Wales coal fields. 
This led to high wages in the mines as mine owners tried to attract workers. Massive 
immigration into Wales followed. Between 1871 and 1911 the population of Wales increased 
by one million. This was a young, tough industrial population used to working in teams. 
Rugby flourished, with many clubs based around pubs. The game was violent, both on and 
off the pitch. In 1897 a game between Dowlais and Merthyr was so violent that according to 
a local paper "most of the Merthyr players were maimed" (quoted in Sport In Britain, A Social 
History, ed; Tony Mason).  Wales was booming economically, and was also seeking a clear 
national identity within Britain. This cause was served by rugby.  But it could only be served 
by sticking to the amateur code, since the Welsh wanted to play widely against other national 
teams within Britain. This could only be done by amateur players. So in the interests of Welsh 
nationalistic feeling Welsh rugby remained an amateur game. The rewards of this position 
were not slow in coming.  
By the turn of the century the Welsh team was a major force. A great Welsh national moment 
came in 1905 during a tour of Britain by the New Zealand All Blacks team. The All Blacks 
had destroyed all opposition in England, Scotland and Ireland, amassing eight hundred points 
to twenty seven for the combined opposition.  Then on 16th December 1905 the All Blacks 
came up against Wales at Cardiff Arms Park. The match was a closely fought battle, won 
with a single Welsh try, scored by Dr Edward Morgan. This was a significant event in the 
cultural history of Wales, and Edward Morgan is commemorated by that great medal for 
figures deemed historical, a blue plaque, placed near his birthplace in Agents Row, Abernant. 
In this sense the history of rugby is not confined to quirky interest in sport. That day in  
December 1905 is a date in Welsh as well as rugby history. 
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Alas, there was not only violence, but much death and destruction to be encountered by those 
many courageous Welsh players who readily enlisted to fight for ‘King and Country’ in the 
Great War.  Rugby in the Principality ground to a halt.  The village and valley clubs’ playing 
resources had become brave soldiers, stuck in the unyielding mud in France and Belgium, 
and facing a new, very competitive opponent.  However this confrontation was too far exceed 
eighty minutes. Sadly, this struggle sometimes called for the mere grassroots rugby player to 
make the ultimate sacrifice in representing his country.  
The Unofficial Championship Pre-War, 1894-1914. 
The first twenty years of an Unofficial Welsh Club Championship, 1894-1914, had seen just 
six clubs share the title. Swansea was by far the most successful club with eight 
championships, six in seven seasons. But the giants of East Wales, Cardiff (4) and Newport 
(5) were not far behind.  Llanelli, Neath and Pontypool all claimed one title each. The titles 
revealed that the strength of Welsh rugby clearly lay in the South Wales coastal belt. 
Membership of the WFU had grown to sixty-five clubs.  Up to 1914, rugby clubs had 
benefitted from the external environment and the newly found social interest in rugby.  
However, the financial and social environment was soon to change dramatically, and not for 
the better. 
 
The Inter-War Seasons, 1919-1939 
The 1920s and 1930s were difficult times for Welsh rugby.  The war could not be blamed for 
the downturn in Welsh fortunes as all the home nations lost their young talent in equal 
numbers. Wales lost eleven International players and many more club players. But the main 
reason for Welsh failure on the rugby pitch, and the resulting difficulty for Welsh clubs off 
it, can be mapped to an economic failure of Wales as a country. The First World War had 
created an unrealistic demand for coal. In the 1920s the collapse in the need for coal resulted, 
because of the reliance on one industry, in a massive level of unemployment (from 265,000 
miners in 1920, down to 138,000 miners by 1933) throughout the South Wales valleys. With 
over 56% of the population employed in the mining and metallurgical industries, Wales was 
hit more severely than other areas in comparison and was literally brought to its knees and 
crippled (Morgan 1981).  
In the Rhondda, a heartland for rugby, the number of miners fell by 50% from 39,177 in 1927 
down to 19,873 by 1936.  Prolonged unemployment in the valleys was over 40% in 1935, 
which in turn lead to mass emigration, well over 430,000, as nearly a fifth of the entire 
population left Wales for work in England and beyond between 1921 and 1940 (Morgan, 
1981).  The population of the Rhondda fell by 13% in the twenties, and possibly higher in 
the thirties. The knock-on effect was felt in the port cities of Newport and Cardiff, that relied 
on the transportation of coal with the result that railwaymen were forced to take a ‘cut’ in 
wages of 4s per week  (Johnes, 2005).  Suddenly, the call of the professional league was a  
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very strong draw to men, (particularly unemployed miners from the valleys) who could not 
claim money for playing union. With a miner’s weekly wage only £2. 3s, 9d,  the offer of a 
new job, a lump sum of £250 and even £1.15s for a defeat was too much to resist for many 
players (Johnes, 2005). Between 1919 and 1939, the ranks of the Northern clubs were filled 
with some 392 Welsh rugby union players, including seventy Internationals, who joined 
league rugby. In the 1939 Rugby League Cup Final, half the players were Welsh (Richards, 
2006 p.124).  
The economic circumstances even affected those Welsh Internationals who remained  loyal  
to  the  Game  and  stayed  at  home,  preventing  them   from accepting invitations to join 
Lions rugby tours abroad (Smith and Williams, 1980). The Depression resulted in economic, 
social and cultural destruction to Wales.  Another side of the downturn affected those players 
that stayed behind in homes where men were the only earners but on reduced wages or 
shortened hours.  In 1929, an unemployed man received 23s a week for himself and his 
family, plus 2s per child (Morgan, 1981, p.231). The decline in heavy labour areas resulted 
in very stark choices in where the household money could be spent. It was difficult to justify 
paying to play or watch rugby when there was little money for priorities such as food and 
rent.  With crowds dwindling, and no club being able to rely wholly upon gate receipts for 
financial stability, clubs were forced to drastic measures in the hope of survival.    In season 
1926-27, many clubs, particularly those in East Wales, were in danger of actual extinction. 
Blaenavon, Cross Keys, Ebbw Vale, and Pontypridd all sought financial assistance from a 
struggling WFU.  In the case of Cross Keys, the WFU refused an appeal for a cash loan, but 
instead agreed to send the Welsh national team to play in an exhibition match at Pandy Park. 
The sell-out crowd assured Cross Keys future and resulted in an historic win for the home 
team by thirteen points to eight.      
 
The governing body’s income had halved during the 1920’s due to smaller crowds and clubs 
defaulting.    Falling attendances at Internationals posed major problems.    Only 15,000 
watched the Wales v France game at Swansea partly due to the consideration that the 2s 
admission charge was too high in the existing economic environment (Williams, 1983). In 
West Wales, Skewen also sought financial support; Loughor, which had produced  five  
internationals in the 1920s, were, by 1929, begging door to door for old kit to keep rugby 
going.  Due to work at the local dockyards stopping, Haverfordwest disbanded from 1926-
29, and Pembroke Dock Quins were reduced to five members by 1927. In October 1927, 
Aberavon could only attract a crowd of less than two hundred due to price admission being 
raised to one shilling. In the valleys the Treherbert, Llwynypia, Nantyffyllon, Senghenydd, 
Treherbert,  Tredegar and Cwmbran clubs had vanished before 1930.  In 1927 due to falling 
gate  receipts,  caused  by  the  increasing  attraction  of  rival  sports  such   as football,  Ebbw 
Vale staged a rugby league game on their pitch, the Welfare Ground.    The WRU reacted 
strongly and threatened Ebbw Vale RFC with expulsion from the Union.      
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This was seen by many as an overly aggressive stance to a club that was desperate for aid not 
sanctions.  In 1929 steel-making in the town stopped resulting in 10,000 workers being put 
out of a job. By 1932 the gate at Ebbw Vale rarely reached twenty shillings, despite admission 
reduced to 4d, and a catchment area population of 40,000. The club was forced to resort to 
public subscriptions to survive (Williams, 1983).  Clubs throughout Wales, even those of the 
size of Pontypool were not spared; in 1927 they were playing and beating the touring 
Waratahs and the Maoris; by 1930 they were £2,000 in debt, facing bankruptcy and forced 
to appeal to the WRU for financial assistance (Smith and Williams, 1980, p.259). A further 
East Wales valley club, Abertillery, with 85% unemployment in the locality, had difficulty 
paying its £3 ground rent and faced closure in 1931. Yet in West Wales, where anthracite 
and tinplate dominated, unemployment was only 8.3% allowing Llanelli to make a profit of 
£300 per season (Williams, 1983, p.343).  An alternative reason for the fall in the Welsh 
union game can be placed on the improvement of football in Wales.      Traditionally, seen 
as a game more associated with North Wales, the success of Cardiff Football Club in the 
1920s proved a strong draw for many supporters.   With two F.A. Cup Finals in 1925 and 
1927, Cardiff were  making  the  once  unpopular  sport  of 'soccer' very fashionable, for fans 
and sportsmen alike  (Johnes, 2005). But despite the on-field successes of soccer, and 
regardless of the lack of International rugby victories throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, 
rugby continued to secure much more support amongst the sporting of South Wales (Morgan, 
1981).   
The one team that appeared to be unaffected by the double threat of soccer and financial debt 
was Llanelli, who appeared to be the only club capable of turning a deficit into a  profit.  The 
Scarlets benefitted  from  a generally buoyant steel industry along the coastline from Port 
Talbot to Llanelli, and  an  unswerving  loyalty  shown  by their home supporters, who were 
repaid by exciting, high scoring matches (Williams, 1985).  The level of support was unusual 
as most clubs in South Wales realised the challenge facing them to uphold a realistic amount 
of local spectator backing.  Because even with reduced admission charges, unemployed men 
relying on Poor Relief, were unable to pay. During the 1925/26 season the club was unbeaten. 
During that season, Llanelli, whilst playing Penygraig, encountered over 1,000 unemployed 
miners taking matters into their own hands by forcing their way into the ground to watched 
the game, peaceably, from the ‘tanner’ bank. Penygraig took no action against the ‘non-
paying’ miners. Nonetheless, by 1930, even the Penygraig club found itself in dire financial 
straits (Williams, 1983, p. 350). Apart from a few sporadic victories from the national team, 
there appeared little to cheer about in the 1920s for Welsh rugby at club or country level.  
 
The start of the 1930s opened with the formation of the West Wales Rugby Union, an event 
that initially appeared to be a positive indication of growth; but in fact the WWRU was 
formed in Swansea by Western clubs to wrestle control away from the WRU. More than  
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fifty West Wales clubs had become disenchanted in decisions made by their parent body and 
believed the Union had no interest in the lower tier clubs, allowing them to become ‘mere 
feeders for the bigger clubs’ (Smith and Williams, 1980, p.261).  During  the  1930’s,  the  
mass  unemployment  and  poverty demonstrated that  the same  problems  that  dogged  
Welsh  Rugby  throughout the  1920s still remained. Wales was still suffering the tragic 
effects of the economic depression upon the   working, social and cultural life of entire 
communities (Morgan, 1981).  An action which reflected the harsh fiscal situation facing 
people in Wales, occurred in Neath in January 1933, and resulted in, cultural life of entire 
communities (Morgan, 1981).   
    ‘the gates were rushed at Neath’s Gnoll ground by some 3/400 
spectators protesting against the shilling admission charge for the ‘local 
derby’ game against Aberavon. The club duly took note of the concerns of 
spectators, and for the next home game, against Bath, admission was 
thereby reduced to seven pence’  
(Williams, 1983, p.346).   
Club rugby was desperately struggling to survive in an hostile, economic environment. 
Unfortunately, being unable to retain the services and  commitment  of  local  young  men,  
some  clubs  failed,  including  Abercynon, Abercarn, Cwmtwrch, Nelson and Taibach, 
between 1934 and 1937 (Williams, 1983). But despite those failures many more clubs fought 
hard to ensure their survival. 
As pre-war, the national team was considered to be the role model for clubs both on and off 
the field throughout the 1920s’. During this decade, the Welsh XV was mainly made up of 
working class men. Sadly, the team’s playing record was abysmal.  An (unintended) change 
of selection saw more college students brought into the Welsh team. This resulted in a 
Championship title in 1931, a first ever victory at Twickenham in 1933 and remarkably in 
1935, when the WFU became officially the Welsh Rugby Union, the National team emulated 
its victorious predecessors of 1905 by beating the mighty New Zealand ‘All Blacks’ at 
Cardiff in front of a passionate crowd of over 50,000 spectators. In a game of high emotions 
and tragedy, Welsh hooker Don Tarr was carried off with a broken neck, Wales, with fourteen 
players, snatched victory by 13-12pts. The consequences of this achievement moved well 
outside the touchlines of the Arms Park.  ‘Old Stager’ wrote in the Western Mail,  
 
 ‘Wales is proud of this victory: she is particularly proud of the fact that 
Welsh peers and Welsh labourers – with all the intervening stratas of 
society- were united in acclaiming and cheering the Welsh team. It was.....a 
victory for Wales in a sense that probably is impossible in any other sphere’  
(Quoted in Smith and Williams, 1980, p.292). 
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Evidently, the game of rugby football was a means of ensuring public harmony and social 
cohesion, whereby people could come into contact and create personal and social attachments 
that rose above the restrictions of class (Williams, 1983).  
The Unofficial Club Championship  1919-1939 
The Championship title was wider spread from 1918-1939, with nine clubs winning the title. 
Cardiff (3) Newport (2) and Pontypool (3) dominated from East Wales; the emergence of 
Aberavon in the mid-1920s with four consecutive titles kept the flag waving for West Wales, 
along with Neath (3) and Llanelli (2).  However, Swansea had to be content  with  only  the  
runners-up  spot  on  three separate occasions.  
By the beginning of the 1939 season, and despite the two decades of depression, membership 
of the WRU had grown to 89 clubs.  But all local and senior club rivalry was to be halted in 
1939 by a greater global conflict.  The War period actually produced a vision of the future 
for Rugby.  Amateur rugby union and professional rugby league players were allowed to play 
together in charity games, service matches and friendlies (Johnes, 2005).     Rugby league 
players even represented Wales in its victories gained in Internationals played during this 
desperate period, showing how much rugby union had lost to rugby league.  Quite 
remarkably, even games played on a Sunday were allowed. (After 1995, all of the 
characteristics of the ‘War games’ had been incorporated not only into the Game in Wales, 
but to all the major rugby playing countries). 
The Post War Playing Context 
Following the Second World War, many clubs were found to be struggling financially.  
Carmarthen had 15s.8p in the bank; Cefneithin with 5s.6p and Machen had a membership of 
eight and shorts made out of black-out material (Smith and Williams, 1980, p.330).    Like 
the rest of the country, rugby suffered austerity but then the subsequent economic boom 
brought prosperity.  By 1950, membership of the WRU had grown to 120 clubs, a 35% 
increase since 1939.  Rugby teams now built their own clubhouse, purchased/leased their 
ground and became the social centre of village and town life.  With improved facilities and 
amenities providing a range of activities, women and children were attracted to the clubs in 
greater numbers (Johnes, 2005). In order to raise the necessary finance (unofficially to meet 
players’ demands), clubs resorted to developing a social membership by opening their 
facilities in the evenings outside the normal two training nights and match days, for special 
social events such as dances, quiz’s, bingo etc, run to attract non-rugby visitors into the club. 
All monies raised, including any surplus, were ploughed back into the club. 
Attendances at both club and International games revealed that public interest in the sport 
was still high. In February 1951, a game between Cardiff and Newport attracted a world  
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record club attendance of 48,500 spectators. At National level, Wales won the Triple Crown 
and Championship, both in 1950 and again in 1952, to continue the post-war momentum in 
Welsh rugby (Williams, 1983). In current terms, it is strange to learn that Wales and British 
Lion legend, Cliff Morgan, caught the bus from his home in Trebanog, Rhondda on a 
Saturday morning to travel down to Cardiff to play for Wales in the afternoon. His reward 
was re-imbursement of his bus fare before returning home the same day!  
Despite the success of the National Team, rugby in Wales was even more divided between 
the so-called top eight  ‘first class’ clubs, such as Llanelli, Swansea, Cardiff, Newport, Neath, 
etc, and the remaining vast majority of the 112 WRU clubs, who were dubbed by supporters 
the dubious title of ‘second-class’ or ‘feeder clubs’. The self-esteem of the first class clubs 
was further boosted by the National newspaper, the Western Mail, establishing in 1946 its 
unofficial club championship but with only the senior clubs partaking.  This was regardless 
of the fact that the WRU told clubs that membership of the Union was the only status they 
recognised and that one of the Union’s bye-laws was “to encourage and maintain sociability 
and good fellowship among the clubs and organisations in the Union”.     In spite of the 
protestations of the WRU, and the ‘second-class’ clubs, the first class clubs organised fixtures 
between themselves on a home and away basis as well as playing against the first class clubs 
in England such as Leicester, Northampton, Harlequins, Bath, Gloucester, Bristol and others.    
By the 1960s South Wales had become less dependent on its traditional industries with the 
exception of the growing steel industry. Wales had been opened up by new roads and an 
expanding ownership of cars.  Saturday afternoon televised sports and higher earnings now 
offered alternatives to rugby supporters than standing in the cold, wind and rain at rugby 
grounds. Attendances at games dropped. It took the Aberfan tragedy of 1966, and the 
demonstration riddled South African rugby tour of 1969, to move Wales, and its rugby, out 
of the comfort zone (Johnes, 2005).  
The Unofficial Club Championship, 1946-1970. 
Cardiff proved to be the leading Welsh club after the war winning five titles between 1946-
1970.   Ebbw Vale won four titles through the 1950’s. Newbridge, who had become a ‘first-
class’ team only after the war, won the title for the first time (1965) as did Pontypridd (1963) 
and Bridgend (1964). The long established clubs like Llanelli, Neath and Newport also tasted 
championship success, but this was a barren time for Swansea. 
The Second Golden Era; the 1970s. 
The number of miners fell from 91,000 in to 41,000 by 1971 and the number of working pits 
fell to a low of fifty-four. Fossil fuel was considered outdated as were the previous 
occupations of rugby players. Miners, steelworkers and policemen were replaced by the 
university and college graduate. The blue-collar worker was replaced by the white-collar  
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employee. This opened doors, not only for players to further their business opportunities but 
to herald the introduction of business sponsorship into all levels of rugby (Smith and 
Williams, 1980). The success of the British Lions in New Zealand (1971) and South Africa 
(1974) did much to revive interest in the UK Game. In Wales, the magnificent spectacle that 
occurred in Cardiff between the Barbarians and New Zealand in 1973, proved to be the 
forerunner of great Welsh success in the Five Nations Championship with three Grand Slams, 
five Triple Crowns and six Championship titles won during the decade. Welsh rugby was 
buoyant at all levels of the Game.  Nonetheless, the pressure for change, to allow all 181 
WRU clubs the opportunity to rise to the top level, had grown since the early 1970s. It was 
no surprise then that, in 1975, Ray Williams, WRU Coaching Organiser, proposed a league 
scheme that was supported by 72% of clubs, but the senior clubs again saw no justifiable 
reason to accept change. Support for the status quo then came in the unexpected shape of 
brewers, Whitbread, whose newly formed Merit Table only recorded played between the first 
class sides in the Principality.      
Outside the top end of the Game, the only change in organisation saw ‘the Welsh Junior 
Rugby Union become the Welsh Districts Rugby Union in 1976 with thirteen districts and 
343 clubs under its aegis’ (Smith and Williams, 1980, p.435).  An outside view of Welsh 
Rugby at that time was given by Chris Laidlaw, former New Zealand captain who wrote 
(1973, p155), 
“Back home in the valleys little has changed in fifty years. In Pontypool or 
Cross Keys, and in a large number of smaller communities, the Rugby Club 
has played a deep and highly significant sociological role. It was, and still 
is, the social focus of the community. A man’s standing in the town or 
village is directly related to his position in the club...Rugby, then is the very 
cornerstone of Welsh Society”. 
The Unofficial Club Championship, 1971-1980 
Success on the first class fields during the ‘70s  was spread across South Wales from 
Pontypridd (3) in the Rhondda valley, Pontypool (2) in the Eastern valleys, through Bridgend 
(1) and Swansea (1) to the Llanelli (2) West Walians. Even London Welsh, with their team 
of victorious British Lions, captured a first ever title. 
 
The Centenary Year 1980, and its Decade. 
The WRU Centenary in 1980 saw further pressure for changes to the club structure. 
Nevertheless, the many traditionalists and romantics were content to reminisce that Welsh 
rugby was about the person who, 
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‘is the youth team coach, the ex-referee, the man who runs the line for the 
Athletic XV, the unsung, dedicated enthusiasts who turn up to offer their 
skills and knowledge, in any weathers, so that the game is never neglected 
at any level.    It is men like Rhys E. Williams, still serving Crynant as club 
secretary after more than fifty years’  
(Smith and Williams, 1980, p.461).   
The 1980’s contrasted with the 1920s’ in Wales. Economic depression, large scale 
unemployment and industrial conflict, especially the miners’ strike in 1984, had the same 
effect on Welsh rugby i.e. thinning crowds, players turning to rugby league and clubs 
desperately looking to the Union for financial assistance. All these factors added to the mood 
for change, which was gaining momentum. The poor performances of the National Team 
during the 1980s finally forced the Merit Table clubs to accept that change was required. 
During the late 1970s and 1980s major changes took place in the occupational backgrounds 
of Welsh players.  
 “The last two decades of the twentieth century saw Wales undergo a 
dramatic transformation, and no part of society – politics, culture, 
education or sport - was unaffected by it”   
(Smith and Williams, 1999, p. 215). 
The Unofficial Club Championship 1981-1990. 
During this decade two clubs dominated the club championship. The mighty Pontypool club 
in East Wales, under the direction of the legendary forward, Ray Prosser, won four 
Championship titles in five seasons between1983-1988. They were replaced by Neath, in 
West Wales, who won three titles in four seasons towards the end of the decade. Bridgend, 
Cardiff and Swansea won one title each. 
 
“The sport has retained both a genuine community spirit at the local level, and a national 
flavour that is more populist than that of Wales regular opponents in the Five Nations” 
(Polley, 1998, p.57). 
 
Creeping Professionalism 
Following the National Miners’ Strike in 1984, Rugby players were no longer the miners or 
steelworkers, because of the reduction in the workforce of the declining traditional core 
industries, but now into their place emerged the newer commercial, financial services and 
educational sectors; they produced the new breed of business executives, financial advisors, 
managers and teachers. Recognisable players, seen via the BBC and HTV’s weekly televised 
rugby programmes, became marketable rugby personalities, which now opened previously 
closed doors in the business world.  As a result, British Lions Derek Quinnell (Llanelli), 
Tommy David (Pontypridd), Steve Fenwick (Bridgend) and J.J. Williams (Llanelli) all 
opened their own businesses with great success. In spite of the business opportunities, there 
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were still some high profile defections to Rugby League. The first International to go North 
for over a decade in 1985, Terry Holmes (Cardiff), was followed in 1987 by the brilliant 
Jonathan Davies (Llanelli), who joined Widnes RLC for £200,000. Over one third of the 
successful 1988 Triple Crown team crossed the border, disillusioned at the running of the 
Game in Wales. The quality players who stayed in Wales then demanded material factors 
such as cars, cash and jobs to remain at a club. Some club administrators called it ‘a ransom’, 
others saw it as a necessity to keep their best players, but now material benefit came into the 
player retention equation (Johnes, 2005). 
Globally, at the first Rugby World Cup held in New Zealand in 1987, visiting Northern 
Hemisphere players, and I, saw the host country’s captain, hooker Andy Dalton, on a paid 
TV advertisement endorsing a farm tractor. This was clearly contrary to the century old edit 
from the IRB that ‘no player should profit materially from participation in the Game’. In 
1988 in South Africa a player won a court judgement for not receiving payments promised.   
By 1990 the IRB had revised some of the amateurism regulations;  ‘players could now receive 
material benefits from any form of communication, written, oral or visual, provided that the 
reward does not derive from the game’ and also ‘participate in advertising or product 
endorsement provided it has no rugby connection’ (Richards, 2007, p.225).   Unlike the other 
Home Unions, Wales supported the IRB amendment.  The 1991 RWC was held in England 
with rumours and hearsay about Professionalism. The highly respected rugby journalist, 
Stephen Jones, wrote in The Times in 1993, “There is no longer a major test team which 
does not, for the right rate and on a rota basis, farm itself out to a range of sponsors’ 
functions, club dinners and company lunches and photo opportunities; not a team which does 
not add to the communal pot by flogging off its allocation of tickets... The All Blacks are 
particularly clued up”. By 1995, with the third RWC looming in South Africa, pressure on 
the IRB’s stance on amateurism rose to unprecedented levels (O’Brien and Slack, 1999).  The 
last decade of the Millennium saw a transformation unprecedented, in not only Welsh Rugby, 
but in World Rugby. 
It is worth noting that it was a Rhodes scholar, and former New Zealand captain, scrum-half 
Chris Laidlaw (1973, p126) who wrote that “In Welsh valleys Rugby was more than 
amusement, it was a whole social order...The Welsh rugby club was perhaps the most graphic 
example of a sporting institution providing the central focus of community life anywhere in 
the world”.  Because of this, he argued, Welsh passion for the Game was deeper and would 
last longer than New Zealand’s!    
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WELSH UNOFFICIAL CLUB CHAMPIONS BY DECADES: 1890s to 1999. 
 
Merit Clubs 1890s 1900-09 1910-19 1920-29 1930-38 1940s 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990/94 1995/99 Total 
Aberavon - - - 4 - - - 1 - - - - 5 
Abertillery - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 
Bridgend - - - - - - - 3 1 1 - - 5 
Cardiff 1 3 - - 3 2 3 - - 1 1 1 15 
Cross Keys - - - 1 1 - - - - - - - 2 
Ebbw Vale - - - - - - 4 - - - - - 4 
Glam Wdrs - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 
Llanelli 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 2 - 1 1 8 
Maesteg - - - - - 1 -  - - - - 1 
Neath - - 1 1 2 1 - 1 - 3 1 1 11 
Newbridge - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 
Newport 2 2 2 1 - - 2 2 - - - - 11 
Penarth - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 
Pill Harriers   1          1 
Pontypool - - 1 1 2 - 1 - 2 4 - - 11 
Pontypridd - - - - - - - 1 3 - - 1 5 
SW Police       - - - - - - 0 
Swansea 2 5 1 - - - - - 1 1 2 1 13 
Tredegar - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 
 
354 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE HISTORY  
OF  
EACH RESEARCH CLUB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
355 
 
                                                                                                              Appendix 3.4a 
 
 
 
 
EBBW VALE  RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB 
HISTORY 
 
(Source: Rugby in Ebbw Vale & The Valleys; 1870-1952. 
David Boucher 2000) 
SEASON                                     EVENT 
 
1880/81 
(p.27) 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Ebbw Vale  RFC Formed:  Captained by L. Williams, early games 
played at Dobbs Field, then the Bridge End Field.  First game v 
Tredegar Working Men’s Football Club on 2nd December 1880.  
 
1881/82 
 
Club used Bridge End Field as its home venue. 
County Hotel was considered as club’s headquarters. 
 
 
1882-1890 
 
Limited number of games per season (9-12). 
Little press coverage of club prior to 1890.  
 
1894/95 Second Team record better than firsts.  
 
1895/96 
(p.9) 
STRATEGIC 
 
Club accepted into membership of WFU, 30th August 1895. 
 
1895-1907 Club involved in ‘broken time payments’ disputes. 
 
1896/97 
(p.35) 
 
Record; P33, W20, D5, L8.     (65.8%)  
Monmouthshire District of Rugby Football Union formed. 
 
 
1897/98 
 
Club withdrew from Monmouthshire League. 
 
 
1898/99 
(p.36) 
 
 
Club vacated the Bridge End Field (rent £2 per game) for cheaper 
option of playing on the Beaufort Fields. 
Club had financial difficulties due to opponents not fulfilling the home 
fixtures due to inability to raise a team. 
Two captains suspended by WFU for Foul Play. 
 
 
1899/00 
(p.37) 
STRATEGIC 
 
Club defaulted on payment of its dues to the WRFU. Struck off 
Union list but readmitted later in year.  
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EBBW VALE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB 
HISTORY 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1900/01 
(p.37) 
 
League Record; P18, W3, D3, L12.   (28.7%) 
Club complained to WRFU that Pontymister, Treorchy and Blaina had 
failed to fulfil fixtures. 
 
1901/02 
(p.37) 
 
Readmitted to Monmouthshire League, finished 3rd in table. 
 
 
 
1902/03 
(p.37) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Season proved a disaster.   
Record; P18, W3, D3, L12, Pts For; 26; Pts Agst;147 pts. (28.6%)   
Last in table.   
Team folded at end of season, owing to ground difficulty. 
 
1905/06 
(p.37) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Club reapplied to join WRFU.  Rejected. Told they must play a 
full season before re-consideration. 
Not readmitted into Monmouthshire League. 
Returned to play at Bridge End Field. 
 
 
1906/07 
(p.38/39) 
 
 
Unbeaten at home for season. 
Beat most of the strongest teams in Monmouthshire League. 
Club made a profit but fined £10 for failure to fulfil a fixture. 
Club not re-admitted to WRU. 
AGM:  Income from season £820.  Surplus £206. 2s. 3d. 
 
 
1907-1912 
(p.52) 
STRATEGIC 
 
Club joined the Northern Rugby League along with Merthyr. 
 
1914/18 
 
The Great War. 
 
1919/1920 
(p.84) 
Club re-accepted into membership by WFU. 
Secretary, N.J.Turner, wrote to WFU denying any plans to 
return the club to Rugby League.  
 
1924/25 
(p.128) 
 
Record;  P41, W19, D9, L13   (56%) 
Opposition now included Neath, Bridgend, Pontypool, Abertillery 
plus Bedford & Northampton. 
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EBBW VALE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1925/26 
(p.129) 
 
Undefeated home record. 
Severe financial difficulties. 
 
 
1926/27 
(p.130) 
 
Cutback on English opponents due to heavy cost of travelling. 
Cardiff on fixture list for first time but Athletic XV not firsts. 
 
 
1928/29 
 
Closure of steelworks. 
 
 
1932/33 
(p.133) 
 
 
Won Ben Francis Cup for first time.  Defeated favourites Blaina. 
Otherwise club had an abysmal record. 
 
Mid 1930’s 
Financial record of club worsened. 
Other valley’s clubs joined together to raise funds for Ebbw Vale. A 
disappointing crowd saw the club lose 14 pts – 9 pts. 
 
1933/34 
(p.134) 
 
Club finished third from bottom of League with 17 pts. 
 
 
1936/37 
(p.134) 
 
 
Press reports of games claimed ‘brilliant play’, great improvement’ and 
‘splendid advance’ concerning Ebbw Vale’s play. 
 
 
1937/38 
(p.135) 
 
Club continued to advance on the field with some great victories. 
1938/39 
Former ‘All Whites’ player, Dudley Folland, banned by WRU from 
assisting the club because of his association with Swansea Town FC. 
 
 
1940/41 
(p.138/140) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
THE WAR YEARS 
 
Committee agreed to keep playing as long as there were fixtures. 
Large number of young men employed in vital industries locally. 
Record: P30, W30, D0, L0, Pts For: 629. Agst: 103   (100%) 
Club, captained by Wally Talbot, defeated the RAF, Army XV, 
South Wales Borders, Cardiff (twice), and Llanelli. 
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EBBW VALE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON  EVENT 
 
1941/42 
(p.139/141) 
 
Club was again undefeated until last game of season against Percy 
Jones XV in a benefit match for Red Cross. 
 
 
1945/46 
 
Record: P42, W25, D2, L15. Pts For; 402;  Pts Agst; 300.  (61.2%) 
 
 
1946/47 
(p.144) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P34, W23, D3, L8.Pts For; 404;  Pts Agst;  210.   (70.3%) 
Committee adopted adventurous policy in attracting English 
opponents because southern Welsh clubs remained ‘aloof’. 
 
 
1947/48 
 
Record: P35, W24, D3, L8. Pts For: 409;  Pts Agst;  208.  (71.1%) 
 
 
1948/49 
(p.143/144) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P36, W25, D2, L9. Pts For;  347;  Pts Agst;  220.  (71.1%) 
Welfare Ground deemed unplayable by Welfare Committee. Club 
had to rely on goodwill of local clubs to play. Loss of revenue. 
National Coal Board refused to follow other local employers for 
workers to have 6d per week deducted from wages to be paid to 
club.  
 
1949/50   
(p.145/147) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Recognised as a ‘First Class’ club.   
Included in  Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Championship, 
finished 4th.  
Record: P44, W28, D7, L9.   Pts For: 472, Pts Agst;  191.  (68.6%). 
Newly laid ground and refurbished dressing rooms. 
 
 
1950/51 
(p.149) 
 
 
 
Record:  P41, W31, D4, L6.   (77.8%).                        WMUWCC 3rd 
Finished behind Newport & Cardiff in table. 
 
1951/52 
(p.148/150) 
 
TROPHY & 
STRATEGIC 
Record: P39, W31, D2, L6. Pts For:  644,  Pts Agst; 140.   (80.5%). 
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions.  
Captained by George Gwyn. Club undefeated for last twenty five 
games 
Only one home defeat. 
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EBBW VALE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1952/53 
 
Record:  P                                                                    WMUWCC 4th.     
First fixture with Llanelli RFC, 29th September. 
 
 
1953/54 
 
TROPHY & 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P39, W29, D4, L6.   (76.7%).        
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions.  
Snelling Sevens Finalists. 
 
 
1954/55 
 
Record:  P44, W27, D11, L6,   (69.1%).                     WMUWCC 5th.  
 
 
1955/56 
 
Record:  P41, W23, D5, L13,   (60.9%)                       WMUWCC 8th 
 
 
1956/57 
 
TROPHY & 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P40, W29, D2, L9,   (73.8%). 
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions  
 
 
1957/58 
 
Snelling Sevens Winners. 
 
 
1958/59 
 
 
 
Record: P35, W24, D5, L6,   (72.5%). 
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists. 
 
1959/60 
 
TROPHY & 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P41, W32, D2, L7,   (79.1%) 
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions. 
 
 
1960/61 
 
 
Record:  P40, W28, D1, L11,  (70.7%).                      WMUWCC 4th. 
 
 
1961/62 
 
 
Record:  P41, W28, D3, L8,   (70.5%).                       WMUWCC 2nd. 
 
 
1962/63 
 
Record:  P39, W26, D4, L9,   (69.8%).                       WMUWCC 4th. 
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EBBW VALE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1963/64 
 
Record:  P45, W27, D5, L13.   (64.0%). 
 
 
1964/65 
 
 
 
Record:  P40, W17, D4, L19,   (47.7%).                  WMUWCC 13th. 
 
 
1965/66 
 
 
Record: P50, W18, D4, L28,   (40.7%)    
 
 
1966/67 
 
Record:  P48, W29, D4, L15,  (63.5%)                       WMUWCC 8th. 
 
 
1967/68 
 
Record:  P48, W29, D7, L12, (65.5%)                        WMUWCC 5th. 
Ebbw Vale forward, David Nash became first Welsh National Coach.   
 
 
1968/69 
 
 
Record:  P44, W30, D3, L11,  (70.2%)                       WMUWCC 6th. 
 
1969/70 
Record:  P46, W30, D2, L14,   (66.7%).                     WMUWCC 6th. 
Welsh Floodlight Alliance Finalists.   
 
1970/71 
 
Record: P40, W24, D1, L15,   (61.0%).                     WMUWCC  8th, 
Welsh Floodlight Alliance Finalists 
 
 
1971/72 
 
New WRU 
Cup 
Compete 
 
Record: P41, W26, D0, L15,   (63.4%).                      WMUWCC 6th.  
Welsh Floodlight Alliance Finalists.   
Club record win, 64 – 6 pts v Penarth.   
New club season record points total of 960.   
 
1972/73 
Record: P42. W21, D3, L18.   (53.3%)                     WMUWCC 11th. 
Tour to California, USA.  
 
1973/74 
 
WMT 
10 Clubs 
 
Record: P39, W19, D3, L17 (52.56%).                       WMUWCC 9th.  
WMT 7th, (40.0%) 
Record win of 84 – 4 pts v San Francisco in October.  
Coach Denzil Williams resigned to concentrate on playing in final 
season. 
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EBBW VALE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1974/75 
 
Record:  P41, W27, D1, L13,   (66.7%).                     WMUWCC 4th.  
WMT.5th. (52.9%)  
 
 
1975/76  
 
WMT 
15 Clubs 
 
Record:  P39, W24, D1, L14,  (62.5%).                      WMUWCC 6th.  
WMT. 4th. (66.7%) 
Schweppes Cup Semi-Finalists.    
Scrumhalf Steve Lewis scored record 294pts.   
 
 
1976/77 
 
 
 
 
Record. P38, W30, D1, L7, (80.3%).                          WMUWCC 3rd.  
WMT. 3rd. (72.7%) 
Best season for 15 years.  
Club lead table until loss of last game v Coventry.  
 
1977/78 
Record:  P40, W23, D3, L14, (60,5%).                       WMUWCC 8th.   
WMT. 4th. (61.5%) 
Record post-war home defeat 6 – 32 pts v Llanelli.  
 
1978/79 
 
Record: P44, W30, D1, L13 (69.3%).                         WMUWCC 6th.  
WMT. 8th. (53.8%) 
Snelling Sevens Finalists.   
 
 
1979/80 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
 
Centenary season.   
Record: P 43, W19, D2, L22. (46.5%).                     WMUWCC 13th.  
WMT.10th. (38.5%) 
Game v Romania, Lost; 0 – 12 pts.   
Game v WRU Presidents XV, Won. 19 – 7 pts.    
Won Centenary Sevens.  
Tour to California, USA. Four played, four won.  
 
 
1980/81 
 
Record: P46, W24, D1, L21, (53.2%).                      WMUWCC 10th.  
WMT. 11th. (36.0%)    
Gareth Howls reached 608 games for club. 
Charity match v Deri, wing Ian Evans passed overall club try record with 
147 tries.  
Allan Lewis replaced as coach by Chris Padfield.   
Flanker Clive Burgess voted Welsh Player of Year. 
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EBBW VALE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1981/82 
 
 
 
Record:  P41, W18, D2, L21, (48.8%).                     WMUWCC 12th.  
WMT. 9th. (51.7%)    
Tour to Canada, four played & won. 
 
 
1982/83 
 
Record:  P44, W25, D1, L18, (57.8%).                        WMUWCC 8th  
WMT. 10th. (46.2%) 
Snelling Sevens Finalists.  
Tour to Italy, three played but only one won.  
Coach Chris Padfield finished at end of season.  
 
 
1983/84 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P46,  W14, D1, L31,   (31.9%). 
Lowest ever position, Club finished 17th (out of 19 teams) in Western 
Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Championship.     
WMT. 11th. (32.1%) 
 
 
1984/85 
 
 
 
Record: P40, W17, D0, L23, (42.5%).                     WMUWCC 14th.   
WMT.12th. (34.6%) 
Secretary Ivor George reigned before start of season. 
 
 
1985/86 
 
WMT 
16 Clubs 
 
Record:  P38, W16, D2, L20, (45.0%).                     WMUWCC 14th.  
WMT 11th. (43.5%)               
 
 
1986/87 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P40, W19, D0, L21, (47.5%).                     WMUWCC 15th.  
WMT 12th   (40.7%) 
Tour to Florida, USA, three played & won. 
Clive Burgess made over 300 appearances for club. 
Clubhouse badly damaged by fire. 
 
 
1987/88 
 
WMT 
1 Clubs 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:   P39, W21, D2, L16, (56.1%).                     WMUWCC  9th.  
WMT. 9th. (54.8%) 
Game v USA, Won. 16 – 14 pts.  
Full Back Arwel Parry scored a club record 339 pts.  
New clubhouse opened. 
Old stand condemned under 1987 Safety of Sports Ground Act. 
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EBBW VALE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1988/89 
WMT 
18 Clubs 
 
Record: P43, W20, D1, L22, (47.7%).                WMUWCC  11th.  
WMT.12th. (43.8%) 
 
 
1989/90 
Last of the 
WMT, 
 
Record: P43, W15, D1, L27, (36.4%).                 WMUWCC  13th. 
Final Whitbread Welsh Merit Table finished 14th (out of 18 teams). 
(32.4%). 
New grandstand opened. 
 
 
1990/91 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
 
 
Worst playing season in club history.  
Not  included in the Top Division of new National League 
Record: P29, W5, D1, L23.  (20.0%) 
Heineken National League Division One 6th. (28.6%).  (16th) 
Club suspended for first two weeks of season for having five players 
sent off the previous season.     
 
1991/92 
Record:  P18, W11, D1, L6  (61.1%) 
National League  Division Two 4th. (14th) 
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists.   
 
1992/93 
 
 
Record: P22, W7, D0, L15,   (31.8%).              NLDT    10th. (22nd) 
 
1993/94 
 
 
Record:  P22, W8, D2, L12,  (41.7%)                NLDT    9th  (21st) 
 
 
1994/95 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P22, W16, D1, L5.    (73.9%)               NLDT    2nd  (14th) 
Promoted to Division One.   
 
1995/96 
 
STRATEGIC 
PROFESSIONALISM 
Record:  P22, W11, D0, L11,   (50.0%)              NLPD  7th  
Byron Hayword scored record 342 pts for season, 29 pts in one match. 
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists. 
  
364 
 
 
Appendix 3.4a 
 
 
EBBW VALE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1996/97 
 
Record:  P22, W12, D2, L8,    (58.3%)                          NLPD  7th  
Swalec Cup Semi-Finalists.   
Mark Jones, Number 8, took WRU to court over suspension of four 
weeks for fighting.   EVRFC chairman, Malcolm Shepherd called for 
WRU Chairman, Vernon Pugh, to resign because of continuing 
confrontation between the Union and clubs. 
 
 
1997/98 
 
Record:  P14, W8, D0, L6,    (57.1%)                            NLPD  4th  
Swalec Cup Finalists.   
Court of Appeal decision overturned High Court of previous year so that 
Mark Jones had to serve 28 days suspension.   
 
 
1998/99 
 
Record: P20, W12, D1, L7,   (61.9%).                           NLPD  4th  
Swalec Cup Quarter-Finalists. 
 
 
1999/00 
 
Record:  P22, W12, D0, L10,   (54.5%). Welsh/Scottish League 6th.   
Swalec Cup Semi-Finalists.   
European Shield Quarter-Finalists. 
 
 
 
KEY 
 
   Strategic    70%+ Success    Below 50%      
  Win 
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EBBW VALE: THE TROPHY YEARS 
Season Win % Strategic Issues 
1932/33  Winner of Ben Francis Cup 
   
1951/52 80.5 Western Mail Unofficial Club Champions 
1953/54 76.7 Western Mail Unofficial Club Champions 
1956/57 73.8 Western Mail Unofficial Club Champions 
1957/58  Winner of Snelling Sevens 
1959/60 79.1 Western Mail Unofficial Club Champions 
   
1969/70 66.7 Finalists Welsh Floodlight Alliance Competition 
1970/71 61.0 Finalists Welsh Floodlight Alliance Competition 
1971/72 63.4 Finalists Welsh Floodlight Alliance Competition 
1978/79 69.3 Finalists Snelling Sevens 
 
 
  
1982/83 57.8 Finalists Snelling Sevens 
   
   
1994/95 73.9 Promotion to Premier Division 
1997/98 57.1 Finalists Swalec Cup 
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EBBW VALE: STRATEGIC SEASONS 
Season Win % Strategic Issues 
1880/81  Founding of Club 
1895/96  Accepted into membership of WFU 
1899/00  Struck off WFU because of defaulting on payments 
   
1902/03  Team Folded 
1905/06  Re-applied to join WFU, Refused. 
1907/08  Joined Northern Union Rugby League 
   
1919/20  Accepted back into membership of WFU. 
   
1932/33  Won first trophy: Ben Francis Cup. 
   
1940/41 100.0 Undefeated in 30 games. 100% Record 
1946/47 70.3 
Attracted top English Clubs as opposition.     Welsh 
Clubs were too ‘aloof’ to play Ebbw Vale. 
1948/49 71.1 
Welfare Ground was unplayable.      Home games 
played at other local clubs grounds. 
1949/50 68.6 Recognised as a First Class Club. 
   
1951/52 80.5 
Western Mail Unofficial Club Champions of Wales for 
the First Time 
1953/54 76.7 WMUCC Champions 
1956/57 73.8 WMUCC Champions 
1959/60 79.1 WMUCC Champions 
   
1979/80 46.5 Centenary Season. Game v Romania 
   
1983/84 31.9 Lowest Position in WMUCC; 17th out of 19 clubs. 
1986/87 47.5 Clubhouse badly damaged through fire. 
1987/88 56.1 New clubhouse opened.  But old stand condemned. 
1989/90 36.4 New grandstand opened. 
   
1990/91 20.0 
Worse ever club playing record, 20%.  Placed in 
Division Two of new National Leagues. 
1994/95 73.9 Promoted to Top Division of National Leagues. 
1995/96 50.0 Professionalism 
1997/98 57.1 Change of legal entity to Limited Company. 
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EBBW VALE: MATCH PERFORMANCES 
HIGH & LOW PERCENTAGES 
Season Over 70% Win Win % Season Below 50% Win Win % 
1941/42 (Wartime) 100.0   
1946/47 70.3   
1947/48 71.1   
1948/49 71.1   
    
1950/51 70.8   
1951/52 80.5   
1953/54 76.7   
1956/57 73.8   
1958/59 72.5   
1959/60 79.1   
    
1960/61 70.7 1964/65 47.7 
1961/62 70.5 1965/66 40.7 
1968/69 70.2   
    
1976/77 80.3 1979/80 46.5 
    
  1981/82 48.8 
  1983/84 31.9 
  1984/85 42.5 
  1985/86 45.0 
  1986/87 47.5 
  1988/89 47.7 
  1989/90 36.4 
    
1994/95 73.9 1990/91 20.0 
  1992/93 31.8 
  1993/94 41.7 
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  EBBW VALE RFC COMMITTEE:                                                             EVRFC LTD:  BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
Officers 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 Ltd Co. 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 
President Powell J.H Powell J.H Powell J.H Powell J.H   Russell  P Russell P President Russell P Russell P Russell P 
Chairman Westwood P Treanor M. Treanor M Treanor M Gardner P Shepherd M Shepherd M Chairman Russell M Russell M Russell M 
Vice Chair Johns D Morgan A Lapham C. Lapham C. Lapham C. Johns D Brennan C CEO       
Secretary Jones E Jones E. Shorthse J Shorthse J George I. Jones E Jones E        
Treasurer Everett J Hamilton J. Hamilton J. Hamilton J. Lewis S Lewis S Harrington P Fin Direct Morgan  T Morgan  T Morgan  T 
Match Sec Shepherd M Moseley P. Moseley P. Moseley P. Evans C Evans C Taylor D        
Fix Sec Lapham C Lapham. C Lapham. C Lapham. C Brennan C Brennan C Brennan C Dir  Rugby Jones  L Jones  L Jones  L 
As Fix Sec       Brennan C.       Team Man. Taylor  D Taylor  D Taylor  D 
Changes 4 2 0 5 0 3 5   0 0 0 
Committee Elect to 92 Elect to 92 Elect to 94 Elect to 94 Elect to 96 Elect to 96 Exec Com        
  Graydon J Bowker G Bowker G Bowker G Bowker G Bowker G Jones E  Directors Russell M Russell M Russell M 
  Howell R Graydon J Dallimore J Dallimore J Dallimore J Dallimore J Shepherd M   Hancock S Hancock S Hancock S 
  Jones J Howell R Evans C Evans C Evans C Evans C Harrington P   Harris R Harris R Harris R 
  Marshall N Jones J Graydon J Graydon J Gardner P Gardner P Brennan C       Brennan C 
  Morgan I Marshall N Howell R Howell R Haycock K. Haycock K. Webber N       Jude B 
  Moseley P Moseley P Marshall N Marshall N Howells R Morgan T.          
  Newcombe J Newcombe J Moseley P Moseley P Morgan T. Rose J     General Committee       
  Rose J Rose J Rose J Rose J Rose J Taylor D          
  Scully B Wharton S     Taylor D Williams J Brennan C  Porter C       
  Westwood P Westwood P     Williams J   Dentus J Shepherd M       
Committee Elect to 91 Elect to 93 Elect to 93 Elect to 95 Elect to 95 Elect to 97 Dix A Snllgrove D       
  Brennan C Brennan C Brennan C Brennan C Brennan C Brennan C Edwards A Taylor D       
  Cameron T Cameron T Cameron T Cameron T Cameron T Cameron T Evans A Taylor R       
  Dentus J Dentus J Dentus J Dentus J Dentus J Dentus J Haycock K Webber C      
  Johns D Edwards A Edwards A Edwards A Edwards A Edwards A James I Webber N       
  Lapham C Johns D Johns D Harse K Johns D James I Johns D Williams J       
  Mitchum P Jukes R Jukes R Johns D Lapham C Johns D Michael I        
  Morgan A Lapham C Lapham C Jukes R Morgan A Morgan A Morgan A        
  Porter C Morgan A Morgan A Lapham C Rose K Taylor R Morgan T        
  Shepherd M Porter C Porter C Morgan A Treanor M Webber N Phillips A        
  Treanor M Treanor M Treanor M Treanor M              
Total Com 20 20 18 18 19 18   20       
Change  4 4 1 5 4 9 All  Change 0 0 0 
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NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB 
HISTORY 
 
(Source:  An Illustrated History of Newbridge R.F.C.  
Terry Powell, 1988) 
 
SEASON                                             EVENT 
 
1888/89 
(p.16) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Newbridge RFC Formed:  Due to difficulty of obtaining a suitable 
ground and acceptable playing facilities the club did not obtain 
admission to the Welsh Rugby Union until 1911. 
 
 
1889/90 
(p.16) 
 
Club now running 3 teams.  Ground move from Dr Richards’s field to  
Ty Hir Farm, then to ‘Top Flats.’    
 
 
1898/99 
(p.18) 
 
Club joined Monmouthshire Junior League.   
Team called Newbridge White Stars. Other teams involved  
were Newbridge Reserves and Newbridge Harlequins. 
Tom Banfield “went North” for £30 down and £2 per week. 
 
 
1901/02 
(p.19) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Newbridge United team formed to play on Wednesdays only.  
Club moved to ‘Showfield’ then on to ‘Waun Bwdr’. 
 
 
1903/04 
(p.19) 
 
 
Charity Match played for Mr David Evans raised £22. 
 
1904/05 
(p.20) 
 
Monmouthshire County Football Club established. 
Newbridge & Abercarn supporters brought before magistrates for 
causing an affray after game. Heavy fines were handed out. 
AGM of club held at Beaufort Arms Hotel. 
 
 
1906/07 
(p.21) 
 
 
 
Record: P8, W2 D2, L4. Pts For, 36, Agst: 40.   (40.0%). 
Newbridge finished season well down Monmouthshire Junior League 
Table:  Charity match held between Morgan’s XV and George Bennett’s 
XV. 
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NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON                                             EVENT 
 
1911/12 
(p.22) 
 
Elected to membership of WRFU.    
Club AGM elected, President, Vice Presidents (8), Chairman, Vice 
Chairman, Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer, 9 Committeemen 
and team captain. 
 
 
1912/13 
(p.23) 
 
 
Deputation from club attended monthly meeting of Abercarn District 
Council. Point made that club had held ground for 12 years and had 
undertaken all repairs themselves.  
It was impossible to get gate money from spectators. Council promised 
to look at acquiring ground and letting it to club. 
 
 
1913/14 
STRATEGIC 
 
Club accepted into Monmouthshire League. 
 
 
1914/18 
 
The Great War. 
 
 
1919/20 
(p.26) 
 
 
Record: P24, W2, D5, L17, Pts For: 28, Agst, 130.   (24.1%) 
Newbridge played Newport 1st XV for first time.  Lost 0 – 17 pts. 
 
 
1922/23 
(p.29/30) 
 
At May AGM, at Beaufort Arms, Harry Hoare, Secretary, reported 
Receipts £129. Expenditure £128, Balance at bank of £1/6/lld.  
Club Tour at Easter to Cornwall.   
 
 
1923/24 
(p.30) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Monmouthshire League Runners-Up. 
Official opening of new ground, Newbridge Welfare Ground with 
7,000 capacity, costing £1,500 to date. Intension was to spend a 
further £7,000 on bowling greens and tennis courts.  
The game against Newport ended in 3-3pts draw.   
Newbridge RFC Supporters Club formed at Beaufort Arms. 
 
 
1924/25 
(p.33) 
 
Monmouthshire League 3rd.   
Miners Betterment Fund allocated £1,500 to the Newbridge Welfare 
Club for lay out purposes.    “The spacious pavilion which had been 
erected on the Welfare Ground at the cost of several hundred pounds was 
opened” prior to game v Cross Keys on 28th February 1925. 
Newport-Abercarn Company had leased the land for the pitch and 
pavilion to the Welfare Fund for 99 years at an annual rental of 1s per 
year.  
H.S. Coleman, former Newbridge player was killed in a mining accident. 
 
  
374 
 
Appendix 3.5a 
  
 
 
NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON                                             EVENT 
 
1925/26 
(p.34) 
TROPHY 
 
Monmouthshire League Champions.    
At AGM Secretary announced a profit of £22.  Income was £139 with 
best gate v Crumlin of £15. 
 
 
1926/27 
(p. 38/39) 
 
Monmouthshire League Runners-Up.    
Fire in club in visitors’ dressing room. Quickly extinguished.    
AGM Financial Report; Receipts were £73/3/5d with admission fee of 
4d. 
 
 
1928/29 
(p.38/39) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
League Record: P18, W1, D5, L12.  (31.6%)   
AGM Financial Report; Receipts down to £68/14/9d with an 
admission fee of 6d.   Newbridge 2nd XV was formed. 
 
1929/30 
(p.41) 
 
Celynen Collieries closed for six months with 1,600 men idle.  
“Children were crying with cold at Newbridge”. 
 
 
1920-1930 
(p.41) 
 
“The success on the field must have helped in no small measure to dispel 
the gloom and despondency that the depression had brought to the 
valleys” 
 
 
1930/31 
(p.43) 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P36, W16, D6, L14.   (52.4%). 
Coal Owners brought in new working practice. Men had to work 
until 2:30pm on Saturdays. 
This led to decrease in attendances. Game v Ebbw Vale expected to 
attract £10 gate, only took £1/4s.  
If maintained Club will have great difficulty in carrying on.    
At AGM Receipts were announced as £60/9s. 
 
 
1931/32 
(p.45) 
 
 
 
Record: P15, W6, D2, L7.  (47.1%).  Monmouthshire League 4th.   
Ben Francis Cup Finalists. 
Former club captain, W. Shipp, (27 years old) died from injuries received 
as a result of roof fall at South Celynen mine. 
 
 
1932/33 
STRATEGIC 
 
New Boys Club Pavilion opened at cost of £2,500. 
 
 
1938/39 
(p.51) 
 
Record: P42, W15, D7, L20.  (52.4%). 
AGM reported financial deficit of £49/9/3d.   
Old English Ball was held in aid of Newbridge RFC to raise funds. 
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NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON                                             EVENT 
 
1940-1945 
(p.57) 
 
THE WAR 
YEARS 
 
Season 1943/44, Record: P28, W26, D1, L1 Pts For: 543 Agst: 95. 
(93.1%)  Miners allowed to play for club during war.   
In March 1945 first win over Cardiff, 16 – 6 pts. 
Average gates were 4-5000 spectators paying between £60-£70.  
First regular fixture v Newport RFC. 
Games organised to raise money for organisations like the Red Cross and 
YMCA.  At its peak there were 1000 members of Supporters Club. 
 
 
1946/47 
(p.68) 
 
Ladies Committee reformed.   
Two games played on tour to France. Both won. 
 
 
1947/48 
(p.60/63) 
 
 
 
 
 
Arguably Newbridges best ever season to date.  
Record: P45, W34, D4, L7. (77.6%).  
Western Mail Welsh Unofficial Club Championship Runners-Up.  
(12 ‘First’ class Welsh Clubs).   53 players represented club.        
First fixture with Llanelli RFC, 7th February. 
Three games played on tour to France. Two won. 
First full Welsh International player, Billy Gore. 
 
 
1948/49 
 
 
 
Record:   P41, W34, D3, L4,     (84.1%) 
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Championship Runners-up. 
 
 
1949/50 
(p.64) 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P49, W29, D7, L13,   (64.3%)                       WMUWCC  7th.  
Fixture list was now full of the best Welsh & English Rugby Clubs 
with the exception of Cardiff RFC.    
Newbridge Welfare Committee erected a 1000 sitter stand in front 
of the Boys Club at cost of £5,000.    
Ron Coles scored record 28 tries in season. 
 
 
1950/51 
 
 
Record:  P37, W21, D9, L7.   (65.2%)                         WMUWCC  9th.    
 
1951/52 
(p.71) 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P41, W22, D3, L16,   (56.8%)                       WMUWCC  9th.     
During 50’s ground improvements, changing rooms and stand 
brought up to first class standard.  
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NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON                                           EVENT 
 
1953/54 
(p.75) 
   
Record:   P42, W17, D6, L18.   (47.9%)                    WMUWCC   15th  
Lowest ebb since attaining ‘First’ class status.  
  
 
1954/55 
(p.77) 
 
Record:  P41, W14, D6, L21   (42.6%)                      WMUWCC  15th.     
Club finished bottom but one in Unofficial Welsh Championship.   
Won only 14 games from 41 matches.  
Over sixty players turned out for club.   
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists. 
 
 
1956/57 
(p.78) 
 
Record: P42, W23, D4 L15,   (58.7%).                      WMUWCC  11th.     
 
1959/60 
(p.83) 
 
Record: P42, W22, D4, L16,   (56.5%)                      WMUWCC  10th.     
Tour to Cornwall. Two games played and won.       
First full English International player, Derek Morgan. 
 
 
1960/61 
(p.87) 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P44, W15, D7, L22.    (43.1%)                    WMUWCC  16th.        
New £11,000 Clubhouse opened.  
 
 
1961/62 
(p.89) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P43, W20, D2, L21,   (48.9%)                     WMUWCC  15th.        
Club signed lease for Welfare Ground for 21 years rental of £250 
p.a.   
Game v Derek Morgan International XV, Lost 10 – 54 pts. 
Tour to Ireland to play two games. One won, one lost. 
 
 
1962/63 
(p.91) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P40, W24, D2, L14,   (61.9%)                      WMUWCC  9th.          
Played special fixture against Cardiff RFC to open Sportsman’s Club.   
Won, 6 – 0 pts. 
Establishment of Newbridge Youth team after Newbridge Boys 
Club become extinct.   
 
 
1963/64 
(p.95) 
 
Record: P43, W28, D3, L12.   (68.9%) 
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists.   
Tour to West Country, Two played one won.  
Benefit game Newbridge v International XV to raise funds for former 
player, Dickie Rossiter, confined to a wheelchair due to mining accident. 
 
  
377 
 
 
Appendix 3.5a 
    
NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON                                             EVENT 
 
1964/65 
(p.97, & 
116/124) 
 
TROPHY 
 
NEWBRIDGE’S BEST EVER SEASON.  
Record: P37, W26, D8, L3, Pts For: 645, Agst: 234.   (75.6%). 
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions.   
National Sevens Finalists. 
 
 
1965/66 
(p.97/105) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
75th Anniversary.  
Record:  P40, W23, D3, L14,   (60.5%) 
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists.   
Clubhouse damaged by fire.   
Tours to Somerset and France.   
 
 
1966/67 
(p.103) 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P38, W28, D4, L6.     (76.2%)  
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Championship Runners-Up. 
Fixtures against champions Neath cancelled over alleged ‘biting’ 
incident.     
Tour to North of England. Three games played and won.  
 
 
1967/68 
(p.107) 
 
Record: P46, W30, D3, L13.   (67.3%)                    WMUWCC  4th.          
Teams from Northern Ireland, England, Scotland and France (W1, L1)  
played during season.   
 
 
1968/69 
 
 
Record:  P37, W18, D4, L15,  (53.6%)                      WMUWCC  12th.  
 
1969/70 
(p.111) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P43, W21, D1, L21,  (50.0%)                      WMUWCC  12th. 
National Sevens  Finalists.    
Due to drop in gate receipts and increased expenses, Newbridge 2nd 
XV was dispensed with.   
But Newbridge United still continued to exist as independent club.    
End of season tour to Northern Ireland. Two played both lost. 
 
 
1971/72 
(p.126) 
 
New WRU 
Cup 
Competetion 
 
Record:  P42, W17, D1, L24.    (41.9%)                    WMUWCC  15th. 
Financial position of the club was not very good. Drive for fund 
raising. 
First season of WRU Challenge Cup.  Lost in 2nd Round to Cardiff 
College of Education. 
Former player, Brian ‘Bomber’ Wellington took over as secretary 
(retired after 25 years service in 1997).  Mini Rugby section started. 
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NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB 
HISTORY 
 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1972/73 
(p129/131) 
 
Record: P43, W21, D2, L20. ( 51.1%).                      WMUWCC  12th. 
Club getting on to a firmer financial footing through many fund raising 
events.    
Club fielded two 1st XVs v Bath & St. Josephs (cup) on same day. 
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists.    
Club tour to Cyprus, Three games played and won.   
 
 
1973/74 
(p.134) 
 
WMT started 
10 Clubs 
 
Record: P40, W13, D2, L25.  (35.7%). 
Finished 17th (out of 18 teams) in WMUWCC.   
First season of Merit Table (10 teams including Newbridge). Club 
finished bottom of table.   
Tour to Cornwall, Three games played, two won.   
Derek Morgan took over from Arthur Hughes as coach. 
Bar in clubhouse was being run without a steward but by players on rota.  
 
                
1974/75 
(p.135) 
 
 
 
Record:  P39, W15, D2, L22, (41.5%).                     WMUWCC. 14th.  
WMT. 10th (14.3%)  out of 10 clubs.  
 First club to have a manager (sole coach & selector, Dai Harris).  Tour 
to North of England. Two games, 1 won, 1 lost.   
Tour to Belgium One game, won. 
 
 
1975/76 
(p.138) 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P42, W23, D1, L18.   (55.8%).                     WMUWCC 8th, 
WMT.11th (45.8%)   WMT now 15 Clubs 
Clubhouse destroyed by explosion. 
 
 
1976/77 
(p.143) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P41, W15, D0, L26.   (36.6%).                     WMUWCC 15th. 
WMT 12th (25.0%) 
Club facilities were very poor. Llanelli stopped fixtures as a result.  
Offers from other clubs of help, particularly from Ebbw Vale.  
Tony Browning scored club record 28 pts in a game. 
Ken Braddock completed 300 games for club (after 8 years retired). 
Dai Harris resigned as coach.     
Tour to Czechoslovakia.  Five games played, four won.  
  
 
1977/78 
(p.144) 
 
 
 
 
 
Record: P41, W17, D2, L22.   (44.2%).                    WMUWCC 13th.  
WMT12th.(32.0%)       
New coach appointed, Keith Westwood.   
Steve Diamond turned professional with Wakefield RLC for £8,000.  
Tour to Cornwall. Three games all won.    
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NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1978/79 
(145/146) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P32, W16, D0, L16.    (50.0%).                     WMUWCC 12th.  
WMT 10th.(50.0%)     
Decision taken to make the Boys Club the HQ of Newbridge RFC. 
Training taking place at local comprehensive school and on pitch under 
car headlights!   
 
 
1979/80 
(p.147) 
 
Record: P37, W23, D1, L13,     (63.2%).                      WMUWCC 8th.  
WMT.  6th.  (59.3%). 
National Sevens Semi-Finalists. Tour to Florida, USA, three played & 
won.   Mike Croad took over as chairman (position held until 1993). 
Work on replacement clubhouse started. 
 
 
1980/81 
(p.150/156) 
 
Record: P40, W21, D2, L17,   (54.8%).                        WMUWCC  9th.     
WMT.  8th.  (52.0%). 
Llanelli & Cardiff back on fixture list. Supporters Club re-kindled.   
Tour to Miami, USA.  Three games played all won. 
   
 
1981/82 
(p.174) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P38, W21, D2, L15,   (57.5%)                        WMUWCC  7th.     
WMT.  7th.  (56.0%).   Schweppes Cup Semi-Finalists.  
New floodlights completed with game v Crawshays Welsh RFC,  
Won, 32 – 14 pts.   
Father, Dennis Hughes, and son, Wyn, played together v Maesteg.  First 
occasion ever for a father & son to play together in first class fixture in 
Wales.   Tour to California, USA. Three games played, all won. 
 
 
1982/83 
(p.178) 
 
 
 
Record, P41, W31, D1, L9 (76.82%).   
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Championship 3rd.  
WMT.  4th.   (69.2%).  Schweppes Cup Semi-Finalists. 
Tour to West Germany, two played & won 
 
 
1983/84 
(p.180/5) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Record:  P45, W32, D2, L11,   (72.3%)                     WMUWCC  4th.  
WMT  3rd. (71.4%).    Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists.  
Newbridge v Japan: Lost.  14 – 19 pts. First time the club had played 
a touring country on its own.   
Paul Turner scored record 405 pts.  Club scored record 1,129 pts. 
Club played Public School Wanderers  RFC in a 100pt spectacular, (Ref: 
CN) fund raising game (£2000+) for a young local soldier, Andrew Bull, 
blinded in a Northern Ireland bomb blast.  
Tour to Spain. One game played and won. 
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NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON                                             EVENT 
 
1984/85 
(p.187) 
 
Record:  P42, W26, D0, L16,    (61.9%).                    WMUWCC  7th.  
WMT.  5th.   (62.5%). 
Double recorded over Newport plus a win over Cardiff. 
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists.   
Collections made at matches in aid of local miners’ families strike fund.  
Tour to Spain, two games cancelled.   
 
 
1985/86 
(p.194) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P41, W16, D5, L20,     (45.7%).                  WMUWCC  13th. 
WMT.  9th.   (50.0%). WMT now 16 clubs. 
£25,000 Sponsorship deal with local company AIWA.  
Tour to Switzerland. Three games played and won.   
Local rivals, Pontypool, cancelled fixtures with Newbridge over  
“The Bishop Punching Affair”. 
 
 
1986/87 
(p.194) 
 
 
Record: P41, W20, D1, L20.   (50.0%).                    WMUWCC  13th. 
WMT.  10th.   (48.0%). 
Schweppes Cup Semi-Finalists.  
Chris Padfield now senior coach and Keith Westwood as team manager. 
   
 
1987/88 
 
WMT 
17 Clubs 
 
Record: P39, W21, D0, L18.   (53.8%)                      WMUWCC  11th. 
WMT.  7th.   (64.0%). 
Clive Davis took over as coach.  
Tour to West Country, Two played, one won. 
 
 
1988/89 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
 
Centenary Season.   
Record:  P39, W31, D2, L8,    (80.5%) 
Western Mail Unofficial Club Championship 3rd ,    
Whitbread Merit Table 3rd (82.8%).  Now 18 clubs. 
Schweppes Cup Semi-Finalists:   
Game v Western Samoa, Lost 15 – 16pts. 
Tour to Canada, three played & won. 
 
 
1989/90 
Final 
WMUWCC 
 
Final WMT. 
 
Record:  P38, W24, D0, L14,   (63.2%)                      WMUWCC  7th.  
Whitbread Merit Table. 4th  (72.4%).   
Full back, David Rees scored record 30 pts in a game.   
Newbridge v Wales.  Lost 4 -25 pts (Ref: CN).     
Tour to Cyprus, two played & won. 
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NEWBRIDGE RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON                                             EVENT 
 
1990/91 
 
New 
National 
Leagues 
STRATEGIC 
 
Team Placed in Top Division (10 clubs) of new National League. 
Record: P18, W9, D0, L9, (50.0%)  Heineken Premier Division. 7th.     
Club scored a record 1211 points and record 208 tries in season.   
Snelling Sevens Winners. 
Swalec Cup Quarter-Finalists. 
 
 
1991/92 
 
Record: P18, W10, D0, L8.    (55.6%)                            NLDO  5th  
 
 
1992/93 
 
 
 
Record: P22, W6, D0, L16.   (27.3%)                             NLDO  10th  
Snelling Sevens Winners 
Paul Evans quit as coach mid-season. 
 
 
1993/94 
 
 
 
Record:  P22, W7, D1, L14,   (34.8%)                            NLDO  8th  
Swalec Cup Quarter-Finalists. 
 
 
1994/95 
 
 
 
Record:  P22, W8, D0, L14,    (36.4%)                           NLDO  9th  
Heineken National League Division One,  9th.    
Swalec Cup Quarter Finalists. 
 
 
1995/96 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
PROFESSIONALISM 
Record: P22, W9, D0, L13.     (40.9%)                           NLDO  9th  
Heaviest League Defeat, Lost 7 – 78 pts to Cardiff. 
Swalec Cup Quarter-Finalists. 
 
 
1996/97 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P22, W4, D0, L22.    (18.2%).                              
Relegated from National League Division One (12th).   
 
 
1997/98 
 
 
Record:  P30, W14, D0, L16,  (46.7%)                           NLDO  10th  
 
 
1998/99 
 
 
Record: P30, W14, D0, L16.   (46.7%).                          NLDO  10th  
 
1999/00 
 
Record: P30, W14, D2, L14.   (50.0%).                           NLDO  6th  
 
 
KEY 
 
   Strategic    70%+ Success    Below 50% 
win 
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NEWBRIDGE RFC 
 
THE TROPHY SEASONS 
 
 
Season Win % Trophy 
1925/26 - Monmouthshire League Champions.  
   
1964/65 75.6 Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club  Champions 
   
1990/91 50.0 Snelling 7s Winners 
1992/93 27.3 Sne9lling 7s Winners 
   
4 Trophies in 108 
seasons. 
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             NEWBRIDGE RFC 
 
    THE STRATEGIC SEASONS 
 
 
Season Win % Strategic Issues 
1888/89 - Club Founded. 
1901/02 - Newbridge United formed to play only on Wednesdays 
1911/12 - Elected to membership of WRFU 
1913/14 - Club accepted into Monmouthshire League 
   
1923/24 - Official opening of new Welfare ground, cost £1,500. 
1924/25 - New pavilion opened on ground 
1928/29 31.6 Newbridge 2nd XV formed. Total Receipts £68,14s.9d. 
   
1930/31 52.4 Coal Owners new working practices. Receipts £60.9s. 
   
1940/45  War Years but club still played. 
1949/50 64.3 1000 seater stand erected costing £5,000. 
   
1951/52 56.8 Ground improvements up to first class standard. 
1954/55 42.6 Club finished bottom but one of WMUWCC. 
   
1960/61 43.1 New £11,000 clubhouse opened. 
1961/62 48.9 Club signed 21 year lease for ground, rent £250 p.a. 
1965/66 60.5 75th Anniversary. Clubhouse damaged by fire. 
1969/70 50.0 Newbridge 2nd XV abolished due to costs. 
   
1971/72 41.9 Financial position perilous. 
1975/76 55.8 Clubhouse destroyed by explosion. 
1976/77 36.6 Fixtures affected by lack of clubhouse. 
1978/79 50.0 Boys Club made HQ of Newbridge RFC. 
   
1981/82 57.5 New floodlights installed. 
1983/84 72.3 Game v Japan. First time to play a touring country. 
1985/86 45.7 AIWA £25,000 sponsorship deal. 
1988/89 80.5 Centenary Season. 
   
1990/91 50.0 Club placed in Premier Division of new National League. 
1996/97   18.2 Club relegated from Top Division. 
28 Seasons out of 
108 seasons. 
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         NEWBRIDGE RFC 
 
   MATCH PERFORMANCES 
 
HIGH & LOW PERCENTAGES 
 
Season Over 70% Win Win % Season Below 50% Win Win % 
1943/44 93.1 1905/06 40.0 
    
  1919/20 24.1 
  1928/29 31.6 
  1931/32 47.1 
  1937/38 37.8 
    
First Class Status  First Class Status  
1947/48 77.6   
1948/49 84.1   
    
  1953/54 47.9 
  1954/55 42.6 
    
1964/65 75.6 1960/61 43.1 
1966/67 76.2 1961/62 48.9 
    
  1971/72 41.9 
  1973/74 35.7 
  1974/75 41.5 
  1976/77 36.6 
  1977/78 44.2 
    
1982/83 76.8 1985/86 45.7 
1983/84 72.3   
1988/89 80.5   
    
  1992/93 27.3 
  1993/94 34.8 
  1994/95 36.4 
  1995/96 40.9 
  1996/97 18.2 
7 seasons out of  55 played  1997/98 46.7 
  1998/99 46.7 
31 seasons with win % between 
50.0% & 69.9% 
 17 seasons out of 55 played   
(30.9%) 
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NEWBRIDGE RFC COMMITTEE 1990 - 2000 
Officers 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 
President Walker L Herring J Herring J Gregory N Gregory N Gregory N Gregory N Gregory N Hughes A Hughes A 
Chairman Croad M Croad M Croad M Roberts H Roberts H Roberts H Merton P Merton P McCarthy I McCarthy I 
Secretary Wellington B Wellington B Wellington B Wellington B Wellington B Wellington B Patterson G Patterson G Patterson G Patterson G 
Treasurer Hiscott M Hiscott M Hiscott M Hiscott M Hiscott M Hiscott M Gibby D Gibby D Gregory N Jones G 
Fix. Sec Morgan R Morgan R Morgan R Morgan R Morgan R Morgan R Bartley P Bartley P Bartley P Bartley P 
Dir of Rugby                 Powell A Powell A 
Com Dir                 Bartley P Bartley P 
PR/Com Sec                 Merton P Thomas R 
Changes 1 0 2 0 0 4 0 3 2   
Committee Bartley B Bartley B Bartley B Asbridge B Asbridge B Ashbridge B  Bartley B Bartley B Bartley B  Gregory N 
  Burland L Burland L Bennett G Bartley B Bartley B Bartley B Bradford D Bradford D  Harris B Griffiths G 
  Edwards K Edwards K Burland L  Bartley P Bartley P Bartley P  Brooks K Brooks K  Matthews D Harris B 
  Gregory W Gregory W Edwards K  Bennett G  Britten P Bradford D Harris B Harris B Morris B Matthews D 
  Harries B Harries B Gregory W  Britten P Gibby D Britten P  Isaac J Isaac J  Pike N Morris B 
  Hughes C Hughes C Harries B Davies R  Griffiths J Gibby D  Jones B Jones B  Pugh V Pike N 
  Isaac J Isaac J Harries H Griffiths J Harries B Griffiths J Jones G Jones G  Way H Pugh V 
  McQuillam R Jones B Hughes C Harries B Harries B  Matthews D Matthews D   Way H 
  Morgan P McQuillam R Isaac J Harries H Harris B Morgan S  McCarthy I      
  Morris B Morgan P Jones B Harris B  Hughes C  Morham D  Pike N     
  Powell P Morris B McQuillam R  Hughes C Isaac J Pike N Powell P      
  Powell T Powell P Morgan P Isaac J  Jones B Powell P Pugh V     
  Roberts H Powell T  Morris B  Jones B Jones G Pugh V  Way H     
  Shimwell N Roberts H Powell P Jones G Matthews D Way H  Wellington J      
  Taylor R Shimwell N Roberts H  Merton P Merton P  Wellington J       
  Thomas G Smith B Shimwell N  Morgan P  Morgan P          
  Thomas R Taylor R  Smith B  Patterson G Paterson G          
  Way G  Thomas G Taylor R Powell P Powell P         
  Way H Thomas R Thomas G  Pugh P Pugh V         
  Williams G Way H Way H Taylor R Taylor R          
    Williams G Williams G  Way H Way H         
          Wellington J         
Changes 1 1 10 4 10 6 3 5 1 
          
            KEY  Left Position         
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LLANELLI  RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB 
                           HISTORY 
 
(Source: The Scarlets: A History of Llanelli RFC.  Gareth Hughes 1986) 
 
SEASON                                     EVENT 
 
1875/76 
(p.7) 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
 
Llanelli FC was formed in 1872 as an association football club.  
 
Some three years later at a  meeting on 11th November 1875, at the 
Athenaeum, it was decided to form a rugby club.   
 
Mr John Rogers of Morewood & Rogers took the chair. with Mr W.Y. 
Nevill as secretary and Mr Rogers, an old Rugbeian, as captain.  
First recorded match v Cambrian Club (Swansea) at People’s Park.   
In first season. Record: P5, W0, D4, L1. (44.4%) 
 
 
1876/77 
(p.10) 
 
 
Record:  P3, W1, D1, L1, (50.0%)  
Game of 18 players per side v Swansea.  
Death of club captain Arthur Buchanon (24 years old) in gunshot 
accident. 
 
 
1877/78 
(p.12) 
 
 
Record:  P8, W2, D3, L3.  (45.5%) 
Institution of South Wales Challenge Cup Competition. 
 
 
1878/79 
(p.14) 
STRATEGIC 
 
Llanelly club had virtually collapsed.  
Only one game played, & lost, at end of season v Felinfoel.  
 
 
1879/80 
(p.15) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P7, W4, D0, L3. (57.1%)  
Stradey cricket ground acquire for practices and matches.  
Club ‘uniform’ was blue and white.     
 
 
1880/81 
(p.17) 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record: P12, W7, D4, L1. (68.8%) 
In March, 1881, the club was one of the eleven founder members of 
the WRFU at the Castle Hotel, Neath. 
Club ‘uniform’ was now black guernseys and trousers’.  
Following a cup win over Swansea, the team were drawn through town 
by a procession of thousands to the Thomas Arms Hotel.  
First ever game v Cardiff in South Wales Challenge Cup Final. 
Lost.  
  
 
1881/82 
(p.19) 
 
 
Record: P12, W8, D2, L2. (71.4%) 
South Wales Challenge Cup Finalist.  (Lost to Newport). 
Club colours now rose and primrose. 
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LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON                                   EVENT 
 
1882/83 
(p.21) 
 
Record: P12, W7, D2, L3  (64.3%). 
Due to heavy expenses admission charge of 6d ‘for all classes’. 
Previously working men charged 3d and ladies ‘free’.   
First International players, Harry Bowen and Alfred Cattell. 
 
 
1883/84 
(p.23/25) 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record: P20, W13, D2, L5. (68.2%) 
First occasion v Irish XV for Scarlet colours to be worn by team.  
Crowd of between 2-3,000 watched game v Newport.   
Winners of South Wales Challenge Cup. ‘Never was there a more 
enthusiastic or more general demonstration at Llanelly’.   
AGM, duties of captain and chairman separated for first time.  
 
 
1884/85 
(p.26/27) 
 
Record P23, W11, D3, L9. (53.8%).  Club membership was 156.   
First time for Llanelly to entertain an English team (Hull). Game at 
home v Dewsbury drew 4,000 crowd and gate money of approx. £40.  
Tour to North of England. Four played & lost. 
 
 
1885/86 
(p.29/30) 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record: P28, W14, D8, L6 (64.3%).  
Winners South Wales Challenge Cup. Town band met team at station 
and a large touch light parade accompanied players to Thomas Arms 
Hotel.       At AGM membership was given as 259 
 
 
1886/87 
(p.31/32) 
 
Record: P31, W16, D4.,L11, (57.1%). 
South Wales Challenge Cup Finalists. (Lost to Swansea). 
Financial position of the club was such as called for frequent 
subscription from players towards buying balls.   
Six Llanelli players joined Rochdale RLC for £50 each and work. 
First International played at Stradey, Wales v England, crowd of 8,000. 
 
 
1887/88 
(p.34/35) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record: P27, W13, D3, L11,  (53.3%). 
End of season tour to North of England. Four played, one won.  
Captain Harry Bowen said at AGM “Something ought to be done to 
keep the men in good condition on tour. All ought to be made to sign 
the pledge, which they ought to keep until all the matches are played”.  
Withdrawal of South Wales Challenge Cup. 
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LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1888/89 
(p.36/38) 
 
 
 
 
Record: P 37, W, 28, D4, L5. (78.0%).  
Game v New Zealand Maoris, Won  3 – 0pts.  .    
Ground Record, players were presented with a gold medal in 
recognition. 
Scrumhalf Gitto Griffiths scored 24 tries. 
 
 
1889/90 
(p.39/40) 
 
Record:  P29, W16, D5, L8.  (61.8%). 
Team took two tours to London and to Devon. 
At AGM, treasurer, William Wilkins said the season would have been 
more successful “if the players had stuck together better and quibbled 
less”. Plead for players to return to Friday evening meetings to discuss 
opponents strengths & weaknesses.  Chairman pointed out that 
majority of rivals Swansea’s forwards were abstainers. 
 
 
1890/91 
(p.41/43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P29, W11, D4, L14 (45.5%).  
Season described as ‘the gloomiest ever’.   
No arranged fixtures with either Cardiff or Newport.    
At AGM treasurer warned of practice of ‘cheating the gate’ where 
membership cards were thrown over wall to admit other persons.   
New chairman, Gavin Henry, was elected. Previously he was the first 
treasurer of the club, and now a member of WRU. 
 
 
1891/92 
(p.44/45) 
 
 
Record:  P34, W19, D6, L9.  (62.5%). 
Fixtures with Cardiff & Newport restored.   
At AGM secretary commented on improved fixture list and that 
Blackheath might play at Stradey but hotel costs would be high at £40 
or £50.   
Seven junior teams now playing in Llanelli & District. 
 
 
1892/93 
(p.46/47) 
 
 
Record:  P31, W16, D5, L10 (58.3%). 
March 1893 formation of Llanelli Association Football Club. Played 
two home matches at Stradey. 
Several games played with North of England teams.   
Tour planned to Ireland cancelled due to financial position of club. 
Last International played at Stradey v Ireland, crowd of 20,000. 
Death of businessman and former chairman, Isaiah Bevan, 1884-87, 
aged 40, due to fatal accident on dock-side at Briton Ferry.  
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LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
  
SEASON EVENT 
 
1893/94 
(p.48/49) 
 
 
Record:  P34, W19, D5, L10,  (61.5%). 
Season started with concerns over whether or not club would survive 
or go to the wall.   
Distinction of ‘class’ was said to have entered team.  
D.J. Daniel became first player from club to be sent off. 
Three match Christmas tour to Devon, all won.   
At AGM chairman, William Wilkins, was highly critical of players 
who did not train nor abstain from drink. Such players were not 
required at Stradey. 
 
 
1894/95 
(p.50/51) 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P33, W23, D6, L4,    (74.4%). 
Club was heavily in debt at start of season.  But by end of successful 
season a debt of £400 had been cleared.  
In January, Cardiff broke off fixtures after ‘roughness’ in first two 
games played.  It was six seasons before fixtures were resumed. 
 
 
1895/96 
(p.52/53) 
 
 
 
Record:  P32, W23, D4, L5,    (75.0%). 
Sign of the times;  Badger & Lloyd, two star three-quarter admitted 
going to look for ‘honest employment’ in Neath but not to play rugby 
for that club.  
Tour to London, two played and won.  
Seven players selected for Wales revealed strength of club. 
 
 
1896/97 
(p.54/56) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P31, W26, D4, L1,    (85.7%).     
Llanelly’s Most Successful Season to date. 
Ground Record. 
Captain Badger put it down to ‘regular training, three nights of the 
week; Prior to each game, every man was in the pink of condition, and 
after it we were all as fresh as paint’. 
The Northern Clubs split meant that new fixtures had to be arranged 
with Bath & Leicester, the first.  
 
 
1897/98 
(p.57/58) 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P36, W22, D6, L8,    (66.7%). 
Ground Record. 
Owen Badger joined Swinton RLC  for £75 down and £2.10s a week.  
Joined up North by Morgan Bevan, David Davies and International 
Jack Evans. 
Tour to Devon, end of season. Two played, one won, one lost. 
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LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
  
SEASON EVENT 
 
1898/99 
(p.59/60) 
 
Record:  P37, W21, D5, L11,  (61.9%) 
Now a professional, Dai Davies, refused re-instatement by WRU in 
order to play again for Llanelly. 
Lost all four games to local rivals, Swansea.  Two Llanelli forwards 
sent off in home fixture in March.  Referee needed police protection at 
end of game. 
At AGM reported financial position was causing much anxiety, after 
making loss of £50 over season. No-one stood for post of treasurer. 
Because of the parlous financial position, the Swansea committee 
‘offered an extra, end-of-season game at St. Helens with Llanelly 
taking half the gate money’.  Gratefully accepted. 
Steelworks had been idle for year and other works in town idle for 
nearly two months.  This had impacted on club’s financial position. 
R.T. Gabe rejected’ handsome inducements’ to go North. 
 
 
1899/00 
(p.61/62) 
 
 
Record:  P33, W21, D2, L10,  (65.7%). 
Resumption of fixtures with Cardiff after six seasons. 
Tour to Devon in January, both games lost. 
No player chosen for Wales.   
Now only two junior teams in Llanelli & District. 
The Mercury wrote ‘Some of the committee have lost interest in the 
game, and it is hoped that the more lethargic members will give way to 
those who are more enthusiastic’. 
 
 
1900/01 
(p.63/64) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P31, W14, D2, L15   (48.5%). 
Ground closed by WRU for one month after referee was abused by 
crowd following loss against Newport. This had a negative effect on 
the entire season. 
Two games played in January on Devon Tour. Both lost.   
Apathy shown by players to training.    
Crowd attendances had dwindled considerably. 
 
 
1901/02 
(p.65/66) 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P31, W21, D3, L7,    (70.6%). 
Crowd of 12,000 for home game v Swansea. 
Rev. S.B. Williams elected chairman. He condemned the attitude of ‘so 
called Christians’ who objected to going to a rugby match. 
Lack of playing fields in the Llanelli area.  
Children playing rugby on fields to which they had no right were 
charged with trespass and fined 1s. 
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LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1902/03 
(p.67/68) 
 
 
 
Record:  P35, W24, D2, L9,    (70.3%). 
Game v Canada, Won  11 -  9pts. 
Beat Bridgend by record score of 53-0 pts. 
Willie Arnold scored 32 tries in season. 
Tom Samuel and Ned Jenkins went North. 
 
 
1903/04    
(p.69/70) 
 
 
 
Record:  P34, W20, D4, L10,   (63.2%). 
Crowd of 8,000 to see home game v Swansea. 
Biggest loss to Swansea at St. Helens by 45-3pts. 
Former players Tom Samuel and White were among the spectators for 
home game v Pontypridd.  Guardian wrote,  
“Both of them have now returned to Llanelly, and they were the most 
forlorn pair on the field. Today both of them have ended their football 
careers. I hope this will act as a warning to all local footballers who 
may be offered northern gold to leave their native land”.  
 
 
1904/05 
(p.71/72) 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:  P34, W,21, D4, L9,    (65.8%). 
New Ground opened 15th October with game v Swansea. 
New Grandstand erected on Pembrey side. 
Despite this public support was waning.  Blame placed on Northern 
Union taking players from Llanelly. 
Tour to Ireland in March, Two played, One won, one lost. 
 
1905/06 
(p.73/74) 
 
Record:  P34, W17, D5, L12,   (56.4%). 
Lost away to Cardiff by 40-0pts. 
Team did not win away from home until last game of season. 
 
 
1906/07 
(p.75/76) 
 
 
 
Record:  P34, W25, D2, L7,    (75.0%). 
Unofficial Club Championship Runners-up. 
Game v South Africa Lost 3 – 16pts in front of a 20,000 crowd. 
Beat Maesteg by 47-0pts.  
At the AGM, the club’s patron and former president, Squire of Stradey, 
C. W. Mansel Lewis ruled ineligible for office as not being an ordinary 
or honorary member.  Re-instated the following year. 
 
 
1907/08 
(p.77/78) 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P35, W21, D6, L8,     (65.9%). 
Ground closed for two weeks after spectator abuse against the referee 
in game v Neath (lost) in October. At the return match in Neath which 
Llanelly won, players abused by Neath crowd. 
November Tour to Midlands. Two played, one won, one drawn. 
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LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
 
SEASON EVENT 
 
1908/09 
(p.79/80) 
 
 
 
Record:  P31, W20, D5, L6,     (69.4%). 
Game v Australia Won 8 – 3pts in front of 10,000 crowd. 
Complaint by second team members about local players being ignored 
for preferred outsiders. 
Local club Hospital Rangers approved as Llanelly Seconds. 
 
 
1909/10 
(p.81/82) 
 
 
 
Record:  P34, W20, D6, L8,     (65.0%) 
Ground Record for Season.  Beat Aberavon four times. 
Neath cancelled fixtures with Llanelly due to bad feeling from previous 
seasons.  Newport also requested to break off fixtures.  
After game v Newport in November, Llanelly sued South Wales Argus  
for libel (“Llanelly were the roughest and foulest players in Wales”) 
and were awarded damages of one farthing.  Both sides had to pay 
costs.  
Llanelly players who attended courts as witnesses were paid 15s by the 
club for ‘loss of time’. 
First game in France v Racing Club, Won,13-3pts. Cost £119.12s 7d. 
Gate receipts v Bridgend, £17.12s.3d;  v Cardiff, £109,14s. and against 
Newport, £137,15s. 
 
 
1910/11 
(p.83/84) 
 
 
 
Record:  P34, W17, D4, L13,   (55.3%) 
Last fixture with Newport until 1925, visitors refused to play at 
Stradey. 
Two games played by team on same day. AM v Northampton, won, 6-
5pts and PM v Leicester, Won, 6-3pts. 
It was a confused and difficult season with 2nd XV players complaining 
that outsiders were being preferred to them in the first team. 
Financial position was precarious; WRU and local breweries asked for 
financial aid.  
 
 
1911/12 
(p.85/86) 
 
 
 
Record:  P35, W22, D3, L10,   (65.8%) 
Wings Evan Davies and T.J. Williams signed for Oldham RLC. 
Northern Union ‘poachers’ were in town looking for other players. 
New set of jerseys ordered at 28s 6d a dozen. 
At AGM a debt of £550 was reported. 
 
 
1912/13 
(p.87/88) 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P35, W17, D5, L13,   (55.0%) 
Game v South Africa,  Lost,  7 – 8pts. 
New fixtures arranged against Bath, Coventry, Cheltenham and 
London Welsh.   No fixtures with Rhondda clubs. 
Guardian said, ‘Many have turned their affections to their new love, 
soccer’.   Reported that club debt had grown to over £600. 
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LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
  
SEASON EVENT 
 
1913/14 
(p.89/90) 
 
 
 
 
Record:  P35, W16, D2, L17,   (48.6%). 
Debt of over £700 prevented club making donation to the war effort. 
Over 30 players from this season had joined up in the forces. 
No rent would be charged on ground during duration of war. 
 
 
1914/18 
 
The Great War.  
Over 400 players from the Llanelli League, seven teams,  joined 
the colours. 
 
 
1918/19 
(p.96/98) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P17, W13, D1, L3,   (77.8%). 
Fixtures re-commenced in January 1919. 
Beat New Zealand Army 3-0pts. 
Beat New Zealand Maoris, 6-0pts in front of 7,000 crowd. 
Last match against a NZA team raised money for local War Memorial 
Fund. 
Inside half, Ike Fowler joined Batley RLC. 
Albert Jenkins offered £300 to join Wigan RLC, rejected. 
Capt. S. Clarke who brought colonial teams to Stradey, wiping out debt 
of over £1,000, made a life member.  Credit balance now of £213.  
 
 
1919/20 
(p.99/100) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Record:   P40, W29, D4, L7,   (76.7%) 
Grandstand enlarged by three sections at cost of £310. 
Crowd of 10,000 watched game at home v Swansea, Won 10-5 pts. 
Gained double over ‘All Whites’ with first win at St. Helens for 23 
years. 
Albert Jenkins refused biggest offer ever made to a Welsh player of 
£375 to go North and join Wigan RLC. 
 
 
1920/21 
(p.101/103) 
 
 
 
Record:   P46, W31, D4, L11,   (70.0%). 
Formation of Supporters Club for 2s membership. 
International wing, Bryn Williams joined Batley RLC for £400 and two 
outside halves, Stan Williams and W.H. Charles joined Huddersfield 
(£500) and Hull RLC respectively. 
Albert Jenkins offered a record £1,000 to join Batley RLC, rejected. 
Inauguration of the ‘Rag Doll’ tradition with Bath in March. 
Club’s bank manager approached for £800 overdraft.   
Chairman explained that unemployment in town had left club in 
difficulties. 
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LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
  
SEASON EVENT 
 
1921/22 
(p.104/106) 
 
 
Record:   P48, W28, D4, L16,    (61.5%) 
Wing Frank Evans and scrumhalf, Billo Rees joined Swinton RLC.  
Star forward, Edgar Morgan, joined Hull RLC because he had been out 
of work for so many months that he succumbed to the tempting offer. 
Guardian put team’s games lost down to a  ‘lack of training’. 
At AGM current secretary, E.E. Bailey, who had been in post since 
1905 was defeated by W.G. Edmunds for the office. 
Committee proposed to WRU that Welsh rugby be re-structured in to 
three divisions, with promotion and relegation each season. 
St. John’s Ambulance invited for first time to attend games at Stradey. 
 
 
1922/23 
(p.107/109) 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P45, W31, D5, L9,   (72.0%%). 
Record win v Coventry, 47-0pts. 
Star International, Albert Jenkins, applied to join Swansea.  The ‘All 
Whites’ committee, after careful consideration, regretted they were 
unable to accept Jenkins’s offer.  Swansea said they did not wish to 
disturb good feelings that existed between the two clubs.  
Opening of soccer ground in town, Stebonheath Park. 
Death of one of club founders, W. Y.Neville. 
New Dock Stars agreed to take over Llanelly Seconds fixtures. 
 
 
1923/24 
(p.110/111) 
 
 
Record:   P50, W33, D6, L11,   (69.6%%) 
Team amassed a record total of 573 points. 
Leicester team had to borrow players from Swansea, Neath & 
Aberavon after arriving at Stradey with only 7 players. 
Forward Claude Ellery joined Hull RLC. 
Death of founder chairman, J.H. Rogers, aged 76years old. 
Tour to Midlands in October. Two played, two won. 
 
 
1924/25 
(p.112/114) 
 
 
Record:   P49, W33, D2, L14,   (68.6%%) 
Game v New Zealand Lost 3 – 8pts before crowd of 22,000 with 
two temporary stands erected.  WRU wanted to move fixture to 
Swansea but the club refused. 
Extra game played away to Cardiff to raise funds for both clubs. 
W.J. Davies joined Hull RLC for £400 in January. 
Appeal made to patrons, vice-presidents and local tradesmen for funds 
to pay for ground improvements. 
Guardian commented that “Soccer clubs are certainly more business-
like than rugby organisations”. 
 
 
 
 
396 
 
 
                                                                         Appendix 3.6a 
 
LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
  
SEASON EVENT 
 
1925/26 
(p. 115/117) 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P46, W35, D1, L10,   (76.6%%) 
Ground Record first time since 1890s.  Blazers presented to all 
players. 
Renewal of fixtures with Newport after 14 years. First game away in 
September saw 3,000 Llanelly supporters travel to Rodney Parade. The 
Mayor of Newport reported that there had not been one incident of 
trouble surrounding the game. 
Club beat Swansea four times during the season for first time. 
Wing Elwyn Evans joined Broughton Rangers RLC. 
First press telephone installed at Stradey. 
William Wilkins, former chairman, secretary, treasurer, died. 
 
 
1926/27 
(p.118/119) 
 
 
 
Record:   P46, W34, D1, L11,   (74.5%) 
Game v New Zealand Maoris Won 3 – 0pts. 
Club beat Neath four times, Cardiff and Swansea three times during 
the season 
First visit to Stradey by Newport since 1911. Drawn game. 
Club had been pressing Stradey Estate to find cost of buying ground. 
 
 
1927/28 
(p.120/121) 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record:  P43, W34, D2, L7,  (80.0%) 
Unofficial Welsh Club Champions.   
Game v New South Wales Lost 14 – 24pts.   
Club beat Cardiff four times during season. 
Seven players in same Welsh team v Ireland. 
Wing W.J. Davies signed for Batley RLC in May. 
 
 
1928/29 
(p.122/124) 
 
 
Record:   P44, W21, D6, L17,   (54.0%). 
Heaviest defeat since First World War, away to Neath, Lost 0-29pts. 
Tour to Ireland, Two played, one won, one drawn. 
Star International, Albert Jenkins retired. 
Part of grandstand at Stradey blown away in gale in November. 
 
 
1929/30 
(p.125/126) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P41, W27, D3, L11,   (68.2%). 
Coventry broke off fixtures after home game v Llanelli alleging rough 
play. 
Wing-forward, Ivor Jones, toured with British Lions to Australia and 
NZ. 
Death of Ben Jones, International, committeeman and former secretary 
aged 57 years. 
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LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
  
SEASON EVENT 
 
1930/31 
(p.127/128) 
 
 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
 
Record:  P44, W30, D7, L7   (72.5%) 
Unofficial Welsh Club Champions.  
Ground Record. 
First ‘double’ over Newport since 1904. 
Deaths of C.W. Mansel-Lewis, Squire of Stradey, club’s first 
president, aged 86 years.  Another president, David John, aged 71 yrs 
passed away. Also former secretary, E.E. Bailey, 57 yrs.  
At AGM, chairman, Dick Edmunds, said “ I do not glory in the fact 
at all because championship competition is not conducive to the best 
type of rugby, but we certainly have the best team in Wales”. 
 
 
1931/32 
(p.129/130) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:   P49, W32, D5, L12,   (68.5%). 
Game v South Africa  Lost 0 – 9pts in front of 19,000 crowd. 
Club paid £1,000 for new stand, borrowing £600 from WRU.  
Two games v International XVs. First, to raise funds for Llanelli 
General Hospital and second, to help cost of new grandstand. 
 
 
1932/33 
(p.131/132) 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record:  P42, W32, D2, L8   (77.3%). 
Unofficial Welsh Club Champions. 
Club beat Swansea & Neath four times each during the season. 
Oxford University arrived by plane landed behind grandstand! 
AGM. President Frank J Rees, said to make a profit of over £500 in 
such difficult economic times was phenomenal. 
 
 
1933/34 
(p.133/134) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P45, W35, D3, L7,   (79.2%). 
Ground Record. 
Club beat Cardiff four times during the season. 
Home game v Neath attracted 9,000 crowd. 
Home game v Newport in May to raise funds for Llanelli Cricket Club. 
President Frank Rees died aged 55 years. 
Proposed move to Stebonheath Park hit setback when WRU said 
unable to offer any financial assistance. 
 
1934/35 
(p.135/136) 
 
 
Record:   P46, W28, D3, L15,   (63.3%). 
Installation of electric lights for training. 
Fixtures with Leicester resumed after nine seasons absence. 
Club experimented with 19 different combinations at half back. 
Scrumhalf, Ben Jones, signed for St. Helens RLC. 
Record win v Bath, 42-0pts. 
Concerns at reports that Stradey Park may become housing 
development. Committee met landlord, the Squire of Stradey who 
dismissed concerns 
 
 
 
 
 
398 
 
 
                                                                         Appendix 3.6a 
 
LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
  
SEASON EVENT 
 
1935/36 
(p.137/138) 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:   P46, W31, D2, L13,   (68.8%). 
Diamond Jubilee Celebrations including a dinner held in May at 
the  Stepney Hotel. 
Game v  New Zealand  Lost 8 – 16pts. 
Covering of Supporters Stand at Pwll End completed at cost of 
£400. 
Swansea asked Llanelli to cancel last two fixtures of season. 
Declined but both fixtures were ill-tempered affairs. 
Former treasurer, John G Lewis, died aged 75 years. 
 
 
1936/37 
(p.139/140) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P50, W37, D4, L9,   (75.9%). 
Unofficial Welsh Club Championship Runners-up. 
Fixtures with Swansea were cancelled for remainder of this and 
following season after game at St. Helens in which ‘many discreditable 
happenings took place’.  The mayors of both towns tried to resolve the 
matter, but unsuccessfully.  
Guardian declared that “The rugby code cannot afford to have two of 
Wale’s most famous clubs at loggerheads in this way”. 
Young outside half, Melville de Lloyd joined Warrington RLC and 
scrumhalf Ray Smith joined Oldham RLC. 
At the end of the season the Mercury commented that “The Scarlets 
enjoyed the distinction of commanding a bigger following in their 
away matches than any other team in the Principality”. 
 
 
1937/38 
(p.141/142) 
 
 
Record:   P43, W29, D2, L12,   (68.9%). 
Club recorded ‘double’ over Newport including best ever away win by 
19-6 pts.  Fielded five teenagers in three-quarter line-up. 
Centre Glyn Elias lost to Halifax RLC; Centre Ted Ward and wing-
forward, Jackie Bowen joined Wigan RLC. 
W.H. Clement and Elvet Jones selected for Lions tour to SA. 
BBC proposed broadcasting 2nd half of game v Cardiff. Rejected. 
 
 
1938/39 
(p.143/145) 
 
Record:   P45, W24, D7, L14,   (59.6%). 
Fixtures resumed with Swansea. 
Crowd of 15,000 at Llanelli AFC ground to watch R.L. International. 
Guardian complained that ‘few players were turning up for training’. 
Deaths occurred of Owain Badger, 67; Gethin Thomas, 41; Rev. C. B. 
Nicholl, 69. 
Fullback, Glyn Thomas joined Oldham RLC for £550. Centre Gareth 
Price also went North. 
Negotiations between Llanelli Borough Council and Squire of Stradey 
to purchase ground for £20,000 stalled.  
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1939/45 
 
The War 
 
 
1945/46 
(p.155/156) 
 
 
 
Record:   P38, W17, D2, L19,   (47.5   %) 
Game v New Zealand Army Lost 8 – 16pts. Crowd of 14,000+. 
Club appealed to supporters for any spare clothing coupons to buy kit. 
Wing-forward Hagen Evans first Llanelli player to be sent off post war. 
Mercury wrote “the committee should take the bold line of inviting a 
man they know to possess the desired qualities of ability and 
personality to undertake the instruction of the team in a methodical 
and progressive way”. 
Former captain, F.L. Margrave, died aged 87 yrs.  
And former chairman, T.R. Mills died aged 73 yrs.   
 
 
1946/47 
(p.157/158) 
 
 
 
Record:  P41, W32, D4, L5  (80.0%). 
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Championship Runners-up. 
Five players, including four forwards, went North during season. 
Took Swansea’s unbeaten record at Stradey before crowd of 15,000. 
Took Cardiff’s ground record in April before crowd of 20,000. 
Six Llanelli players represented Wales. 
 
 
1947/48 
(p.159/160) 
 
 
 
Record:   P44, W21, D4, L19, (52.1%)              WMUWCC.  12th 
Game v Australia  Lost 4 – 6pts. 
Llanelli played Newbridge for first time. 
Club only scored double figures in 9 out of 44 games. 
Reduced charge for admission for the unemployed. 
Complaints from spectators about unclean condition of stand. 
Club had 700 members. 
 
 
1948/49 
(p.161/162) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P43, W18, D1, L24,   (43.2%)          WMUWCC.  11th  
Lowest success percentage of club to date. 
New scrumhalf, Joe Silva, joined Oldham RLC for £750. 
Shortage of funds; committee considered whether or not to provide 
hospitality for visiting teams. 
Current players club ties 5s. Past players club ties 9s. 
Fee of £5 received from BBC for commentary of game v Bridgend. 
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1949/50 
(p.163/164) 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P41, W18, D7, L16,  (52.1%)           WMUWCC.  12th 
Benefit match for Llanelli legend, Albert Jenkins who was unable to 
work because of illness. Crowd of 9,000 turned out in tribute. 
Club decided to meet WWRU over difficulties in recruiting players 
from second-class clubs. 
Club blazer badge designed by local artist. Thirty games needed to 
qualify. 
The need for economies in club was still paramount. 
 
 
1950/51 
(p.165/166) 
 
 
 
Record:   P37, W16, D6, L15,  (51.2%)            WMUWCC.  13th 
Club took Neath’s unbeaten ground record in March. First win at the 
Gnoll since the war. 
Supporters baffled by inconsistency of the team over the season. 
British Lion, Lewis Jones turned down £5,000 offer to go North. 
 
 
1951/52 
(p.167/168) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Record:   P42, W24, D3, L15,  (60.0%)                   WMUWCC.  8th 
Game v South Africa  Lost  11 – 20pts.   
Club purchased Stradey Park for a ‘bargain’  £6,500. 
Club established a Development Appeal to raise £15,000. Future club 
President, Joseph Rolfe, lead way with £2,000 donation. 
 
 
1952/53 
(p.169/170) 
 
Record:   P45, W27, D5, L13,   (64.0%) 
Star player, Lewis Jones, signed for Leeds RLC for £6,000. Later in 
season young forward, Roy Williams, signed for Wigan RLC. 
Ebbw Vale played at Stradey for first time. 
Squire of Stradey, C.R. Mansel Lewis retired as President. 
 
 
1953/54 
(p.171/172) 
 
 
 
Record:   P45, W32, D2, L11,  (72.3%)                    WMUWCC 3rd.   
Game v New Zealand. Lost 3 – 17pts.   
Llanelli’s greatest-ever rugby hero, Albert Jenkins, died. 
Death also, at 78 yrs, of only clergyman to hold office  at club, S. B. 
Williams, Vicar of Laugharne. 
New terracing opened at cost of £5,000.  Best season for years. 
 
 
1954/55 
(p.173/174) 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P38, W26, D2, L10,  (70.0%)               WMUWCC 3rd.  
Lost only one home game v Cardiff but it generated a club record 
receipts of £604,12s.6d.  
Two games v International XVs to raise funds for Development 
Programme. 
Of 97 tries scored, 82 were gained by three quarters. 
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1955/56 
(p.175/176) 
 
 
 
Record:   P47, W31, D2, L14,   (67.3%)              WMUWCC 4th. 
Game v International XV to raise funds for Development 
Programme. 
First game v Leicester at Stradey for 30 years. 
Start of new £15,000 grandstand made in June. WRU had given 
interest free loan of £3,000 with a further £2,000 to follow. 
 
 
1956/57 
(p.177/179) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:   P46, W32, D2, L12,   (70.8%)               WMUWCC  5th  
New grandstand opened with match v Combined Oxford/ 
Cambridge Universities in April. 
Game v South African Universities ended 11-11 draw. 
Young centre Wynford Phillips signed for Halifax RLC for £3,000. 
Record club profit of £4,166. 
 
 
1957/58 
(p.180/181) 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
 
Record:   P50, W31, D2, L17,   (63.5%) 
Game v Australia. Lost. 5 – 9pts.   
Club first British team to play in Russia. Three games,  
W1, D1.L1. 
Six Llanelli players in Welsh Team v Australia. 
Club’s first taste of floodlight rugby at Newport. 
Club treasurer, Ron Harries retired after ten years.  Reported that 
membership was now a record 1,783 members. 
Work started on new £4,500 clubhouse. 
International Terry Davies offered £8,000 from Leeds RLC and 
£9,000 from Huddersfield RLC to go North. Both rejected. 
 
 
1958/59 
(p.182/183) 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Record:   P45, W25, D5, L15,  (60.0%) 
Official opening of club-house and dining room at Stradey in 
March with game by first time visitors, Harlequins. W 6-0 pts. 
Captain Howard Davies suspended for six weeks by WRU for abuse 
made to referee in game v Northampton. 
 
 
1959/60 
(p.184/185) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P46, W23, D4, L19    (54.0%) 
Snelling Sevens Winners for first time at Cardiff. 
Club President, Joseph Rolfe, died in December and was replaced by 
W. John Thomas, a local businessman.  
New floodlights, costing £4,000, would be installed before start of 
next season.   
Club withdrew from agreed trip to Canada over £6,000 costs. 
R.H. Williams retired after gaining a club record 23 International 
caps. 
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1960/61 
(p.186/188) 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
 
Record:   P50, W22, D6, L22,   (50.0%)            WMUWCC  13th. 
Game v South Africa. Lost. 0 – 21pts.  Record, 22,000 crowd. 
New floodlights in use against Pontypool in October allowing 
club to play a record number of games in a season. 
Fylde flew from Blackpool to Swansea for their fixture in Dec. 
Ray Williams, 1946-61, became the first player to be made a life 
member immediately on his retirement. 
Club Patron & former President C.R. Mansel Lewis died, 80 yrs. 
 
 
1961/62 
(p.189/190) 
 
 
Record:   P51, W28, D5, L18,   (58.9%)            WMUWCC  10th. 
Opening of the Supporters Club stand at Pwll end of ground with 
game v International XV, in September, lost 14 – 22 pts. 
Club Chairman, Elvet Jones, said “the Scarlets had played attractive 
rugby at a time when there were so many complaints of the ‘dour’ 
game being played throughout the country”. 
 
 
1962/63 
(p.191/192) 
 
 
Record:   P50, W23, D4, L23,   (50.0%)            WMUWCC  14th. 
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists. 
Moseley visited Stradey for first time since 1895 but lost 0 - 13 pts.  
No home games played in January because of frost. 
Club launched development appeal for £10,000 for new dressing 
rooms. 
The Star commented that “The Scarlets lack of reserve strength has 
been forcibly emphasised this season. Unless something is done they 
are going to be the chopping-blocks for most Welsh clubs for some 
time to come”. 
 
 
1963/64 
(p.193/194) 
 
 
 
Record:   P46, W19, D7, L20,   (49.1%)              
Game v New Zealand. Lost. 8 – 22pts. 
Prop John Warlow joined St. Helens RLC. 
Terry Price turned down £4,000 offer from Wigan RLC. 
Future Internationals and British Lions, Barry John made debut 
against Moseley, and Gerald Davies debuted against Bristol 
Club toured West Germany, three played and all won. 
 
 
1964/65 
(p.195/196) 
 
 
 
Record:   P55, W27, D6, L22,   (54.1%)             WMUWCC  7th. 
Biggest loss in club history, 8 – 50 pts to Harlequins away. 
Inaugural Floodlight Alliance Trophy Finalists.   
Best performance was in October, taking Neath’s 34 game ground 
record. 
Elvet Jones said at AGM that he would urge the committee to form a 
second XV to bridge the gap between youth and senior rugby. 
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1965/66 
(p.197/198) 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:   P46, W28, D2, L16,   (62.5%)                           
Opening of new dressing-rooms and dining hall, costing £21,000. 
First visit of Barbarians to mark opening, they won 28 – 15 pts. 
Future committeeman and chairman, Stuart Gallacher, sent off 
against Neath at Stradey.  
Club gained four victories over Swansea. 
Delme Thomas selected for Lions tour to Australasia. 
Chairman Elvet Jones said at AGM that TV was becoming a 
‘scourge’ and if coverage of club games was extended then ‘one 
armed bandits’ would have to subsidise the game.  
Membership was dropping year after year, and the drift from the club 
was very discouraging. 
 
 
1966/67 
(p.199/200) 
 
 
Record:   P49, W24, D6, L19,   (54.5%)              WMUWCC  11th. 
Game v Australia. Won. 11 – 0pts.  
Phil Bennett played first game for club v Swansea, away, in 
November. 
Introduction of coaching and squad training was a major innovation. 
Ieuan Evans appointed coach; Tom Hudson, Olympian, appointed 
fitness trainer; 
Club toured Italy in May. Three games played and all won. 
International Terry Price joined Bradford Northern RLC for £10,000. 
Death of Dr Noel Rees, former chairman when Stradey was bought. 
 
 
1967/68 
(p.201/202) 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
 
 
Record:  P46, W34, D1, L11,   (74.5%) 
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions.(1st since 
1932/33) 
Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners.  (beating Bridgend in replay) 
National Sevens Winners. 
Stuart Gallacher appointed as youngest ever club captain. 
Derek Quinnell’s first game against UAU. 
Delme Thomas chosen to tour South Africa with British Lions.  
Phil Bennett and Brian Butler turned down offers to join Halifax 
RLC 
Death of former International R.T. Gabe at age of 87 years. 
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1968/69 
(p.203/204) 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
 
 
Record:   P45, W33, D2, L10,   (74.5%)              WMUWCC 3rd. 
Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners (2nd  year) 
Snelling Sevens Finalists;   National Sevens Finalists 
Club gained four victories over Neath. 
Biggest win over Swansea 34 – 3 pts. 
Handel Rogers resigned as secretary,   replaced by Ken Jones. 
In May, club undertook a ‘missionary’ tour to North Wales. 
Ivor Jones elected President of the WRU. 
 
 
1969/70 
(p.205/206) 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record:   P43, W30, D2, L11,   (71.1%)              WMUWCC  4th.   
Game v South Africa. Lost. 9 – 10pts.  
Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners (3rd year)  
Twickenham Sevens Winners.   
Snelling Sevens Finalists;  Gala Sevens Finalists. 
Carwyn James succeeded Ieuan Evans as coach. 
First victory at Newport since 1954. 
New scoreboard presented to club by President, W. John Thomas. 
Tom Hudson resigned after three seasons as fitness coach. 
In June both Stuart Gallacher and Brian Butler joined Bradford 
Northern RLC for £7,000 and £5,000 respectively. 
 
 
1970/71 
(p.207/208) 
 
 
TROPHY 
       & 
STRATEGIC 
 
Record:   P41, W24, D5, L12,   (63.0%)             WMUWCC  6th. 
Snelling Sevens Winners 
Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners (4th year)   
A £10,000 extension to grandstand and enclosure increased 
seating to 2,650. 
Charity match for local player, Ken Jones, who had died playing in 
match; funds raised from game v Welsh XV. 
Coach, Carwyn James, blamed the decline of team performances on 
too many games. “We are expecting more from our amateur players 
than Manchester United or Leeds expect from their professionals”. 
 
 
1971/72 
(p.209/210) 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
 
 
 
Record. P41, W32, D1, L8  (78.6%).   
Western Mail Unofficial Championship Runners-Up.  
Whitbread Merit Table Runners-up. 
National Sevens Winners. (Crowd of only 6,000). 
Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners (5th year)   
Schweppes Cup Finalists.  .   
First season of Merit Table (10 teams including Llanelli).  
Tour to South Africa in June six played, three won and lost.   
Wing Roy Mathias scored record 36 tries then joined St. Helens for 
£8,000. 
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1972/73 
(p.211/213) 
 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
Centenary Season.    
Record:   P38, W24, D0, L14,   (63.2%)            WMUWCC  5th. 
Schweppes Cup Winners.    
Last Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners (for 6th year running)   
Snelling Sevens Winners.   
Game v New Zealand. Won. 9 – 3pts.  
Second visit of Barbarians to Stradey. Club won 33 – 17 pts.  
Club scored 1000pts for first time.   
Wing Andy Hill scored a record 39 tries in a season. 
Ray Hopkins, scrumhalf, joined Swinton RLC for £7,000 but Tommy 
David turned down £8,000 from same club. 
Phil Bennett turned down £10,000 offer from Leigh RLC.   
Banquet for 600 guests in marquee on Stradey park. 
Tour to Canada, seven played & won.   
 
 
1973/74 
(p.214/216) 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record: P41, W32, D1, L8,   (78.6%). 
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions.   
Boxing day game v London Welsh crowd 16,000, receipts £2,500.  
Whitbread Merit Table Runner-Up.  (68.8%) 
Schweppes Cup Winners.    
Tour to Canada, seven played and won.  
Norman Gale replaced Carwyn James as coach for a season. 
First of Phil Bennett’s six consecutive seasons as captain. 
Delme Thomas awarded MBE. 
 
 
1974/75 
(p.217/218) 
 
 
TROPHY 
       & 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
 
Record: P50, W36, D4, L10,   (74.1%).              WMUWCC  3rd. 
WMT.  6th.   (46.7%)   Schweppes Cup Winners.   
Game v Tonga. Won.  24 – 15pts.   
Centenary Gates officially opened at Stradey.(costing £9,000) and 
presented by four local authorities. 
Phil Bennett made redundant at Dupont Steelworks reported to be 
emigrating to South Africa to play. Tom David returned to 
Pontypridd.  Carwyn James returned as coach. 
Wing J.J. Williams turned down £15,000 offer from Widnes RLC. 
No.8 Phil Davies died in a car crash after moving to Swansea. 
 
 
1975/76 
(p.219/220) 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record:   P39, W27, D1, L11,   (70.0%)            WMUWCC 4th.  
WMT. 5th.   (63.2%)   Game v Australia. Draw. 28 – 28pts.   
Schweppes Cup Winners (4th Successive Win). 
Handel Rogers elected President of WRU. 
Carwyn James left as coach leaving Norman Gale in control. 
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1976/77 
(p.221/222) 
 
 
TROPHY 
       & 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Record, P37, W30, D0, L7,   (81.1%).   
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions.  
WMT.  4th.   (68.4%) 
Phil Bennett captained Wales & British Lions.  
Also voted Welsh Player of Year.    
First time loss outside a cup final; to Cardiff by 15-25 pts (Ref: CN) 
Sponsorship brand on jersey for first time. Many supporters 
dismayed by this action. 
Tour in June to West Germany, two played and won. 
 
 
1977/78 
(p.223/224) 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Record:   P37, W23, D1, L13,   (63.2%)               WMUWCC 6th . 
WMT.  5th.   (59.1%) 
Phil Bennett awarded OBE. He retired from International rugby after 
29 caps for Wales and eight appearances for the British Lions. 
New floodlights installed at Stradey at a cost of £42,000.   
Norman Gale resigned as coach.  
 
 
1978/79 
(p.225/227) 
 
 
 
Record:   P39, W25, D2, L12,   (65.9%)               WMUWCC  7th. 
WMT.  6th.   (57.1%) 
Snelling Sevens Winners.   
Schweppes Cup Semi-Finalists.  
National Sevens Runners-Up.     
New coach John Maclean replaced Norman Gale. 
Games v Rovigo (Italy), B.A.T.S. (USA), Taranaki (NZ). All won. 
Richmond broke off fixtures with Llanelli over ‘Ralston’ stamping 
affair. 
Long serving wing, Andy Hill, retired after 454 games, 310 tries and 
2,577 points. 
 
 
1979/80 
(p.228/229) 
 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
 
Record: P44, W27, D0, L17 (61.36%).                 WMUWCC  7th. 
WMT.  5th.   (68.2%) 
Game v South African Barbarians, Lost 6 – 15 pts. (ref: CN).    
Biggest ever club victory 106-6 against South Wales Police. 
Pre-season club tour to South Africa, six played, four won. 
Clive Griffiths joined St. Helens RLC for reported £30,000.   
Club disbanded Athletic XV because of difficulties in raising side. 
Secretary, Ken Jones, bemoaned the worst season since the 1960s, “If 
we are to remain a force in Welsh rugby, then dedication, application 
and discipline are required from all concerned”. 
Treasurer announced a club record income of £103,000. 
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1980/81 
(p.230/231) 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P41, W26, D1, L14,   (64.3%)               WMUWCC  6th. 
WMT,  5th.   (63.6%) 
Game v New Zealand. Lost. 10 – 16pts.  
Schweppes Cup Semi-Finalists.    
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists.  
International wing, JJ Williams, retired after 205 games & 159 tries. 
Phil Bennett retired after 412 games, 132 tries and 2,532 pts. He had 
captained club, country and British Lions. 
Carwyn James elected new club President. 
 
 
1981/82 
(p.232/233) 
 
 
 
Record:   P38, W26, D3, L9,   (70.7%)                 WMUWCC  5th. 
Whitbread Welsh Merit Table Runners-Up. (77.3%).  
Benefit for Roger Thomas of Tenby seriously injured in schoolboy 
match. 
British Lion, Wales & Llanelli great, Derek Quinnell, retired after 
366 appearances, twenty-three Welsh caps and three Lions tours. 
Long serving physiotherapist collapsed and died at Christmas game v 
London Welsh  (Ref: CN). 
Biggest scores ever against Newport and Bath. 
End of season tour to Spain, two played, one won, one lost. 
Both coaches resigned at end of season.   John Maclean joined 
committee.  New captain was second row, Phil May. 
 
 
1982/83 
(p.234/235) 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P40, 28, D3, L9. (73.8%).                     WMUWCC  4th.  
WMT,  6th.   (59.1%) 
Game v New Zealand Maoris. Won. 16 – 9pts.   (TJ:CN) 
Gareth Jenkins and Allan Lewis took over as club coaches.   
Sudden death of club President, Carwyn James, aged 53 yrs. 
Legendary former captain in ‘20s & ‘30s, Ivor Jones, died 
Tour to Canada, four played, three won. 
Resignation, after ten years, of treasurer Rowland Hughes, in August 
after disagreement with the committee over club’s financial policy. 
New treasurer was former International referee, Gwynne Walters. 
 
 
1983/84 
(p.236/237) 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P43, W25, D1, L17,   (59.1%)               WMUWCC  7th. 
WMT,  6th.   (55.0%) 
Schweppes Cup Semi-Finalists.   
Crowd and atmosphere of ‘touring side’ in cup game v Pontypool. 
Death of ‘20s legendary wing, Ernie Finch, aged 84 yrs. 
Club Chairman, Gareth Thomas, said wheels were in motion to 
recruit new players. “We have been also rans and bridesmaids since 
the 1970s and haven’t had a say in any honours”.  
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1984/85 
(p.238/239) 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record:   P38, W25, D0, L13,   (65.8%)               WMUWCC  6th. 
WMT,  4th.   (66.7%) 
Game v Australia. Won. 19 – 16pts.  
Schweppes Cup Winners. 
Ray Gravell’s career ended after 485 games for Llanelli. 
Alun Thomas became President of the WRU. 
 
 
1985/86 
(p.240/242) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P42, W23, D3, L16,   (57.8%)               WMUWCC 9th 
WMT,  8th.   (50.0%) 
Game v Fiji. Won. 31 – 28pts. (after being 0-25pts down). 
Lost first Carwyn James Memorial game v Queensland, 12-13 pts. 
Crowd of over 15,000 saw cup game v Pontpool. Won 27-6 pts. 
Biggest win over Bristol 58-10, including 11 tries. 
Gary Pearce scored a club record 420 pts. 
 
 
1986/87 
 
Record:   P41, W24, D2, L15,   (60.1%)               WMUWCC 7th. 
WMT,  5th.   (60.0%) 
Club toured Queensland & Fiji. Four played, three won.     
Gary Pearce joined Hull RLC for £80,000.   
 
 
1987/88 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record:   P44, W29, D1, L14,   (66.7%)                WMUWCC 4th 
WMT,  8th.   (57.1%) 
Schweppes Cup Winners.   
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists.  
Club record 1434 pts in season and record 239 tries.  
Wing Carwyn Davies scored record 45 tries.   
 
 
988/89 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record: P41, W34, D0, L7 (82.9%).    
Runners-Up in Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club 
Championship. Whitbread Welsh Merit Table Winners.  (92.0%) 
Snelling Sevens Winners. 
Schweppes Cup Finalists.  
Phil Davies voted Welsh Player of the Year.  
 
 
1989/90 
 
Final 
WMUWCC 
 
Last of the 
WMT 
 
Record:   P43, W35, D0, L8,   (81.4%)           
Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Championship Runner-Up.  
Team scored a club record 1,666 pts.  
Whitbread Welsh Merit Table Runners-Up. (82.6%)  
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists.      
Game v New Zealand, Lost 0 – 11pts.    
Tour to California, USA. Three played, two won. drew one.   
 
  
409 
 
 
 Appendix 3.6a                                                                                                       
  
LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
  
SEASON EVENT 
 
1990/91 
New 
National 
Leagues. 
TROPHY & 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Team Placed in Top Division (10 clubs) of new National League. 
 
Record:  P18, W12, D1, L5,     (68.4%) 
Heineken WRU National League Premier Division Runner-Up.  
Schweppes Cup Winners,    
Club spent £350,000 on new grandstand. 
 
 
1991/92 
 
TROPHY 
 
Record:  P18, W11, D1, L6,      (63.2%) 
Heineken WRU National League Division One Runners Up.   
Schweppes Cup Winners.   
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists. 
 
 
1992/93 
 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
 
A fantastic season winning:  
Record:  P22, W19, D1, L2,     (87.0%) 
Heineken WRU National League Division One Champions,  
Schweppes WRU Cup Winners,  
Defeating the World Champions, Australia 13 – 9 pts.  
Awarded the “Best Team in Britain” Trophy, and  
Best Match programme in Britain.   
Wing, Ieuan Evans, voted Welsh Player of the Year. 
 
 
1993/94 
 
Record:   P22, W13, D1, L8,    (60.9%)                 NLDO  5th 
Swalec Cup Finalists.   
 
 
1994/95 
 
 
 
Record:   P22, W10, D0, L12,  (45.5%)                  NLDO  7th. 
Swalec Cup Semi-Finalists.  
Scott Quinnell, aged 22, joined Wigan RLC for £400,000. 
 
 
1995/96 
 
 
STRATEGIC 
 
 
 
 
 
PROFESSIONALISM 
Record:   P22, W15, D0, L7, (68.2%) Nat. League Prem. Div.  4th.  
Crowd of 12000 watched game v Cardiff.        
Game v Fiji, Lost, 12 – 38 pts.   
Swalec Cup Semi-Finalists.      
Snelling Sevens Semi-Finalists. 
Ieuan Evans Testimonial game raised £100,000. 
Ieuan Evans awarded MBE for services to rugby. 
 
 
1996/97 
 
 
 
Record:   P22, W16, D2, L4,    (75.0%)                    NLPD  3rd. 
Swalec Cup Semi-Finalists. 
Captain Ieuan Evans left club to join Bath. 
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                                                    Appendix 3.6a   
 
LLANELLI RUGBY FOOTBALL CLUB  
HISTORY 
  
SEASON EVENT 
 
1997/98 
 
TROPHY &    
STRATEGIC 
 
 
Record:   P14, W5, D2, L7,      (43.8%)                     NLPD   5th. 
Swalec Cup Winners.   
WRU Challenge Trophy Semi-Finalists. 
Club became a Limited Company in June ’97. 
 
 
1998/99 
 
 
TROPHY 
 
 
 
Record:   P20, W15, D1, L4.     (76.2%)            
National League Premier Division Champions 
Heineken Cup Quarter-Finalists,     
Swalec Cup Finalists 
Scott Quinnell re-joined club from Richmond. 
Lock Chris Wyatt, voted Welsh Player of the Year. 
 
 
1999/00 
 
TROPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
Record:   P22, W13, D0, L9,  (59.1%) Welsh/Scottish League 5th.   
Crowd of 10,500 watched W/S League game v Swansea. 
Record all-time victory over Cardiff, 60-18 pts at Stradey. 
WRU Challenge Trophy Winners.      
Swalec Cup Winners.   
Heineken Cup Semi-Finalists 
 
 
 
KEY 
 
 
 
Strategic/Trophy   
 
70%+ Success   
 
 Below 50% 
win 
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                                                                    Appendix 3.6b 
 
LLANELLI: 
THE TROPHY SEASONS 
 
 
Season Win % Trophy  
1883/84 68.2 Winners of South Wales Challenge Cup 
1885/86 64.3  Winners of South Wales Challenge Cup. 
   
1927/28 80.0 Unofficial Welsh Club Champions 
   
1930/31 72.5 Unofficial Welsh Club Champions 
1932/33 77.3 Unofficial Welsh Club Champions 
   
1967/68 74.5 Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions 
Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners: National 7s Winners  
1968/69 74.5 Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners. 
1969/70 71.1 Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners. Twickenham 7s Winners 
   
1970/71 63.0 Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners. Snelling 7s Winners.    
1971/72 78.6 Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners; National 7s Winners 
1972/73 63.2 Floodlight Alliance Trophy Winners;    
Schweppes Cup Winners  
1973/74 78.6 Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions;  
Schweppes Cup Winners 
1974/75 74.1 Schweppes Cup Winners 
1975/76 70.0 Schweppes Cup Winners 
1976/77 81.1 Western Mail Unofficial Welsh Club Champions. 
   
1984/85 65.8 Schweppes Cup Winners 
1987/88 66.7 Schweppes Cup Winners 
1988/89 82.9 Whitbread Merit Table Winners:  Snelling 7s Winners 
   
1990/91 68.4 Schweppes Cup Winners 
1991/92 63.2 Schweppes Cup Winners 
1992/93 87.0 Heineken National League Champions:  
Swalec Cup Winners; 
Best Team in Britain Trophy. 
1997/98 43.8 Swalec Cup Winners 
1998/99 76.2 National League Premier Division Champions 
1999/00 59.1 Swalec Cup Winners:  WRU Challenge Trophy Winners. 
   
24 Seasons   
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                                                                           Appendix 3.6c 
LLANELLI: 
STRATEGIC SEASONS 
 
 
SEASON Win % Strategic Issues 
   
1875/76 44.4 Founding of Club. 
1878/79 - Club had virtually collapsed. 
1879/80 57.1 Stradey cricket ground acquired for matches 
   
1880/81 68.8 Llanelli one of eleven Founder Members of WRFU. 
   
1904/05 65.8 New Grandstand opened. 
   
1919/20 76.7 Enlargement to Grandstand 
   
1931/32 68.5 New Stand costing £1,000. 
1935/36 68.8 Covering of Supporters Stand at Pwll end costing £400. 
   
1951/52 60.0 Stradey Park ground purchased for £6,500 
1956/57 70.8 New Grandstand opened  
1957/58 63.5 First British Team to play in Russia. 
1958/59 60.0 New Club House & Dining Room at Stradey 
   
1960/61 50.0 New Floodlights  erected. 
1965/66 62.5 New Dressing Rooms and Dining Hall costing £21,000. 
   
1970/71 63.0 Extension costing £10,000 to Grandstand & Enclosure        
1974/75 74.1 Centenary Gates Opened .                                                              
1977/78 63.2 New Floodlights Installed at cost of £42,000. 
   
1990/91 68.4 Club spent £350,000 on new Grandstand.                                      
1997/98 43.8 Club became a Limited Company under Huw Evans. 
   
19 Seasons   
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                                                                                   Appendix 3.6d  
 
LLANELLI  MATCH PERFORMANCES 
               HIGH & LOW PERCENTAGES 
Season Over 70% Win Win % Season Below 50% Win Win % 
1881/82 71.4 1875/76 44.4 
d1888/89 78.0 1877/78 45.5 
1894/95 74.4 1878/79 - 
1895/96 75.0 1890/91 45.5 
1896/97 85.7   
1901/02 70.6 1900/01 48.5 
1902/03 70.3 1913/14 48.6 
1906/07 75.0   
1918/19 77.8   
1919/20 76.7   
1920/21 70.0   
1922/23 72.0   
1925/26 76.6   
1926/27 74.5   
1927/28 80.0   
1930/31 72.5   
1931/32 68.5   
1932/33 77.3   
1933/34 79.2   
1936/37 75.9   
1946/47 80.0 1945/46 47.5 
  1948/49 43.2 
1953/54 72.3   
1954/55 70.0   
1956/57 70.8   
1967/68 74.5 1963/64 49.1 
1968/69 74.5   
1969/70 71.1   
1971/72 78.6   
1973/74 78.6   
1974/75 74.1   
1975/76 70.0   
1976/77 81.1   
1981/82 70.7   
1982/83 73.8   
1988/89 82.9   
1989/90 81.4   
1992/93 87.0 1994/95 45.5 
1996/97 75.0 1997/98 43.8 
1998/99 76.2   
38 Seasons out of  116  11 Seasons out of 116  
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     LLANELLI RFC COMMITTEE  1990 – 1997:                                                                  LRFC LTD: BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1997-2000 
 
 Officers 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 Ltd Co. 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 
President Thomas A  Thomas A  Jones K Jones K James E James E James E         
Chairman Jenkins H McClean J McClean J McClean J Bergiers R Bergiers R Gallacher S Chairman Evans H Evans H Evans H 
Vice Chair McClean J Powell R Thomas W Thomas W Gallacher S Gallacher S Thomas W CEO Gallacher S Gallacher S Gallacher S 
Secretary Jones K Jones K Jones K Parfitt K Parfitt K Parfitt K Parfitt K         
Treasurer Jones M Jones M Jones M Jones M Jones M Jones M Jones M Fin Direct Jones P S Jones P S Jones P S 
                        
Changes 1 1 1 3 0 2 5   0 0 0 
                        
Committee Bergiers R Bergiers R Bergiers R Bergiers R Jenkins H Delaney L Bergiers R Directors Evans H Evans H Evans H 
  James A James A James A Galacher S Lewis A  Jenkins H Delaney L   Gallacher S Gallacher S Gallacher S 
  Morgan M Morgan M Jenkins H Jenkins H Morgan M Lewis A  Jenkins H   Gravell R Gravell R Gravell R 
  Powell R Powell R Morgan M Morgan M Roberts G Morgan M Lewis A    Griffiths P Griffiths P Griffiths P 
  Thomas G Thomas G Thomas G Powell R Thomas G Thomas G Morgan M   Jenkins G Jenkins G Jenkins G 
  Thomas H Thomas H Thomas H Roberts G Thomas W Thomas W Rees D   Jenkins H Jenkins H Jenkins H 
  Thomas W Thomas W Thomas W Thomas G Tucker G Tucker G Thomas G   Jones P S Jones P S Jones P S 
                  Jones R Jones R Jones R 
                        
Changes 0 1 2 0 1 2 6   0 0 0 
                        
Coach Jenkins G Jenkins G Jenkins G Lewis A Lewis A Jenkins G Jenkins G Dir.Rugby Jenkins G Jenkins G Jenkins G 
As. Coach Lewis A Lewis A Lewis A Cooper J Cooper J Lewis A Lewis A        
Team Mg         Buchanon A Buchanon A Buchanon A Team Mg Buchanon A Buchanon A Buchnon A 
                       
Changes 0 0 1 0 1 0 0   0 0 0 
 
       KEY  Left Position 
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                                                                                                               Appendix 3.7 
LIST OF CLUBS BY DISTRICT 
 
Dis CLUBS   (42) Est. WRU Dis CLUBS  (29) Est. WRU 
A Abercarn 1895   B Barry     
A Abergavenny 1877   B Canton 1876   
A Abertillery 1883   B Cardiff 1876 1881F 
A Bedwas 1889 1910 B Cardiff HSOB 1928   
A Blackwood 1889 1918 B Cardiff Meds     
A Blaenau Gwent 1869   B Cardiff Univ     
A Blaenavon 1877   B Cowbridge     
A Blaina 1875 1895 B Dinas Powys 1882    
A Brynithel 1974 1998 B Glamorgan Wdrs 1893   
A Brynmawr     B Heol y Cyw 1906   
A Caldicot 1959   B Llandaff 1876 1948 
A Chepstow 1878   B Llandaff North 1898 1963 
A Croesyceiliog 1881 1876 B Llanharan 1891 1919 
A Cross Keys 1885   B Llanishen 1962   
A Crumlin 1887   B Llantwit Major 1889 1962 
A Cwmbran 1880   B Old Illtydians 1928 1967 
A Ebbw Vale 1879 1893 B Old Penarthians 1923 1964 
A Garndiffaith 1922   B Penarth 1879   
A Llanhilleth 1894   B Pencoed 1888   
A Machen 1880   B Pentyrch 1882   
A Monmouth 1873   B Pontyclun 1887 1887 
A Nantyglo 1887?    B Rhiwbina 1962 1975  
A New Tredegar 1977 1994 B Rumney     
A Newbridge 1888 1911 B St. Albans     
A Newport 1874 1881F B St. Josephs 1979 1984 
A Newport HSOB 1923 1957 B St. Peters 1886   
A Newport Scars 1912   B Taffs Well 1887 1900 
A Oakdale 1947   B UWIC 1950   
A Pill Harriers 1882           
A Pontllanfraith   1998         
A Pontypool 1901 1881F         
A Pontypool Utd             
A Rhymney 1882 1910         
A Risca 1875           
A RTB Ebbw Vale 1953 1989         
A Talywain 1898           
A Tredegar 1893           
A Trinant 1956           
A Usk 1874           
A UWIN             
A Ynysddu 1894           
         
 Founder Members of WRU 1881  Clubs Founded Before 1881 
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                                         Appendix 3.7 
 
LIST OF CLUBS BY DISTRICT 
 
Dis CLUBS  (29) Est. WRU Dis CLUBS  (32) Est. WRU 
C Abercwmboi 1980   D Aberavon 1876 1887 
C Abercynon 1886   D Aberavon GS 1887   
C Aberdare 1892   D Aberavon Quinn 1891 1955 
C Bargoed 1882   D Baglan  1963   
C Beddau 1951   D Blaengarw     
C Bedlinog 1971   D BP Llandarcy     
C Brecon 1879 1881F D Bridgend 1878   
C Builth Wells 1888   D Bridgend Ath 1939   
C Caerphilly 1887   D Bridgend Sports 1938   
C Cefn Coed     D British Steel PT     
C Cilfynydd     D Briton Ferry 1888   
C Gilfach Goch 1889   D Bryncoch 1898   
C Gwernyfed 1965 1996 D Cefn Cribbwr     
C Hirwaun     D Cwmavon     
C Llantrisant 1888   D Kenfig Hill 1897   
C Llantwit Fadre 1946   D Maesteg 1877   
C Merthyr 1876 1881F D Maesteg Celtic     
C Mountain Ash 1946   D Maesteg Quinn 1936   
C Nelson 1934   D Nantyffyllon     
C Penygraig 1877   D Nantymoel 1885   
C Pontypridd 1876   D Neath 1871 1882 
C Rhyderfelin 1905   D Neath Ath 1947 1972 
C Senghenydd 1898   D Ogmore Vale     
C Treherbert 1875   D Pontycymmer 1887   
C Treorchy Rhon 1886   D Porthcawl 1880   
C Tylorstown 1903   D Pyle     
C Ynysybwl 1898   D Skewen 1883 1897 
C Ystrad Rhondda 1884   D S.W. Police 1969 1971 
        D Taibach 1886?    
        D Tondu 1880   
        D Tonmawr 1897   
        D Tonna 1888   
 
KEY 
 Founder Members of WRU 1881  Clubs Founded Before 1881 
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                                                                                                           Appendix 3.7 
 
LIST OF WRU CLUBS BY DISTRICT 
 
Dis CLUBS   (21) Est. WRU Dis CLUBS  (21) Est. WRU 
E Abercrave 1894   F Amman Utd 1903   
E Alltwen     F Ammanford 1887   
E Banwen 1947   F Betws     
E Birchgrove  1953?   F Brynamman 1892   
E Bonymaen 1914   F Cefneithin 1922   
E Crynant 1898   F Cwngors 1927 1938 
E Cwmgwrach 1906 1949 F Gorseinon 1884 1895 
E Cwmllynfell 1904   F Gowerton 1884   
E Cwmtwrch 1890   F Hendy 1893   
E Dunvant 1888   F Llandeilo 1871 1881F 
E Glais     F Llandovery 1878 1881F 
E Glynneath 1889 1909 F Llandybie 1901   
E Morriston 1876   F Llangennech 1885   
E Mumbles 1887   F Loughor 1882   
E Pontardawe 1882   F Penclawdd 1888 1927 
E Resolven 1885   F Penygroes     
E Rhigos 1930   F Pontarddulais 1881   
E Seven Sisters 1897   F Pontyberem 1895   
E Swansea 1874 1881F F Tumble 1897   
E Swansea Univ     F Tycroes 1911    
E Swansea Upland 1919 1928 F Waunarlwydd 1900   
E Trebanos 1897           
E Vadre             
E Ystalyfera 1884           
E Ystradgynlais 1890           
                
                
 
KEY 
 Founder Members of WRU 1881  Clubs Founded Before 1881 
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LIST OF WRU CLUBS BY DISTRICT 
 
Dis CLUBS  (19) Est. WRU Dis CLUBS  (18) Est. WRU 
G Burry Port 1880   J Bangor 1876 1881F 
G Bynea 1883   J Bangor Norm Col     
G Carmarthen Qs 1875   J Bangor Univ     
G Carmarthen Ath 1944   J Bethesda     
G Carmarthen Coll     J Caernarfon 1973   
G Felinfoel 1876 1935 J Colwyn Bay 1923   
G Furnace Utd 1888   J Denbigh 1977  1991  
G Kidwelly 1880   J Dolgellau     
G Lampeter Town 1875 1881F J Llandudno 1952 1959 
G Lampeter Coll 1850   J Llanidloes 1975 2001 
G Laugharne 1893   J Mold 1935    
G Llanelli 1875 1881F J Nant Conwy 1980    
G Llanelli Wdrs 1951   J Newtown 1925   
G Llandybydder     J Pwllhelli 1972   
G New Dock Stars     J Rhyl & District     
G Newcastle Emlyn 1977   J Ruthin (Est24/31)  1960 1969 
G Pontyates     J Welshpool 1926 1990 
G St. Clears  1985 2001  J Wrexham 1931    
G Trimsaran  1927           
        
Dis CLUBS  (16) Est. WRU     
H Aberaeron         
H Aberystwyth 1949       
H Aberystwyth Uni         
H Cardigan 1876 1956     
H Crymych 1984 1995     
H Fishguard & Good  1907       
H Haverfordwest 1875       
H Llangwm 1885       
H Milford Haven 1951 1959     
H Neyland 1885       
H Narberth 1882       
H Pembroke 1896       
H Pembroke Dock Qs 1880       
H St. Davids 1953       
H Tenby Utd 1876 1898     
H Whitland 1910       
        
 
KEY 
 Oldest Club Founded Before 1881  
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Appendix 3. 8   
WRU  NATIONAL LEAGUE TABLES 1990 - 2000 
 
Premier 
Division 
Division  
One 
Division  
One 
Division  
One 
Division  
One 
 Division  
One 
Division  
One 
Premier 
Division 
Premier 
Division 
Premier 
Division 
1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995  1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 
Neath Swansea Llanelli Swansea Cardiff  Neath Pontypridd Swansea Llanelli Cardiff 
Llanelli Llanelli Cardiff Neath Pontypridd  Cardiff Swansea Cardiff Pontypridd Newport 
Bridgend Pontypridd Swansea Pontypridd Treorchy  Pontypridd Llanelli Pontypridd Neath Swansea 
Cardiff Neath Neath Cardiff Neath  Llanelli Cardiff Ebbw Vale Ebbw Vale Pontypridd 
Pontypridd Newbridge Pontypridd Llanelli Bridgend  Bridgend Bridgend Neath Caerphilly Llanelli 
Pontypool Bridgend Bridgend Bridgend Swansea  Swansea Newport Llanelli Bridgend Ebbw Vale 
Newbridge Pontypool Newport Newport Llanelli  Ebbw Vale Ebbw Vale Bridgend Newport Neath 
Swansea Newport Pontypool Newbridge Newport  Newport Neath Newport Aberavon Edinburgh 
Glam Wdrs Cardiff Aberavon      Pontypool Newbridge  Newbridge Dunvant   Bridgend 
Abertillery Maesteg Newbridge Dunvant Abertillery  Treorchy Caerphilly  Cardiff DNE Glasgow 
  Maesteg Aberavon Dunvant  Aberavon Treorchy  Swan DNE Caerphilly 
  SW Police Cross Keys Pontypool  Abertillery Newbridge   Dunvant 
           
Division One Division Two Division Two Division Two Division Two  Division Two Division Two Division One Division One Division One 
1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995  1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 
Newport SW Police Dunvant Treorchy Aberavon  Dunvant Aberavon Caerphilly Dunvant Cross Keys 
Maesteg Aberavon Cross Keys Abertillery Ebbw Vale  Caerphilly Llandovery Aberavon Bonymaen Pontypool 
SW Police Cross Keys Llanharan Maesteg Abercynon  Cross Keys Cross Keys Treorchy Pontypool Blackwood 
Aberavon Ebbw Vale Narberth SW Police SW Police  Pontypool SW Police Bonymaen Treorchy Bonymaen 
Cross Keys Dunvant Tenby Utd Tenby Utd Bonymaen  Bonymaen Pontypool Dunvant Cross Keys Tondu 
Ebbw Vale Llanharan Glam Wdrs Llanharan Maesteg  Llandovery UWIC Merthyr Merthyr Newbridge 
Tredegar Abertillery Abertillery Narberth Tenby Utd  Maesteg Abertillery Llandovery Llandovery Treorchy 
Penarth Glam Wdrs Llandovery Penarth Llandovery  Abercynon Bonymaen Rumney Tredegar Aberavon 
 Tredegar Penarth Ebbw Vale Llanharan  Ystradgynlai Maesteg Abertillery Rumney Rumney 
 Penarth Ebbw Vale Llandovery Cross Keys  SW Police Blackwood Newbridge Newbridge Abertillery 
  Tredegar Montain Ah Narberth  Llanharan Abercynon Cross Keys Abertillery Llandovery 
KEY  Blaina Glam Wdrs Penarth  Tenby Utd Ystradgynlai SW Police UWIC Llanharan 
        Blackwood Blackwood Abercynon 
COLOURED     Research Clubs      Pontypool Tondu Merthyr 
        UWIC SW Police Tredegar 
    Relegated   Promoted    Maesteg Maesteg  
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                       Changes in WRU National League Rugby Clubs 
 
Aspects Situation at 1990 Situation at 2000 
 
 
Club Goals 
 
 
Local & National Trophies 
 
 
National & European Trophies 
 
 
Playing Resources 
 
 
Local players,  
Permit players 
 
Local, National &  
International players 
 
 
Club Form 
 
 
Members club 
Nonprofit, sporting organization 
 
Limited Company.  
Profit seeking to fund players. 
 
Club Governance 
 
Members Committee 
 
Board of Directors 
 
 
Financial Position 
 
Amateur (Shamamateur) 
 
Professional 
 
 
Product 
 
 
The game of rugby 
80 minutes play 
 
The Game/ Merchandising 
80 minutes play.  
Pre & Post match 
entertainment. 
 
 
Producers 
 
Two teams required 
 
 
Two teams required plus 
additional entertainment 
 
Pricing 
 
 
Membership Fee 
 
Hospitality/Executive/Family 
Packages/Membership 
 
Consumption 
 
A season (Sept-Apr) 
 
 
A season (Aug-May) 
 
 
Distribution 
Channels 
 
Local Venue (s) 
 
Local Fixed Venue.  
Modern stadia (TBC). 
 
Fixtures 
 
Unofficial Games 
Friendly Matches 
 
Welsh/Scottish League Games 
European Cup Games 
 
 
Market 
(Supporters) 
 
Local + Visiting Supporters 
TV Viewers (Wales). 
 
 
Local + Visiting Supporters 
TV viewers (European) 
 
 
Opponents 
 
 
Mainly Welsh/English 
Competition + Co-operation 
 
Mainly Welsh/European 
Competition + Co-operation 
 
 
Players 
 
15 Players 
 
15 Players on field + 8 
Replacements. 
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Sport as a Business:  Evolutionary Phases and Features 
(Hoye et al, 2009) 
 
Stages 
 
Values 
Revenue 
Focus 
Structural 
Focus 
Management 
Focus 
Stage 1. 
Kitchen 
Table 
 
 
Sport is 
Recreational/ 
Cultural 
Practice 
Amateurism 
Volunteerism 
 
Small Revenue 
Streams 
Member Funds 
Social Club 
Income 
Management 
Committee 
Unqualified 
Treasurer 
usually 
Providing 
Strong, Local, 
Community 
Club Focus 
Sustaining 
Operations 
 
Stage 2. 
Commercial 
 
 
Sport still 
Recreational / 
Cultural 
Practice 
Elite Player 
Development 
Viability of 
Sport 
Member 
Service 
 
 
More Revenue 
Streams 
Utilized 
Gate Receipts 
Sponsorship 
 
 
Management 
Portfolios 
 
Marketing the 
Club 
Commercial 
Value of Club 
used to attract 
Corporate & 
other Sponsors 
 
Stage 3 
Bureaucratic 
 
 
Sport as a 
Business 
Efficient use of 
sport resources 
Accountability 
 
 
Corporate 
Income 
Merchandising 
 
Board of 
Directors 
Divisions and 
Departments 
 
 
Improving Club 
Efficiency 
 
Stage 4 
Corporate 
 
Sport embraces 
Business 
Model include 
Regulations 
Professional 
Players 
Delivering the 
Outputs 
Building the 
Brand 
 
 
Revenue 
Streams from: 
Brand Value 
Broadcasting 
Rights 
Sponsors = 
Corporate 
Partners 
 
Board 
Policymaking 
Staff 
Operations 
 
Members/Fans = 
Customer 
Increasing Club 
Value 
Regulating 
Constituents 
Performance 
Measurement 
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                                                                                                                 Appendix 4.1 
 
Assumptions of the Main Paradigms 
(Adapted from Creswell, 1994, 1998, and Lee and Lings 2008) 
Philosophical  
Assumption 
Positivism Phenomenology 
 
Ontological 
Assumption 
(the nature of 
reality) 
 
 
Reality is objective and singular, 
separate from the researcher 
 
 
Reality is subjective, complex 
and multilayered as interpreted 
by participants 
 
 
 
Epistemological 
Assumption  
(what constitutes 
valid knowledge) 
 
 
Singular body of knowledge 
Agreed upon by scientists; 
generalisable 
 
Researcher is independent of 
that being researched 
 
 
Multiple types and bodies exist, 
collaboratively, constructed. 
 
Researcher interacts with that 
being researched 
 
 
Human Nature 
(the relationship 
between human 
beings and the 
environment) 
 
 
Mechanical products of the 
environment, controlled like 
puppets.  
(determinism) 
 
 
Producing their own 
environment, initiators of their 
own actions with free will and 
creativity.  
(voluntarism) 
 
Axiological 
Assumption 
(the role of values)  
 
Research is value- free and 
unbiased 
 
 
 
Researcher acknowledges that 
research is value-laden and 
biases are present 
 
Rhetorical 
Assumption 
(the language of 
research) 
 
 
Researcher writes in a formal 
style and uses the passive voice, 
accepted quantitative words and 
set definitions. 
 
 
Researcher writes in an informal 
style and uses the personal 
voice, accepted qualitative terms 
and limited definitions 
 
 
Methodological 
Assumption 
(process of 
research) 
 
 
 
Process is deductive 
 
Study of cause and effect with a 
static design (categories are 
isolated beforehand) 
 
 
Large Quantitative Research is 
context free 
 
Generalizations lead to 
prediction, explanation and 
understanding.  Results are 
accurate and reliable through 
validity /reliability 
 
Process is inductive 
 
Study of mutual simultaneous 
shaping of factors with an 
emerging design (categories are 
identified during process) 
 
Small Qualitative Research is 
context specific 
 
Patterns and/or theories are 
developed for understanding 
Findings are accurate and 
reliable through verification /  
trustworthiness 
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                                                                                                                    Appendix 4.2  
                 
Quantitative  versus  Qualitative Research 
                     (Adapted from Rudestam and Newton, 2007;  Cohen et al, 2009; Lee and Lings, 2009) 
 
 Quantitative Research Qualitative Research 
Researcher 
Researcher directs, manipulates, 
controls. 
 
Researcher participates and 
collaborates. 
 
Research 
Objective: 
 
 
 
What is 
reality? 
 
 
What is 
knowledge? 
To quantify data and generalise results 
from a sample to the population of 
interest. To measure the incidence of 
various views and opinions in a chosen 
sample. 
 
Seeks objectivity, measurable, 
knowable, and separate from those 
looking at it. 
 
Singular body of knowledge, agreed 
upon by scientists, generalisable. 
To provide insights into the setting 
of a problem, generating ideas and/ 
or hypotheses for later quantitative 
research. To uncover prevalent 
trends in thought and opinion. 
 
Interested in subjectivity, interpreted 
by participants. An understanding of 
underlying reasons and motivations.  
 
Multiple types and bodies exist, 
collaboratively constructed, context-
specific. 
Research  
Site 
 
 
Controlled research situations. 
 
 
Naturally occurring and contextual. 
 
Sample 
focus on 
 
Deductive, explanation, prediction, 
creating general laws. 
 
Usually a large number of participants 
representing the population of interest.  
 
Randomly selected participants. 
 
Isolation of operationally defined 
variables  
Inductive, description, 
understanding, generating local 
understanding. 
 
Usually a small number of non-
representative participants.  
 
Participants selected to fulfil a given 
quota. 
Holistic view of phenomena 
Data 
Collection 
Structured techniques such as 
interviews, questionnaires. 
 
Data expressed in numbers 
Unstructured or semi-structured 
techniques e.g. individual depth 
interviews or group discussions.  
Data expressed in words. 
Data  
Analysis 
 
Manipulation and recording of 
previously identified variables. 
 
Statistical data is usually in the form of 
tabulations. Findings are conclusive 
and usually descriptive in nature. 
 
Describes reality as it is, but is 
independent of what it describes. 
Provides rich, in-depth data. 
 
 
Non-statistical. 
Text Analysis. 
 
 
 
Actively constructs reality, and is 
itself part of what it signifies. 
Outcome 
 
Emphasis on prediction and 
explanation. 
Used to recommend a final course of 
action 
Emphasis on description, 
exploration, search for meaning.  
Findings are not conclusive, cannot 
be used to make generalisations 
about the population studied. 
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                                                                                                              Appendix 4.3 
 
      Trustworthiness of the Study and Findings 
(Gubba and Lincoln, 1994). 
 
 
Trustworthiness 
Criteria 
Method of Addressing in this Study 
 
Credibility 
Extent to which the results 
appear to be acceptable 
representations of the data 
 
 
 Eight months conducting interviews/ conversations with all 
forty-five respondents and many stakeholders. 
 Thirty years visiting clubs observing/researching 
 Transcripts of interviews/club story provided to respondents 
for feedback and validation. 
 Result: Respondents bought into interpretations. 
 
 
Transferability 
Extent to which findings 
from one study in one 
context will apply to other 
contexts 
 
    
 Clear, detailed and in-depth description provided so that 
others can decide the extent to which findings from one 
piece of research are generalizable to another situation. 
 Result.  Replication logic. 
        
 
Dependability 
Extent to which the 
findings are unique to time 
and place: the stability or 
consistency of 
explanations 
 
 
 Respondents reflected on many experiences covering 1990-
2000 events, as well as long ago events   
 Chain of evidence was established from the initial research 
questions through to the conclusions in each case study 
 Results: Found consistency across participant stories   
(Triangulation). 
 
 
Confirmability 
Extent to which 
interpretations are the 
result of the participants 
and the phenomenon as 
opposed to researcher 
biases 
 
 Transcripts of interviews/club story provided to all 
respondents for feedback and validation. 
 Observation and conversation with other stakeholders 
confirmed respondents stories (Triangulation). 
 Result: Interpretations were expanded and refined. 
 
 
Integrity 
Extent to which 
interpretations are 
influenced by 
misinformation or 
evasions by participants 
  
 Interviews were professional, of a non-threatening nature 
and (initially) anonymous 
 Result:  Never believed that respondents were trying to 
evade/embellish issues being discussed 
 
 
Understanding 
Extent to which 
participants buy into 
results as possible 
representatives of their 
worlds 
 
 Executive summary of findings sent to participants; asked if 
their fairly reflected their stories 
 Result: Respondents bought into the findings. 
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                                                                                                                    Appendix 4.4 
             Data Collection Techniques;  Advantages and Disadvantages. 
                                                    (Adapted using Cohen et al, 2009;  Westat, 2002) 
 
Data 
Collection 
Instrument 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
 
Action 
Research 
 
Links practice and research 
 
Participants can be researchers  
 
Interventionist-leading to solution of 
‘real’ problems and meeting ‘real’ 
needs 
 
Benefit of stakeholder research 
 
Promotes collaborative research 
 
 
 
How to carry out an interpretive analysis 
of data which can make no claim to be 
generally representative 
Practitioner-Researcher workload over a 
limited timescale 
Not anyone can undertake action research, 
competencies are required by 
practitioners. 
Overdependence on experts/seniors to the 
extent that independent thought and 
expression are stifled. 
A preoccupation with operational rather 
than strategic thinking and practice. 
Internal validation. 
 
 
Case Studies 
 
Holistic treatment of phenomena 
Provide a rich picture of what is 
happening, as seen through the eyes of 
many individuals 
 
To present and represent reality-to give 
a sense of ‘being there’. 
 
Allow a thorough exploration of 
interactions between treatment and 
contextual data 
 
Can help explain changes or facilitating 
factors that might otherwise not emerge 
from the data 
Can be costly in terms of the demands on 
time and resources 
 
 
 
Individual cases may be over interpreted 
or overgeneralised 
 
 
 
 
 
Require a sophisticated and well-trained 
data collection and reporting team. 
 
Computer 
Simulations 
 
 
They are cheaper to run than the real 
life situation 
 
They can make a phenomenon more 
accessible and clearer to researcher 
 
The research has more control over 
simulation than real life situation 
 
Simulation allows work on dangerous, 
sensitive, ethically questionable or 
dangerous real life situations. 
 
They mimic life rather than being the real 
thing 
 
Cost of purchase of computer simulations 
 
Training of participants to use simulations 
 
Software may require programming 
expertise. 
 
 
Experiments 
 
Objective measurement of treatment 
Establishes cause/ effect relationships 
 
Control and experimental group 
 
Simplistic 
Internal validity/Reliability 
 
Limitations due to practical and ethical 
limitations in social science research. 
 
Ecological validity 
 
Inclusiveness 
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Data Collection 
Instrument 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
 
 
 
Ethnography  
 
 
Provide direct information about 
behaviour of individuals and groups 
Permit researcher to enter into and 
understand situation/context 
Permits tests of reliability of responses 
to questionnaires 
Provide good opportunities for 
identifying unanticipated outcomes 
Exist in natural, unstructured and 
flexible setting. 
Can be expensive and time-consuming 
Need well-qualified, highly trained 
observers; may need to be content 
experts 
May affect behaviour of participants 
Selective perception of observer may 
distort data 
Behaviour or set of behaviours 
observed may be atypical, low 
representativeness.  
Low reliability 
 
 
 
 
Interviews 
 
Usually yield richest data, details, new 
insights 
 
Insightful by providing perceived 
causal inferences 
 
Permits face-to-face contact with 
respondents 
 
Provide opportunity to explore case 
study topics in depth 
 
Allow interviewer to explain or help 
clarify questions, increasing the 
likelihood of useful responses 
 
Allow interviewer to be flexible in 
administering interview to particular 
individuals or in particular 
circumstances. 
 
Can be expensive and time-consuming 
 
Ethical issues regarding confidentiality 
or privacy may arise  
 
Need well-qualified, highly trained 
interviewers 
 
Interviewee may distort information 
through recall error, selective 
perceptions, desire to please 
interviewer 
 
Flexibility can result in inconsistencies 
across interviews 
 
Volume of information very large, may 
be difficult to transcribe and reduce 
data. 
 
 
 
Surveys 
 
Good for gathering Descriptive Data 
 
Can cover a wide range of topics 
Relatively inexpensive to use 
 
Can be utilised using a variety of 
existing software 
 
Eliminates bias due to phrasing 
questions differently with different 
respondents 
 
Permits anonymity and may result in 
more honest responses. 
 
Self-report may lead to biased reporting 
 
Data may provide a general picture but 
lack depth 
 
May not provide adequate information 
on context. 
 
There is often a low rate of response 
 
Questions may be misunderstood. 
Inconclusiveness 
 
 
Tests 
 
Provide objective information on what 
the test taker knows and can do 
Can be constructed to match a given 
curriculum or set of skills 
Can be scored in a straightforward 
manner 
Are accepted by the public as a 
credible indicator of learning. 
 
May be oversimplified and superficial 
 
May be very time consuming 
 
May be biased against some groups of 
test takers 
May be subject to corruption via  
coaching or cheating. 
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NATIONAL LEAGUE POSITIONS, 1990/91 - 1999/2000 
 
Merit 
Clubs 
90/ 
91 
91/ 
92 
92/ 
93 
93/ 
94 
94/ 
95 
Sub 
Tot 
95/ 
96 
96/ 
97 
97/ 
98 
98/ 
99 
99/ 
00 
Sub 
Tot. 
     % 
Incr/dec 
Aberavon 14 12 9 11 13 57 11 13 10 8 18 60 -5.0 
Abertillery 10 17 19 14 10 70 12 19 17 21 20 89 -21.3 
Bridgend 3 6 6 6 5 26 5 5 7 6 8 31 -19.2 
Cardiff 4 9 2 4 1 20 2 4 2 2 1 11 +45.0 
Cross Keys 15 13 14 12 22 76 15 15 19 15 11 75 +1.3 
Ebbw Vale 16 14 22 21 14 87 7 7 4 4 6 28 +67.8 
Glam Wdrs 9 17 18 24 33 101 36 44 42 41 26 189 -87.1 
Llanelli 2 2 1 5 7 17 4 3 6 1 5 19 -11.8 
Maesteg 12 10 11 15 18 66 19 21 24 26 35 125 -89.4 
Neath 1 4 4 2 4 15 1 8 5 3 7 24 -60.0 
Newbridge 7 5 10 8 9 39 9 12 18 20 16 75 -92.3 
Newport 11 8 7 7 8 41 8 6 8 7 2 31 +24.4 
Penarth 18 20 21 20 24 103 29 36 48 54 55 222 -115.5 
Pontypool 6 7 8 9 12 42 16 17 22 13 12 80 -90.5 
Pontypridd 5 3 5 3 2 18 3 1 3 2 4 13 +27.8 
SW Police 13 11 12 16 16 68 22 16 20 25 30 113 -66.2 
Swansea 8 1 3 1 6 19 6 2 1 2 3 14 +26.3 
Tredegar 17 19 23 30 27 116 30 33 25 18 25 131 -12.9 
Key: Number indicates finishing position in National League.  Lowest number counts 
 
                         SWALEC CUP POSITIONS, 1990/91 – 1999/2000 
 
Merit 
Clubs 
90/ 
91 
91/ 
92 
92/ 
93 
93/ 
94 
94/ 
95 
Sub 
Tot 
95/ 
96 
96/ 
97 
97/ 
98 
98/ 
99 
99/ 
00 
Sub 
Tot 
       % 
Incr/dec 
Aberavon 6 6 7 6 4 29 7 6 5 5 5 28 +3.4 
Abertillery 6 5 7 7 7 32 6 5 5 6 6 28 +12.5 
Bridgend 4 4 3 7 4 22 5 4 7 5 6 27 -22.7 
Cardiff 4 5 6 1 3 19 4 1 5 3 5 18 +5.3 
Cross Keys 5 5 4 7 7 28 6 6 6 3 6 27 +3.6 
Ebbw Vale 5 7 7 7 6 32 7 3 2 4 3 19 +40.6 
Glam Wdrs 6 6 7 6 7 32 6 7 7 7 5 32 0 
Llanelli 1 1 1 2 3 8 3 3 1 2 1 10 -25.0 
Maesteg 5 6 7 3 7 28 5 7 6 6 7 31 -10.7 
Neath 3 5 2 4 5 19 2 4 4 5 4 19 0 
Newbridge 4 5 5 4 4 22 4 6 6 7 7 30 -36.4 
Newport 6 3 4 6 7 26 3 6 6 7 7 29 -11.5 
Penarth 7 7 7 7 7 35 6 7 7 7 7 34 +2.9 
Pontypool 2 4 5 7 6 24 7 4 7 4 5 27 -12.5 
Pontypridd 5 3 4 3 2 17 1 5 4 4 3 17 0 
SW Police 6 5 5 4 6 26 5 4 6 7 7 29 -11.5 
Swansea 3 2 3 5 1 14 5 2 4 1 2 14 0 
Tredegar 7 7 6 7 7 34 7 7 5 4 7 30 _11.8 
KEY:        Winners 1 Point           Runner Up 2  Points;         Semi Finalist 3 Points;   
                    Qtr Finalist  4 Points  (Lowest Points Counts for Highest Order).     
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CLUB VISITS AND VIEWINGS: 1974 – 1990.  
 
                                EBBW  VALE                           NEWBRIDGE                                 LLANELLI 
 
Season 
 
Date 
  
Opponents 
 
Date 
  
Opponents 
  
Date 
  
Opponents 
1974/75 Sat      8/2 Maesteg        a    Sat 21/9 Moseley        h 
 Wed  30/4 Llanelli         h    Tue 25/3 Pontypridd    a 
      Wed 30/4 Ebbw Vale    a 
Visits  2  0   3 
1975/76 Sat    13/9 Swansea        a    Sat 27/12 Bristol           a 
 Wed  28/4 Abertillery    a    Wed 10/3 British Col    h 
Visits  2  0   2 
1976/77 Fri    24/9 Pontypridd    h Sat    4/12 Cross Keys   h  Tue30/11 Bath              h 
 Sat  11/12 Swansea        a Thur   7/4 Neath            h  Sat     8/1 Cardiff (Cp)  a 
 Sat  12/3 Pontypridd    a Sat   16/4 London Wh  h    
Visits  4  3   2 
1977/78 Wed  8/3 Llanelli         h    Wed   7/9 Aberavon     a 
 Sat  11/3 Moseley        h    Sat 26/11 Cardiff          h 
      Wed   8/3 Ebbw Vale   a 
Visits  2  0   3 
1978/79 Sat  23/12 Hendy (Cp)   a Wed18/10 Newport       a  Sat   23/9 Moseley       h 
 Tue   27/2 Pontypridd    a    Tue14/11 Swansea       a 
Visits  2  1   2 
1979/80 Wed21/11 Newbridge    h Sat     8/9 Bridgend      h  Wed24/10 SA Barbars  h 
   Wed21/11 Ebbw Vale   a  Sat 22/12 Pontypl Utd h 
   Sat    8/12 Risca (Cup)  a  Wed  30/1 Bridgend      a 
      Sat     8/3 Maesteg       h 
      Sat   29/3 Bridgend  S/F 
Visits  1  3   5 
1980/81 Sat  11/10 Pontypridd    a Mon  13/4 Newport       h  Wed 17/9 Penclawdd   a 
 Fri  26/12 Abertillery    a    Wed 5/11 Leinster        h 
      Sat   31/1 Cardiff          h 
      Sat   14/3 Bridgend   S/F 
Visits  2  1   4 
1981/82 Sat  24/10 Cross Keys   a Mon  9/11 Crawshays   h  Sat  26/12 London Wel h 
 Tue   2/2 Pontypridd    a Fri     21/1 Swansea       a    
Visits  2  2   1 
1982/83 Sat      4/9 Newbridge    a Sat      4/9 Ebbw Vale   h  Sat  27/11 Cardiff          a 
 Sat   3/10 Cross Keys   a Fri       4/3 Abertillery   h  Sat  27/12 London Wel h 
 Wed  1/12 Swansea        h Sat    26/3 Swansea S/F    
 Sat    29/1 Swansea        a Wed 20/4 S W Police   a    
Visits  4  4   2 
1983/84 Mon  4/10 Pontypool     h Sat  10/12 Swansea       a  Mon  12/9 Gorseinon     a 
   Mon  26/3 P.S. Wdrs     h  Sat   11/2 Harlequins    h 
   Mon  16/4 Pontypool     a  Sat     8/3 Bridgend       a 
Visits  1  3   3 
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CLUB VISITS AND VIEWINGS: 1974 – 1990.  
 
                                EBBW  VALE                           NEWBRIDGE                                 LLANELLI 
 
Season 
 
Date 
  
Opponents 
 
Date 
  
Opponents 
  
Date 
  
Opponents 
1984/85        
 Wed  30/1 Llanelli         a Wed31/10 Cardiff         h  Sat  29/12 Bristol          h 
      Wed  30/1 Ebbw Vale   h 
Visits  2  2   3 
1985/86 Sat      7/9 Newbridge    h Sat      7/9 Ebbw Vale   a  Sat  13/11 Cardiff         h 
 Sat      8/2 Llanelli         a Sat  14/12 Swansea       a  Sat   11/1 Wasps          h 
 Sat      8/3 Pontypridd    h    Sat    8/2 Ebbw Vale   h 
      Wed  12/3 P.S.Wdrs      h 
Visits  3  2   4 
1986/87 Sat  25/10 Cross Keys   h Sat    10/1 S.W. Police  h  Sat   1/11 Fiji BBs        h 
   Sat    28/3 Swansea   S/F  Sat 27/12 Bristol           h 
      Sat   24/1 Neath            a 
      Sat   14/2 Pontypool     h 
      Sat   28/2 Aberavon      a 
      Wed 25/3 Ystradgynls  a 
Visits  1  2   6 
1987/88 Sat    5/12 Maesteg        h Wed    2/9 Moseley       h  Wed 7/10 Mumbles      a 
 Sat    16/1 Cardiff          h Mon    2/4 Abertillery   a  Sat 31/10 Leicester       h 
      Sat 14/11 Swansea        h 
      Sat   13/2 Pontypool     h 
      Sat   26/3 Aberavon  S/F 
      Sat   23/4 Gloucester    h 
Visits  2  2   6 
1988/89 Sat  12/10 Cross Keys   h Sat    28/1 Newport Cp  a  Sat   5/11 Bath             h 
   Sat      8/4 Llanelli    S/F  Sat 17/12 Pontypl Utd  a 
   Sat    22/4 Cardiff        h  Mon   2/1 Swansea       a 
      Sat     8/4 Newbridg  S/F 
Visits  1  3   4 
1989/90 Sat    31/3 Pontypridd    a Sat    23/9 Wales          h    
        
        
Visits  1  1   0 
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Appendix 4.6a 
EBBW VALE 
 
CLUB VISITS,  VIEWINGS & CONVERSATIONS 
Date Home Team  Away Team Talking To: Comments  On: 
1990/91 (2)    Rugby Club or Business? 
20.11.90 Neath V Ebbw Vale Supporters Impact of Leagues on club 
18.01.91 Ebbw Vale V Pontypridd Committee Impact of Leagues on club   
13.04.91 Ebbw Vale V Tredegar Stakeholders Impact of Leagues on club 
      
1991/92 (1)     
14.09.91 Pontypool V Ebbw Vale Supporters Impact of Leagues on club   
      
1992/93 (1)     
02.02.93 Swansea V Ebbw Vale Committee What about a Promotion Drive? 
      
1993/94 (1)     
21.12.93 Newbridge V Ebbw Vale Supporters Impact of Leagues on clubs 
1994/95   (2)     
05.11.94 Bonymaen V Ebbw Vale Supporters Impact of Leagues on players  
07.02.95 Aberavon V Ebbw Vale Players Impact of Leagues on them 
1995/96 (4)     
09.09.95 Ebbw Vale V Neath Stakeholders   Impact of Professionalism 
04.11.95 Ebbw Vale V Newbridge Stakeholders Impact of Professionalism 
23.12.95 Ebbw Vale V Swansea Stakeholders Impact of Professionalism 
27.04.96 Bridgend V Ebbw Vale Coach/ Plays Impact of Professionalism 
1996/97  (6)     
03.09.96 Ebbw Vale V Newbridge Committees How club coping with Profess 
28.12.96 Newbridge V Ebbw Vale Coaches How club coping with Profess 
08.02.97 Neath V Ebbw Vale Supporters How club coping with Profess 
01.03.97 Ebbw Vale V Cardiff Players:            How club coping with Profess 
08.03.97 Newport V Ebbw Vale Supporters How club coping with Profess 
05.04.97 Swansea V Ebbw Vale Coaches How club coping with Profess 
1997/98 (7)     
28.02.98 Ebbw Vale V Cardiff  (Cup) Directors How club coping with Profess 
28.03.98 Ebbw Vale V Swansea (Q) Supporters How Important is Cup Comp 
25.04.98 Ebbw Vale V Newport (SF) CEO How club coping with Profess 
28.04.98 Ben Francs  Cup Final  Observing Organization 
02.05.98 Ebbw Vale V Llanelli Stakeholders Strategic Management 
10.05.98 Neath V Ebbw Vale Supporters Context/Process/Context Ques 
16.05.98 Llanelli (CF) V Ebbw Vale Stakeholders Goals 1998/99      
1998/99 (7)     
08.09.98 Aberavon V Ebbw Vale Supporters Is it a rugby club or a business? 
26.09.98 Ebbw Vale V Pontypridd Team Mangt Is it a rugby club or a business? 
23.01.99 Ebbw Vale V Romania Directors Is it a rugby club or a business? 
23.02.99 Caerphilly V Ebbw Vale Players Is it a rugby club or a business? 
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                                                                                         Appendix 4.6a 
EBBW VALE 
 
      CLUB VISITS,  VIEWINGS & CONVERSATIONS 
Date Home Team  Away Team Talking To: Topic/Comments On:                          
19.03.99 Swansea V Ebbw Vale Stakeholders Is it a rugby club or a business? 
28.03.99 Neath V Ebbw Vale Management Is it a rugby club or a business? 
07.05.99 Ebbw Vale  V Neath Stakeholders Clubs Goal Priorities 1999/00 
1999/00 (5)     
11.09.99 Ebbw Vale V Caerphilly Directors Use of Strategic Management 
10.12.99 Ebbw Vale v Steau Staff Empowered/Freedom of action 
12.02.00 Ebbw Vale v Newport Team Mangt ERCC & League Standards 
15.04.00 Ebbw Vale v London Irish Supporters Re WRU Actions on ERC    
22.04.00 Llanelli (SF) v Ebbw Vale Stakeholders Cup/League/ERC Title ? 
00/01 (2)     
01.11.00 Ebbw Val 21 v Caerphily 21 Stakeholders Reasons for increased perform. 
24.03.01 Caerphilly v Ebbw Vale Supporters Reasons for increased perform. 
2001/02 (2)     
18.09.01 Llanelli v Ebbw Vale Directors Reasons for increased perform. 
17.04.02 Swansea v Ebbw Vale Team Mangt Reasons for increased perform. 
2002/03 (24)     
07.09.02 Ebbw Vale v Caerphilly Management Reasons for increased perform. 
05.10.02 Ebbw Vale v Edinburgh Staff Empowered/Freedom of action 
26.10.02 Swansea v Ebbw Vale Committees Context/Process/Content Ques 
29.10.02 Ebbw Vale v Swansea Supporters Context/Process/Content Ques 
15.11.02 Neath v Ebbw Vale Supporters Context/Process/Content Ques 
30.11.02 Ebbw Vale v Llanelli Supporters Context/Process/Content Ques 
01.03.03 Swansea v Ebbw Vale Stakeholders Context/Process/Content Ques 
25.01.03 Ebbw Vale v Neath Team Mgt Context/Process/Content Ques 
15.03.03 Bridgend v Ebbw Vale Players Verify Respondents Answers 
22.03.03 Llanelli  v Ebbw Vale Supporters Context/Process/Content Ques 
2003/04 (5)     
21.10.03 Llanelli V Ebbw Vale Supporters Verify Respondents Answers 
29.10.03 Newbridge V Ebbw Vale Stakeholders Verify Respondents Answers 
01.11.03 Swansea V Ebbw Vale Supporters Verify Respondents Answers 
08.11.03 Ebbw Vale  V Llanelli Stakeholders Verify Respondents Answers 
29.11.03 Ebbw Vale v Cross Keys Players Verify Respondents Answers 
     2002/03     Interviews (9)                   Name                        Position 
05.12.02     Interview at Ebbw Vale Club Ray Harris Company Secretary 
05.12.02     Interview at Ebbw Vale Club Terri Morgan Accountant 
05.12.02     Interview at Ebbw Vale Club Doug Taylor Team Manager 
02.01.03 Interview at home, Swansea Mike Ruddock Coach 
03.01.03 Interview at Ebbw Vale Club Roy Lewis Press 
03.01.03 Interview at Ebbw Vale Club Ivor George Long Standing Supporter 
30.01.03 Interview at home, Ebbw Vale Alan Evans Former Committeeman 
30.01.03 Interview at Ebbw Vale Club Chay Billen Club Captain 
21.03.03 Interview in Cardiff Paul Russell President & Fin Backer 
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Appendix 4.6b 
NEWBRIDGE 
 
VISITS, VIEWINGS & CONVERSATIONS 
Date Home Team  Away Team Talking To: Topic/Comments  On: 
1990/91 (2)    Rugby Club or Business? 
22.12.90 Cardiff V Newbridge Committee Impact of Leagues on club 
30.3.91 Newbridge V Pontypridd Stakeholders Impact of Leagues on club 
      
1991/92 (2)     
07.12.91 Bridgend v Newbridge Coaches Impact of Leagues on players 
21.12.91 Maesteg v Newbridge Players Impact of Leagues on players 
      
1992/93 (2)     
28.11.92 Bridgend v Newbridge Supporters Impact of Leagues on club 
24.04.93 Newbridge v Bridgend Committee Impact of Leagues on club 
    1993/94           (3) 
13.11.93 Newbridge V Bridgend Coaches Impact of  Leagues on club 
21.12.93 Newbridge V Ebbw Vale Supporters Impact of Leagues on clubs 
23.04.94 Bridgend V Newbridge Committee View of Strategic Management 
   1994/95           (2) 
15.10.94 Swansea V Newbridge Players Impact of Leagues on them   
04.02.95 Neath V Newbridge  Players Impact of Leagues on players 
     1995/96           (3) 
29.09.95 Bridgend v Newbridge Stakeholders Impact of Professionalism 
04.11.95 Ebbw Vale v Newbridge Stakeholders Impact of Professionalism 
30.03.96 Neath v Newbridge Commitees Impact of Professionalism 
   1996/97            (7) 
03.09.96 Ebbw Vale V Newbridge Committees How club coping with Profess 
18.09.96 Neath  v Newbridge Supporters How club coping with Profess 
07.12.96 Llanelli v Newbridge Players How club coping with Profess 
28.12.96 Newbridge v Ebbw Vale Coaches How club coping with Profess 
01.03.97 Newbridge v Neath Committees How club coping with Profess 
19.04.97 Newbridge v Swansea Supporters How club coping with Profess 
03.05.97 Newbridge v Llanelli Stakeholders How club coping with Profess 
    1997/98            (4) 
20.12.97 Newbridge v Abercwmboi Committee Reasons for Relegation 
24.01.98 Newbridge v Cardiff (Cup) Supporters Reasons for Relegation 
18.02.98 Newbridge v Bonymaen Stakeholders Reasons for Relegation 
12.05.98 Pontypool v Newbridge Coach/Plyrs Reasons for Relegation 
    1998/99              (1) 
19.12.98 Bonymaen C v Newbridge Committee Is it a rugby club or a business? 
1999/00           (1)     
22.01.00 Rumney  cup v Newbridge Committee Future Goals & Management 
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Appendix 4.6b 
NEWBRIDGE 
 
VISITS, VIEWINGS & CONVERSATIONS 
 
Date Home Team v Away Team Talking To: Topic/Comments On: 
2001.02   (5)     
08.09.01 Newbridge v Pontypool Stakeholders Reasons for decreased perform. 
24.11.01 Newbridge v Blackwood Supporters Reasons for decreased perform. 
09.01.02 Newbridge v Llandovery Committee Reasons for decreased perform. 
20.03.02 Newbridge v Merthyr              Players Reasons for decreased perform. 
04.05.02 Newbridge v Bedwas Coaches Reasons for decreased perform. 
      
      
2002/03  (8)     
07.09.02 Newbridge v Beddau Committee Context/Process/Content Ques. 
28.09.02 Newbridge v Treorchy Supporters Context/Process/Content Ques. 
22.10.02 Newbridge v Tredegar Stakeholders Context/Process/Content Ques. 
04.01.03 Carmarthen v Newbridge Players Context/Process/Content Ques. 
18.01.03 Newbridge v Blackwood Stakeholders Context/Process/Content Ques. 
08.02.03 Newbridge v Bridgend Committee Context/Process/Content Ques. 
05.03.03 Tredegar v Newbridge Supporters Context/Process/Content Ques. 
26.04.03 Newbridge v Glam Wdrs Stakeholders Verify Respondents  Answers 
 
2003/04        (5)  
06.09.03 Newbridge v Caerphilly Supporters Verify Respondents Answers 
04.10.03 Neath v Newbridge Supporters Verify Respondents Answers  
29.10.03 Newbridge v Ebbw Vale Stakeholders Verify Respondents Answers 
15.11.03 Llanelli v Newbridge Supporters Verify Respondents Answers 
22.11.03 Newbridge v Swansea Stakeholders Verify Respondents Answers 
 
2003 Interviews (9)                   Name                        Position 
06.03.03      Interview at Newbridge Club Keith Westwood, Team Manager      
06.03.03      Interview at Newbridge Club Idris McCarthey Chairman & Fin Backer      
07.03.03      Interview WRU Office, Cardiff      Geoff Champion Press 
13.03.03      Interview at work, Newbridge Paul Tedstone, Accountant 
13.03.03      Interview at home Newbridge Brian Wellington Former Committeeman 
13.03.03      Interview at Newbridge Club Graham Patterson Club Secretary 
17.03.03      Interview at Newbridge Club Jon Westwood Club Coach      
18.03.03      Interview at Newbridge Club Damion Cooper Club Captain 
03.04.03      Interview at Newbridge Club Brian Jones Long Stand Supporter 
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Appendix 4.6c  
LLANELLI: 
 
VISITS, VIEWINGS & CONVERSATIONS 
 
Date Home Team  Away Team Talking  To:       Topic/ Comments On: 
 
 1990/91         (2)                                                                                   
28.11.90 Llanelli V Newport Committee Impact of Leagues on club 
30.03.91 Llanelli V Northamptn Players Impact of Leagues on them 
 
 1991/92         (2) 
09.11.91 Pontypridd V Llanelli Committee Reason for Cup success? 
26.12.91 Llanelli v Lon Welsh Supporters Impact of Leagues on club  
 
1992/93    (1)     
08.09.92 Pontypool v Llanelli Supporters Reason for Cup success? 
02.01.93 Bridgend V Llanelli Coach Impact of Leagues on club  
 
 1993/94         (2) 
27.10.93 Llanelli v SA Barbars Supporters Reasons for successes last year 
30.11.93 Llanelli v Bridgend Committee Reasons for successes last year 
 
1994/95         (4) 
27.08.94 Llanelli v Swansea Coaches Impact of Leagues on players 
29.10.94 Llanelli v South Africa Supporters Impact of Leagues on players 
10.12.94 Swansea v Llanelli Players Impact of Leagues on them 
01.04.95 Llanelli v Bridgend Committee Use of Strategic Management 
 
 1995/96         (4) 
30.09.95 Llanelli v Cardiff Committee Impact of Professionalism 
07.11.95 Llanelli v Fiji Stakeholders Impact of Professionalism 
26.12.95 Llanelli v Londn Welsh Players Impact of Professionalism 
06.04.96 Bridgend v Llanelli Team Mangt Impact of Professionalism 
 
 1996/97          (5) 
31.08.96 Bridgend v Llanelli Players How Club coping with  Profess 
21.09.96 Llanelli v Swansea Committees How Club coping with  Profess        
07.12.96 Llanelli v Newbridge Playes How Club coping with  Profess 
08.03.97 Swansea v Llanelli Team Mgts How Club coping with  Profess 
03.05.97 Newbridge v Llanelli Supporters How Club coping with  Profess 
 
 1997/98         (11) 
18.10.97 Pontypridd v Llanelli Stakeholders Reasons behind WRU Rescue 
08.11.97 Llanelli v New Zealand Coach Welsh v NZ style of game 
07.02.98 Wales v Italy Staff Empowered/Freedom of action        
14.02.98 Swansea v Llanelli Team Mgts Context/Process/Content Ques  
01.03.98 Llanelli v Caerphilly Supporters View on WRU buying Stradey 
09.03.98 Wales 16 v Portugal 16s Staff Observing Organization 
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LLANELLI 
 
VISITS, VIEWINGS & CONVERSATIONS 
 
Date Home Team  Away Team Talking To: Topic/Comments On: 
1997/98      
12.03.98 Llanelli  v Neath (CQF) Players Context/Process/Content Ques 
26.04.98 Llanelli (SF) v Seven Sisters At Neath Observing Organization 
02.05.98 Ebbw Vale v Llanelli Stakeholders Use of Strategic Management 
06.05.98 W Wales  Cup Final  Observing Organization 
16.05.98 Llanelli  (CF) V Ebbw Vale Stakeholders Goals Priorities for 1998/99      
      
1998/99      (9)     
08.98.98 Llanelli V Saracens Supporters Can club win pro title? 
05.0926. Pontypridd V Llanelli Team Mgt Is Club now rugby or business 
21.11.98 Wales V Argentina CEO Is Club now rugby or business 
05.12.98 Llanelli V Pontypridd Players Is Club now rugby or business 
09.01.99 Llanelli V Blue Bulls  Stakeholders Is Club now rugby or business 
17.01.99 Llanelli V Gauteng Fal Directors Is Club now rugby or business  
09.03.99 Llanelli V Bridgend Management Is Club now rugby or business 
01.05.99 Llanelli V Neath Staff Empowered/Freedom of action 
15.05.99 Swansea V Llanelli  (CF) Stakeholders  Cup/ League/ ERC Title? 
      
1999/00     (6)     
18.09.99 Llanelli V Bridgend Team Mangt Reasons for winning title? 
11.10.99 Argentina V Samoa RWC Game Observing Organization 
27.12.99 Llanelli V Swansea Directors Did Clubs take right pro action? 
26.02.00 Llanelli (Cup) V Bridgend Stakeholders Did Clubs take right pro action? 
15.04.00 Llanelli (ERC) V Cardiff CEO/Coach Cup/League/ ERC Title? 
22.04.00 Llanelli (SF) V Ebbw Vale Stakeholders Cup/ League/ ERC Title? 
20.05.00 Llanelli (CF) V Swansea Stakeholders Cup/ League/ ERC Title? 
 
2000/01         (10) 
02.12.00 Cardiff V Llanelli Coaches Reasons for consistent performs 
05.12.00 Newport V Llanelli Team Mangt Reasons for consistent performs 
23.12.00 Llanelli V Swansea Supporters Reasons for performances 
06.01.01 Llanelli V Glasgow CEO/Mangt Reasons for consistent performs 
19.01.01 Llanelli V Colomiers Directors Context/Process/Content Ques 
01.02.01 Wales 19s V England 19s  Observing Organization 
17.04.01 Wales 16s V Italy 16s  Observing Organization: 
02.05.01 W. Wales V Cup Final Supporters Reasons for consistent performs 
05.05.01 Llanelli V Cardiff Directors Context/Process/Content Ques 
12.05.01 Pontypridd V Llanelli  (CF) Stakeholders Goal Priorities for 2001/02. 
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LLANELLI 
 
VISITS, VIEWINGS & CONVERSATIONS 
 
Date Home Team  Away Team Talking To: Topic/Comments On: 
 
2001/02           
 
(3) 
    
18.09.01 Llanelli v Ebbw Vale Directors Reasons for performances 
28.04.02 Leicester v Llanelli (SF) Supporters Is priority goal ERC Title? 
18.05.02 Pontypridd v Llanelli Coaches Empowered by Board? 
 
2002/03          (13) 
31.08.02 Llanelli V Munster Directors Context/Process/Content Ques 
14.09.02 Neath V Llanelli Coaches x 2 Context/Process/Content Ques 
30.11.02 Ebbw Vale V Llanelli Supportersx 2 Context/Process/Content Ques 
03.01.03 Llanelli V Swansea Players x 2 Context/Process/Content Ques 
04.02.03 Llanelli V Cardiff Management Context/Process/Content Ques 
14.02.03 Neath V Llanelli Players x 2 Context/Process/Content Ques 
       
2002/03       (7)      
22.03.03 Llanelli v Ebbw Vale Supporters Context/Process/Content Ques 
28.03.03 Llanelli v Pontypridd Staff Empowered/Freedom of action 
05.04.03 Llanelli v Neath Directors Context/Process/Content Ques 
19.04.03 Cardiff v Llanelli   (SF) Supporters Context/Process/Content Ques 
03.05.03 Newport v Llanelli  (CF) Players Is goal League or ERC Title? 
06.05.03 Llanelli v Bridgend Stakeholders Verify Respondents Answers  
10.05.03 Swansea v Llanelli Team Mgts Context/Process/Content Ques 
 
2003/04          (5) 
20.09.03 Swansea v Llanelli Stakeholders Verify Respondents Answers 
21.10.03 Llanelli v Ebbw Vale Supporters Verify Respondents Answers 
08.11.03 Ebbw Vale v Llanelli Stakeholders Verify Respondents Answers 
15.11.03 Llanelli v Newbridge Supporters Verify Respondents Answers 
20.12.03 Llanelli v Swansea Stakeholders Verify Respondents Answers 
 
2003 Interviews (9)                   Name                        Position 
20.02.03     Interview at Llanelli Club Colin Stroud Accountant 
20.02.03     Interview at home Llanelli Gareth Jenkins Coach 
14.03.03     Interview at Llanelli Club Stuart Gallacher CEO 
14.03.03     Interview at home Llanelli Norman Lewis Press 
24.04.03     Interview at Work, Skewen Anthony Buchannon Team Manager 
03.06.03     Interview at Work, Cheltenham Huw Evans, Financial Backer 
05.06.03     Interview at home, Pembrey Marlston Morgan Long Stand Supporter 
12.06.03     Interview at CN Home Hefin Jenkins Former Committeeman 
28.07.03 Interview at Vale of Glamorgan Rupert Moon Captain 
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CLUB RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED FOR RESEARCH:  
DATES OF INTERVIEW 
 
             
                  
                         Club 
 
Respondent. 
Ebbw Vale RFC 
 
Newbridge RFC 
 
 Llanelli RFC 
 
Owner/Finance 
Backer 
Paul Russell 
Friday 21st March 
2003. 
Idris McCarthey 
Thurs 6th March  
2003. 
 
Huw Evans 
Tuesday 3rd June  
2003. 
     
CEO/General 
Manager/ 
Company Sec. 
Ray Harris 
Thursday 5th Dec  
2002 
Graham Paterson 
Thurs 13th March  
2003 
 
Stuart Gallacher 
Friday 14th March 
2003 
 
Accountant 
 
Terri Morgan 
Thursday 5th Dec  
2002 
Paul Tedstone 
Thurs 13th March  
2003 
 
Colin Stroud 
Thursday 20th Feb 
2003 
     
 
Team Manager 
 
Doug Taylor 
Thursday 5th Dec  
2002 
Keith Westwood 
Thurs 6th March  
2003 
 
Anthony Buchanon 
Thursday24th April 
2003 
 
Coaching Staff 
 
Mike Ruddock 
Thursday 2nd Jan  
2002 
Jon Westwood 
Mon 17th March  
2003 
 
Gareth Jenkins 
Thursday 20th Feb 
2003 
Senior Player/ 
Captain 
Chay Billen 
Thursday 13th Feb 
2003 
Damion Cooper 
Tues 18th March  
2003 
 
Rupert Moon 
Monday 28th July 
2003. 
     
Ex- Committee 
Member 
Alan Evans 
Thursday 30th Jan 
2003 
Brian Wellington 
Thurs 13th March  
2003 
 
Hefin Jenkins 
Thurs 12th June 2003. 
 
Local Press 
 
Roy Lewis 
Friday 3rd Jan 2003 
Geoff Champion 
Friday 7th March  
2003 
 
Norman Lewis 
Friday 14th March 
2003 
Long Standing 
Supporter 
Ivor George 
Friday 3rd Jan  
2003 
Brian Jones 
Thursday 3rd April 
2003 
 
Marlston Morgan 
Thursday 5th June 
2003. 
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 50 Smiths Road, 
          Birchgrove 
            Swansea  
            SA7 9DY 
 
  Tel /Fax: 01792-414862 
 
      14th September  2002 
 
Dear 
 
You may be aware that I am undertaking research for a PhD with Cardiff Business School, 
University of Wales, into the process of strategic management in small businesses. The small 
organizations chosen are selected Welsh rugby clubs. Llanelli RFC is one of the clubs that I 
am researching and to that end I would be most grateful for your assistance in your role as 
Team Manager. Mr Huw Evans, major shareholder in Llanelli RFC, has given his blessing 
to the club being researched.   
 
May I at the outset say that no club or individual is being identified by name in my thesis.  
Each club and individual involved in the research is assured of the utmost confidentiality. 
 
If you are able to help with my research I would be grateful if you would complete the 
enclosed questionnaire at your earliest convenience. The questionnaire seeks your opinion 
on the process of formulating a strategy for Llanelli RFC.  
There are 39 questions. Against each question is a scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to 
Strongly Agree (7). You need to give a mark to each question based on your own views of 
how the question relates to Llanelli RFC. 
 
If you have any queries regarding the questions please do not hesitate to contact me via my 
home telephone number. 
 
Please find a stamped addressed envelope that you can use to return the completed 
questionnaire to me. Once I have had the opportunity to analyse your questionnaire I would 
appreciate about 50-60 minutes of your time to ‘talk through’ your replies face-to-face.  
 
Before completing my thesis, all individuals may have the opportunity to review their 
contribution to the case study on Llanelli RFC. 
 
May I thank you in anticipation of your assistance. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Clive 
 
Clive Norling. 
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How Strategic Decisions are made in your Rugby Club. 
  
‘Strategic decisions are characterised by a large commitment of resources and deals with issues of 
substantial importance to the rugby club usually with longer rather than just short-term impact; they 
usually involve more than one function and involve significant change’. 
 
Please circle the number you feel is most appropriate between August 1995 – May 2000. 
 
                                                                                                     Strongly                       Strongly             
                                                                                                                Disagree                           Agree 
1.   A senior figure’s vision is our strategy. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.   The chief executive determines our strategic direction. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.   The strategy we follow is directed by a vision of the future      
       associated  with the chief executive (or another senior figure) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.   Our strategy is closely associated with a particular individual. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.   Our chief executive tends to impose strategic decisions 
(rather than consulting the top management team) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.   Our strategy is made explicit in the form of precise plans 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.   When we formulate a strategy it is planned in detail. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8.   We have precise procedures for achieving strategic objectives. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9.   We have well-defined planning procedures to search for solutions  
       to strategic problems. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. We meticulously assess many alternatives when deciding on  
      a strategy       
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. We evaluate potential strategic options against explicit strategic  
      objectives. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. We have definite and precise strategic objectives. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. We make strategic decisions based on a systematic analysis of our  
      business environment. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Our strategy develops through a process of ongoing adjustment. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Our strategy is continually adjusted as changes occur in the market  
      place. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. To keep in line with our business environment we make continual  
      small-scale changes to strategy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Out strategies emerge gradually as we respond to the need to     
      change. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. We keep early commitment to a strategy tentative and subject to  
      review. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. We tend to develop strategy by experimenting and trying new      
      approaches in the market place. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 
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20. Our strategy is a compromise which accommodates the conflicting  
       interests of powerful groups and individuals 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. The vested interests of particular internal groups colour our  
       strategy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. Our strategies often have to be changed because certain groups  
      block their implementation. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. Our strategy develops through a process of bargaining and  
      negotiation between groups or individuals. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. The information on which our strategy is developed often reflects  
       the interests of certain groups. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. The decision to adopt a strategy is influenced by the power of the  
       group sponsoring it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. There is a way of doing things in this organisation which has  
      developed over the years. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. Our strategy is based on past experience. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. The strategy we follow is dictated by our culture. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. The attitudes, behaviours, rituals, and stories of the organisation  
      reflect the direction we wish to take it in. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. Our organisation’s history directs our search for solutions to  
      strategic issues. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. There is resistance to any strategic change which does not sit well  
      with our culture. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32. The strategies we follow develop from ‘the way we do things  
      around here’. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33. Our freedom of strategic choice is severely restricted by our  
      business environment. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34. Forces outside this organisation determine our strategic direction. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. Barriers exist in our business environment which significantly  
      restrict the strategies we can follow. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. We have strategy imposed on us by those external to this  
      organisation, for example the government. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
37. We are not able to influence our business environment; we can   
       only buffer ourselves from it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
38. Many of the strategic changes which have taken place have been  
      forced on us by those outside the rugby club. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39. We are severely limited in our ability to influence the business                 
     environment in which we operate. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
KEY 
0-1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2-3 
Disagree 
4-5 
Agree 
6-7 
Strongly 
Agree 
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              THE EBBW VALE RFC STORY 
 
 
Context 
 
Internal Environment 
Prior to 1995, the Club was run by a General Committee, consisting of some twenty-two 
elected members. The senior figures were the Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and one or two 
other members. The Committee met fortnightly during the season, alternating with sub-
committee meetings every other Monday.  From 1995, this continued under the Presidency 
of Paul Russell 
 
The Club was promoted to the Premier Division in season 1995/96, following the game going 
Open. It has remained in the top division since that time and remains the only club to be 
promoted and not subsequently relegated from the top flight. 
 
External Environment 
The local economic situation is not good and has impacted on sponsorship and crowd 
attendance. The closure of the local steelworks was a body blow to the club both in terms of 
guaranteed regular income and also ‘political clout’.  
 
Blaenau Gwent Council have been a tremendous negative influence on the Club. A business 
plan to develop Eugene Cross Park put forward by the Club was rejected by the council.  
 
FIFA have imposed a crowd restriction of 4,500 on the ground that the council adopted for 
rugby and it still applies. 
 
The Welsh Rugby Union did not show leadership or give direction when the Game went 
professional. Their intervention last summer, forced the Club to impose an £100 season 
ticket. Also the introduction of a meritocracy system for payment within the Premier Division 
has affected cashflow. 
  
Process 
The senior figures in the Club are considered to be Paul and Marcus Russell. The Club is 
under the control of a six man Board of Directors. However, the full-time staff are 
empowered to run the club on a day-by-day basis.  
 
The Club does prepare a written strategic plan each year, setting itself goals for the season 
(in minutes of Board). However, it is not afraid to change course at short notice if/when 
required. Strategy appears, on occasions, to be more ‘emergent’ (incremental) rather than 
‘intended’ (planned). 
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THE EBBW VALE RFC STORY 
 
 
 
Due to the ‘open communication’ approach adopted by the Board of Directors (plus their 
funding), ensures that there is very little politics within the club nowadays. Supporters have 
clear channels of communication to express their views and opinions to the Board.     
 
The Club has a North Gwent valley town culture and attitude.  Club has a close knit approach. 
The history and traditions of the club will not hold back its future progress.  
 
External influences, the local environment, the council and the WRU, have impacted in their 
own way on the strategic direction of the club. 
 
The club was not prepared for the advent of professionalism. 
 
Content 
 
Strategic decisions are taken by the Board, who do not appear to be influenced by either the 
political or culture aspects of the club. The Board is very open and honest with the club’s 
stakeholders.  
 
The Club does have a strategy. Over recent seasons it has been one of survival and 
consolidation.   
 
Key decisions taken have been  
 to form a Ltd Company in 1997;  
 to allow Swansea/Cardiff to take its place in the 1998 European Heineken Cup; and  
 to declare major financial problems in August 2002.   
 
Performance Measures. 
The dream/vision is to keep top class rugby in Ebbw Vale.    To keep Ebbw Vale in the 
Premier Division. 
 
Financial Performance 
 
Success is not necessarily measured by profit. Rather the Club takes the approach of ‘Is our 
financial position at the end of the year what we said it was going to be at the beginning’.   
Unlike the amateur era, the club has not made a financial profit in any season during the 
professional era. 
 
Operational Performance 
 
Performance on the field is very important and the main priority of the Club. 
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THE EBBW VALE RFC STORY 
 
 
Organisational Effectiveness 
 
The Club is also involved to some extent within the community.  It gives the community a 
team to be proud of and it also looks after the welfare of its players. 
 
Reasons for Operating Improvement 
 
The improvement in playing performance in the League post 1995 is attributed to the 
management of the Club by Paul Russell, the recruitment of North Gwent players in the team 
and the coaching of Leigh Jones and Richard Hill.  
 
 
Clive Norling 
Tuesday 12th August 2003. 
 
Respondent’s Amendments: 
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Clive Norling, 50 Smiths Road, Birchgrove, Swansea. SA7 9DY. 
Tel & Fax: 01792-414862 
 
July 2003 
Dear  Ivor, 
 
Re: PhD Research on Ebbw Vale RFC 
 
First, may I thank you for your assistance with my PhD research and for your patience!     
 
As promised a while back now, please find enclosed a copy of the transcript of our interview 
and also my understanding of the Ebbw Vale RFC ‘story’.  I would be grateful if you would 
read through both the transcript and the ‘story’ to verify their accuracy. If there are any 
changes that you would like to make please feel free to do so. 
 
With regard to the use of the content of our interview, I regret to say that I have experienced 
great difficulty in trying to ‘disguise’ Ebbw Vale RFC.  My better half, Mair, who has visited 
EVRFC, immediately recognized my description of the club despite my giving it the 
pseudonym of ‘The Warriors’!  I have explained my difficulties in trying to disguise the club 
to my research supervisors at Cardiff Business School.  
 
After due consideration it has been agreed by the University of Wales that, on successful 
completion of my PhD, a three year embargo will be placed on public access to my thesis. 
This means that nobody, outside my examiners, may access or read my PhD research thesis 
until 2007 at the earliest.  There is also provision to extend the embargo further, until 2010, 
if I felt after three years that it was still necessary. If you disagree with this please contact me 
asap. 
 
The chapters on my findings from the club will not be ‘rugby based’.  Therefore, there will 
not be any chapters in the thesis entitled, ‘The Ebbw Vale RFC Story’. Rather the findings 
may be spread over three academic chapters, ‘Context’, ‘Process’ and ‘Content’.  Your views 
may, or may not, be quoted in one or more of those chapters. However, on completing the 
writing of my thesis, I may inform those participants of selected areas of their interview that 
have been included. Therefore if any of your interview is used, you may then have the 
opportunity to agree to its inclusion or not. To date, there appears to be nothing controversial 
in the contents of the completed interviews. 
 
I would like to telephone you within the next 10-12 days to confirm that you have received 
the scripts and to discuss with you any changes that you wish to make.  
 
Many thanks once again for your invaluable assistance with my PhD research. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Clive  
Clive Norling. 
 
